RESEARCH

Upcoming Presentations

GAP.9 Conference (Osnabrueck, Germany) September, 2015
Florida State University (Tallahassee, FL) October, 2015
Epistemic Norms Conference (Leuven, Belgium) November, 2015
Vanderbilt University December, 2015
Eastern Division APA (Washington, D.C.) January, 2016
Epistemic Dependence on People and Instruments Conference (Madrid, Spain) January, 2016

Work in Progress

Authored Book:

The Epistemology of Groups (under contract). Oxford University Press.

Papers:

“Group Lies”

“What Is Justified Group Belief?”

 

“Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit”


“Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Testimony”

“Why There Is No Epistemic Partiality in Friendship”

 

Publications

 

Authored Book:

 

Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, (2008, hardback; 2010, paperback). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Edited Books:

 

Essays in Collective Epistemology (2014). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in collective epistemology. This collection includes papers by Alexander Bird, Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden Fitelson, David Christensen, Margaret Gilbert and Daniel Pilchman, Alvin I. Goldman, Jennifer Lackey, Christian List, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Sarah Wright.

 

The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, (2013), co-edited with David Christensen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of disagreement. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi, David Christensen, Stewart Cohen, Bryan Frances, Sanford Goldberg, John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan, Thomas Kelly, Jonathan Kvanvig, Jennifer Lackey, Ernest Sosa, and Brian Weatherson.

 

The Epistemology of Testimony, co-edited with Ernest Sosa, (2006). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of testimony.  This collection includes papers by Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, Richard Moran, Frederick Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve. 

 

Papers:

“Disagreement,” forthcoming in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

“Social Epistemology: 5 Questions,” in Duncan Pritchard and Vincent Hendricks (eds.), Social Epistemology: 5 Questions (Automatic Press/VIP, 2015): 111-125.


“Reliability and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Episteme 12 (2015): 203-8.

 

“A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 64-94.

 

“Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously,” in Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 299-316.

 

“Socially Extended Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 24 (2014): 282-98.

 

“On Testimony.” 3 AM Magazine (2013).

 

“Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce.” Analysis 73 (2013): 236-48.

 

“What’s the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements?” Philosophers’ Magazine 59 (2013): 101-6.

 

“The Virtues of Testimony,” in John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013): 193-204.

“Introduction,” (with David Christensen) in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 1-3.

“Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 243-68.

“Deficient Testimonial Knowledge,” in Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work (New York: Routledge, 2013): 30-52.

“Group Knowledge Attributions,” in Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 243-69.

“Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge,” in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 251-75.

“Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge from Others,” in Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 71-91.

“Testimonial Knowledge,” in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

“Disagreement, Epistemology of,” Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2010).

“Acting on Knowledge.” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 361-82.

“A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 298-325.

“What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 274-93.

“Testimony,” in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010): 763-8.

 “Knowledge and Credit.” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 27-42 .

  

“What Luck Is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 255-67.

 

“Perspectives on Testimony.” Episteme 4 (2007): 233-7.

 

“Norms of Assertion.” Noûs 41 (2007): 594-626.

 

“Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158 (2007): 345-61.

 

“Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 209-19.

 

“Learning from Words.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 77-101. 

 

“Introduction,” in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 1-21.

 

“It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 160-89.

 

“Knowing from Testimony.” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 1-17.

 

“The Nature of Testimony.”  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 177-97.

 

“Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.” Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 163-90.

 

“Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 636-58.

 

“A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Noûs 37 (2003): 706-23.

 

“Explanation and Mental Causation.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2002): 375-93.

 

“Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471-90.

 

Reviews:

 

Review of Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014).

 

Review of Martin Kusch, Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 235-8.

 

“Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 284-9.

 

Review of Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2004).