1. Savage, Ian (2003). Safety. In Hensher, David A. and Kenneth J. Button (eds.) Handbook of Transport and the Environment. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

This chapter discusses evidence on the probability and severity of hazardous materials releases, and public perceptions of the risks. It then discusses the evidence as to whether legal liability is sufficient to provide the correct incentives to shippers and transportation firms. Because legal mechanisms are seen as inadequate, public policy has intervened by working with transport firms on the packaging of hazmats, routes to reduce public exposure and the provision, equipping and training of emergency response teams. The chapter describes the track record of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) models used to determine the desirability of these policies, and finds that rival models can provide very different results and divergent conclusions, and also tend to focus exclusively on the effects on humans. There is much work still be done on evaluating the probability and the consequences of hazmat releases on the environment.

The book this is published in should be available from your library.

2. Savage, Ian (2001). Transport Safety. In Hensher, David A. and Kenneth J. Button (eds.) Handbook of Transport Systems and Traffic Control. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

This paper is a handbook chapter presenting a overview of transportation safety, and references important introductory and seminal texts. It covers the safety of both private automobile driving and commercial transportation safety.

The paper initially presents some general data on transportation fatalities in the United States and some measures of the magnitude of risk probabilities. It then discussed the "market failures" that cause the "transportation safety problem:"

• Imperfect information by consumers
• Cognitive failures by consumers
• Myopia by carriers
• Externalities
• Bilateral Crashes
• Imperfect Competition

The paper concludes by discussing public policy towards addressing these market failures for both automobile driving and commercial transportation.

The book this is published in should be available from your library.

3. Savage, Ian (1999). The economics of commercial transportation safety. In Gómez-Ibáñez, José A., William B. Tye and Clifford Winston (eds.) Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.

This paper is part of a collection of essays reviewing transportation economics. It deals with safety in commercial transportation (and not with private automobile driving). It presents some overall statistics on fatalities and risks, and then discusses trends in recent safety performance in commercial aviation, trucking and railroads in the United States. The paper then discusses how well the free market provides consumers with the level(s) of safety they desire, and the types and magnitudes of "market failures" that may occur.

Many of the market failures are addressed by existing legal and insurance mechanisms, however there is a necessity for safety regulations. The paper describes why the law and insurance does not entirely correct market failures, and the effectiveness of safety regulation in recent years in trucking, railroads and aviation.

The paper concludes by discussing policy recommendations for making the public more informed, making insurance companies take a greater role, and for innovative new methods for safety regulations. The latter include setting safety performance targets for carriers rather than specifying the design of equipment and the training of staff.

The book this is published in should be available from your library or the publisher.

You can also read this chapter on-line at the publisher's web site.

4. Panzar, John C. & Ian Savage (1989). Regulation, deregulation and safety: an economic analysis. In Moses, Leon N. and Ian Savage (eds.), Transportation Safety in an Age of Deregulation. New York: Oxford University Press.

This paper was part of the 1987 Transportation Deregulation and Safety conference and explored, at a theoretical level, the nature of the linkages between economic deregulation and safety. The paper discusses that the level of safety provided by a firm is an economic decision, and that is likely that in a competitive world that several different levels of safety may be offered by rival carriers. Then the role that imperfect information, imperfect competition and congestion of common infrastructure may have in producing "market failures" is discussed.

An analytical model of safety determination is presented where the level of safety depends on economic factors, the quantity of common infrastructure, and the resources spent by government to promulgate and enforce safety regulations. The paper concludes that investigation of the effects of deregulation on safety cannot be investigated by looking at economic changes alone. One must also incorporate how government infrastructure provision and surveillance activities responded to the changes caused by deregulation.

The book this is published in should be available from your library or the publisher.

I would be pleased to answer any detailed questions that you may have on our papers, and welcome the opportunity to add what we can to informed formed public debate of these important issues. Please send an e-mail including your name and postal service address to request a package of the complete papers. We would also be interested in knowing your professional connection with transportation safety issues.