Are Normal Narcissists Psychologically Healthy?: Self-Esteem Matters

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Five studies established that normal narcissism is correlated with good psychological health. Specifically, narcissism is (a) inversely related to daily sadness and dispositional depression, (b) inversely related to daily and dispositional loneliness, (c) positively related to daily and dispositional subjective well-being as well as couple well-being, (d) inversely related to daily anxiety, and (e) inversely related to dispositional neuroticism. More important, self-esteem fully accounted for the relation between narcissism and psychological health. Thus, narcissism is beneficial for psychological health only insofar as it is associated with high self-esteem.

A Brief Review of Theory and Research on Normal Narcissism

Two complementary views of normal narcissism have been offered by Paulhus (2001). The first is based on the Big Five framework. Specifically, the structure of interpersonal traits is represented in terms of two dimensions: agency and communion (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Paulhus & John, 1998). Costa and McCrae (1995) related the high-agency and low-communion axes to the Big Five traits of Extraversion and Agreeableness, arguing that the former were slight rotations of the latter. On the basis of this insight, Paulhus (2001) labeled high narcissists “disagreeable extraverts.” The second view of normal narcissism is based on attachment theory. According to the working model hypothesis (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994), attachment styles are structured around one’s perception of self (positive vs. negative) and others (positive vs. negative). High narcissists have a positive perception of self but a negative perception of others, resembling the attachment style of dismissives.

There is now compelling empirical support for the claim that normal narcissists love the self abundantly, far more than they love others. To begin with, narcissism is inversely related to agreeableness, empathy, gratitude, affiliation, and need for intimacy, whereas it is positively related to competitiveness, exploitativeness, Machiavellianism, anger, hostility, and cynical mistrust of others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides, 1979). The vector that diagonally slices the two circumplex axes of high agency and low communion is regarded as the locus of narcissism (Wiggins & Pincus, 1994). Subsequent work has confirmed the view that narcissists are relatively high on agency and low on communion. The first view of normal narcissism is based on attachment theory. According to the working model hypothesis (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994), attachment styles are structured around one’s perception of self (positive vs. negative) and others (positive vs. negative). High narcissists have a positive perception of self but a negative perception of others, resembling the attachment style of dismissives.
Low narcissists, high narcissists relish direct competition against others (Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000). Furthermore, high narcissists glorify the self, conveniently disregarding the possibility that their self-promoting tactics constitute a slight against others. For example, Gabriel, Critelli, and Ez (1994) asked participants to rate their own intelligence and physical attractiveness in relation to the average college student. High narcissists overestimated their intelligence and attractiveness, as evidenced both by the results of an intelligence test and by judges’ ratings of participants’ attractiveness. Similarly, John and Robins (1994) examined participants’ evaluations of their positive contribution to a group discussion task. High narcissists rated their own contribution as more impactful than that of other discussants, a judgment contradicted by observers and peers. In addition, narcissists are interpersonally dismissive and abrasive. For example, Kernis and Sun (1994) gave participants bogus interpersonal feedback. When the feedback was unfavorable, high narcissists regarded the evaluator as incompetent and unlikely, an opinion that they were prepared to convey even in a face-to-face interaction (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Smalley & Stake, 1996). Moreover, not only do high narcissists derogate unfavorable evaluators, they also behave aggressively toward them (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Stucke & Sporer, 2002).

High narcissists manifest entitlement behavior at the direct expense of even close others. Research on the self-serving bias (SSB) is a case in point. The SSB refers to the tendency to take credit for success but disavow blame for failure. The SSB is a robust phenomenon (W. K. Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003), but a rare exception occurs when participants collaborate on an interdependent (i.e., joint outcomes) task with a close other. Here, no SSB emerges (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998, 2002). However, narcissists display the SSB even when their partner is a close other (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 2002). In addition, they derogate close others who outperform them (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993). It would appear that high narcissists self-enhance even at an interpersonal cost. In fact, they deliberately use close others for self-enhancement purposes, a tactic labelled “the Others Exist for Me” illusion by Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, and Gregg (2002). It is no surprise then that high narcissists are attracted to partners who express admiration, whereas they are turned off by partners who offer intimacy (W. K. Campbell, 1999), preferring a game-playing (“ludic”) love style (W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002) and showing low commitment to dating relationships (W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2002). Normal Narcissism and Psychological Health Does the high agency–low communion of normal narcissism have implications for psychological functioning? Does this excessive self-aggrandizement and interpersonal abrasiveness reflect psychological maladjustment? Specifically, are high narcissists psychologically healthy and, if so, why? The objective of the present article is to address this last question. We are exclusively concerned with self-reported psychological health, which we define and operationalize in terms of (a) low levels of depression (or sadness), anxiety, loneliness, and neuroticism and (b) high levels of subjective and couple well-being (Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000; John, 1990).

Theory and research in personality and social psychology have duly entertained the hypothesis that high narcissists are psychologically unhealthy. Indeed, normal narcissists are empirically portrayed as persons in psychological turmoil: They report emotional highs and lows (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004; Rhodewalt & Shimoda, 2002); their self-esteem is unstable and highly dependent on their social interactions (Rhodewalt, in press; Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; see also Kernis, 2001); they are jealous and fearful of closeness (Rhodewalt & Shimoda, 2002); they are distrusting, suspicious and controlling of others (Davidov & Morf, 2004); they react angrily (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998) and aggressively (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Stucke & Sporer, 2002) to threatening feedback; and they may have implicit self-conceptions of which they are ashamed (Tracy & Robins, 2003). As such, it is not an exaggeration to assert that the hypothesis that high narcissists are psychologically unhealthy forms the current subtext of mainstream personality and social psychological thinking.

We wish to challenge this hypothesis. To begin with, the data have not been kind to it. First, there is no evidence that agency per se (a defining dimension of normal narcissism) is linked to poor psychological health. On the contrary, agency is associated with reduced anxiety and depression (Holahan & Spence, 1980) as well as with higher positive affect, lower negative affect, and higher life satisfaction (Saragovi, Aube, Koestner, & Zuroff, 2002). In a similar vein, there is no clear evidence that communion is positively associated with psychological health. Communion may be related to positive affect (Saragovi et al., 2002), but it is also related to distress (Aube, Fichman, Saltarís, & Koestner, 2001).

Perhaps it is extreme levels of agency that are associated with poor psychological health (Bakan, 1966; Helgeson, 1994). After all, the devaluation of close relationships on the part of high narcissists ought to have implications for psychological health. This assertion is backed by evidence that involvement in close and secure relationships is linked with psychological health, specifically (a) the relative absence of anxiety, sadness, depression (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Mickelson, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997) and loneliness (Marangoni & lickes, 1989) and (b) the relative presence of subjective well-being (Diener, 1984). Once again, however, the data discredit the hypothesis: High narcissists report relatively good psychological health. In particular, normal narcissism is positively related to subjective well-being (Rose, 2002), is inversely related to anxiety (Watson & Biderman, 1993) and depression (Watson & Biderman, 1993; Wink, 1992), and is unrelated to loneliness (Joubert, 1986).

Normal Narcissism and Psychological Health: The Role of Self-Esteem Why, then, do normal narcissists report good (i.e., high self-reported) psychological health? We located a possible reason in a key component of narcissism: level of self-esteem (hereinafter self-esteem). This construct reflects the value that one places on the self (Rosenberg, 1965). Self-esteem has been found to be consistently and positively related to narcissism (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Emmons, 1984, 1987; Kernis & Sun, 1994; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995, 1998; Rhodewalt et al., 1998). This strong and persistent relation led Baumeister and Vohs (2001) to characterize narcissism as an addiction to self-esteem. Importantly, self-esteem is also associated with psychological health: It is inversely linked to anxiety (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Tarlow & Haaga, 1996), depression (Gjerde, Block, & Block, 1988; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987),
and loneliness (Jones, Freeman, & Goswick, 1981; M. R. Leary & Baumeister, 2000), and it is positively linked to subjective well-being (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; DeNeve & Cooper, 1998).

Consequently, we hypothesized that a critical reason for the link between normal narcissism and psychological health is self-esteem. Stated more precisely, our hypothesis is that self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological health. Self-esteem is a crucial component of narcissism—a component that is, at least in part, responsible for the relation between narcissism and good psychological health. We are concerned with the mediational role of both global trait self-esteem (Pliner, Chaiken, & Flett, 1990; Rosenberg, 1965) and domain-specific trait self-esteem. For theoretically relevant reasons, we also considered two esteem domains: self-competence and self-liking (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002; Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). It is plausible, for example, that the self-esteem of narcissists is based on self-competence (i.e., derived from agency) rather than self-liking (i.e., derived from communion) and, as such, self-competence esteem would be a more potent mediator of the association between narcissism and psychological health than self-liking esteem.

We note that a recent study by Rose (2002) also addressed the role of self-esteem in narcissism’s predictive utility of psychological outcomes. Our investigation, however, differs from Rose’s study in several important ways. First, the current investigation is concerned with narcissism, whereas Rose’s study was concerned with the distinction between overt and covert narcissism (Cooper & Ronningstam, 1992; Wink, 1991). Second, the current investigation addresses whether self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and multiple indicators of daily and dispositional psychological health, whereas Rose’s study addressed whether self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and a one-time measure of dispositional well-being. Third, the current investigation examines multiple and theory-guided indicators of self-esteem, thereby enabling several nuances of the hypothesized mediational link to be tested (Study 5); Rose’s study, in contrast, only used near redundant indicators of self-esteem, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (RSI; Rosenberg, 1965) and the Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Finally, the current investigation addressed whether the self-esteem-mediated relation between narcissism and psychological health is accounted for by several response biases (i.e., defensiveness, repression, and impression management); Rose’s investigation did not rule out such rival hypotheses.

We conducted five studies. In Study 1, participants completed one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, and subjective well-being). In Study 2, participants completed one-time measures of narcissism and self-esteem, and they subsequently recorded daily their psychological health (i.e., sadness, loneliness, subjective well-being, and anxiety) for five consecutive days. In Study 3, married couples completed one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health (i.e., subjective well-being, couple well-being). In Study 4, we examined whether response biases (i.e., defensiveness and repression) account for the self-esteem-mediated relation between narcissism and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, subjective well-being). Finally, in Study 5, we examined whether another response bias (i.e., impression management) accounts for the esteem-mediated relation between narcissism and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, subjective well-being, anxiety, and neuroticism). In this study, we used four measures of self-esteem.

Study 1

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 149 (107 women, 42 men) University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) students fulfilling an introductory psychology course option. Participants were tested in groups of 8–15. They completed, in random order, measures of narcissism and self-esteem. Next, they completed, also in random order, two measures of depression, three (later condensed to two) measures of loneliness, and two measures of subjective well-being. Debriefing followed.

Measures

Narcissism. Participants completed the 40-item NPI. Its scores range from 0 to 40, with higher scores reflecting higher narcissism. The NPI exhibits adequate reliability and validity (Raskin & Terry, 1988). In this study, scores ranged from 2 to 35 ($M = 15.8; \alpha = .82$).

Self-esteem. Participants completed the 10-item RSI, a measure of global trait self-esteem. RSI scores range from 10 to 90, with higher scores indicating higher self-esteem. The RSI has adequate reliability and validity (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). In this study, scores ranged from 28 to 90 ($M = 72.11; \alpha = .88$).

Depression. Participants completed two depression scales. One was the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), a reliable and valid instrument (Radloff, 1977). The CES-D assesses depression within a nonclinical population by measuring mostly affective symptoms. The scale consists of 20 items with scores ranging from 0 to 60. Higher scores indicate more severe depression. In this study, scores ranged from 0 to 45 ($M = 16.01; \alpha = .91$).

The second measure was the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967). This scale also has high reliability and validity (Steer, Beck, & Garrison, 1986) and assesses clinical levels of depression by measuring affective, behavioral, physiological, and cognitive symptoms. The scale consists of 21 items, with scores ranging from 0 to 63. Scores above 20 reflect severe depression, whereas scores between 14 and 20 reflect moderate depression. In this study, scores ranged from 0 to 33 ($M = 7.8; \alpha = .88$).

Loneliness. Participants completed three measures of loneliness. The first was the University of California, Los Angeles, Loneliness Scale (UCLA-LS; Version 3; Russell & Cutrona, 1988), a scale manifesting adequate reliability and validity (Russell & Cutrona, 1988). The UCLA-LS consists of 20 items and assesses loneliness that results from discrepancies between achieved and desired social contact. Scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores reflecting more loneliness. In this study, scores ranged from 21 to 61 ($M = 41.3; \alpha = .92$).

The other two loneliness measures were the Emotional Loneliness Scale (ELS) and Social Loneliness Scale (SLS; Wittenberg, 1986), both demonstrating adequate reliability and validity (Russell & Cutrona, 1988). The ELS assesses loneliness that results from the absence of a satisfying, romantic relationship. In contrast, the SLS assesses loneliness that results from the absence of satisfying, nonromantic relationships. The ELS and SLS consist of five items each, with scores ranging from 5 to 25. Higher scores indicate higher levels of emotional or social loneliness. The two measures were correlated, $r = .63, p < .001$. Thus, we combined them to form a single index, the Emotional and Social Loneliness Scale (ESLS). Supplementary data analyses on single scales produced results identical to the reported ones. Scores on the ESLS ranged from 10 to 38 ($M = 21.3; \alpha = .79$).

Subjective well-being. Participants completed two reliable and valid subjective well-being scales, the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS;
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Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and the Affect Balance Scale (ABS; Bradburn, 1969). The 5-item (score range: 5–35) SWLS assesses global life satisfaction, with higher scores indicating greater life satisfaction. In this study, scores ranged from 5 to 35 (M = 25.1; α = .88). The 10-item (score range: 0–10) ABS assesses the degree of difference in positive and negative emotions experienced. Higher scores indicate more positive affect. In this study, scores ranged from 1 to 10 (M = 6.4; α = .49). Note that, although the alpha for the ABS was low, the results for the two subjective well-being scales were very similar, as discussed later.

Results and Discussion

We hypothesized that self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological health. In testing for mediation, we followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) guidelines. First, we regressed self-esteem on narcissism. This relation was significant (β = .34, p < .001), a pattern consistent with past research (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Emmons, 1987; Rhodewalt et al., 1998). Second, we regressed each psychological health index on narcissism. Narcissism predicted psychological health. With regard to depression, narcissism was inversely related both to CES-D (β = −18, p < .04) and (marginally) BDI (β = −.13, p < .10). These findings replicate past research (Watson & Biderman, 1993; Wink, 1992). In respect to loneliness, narcissism was inversely related both to UCLA-LS and ESLS (βs = −.30 and −.29, ps < .001). These findings contradict the single available study on the topic (Joubert, 1986), which reported a nonsignificant relation between narcissism and loneliness. In reference to subjective well-being, narcissism was positively related both to SWLS and ABS (βs = .30 and .24, ps < .01). This result replicates a relevant finding reported by Rose (2002).

Parenthetically, we also regressed each psychological health index on self-esteem. With respect to depression, self-esteem was inversely related both to CES-D and BDI (βs = −.58 and −.55, respectively, ps < .001). With respect to loneliness, self-esteem was inversely related both to UCLA-LS and ESLS (βs = −.51 and −.40, respectively, ps < .001). With respect to subjective well-being, self-esteem was positively related both to SWLS and ABS (βs = .59 and .39, respectively, ps < .001). Consistent with past research (Diener, 1984; Jones et al., 1981; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987), self-esteem predicted psychological health.

The third mediational step was to regress each psychological health index on narcissism and self-esteem. If self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological distress, this relation will decrease when self-esteem is entered into the model. Also, critical mediational evidence would be provided by a significant indirect (i.e., through self-esteem) effect of narcissism on psychological health.

Self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on depression. When self-esteem was included in the model (CES-D: β = −.55, BDI: β = −.61, ps < .001), narcissism was unrelated both to CES-D (β = −.01, p < .87) and to BDI (β = .07, p < .31). The indirect effects of narcissism on CES-D and BDI were significant (zs = 3.81 and 3.92, respectively, ps < .01).

Self-esteem partially mediated the effect of narcissism on loneliness. When self-esteem was included in the model (UCLA-LS: β = −.46, ESLS: β = −.34, ps < .001), the independent effect of narcissism on loneliness decreased, although narcissism was marginally related to UCLA-LS (β = −.14, p < .07) and was still significantly related to ESLS (β = −.17, p < .04). Nevertheless, the indirect effects of narcissism on UCLA-LS and ESLS were significant (zs = 3.60 and 3.09, respectively, ps < .01). Narcissism had both a direct and an indirect effect on loneliness.

In addition, self-esteem mediated completely the effect of narcissism on subjective well-being. When self-esteem was entered in the model (SWLS: β = .35, ABS: β = .35, ps < .001), narcissism was unrelated both to SWLS (β = .11, p < .12) and to ABS (β = .12, p < .16). The indirect effects of narcissism on SWLS and ABS were significant (zs = 3.85 and 3.15, respectively, ps < .01).

In summary, the evidence is consistent with the contention that self-esteem mediates the relation between normal narcissism and psychological health. It is the self-esteem component of narcissism that accounts for its positive relations with the psychological health outcomes.

Study 2

In Study 2, we adopted a time-lagged design: We measured narcissism and self-esteem in Time 1, while assessing psychological health at several subsequent time intervals. We wanted to know whether narcissism predicts future (rather than concurrent) psychological health and whether this link is mediated by self-esteem. Additionally, we added anxiety to the list of psychological health indexes (Grahn, 2000), thus broadening the scope of our investigation. Furthermore, we operationalized psychological health in an alternative way, in terms of daily reports over a 5-day period.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 81 (60 women, 21 men) UNC-CH introductory psychology volunteers. They began completing the measures (see below) on Wednesday and finished on Sunday of the same week. Instructions emphasized the importance of daily completion of the measures. Two days into the study, participants met with the experimenter to return the completed measures. Again, they were instructed to complete the measures daily, and they confirmed that so far they had done so. Participants met for a final time with the experimenter the following week to submit the remaining measures and be debriefed. At that meeting, participants also confirmed that they had completed the measures daily.

Measures

Participants completed the NPI (range = 3–29; M = 16.06; α = .80) and RSI (range = 44–89; M = 73.07; α = .82), embedded in a packet of unrelated questionnaires. Next, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire at the end of each day for five consecutive days. This


1 Testing whether an indirect effect (i.e., ab) is significant involved testing the change in beta from the simple to multiple regression. Specifically, the z for ab is as follows:

\[ Z = \frac{ab}{\sqrt{\hat{b}^2 s^2 + a^2 s^2 - s^2}} \]

where b is the standardized beta for the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable when the independent variable (IV) is in the model, \( s_{ab} \) is the standard error for b, a is the standardized beta obtained from regressing the mediator on to the IV, and \( s_{ab} \) is the standard error for a. For more detailed exposition, see Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) or consult the following websites: <http://dakenny/mediate.html> and <http://quantrm2 psy.ohio-state.edu/kris/sobel/sobel.htm>.
questionnaire contained 14 randomly ordered emotion adjectives (bounded by the endpoints 1 = not at all and 9 = very much) that assessed daily level of sadness, loneliness, subjective well-being, and anxiety. We averaged the daily measures to form four psychological health indexes. We computed an alpha for each index by collapsing the ratings for each emotional adjective across days and then averaging the collapsed ratings.

We assessed sadness by asking participants to express each day the degree to which they felt sad, gloomy, depressed, and blue. Scores ranged from 4.0 to 9.0 (M = 7.1; α = .93). We assessed loneliness by asking participants to rate each day the degree to which they felt alone, left out, lonely, and isolated. Scores ranged from 3.4 to 9.0 (M = 7.2; α = .94). We measured subjective well-being by asking participants to indicate each day the extent to which they were delighted, happy, and joyful. Scores ranged from 2 to 7 (M = 6.6; α = .91). Finally, we measured anxiety by asking participants to rate each day the extent to which they felt frightened, nervous, and worried. Scores ranged from 2 to 9 (M = 6.9; α = .87).

Results and Discussion

As in Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological health. We began by regressing self-esteem on narcissism. This relation was significant (β = .35, p < .01), a pattern that replicates Study 1. Next, we regressed each psychological health index on narcissism. Narcissism was inversely related to daily sadness (β = -.24, p < .04), unrelated to daily loneliness (β = -.13, p < .25), positively (albeit marginally) related to daily subjective well-being (β = .19, p < .10), and inversely (albeit marginally) related to daily anxiety (β = -.19, p < .10). As in Study 1, narcissism predicted psychological health.

We also regressed each psychological health index on self-esteem. Replicating Study 1, self-esteem emerged as a predictor of psychological health. Self-esteem was inversely related to daily sadness (β = -.41, p < .001) and daily loneliness (β = -.45, p < .001), positively related to daily subjective well-being (β = .40, p < .001), and inversely related to daily anxiety (β = -.37, p < .01).

Subsequently, we assessed through simultaneous regression analyses whether the independent effects of narcissism on psychological health decreased when self-esteem was entered into the model. We also calculated significance tests for the indirect (via self-esteem) effects of narcissism on psychological health.

Self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on daily sadness: When self-esteem was entered in the model (β = -.38, p < .01), narcissism was unrelated to daily sadness (β = -.11, p < .34). The indirect effect of narcissism on sadness was significant (z = 2.45, p < .05). Also, following inclusion of self-esteem in the model (β = -.47, p < .001), the relation between narcissism and daily loneliness was weakened (β = .04, p < .74). Importantly, the indirect effect of narcissism on loneliness was significant (z = 2.69, p < .01). Furthermore, self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on daily subjective well-being: When self-esteem was entered in the model (β = .38, p < .01), narcissism was unrelated to daily subjective well-being (β = .05, p < .66). The indirect effect of narcissism on daily subjective well-being was significant (z = 2.46, p < .05). Finally, self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on daily anxiety: When self-esteem was entered in the model (β = -.35, p < .01), narcissism was unrelated to daily anxiety (β = -.06, p < .57). The indirect effect of narcissism on daily anxiety was significant (z = 2.34, p < .05).

Replicating Study 1, the results support the contention that self-esteem mediates the link between narcissism and psychological health. Moreover, our time-lagged design allows us to infer that narcissism predicts subsequent psychological health and that this relation is mediated by self-esteem.

Study 3

The objective of Study 3 was to further enlarge the scope of our investigation. First, Study 3 sought to generalize the findings of the previous studies to a community sample. Second, and more important, Study 3 used not only subjective but also couple well-being as an indicator of psychological health. Couple, and in particular marital, well-being is an important correlate of subjective well-being (Argyle, 1987; A. Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976; W. K. Campbell, Sedikides, & Bosson, 1994; Myers & Diener, 1995). Specifically, marriage quality is a potent predictor of subjective well-being, accounting for approximately 50% of the variance (Russell & Wells, 1994). This relation is observed across cultures, as it has been found to be statistically significant in 16 of 17 countries (Stack & Eshleman, 1998). Additionally, problems in marital or close relationships are linked to negative emotions (Kitson & Morgan, 1990) and depression (Berscheid & Reis, 1998).

Although high narcissists prefer a ludic love style and manifest low commitment in dating relationships, they seem to satisfy their (however low) intimacy needs by selecting or marrying admiring partners (W. K. Campbell, 1999; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2002; W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). Within the confines of such a relationship, high narcissists may experience relatively high couple well-being. We test this notion and examine whether narcissistic couple well-being is mediated by self-esteem.

Method

Participants and Recruitment

Participants were 79 married couples who took part in Time 1 activities of a three-phase longitudinal study of marital relations. Participants were recruited through notices posted around campus and in the community as well as through advertisements in local newspapers. Announcements briefly described the project, indicated that the study involved three research sessions over an 8-month period, noted that couples would be paid $50 for taking part in each session, and provided contact information. When couples contacted us, we provided further information about project activities, determined whether couples wished to take part, and scheduled appointments for Time 1 sessions.

2 We also examined the correlations between narcissism or self-esteem and psychological health variability, operationalized in terms of the standard deviation for each psychological health index. Narcissism was uncorrelated with psychological health variability. Note that Rhodewalt et al. (1998) found that, over a period of several days, narcissists reported greater variability than nonnarcissists on positive mood and mood intensity. Additional research will need to test whether the different emotion indexes used were responsible for this conceptual discrepancy. In contrast to narcissism, self-esteem was related to two indexes of psychological health variability: sadness (r = -.21, p < .10) and anxiety (r = -.25, p < .05).

3 We excluded data from (a) 2 couples who failed to follow questionnaire instructions and (b) 1 lesbian couple, given that our data analytic strategy involved identifying a male and female partner in each marriage.
Participants were 34.11 years old on average (34.87 for husbands, 33.36 for wives), the majority were Caucasian (81% Caucasian, 10% African American, 4% Hispanic, 2% Asian American, 3% other), and the majority had at least 4 years of college education (45% obtained advanced or professional degrees, 37% completed 4 years of college, 10% completed 2 years of college, and 8% completed high school only). Their personal annual salaries averaged about $25,000. Participants had been married to one another for 6.05 years on average, and the majority did not have children (73% no children, 11% one child, 8% two children, 8% more than two children).

Procedure

Ten days prior to scheduled laboratory sessions, we mailed couples questionnaires to be separately completed in advance and brought to the session. These questionnaires included measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and subjective well-being along with other constructs that are irrelevant to the objectives of the present study). On arrival at Time 1, participants completed a questionnaire including measures of couple well-being. Finally, couples were debriefed and paid.

Measures

Narcissism and self-esteem. Participants completed the NPI (range = 1–37; M = 13.25; α = .85) and the RSI (0 = do not agree at all, 8 = agree completely; range = 28–80; M = 62.75; α = .90).

Psychological health. We used two indexes of psychological health: subjective well-being and couple well-being. We measured subjective well-being with the SWLS (0 = does not describe me at all, 8 = describes me completely; range = 0–8; M = 5.41; α = .90). The 10-item A. Campbell et al.’s (1976) Scale “Describe your present life by circling a number for each of the following scales”; e.g., “boring-interesting”; “disappointing–rewarding”; range = 2–9 [on a 1–9 response scale]; M = 6.72; α = .88).

We operationalized couple well-being in terms of dyadic adjustment, relationship commitment, and relationship satisfaction. We measured dyadic adjustment with Spanier’s (1976) 32-item Dyadic Adjustment Scale. This scale assesses couple qualities such as affection (e.g., “Do you kiss your partner?”; 0 = never, 5 = every day), intimacy (e.g., “Do you confide in your mate?”), agreement (e.g., “Do you agree about ‘sex relations’?”), and shared activities (e.g., “Do you and your mate engage in outside interests together?”; range = 44–146; M = 113.88; α = .94). We measured relationship commitment with a 15-item instrument modeled after previous relevant research (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998). Using a 9-point rating scale (0 = do not agree at all, 8 = agree completely), participants responded to questions that assessed their intention to maintain their relationship (e.g., “I am completely committed to maintaining our marriage”; 0 = do not agree at all, 8 = agree completely; range = 0–8; M = 6.69; α = .95).

Results and Discussion

We review our analyses in three sections. First, we describe hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) and outline the specifics of our analysis strategy. Second, we examine the associations of narcissism and self-esteem to measures of psychological health. Third, we test whether self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological health.

Data Analytic Strategy

Given that data provided by the two partners in a given relationship are not independent, we used HLM (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) to account for the nesting of data from partners within a couple (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). This data analytic technique examines simultaneously within-couple and between-couple variance, modeling each source of variation while accounting for statistical characteristics of the other level. Predictors and criteria are represented in our analyses as lower level variables; couple as the upper level unit. HLM analyses estimate equations of the following form:

Lower level model: \( Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X + r_{ij} \);

upper level intercept: \( \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \); and

upper level slope: \( \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + u_{1j} \),

where \( X \) is a given predictor variable and \( Y_{ij} \) is the criterion score for Person i in Couple j, \( r_{ij} \) is the error term for Person i in Couple j. \( \gamma_{00} \) is the average intercept across couples, \( \gamma_{10} \) is the average slope across couples, \( u_{0j} \) is the unique intercept for Couple j, and \( u_{1j} \) is the unique slope for Couple j.

Initially, all conducted analyses represented both intercepts and slopes as random effects. When tests examining the variance and covariance components in these analyses revealed nonsignificant across-couple differences in slopes, we recalculated models representing slopes as fixed effects. Slopes were represented as random effects in about 9% of the analyses (i.e., in analyses in which significant across-couple differences were revealed) and as fixed effects in the remaining analyses (i.e., in analyses in which across-couple differences were nonsignificant). For all but one of the analyses, we obtained an identical pattern of significance (or marginality) versus nonsignificance whether intercepts and slopes were represented as fixed or random effects. In the remaining analysis, the representation of the slope as a random effect yielded marginal findings instead of the significant association found with representation of the slope as a fixed effect.

In testing a given hypothesis, we first calculated one-predictor models, examining the association of a single predictor with a single criterion. When a given hypothesis included two predictors of a criterion, we also calculated two-predictor models in which we regressed a single criterion simultaneously onto two predictor variables. We performed preliminary analyses to explore possible gender effects. All preliminary analyses included the main effect of participant gender as well as the interaction of gender with each predictor variable. A few analyses revealed main effects of gender, and the inclusion of gender in the model changed the direct association of two of the predictors with the criterion from marginal significance to nonsignificance. All other associations yielded identical findings with or without gender in the model. Therefore, we dropped participant gender from further analyses.

Psychological Health

Subjective well-being. First, we regressed self-esteem on narcissism. This relation was significant \( (\beta = .40, p < .001) \). Next, we regressed subjective well-being on narcissism. Narcissism was related positively to subjective well-being (SWLS: \( \beta = .17, p < .05 \); A. Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale: \( \beta = .28, p < .001 \)).

Next, we regressed both narcissism and self-esteem on subjective well-being. When self-esteem was entered in the model, narcissism was unrelated to subjective well-being (SWLS: \( \beta = .04, p < .63 \); Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale: \( \beta = .11, p < .16 \)). This
result documents the mediational role of self-esteem, a replication of our previous findings. Similarly, the effects of self-esteem remained significant when entered in the model (SWLS: $\beta = .39$, $p < .001$; A. Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale: $\beta = .42$, $p < .001$). Finally, self-esteem mediated the association between narcissism and subjective well-being (SWLS: $z = 3.78, p < .01$; A. Campbell et al.’s [1976] Scale: $z = 3.91, p < .01$). In conclusion, mediation by self-esteem was complete, in that narcissism did not account for unique variance in subjective well-being beyond variance attributable to self-esteem.

Couple well-being. Next, we examined the mediational role of self-esteem in the relation between narcissism and couple well-being. First, we regressed each measure of couple well-being on narcissism. Narcissism was positively related to all of the measures. Specifically, it was significantly associated with dyadic adjustment ($\beta = .14, p < .05$), relationship commitment ($\beta = .17, p < .05$), and relationship satisfaction ($\beta = .13, p < .05$).

Subsequently, we regressed narcissism and self-esteem on each measure of couple well-being. When self-esteem was entered in the model, narcissism was not related to dyadic adjustment ($\beta = .07, p < .33$), relationship commitment ($\beta = .08, p < .33$), or relationship satisfaction ($\beta = .05, p < .45$). These results establish the mediational role of self-esteem. Further, the effects of self-esteem remained significant when entered in the model for each measure: dyadic adjustment ($\beta = .18, p < .01$), relationship commitment ($\beta = .23, p < .01$), and relationship satisfaction ($\beta = .22, p < .01$). Finally, self-esteem mediated the association of narcissism with all of the couple well-being measures: dyadic adjustment ($z = 2.40, p < .05$), relationship commitment ($z = 2.56, p < .05$), and relationship satisfaction ($z = 2.91, p < .05$). In summary, mediation by self-esteem was complete: Narcissism did not account for unique variance in couple well-being beyond that attributable to self-esteem.4

Caveats

The majority of the couples in our sample did not have children. It is possible that narcissism exerts a toll on couple well-being only when the demands of a family come into play. Also, our sample consisted mainly of well-educated professionals. It is possible that narcissism is a relatively tolerable, if not acceptable, trait among young professionals, although the reverse hypothesis (i.e., narcissism is a more undetected and tolerable trait among relatively uneducated persons) is equally plausible. Nevertheless, we raise these caveats as empirical questions for future research.

Study 4

There is a rival hypothesis to our findings so far. Arguably, the relation between normal narcissism and psychological health is due to a response bias. Narcissists provide positively biased responses, rating themselves favorably across the board.

We believe that this rival hypothesis has trouble accounting for our findings. First, high narcissists do not have a monolithic response bias, as they rate themselves negatively (compared with low narcissists) on several traits. Specifically, they rate themselves as exploitative, Machiavellian, angry, hostile, disagreeable, unempathetic, and ungrateful (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2002). Moreover, although high narcissists may rate themselves positively on traits that reflect intellectual ability, they do not do so on traits that reflect morality or concern for others (W. K. Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; see also Paulhus & John, 1998). Finally, Raskin et al. (1991) reported, in a single study, that narcissism was uncorrelated with social desirability, as measured by Edwards’s (1957) Scale. Nevertheless, a direct test of the rival hypothesis is needed in the context of our investigation. This was the objective of Study 4.

We assessed the response bias hypothesis in two ways. First, we included the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Although this scale was designed as a measure of desirable responding, its authors concluded that high-scoring participants might be more appropriately labeled as defensive, as they engage in self-protective behavior (Crowne, 1979; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). For example, high-scoring participants are intensely afraid of rejection, are less likely to report justified feelings of hostility and anger, and are more likely to change their privately held attitudes as a function of dissonance induction. In summary, use of the Marlowe–Crowne Scale allows us to test whether the results of the previous three studies can be explained in terms of defensive responding.

We also tested the response bias hypothesis by assessing levels of psychological repression. Repressors are individuals who lead their daily lives on an emotional plateau, defensively avoiding peaks and troughs. They cope with negative life events with apathy and restraint rather than emotional intensity or reactivity, shunning negative affect or unwanted thoughts (Weinberger, 1990; Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). We used Weinberger et al.’s (1979) Repression Scale to identify a sample of repressors. These authors regarded repressors as low on anxiety but high in defensiveness and devised a scale to reflect this psychological profile. Weinberger et al.’s (1979) Repression Scale has been validated in several investigations (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Boden & Baumeister, 1997; Davis, 1987; Hansen & Hansen, 1988).

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 154 (105 women, 49 men) UNC-CH undergraduate students, volunteering for introductory psychology course credit.

Measures

Participants filled out the repression scale and the same packet of questionnaires as in Study 1.

Defensiveness. Participants completed the 33-item Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Scores range from 0 to 33, with higher scores reflecting greater social desirability (i.e., defensiveness). In our study, scores ranged from 1 to 28 ($M = 14.6, \sigma = .78$).

Repression. Participants completed Weinberger et al.’s (1979) Repression Scale. First, they filled out the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Bendig, 1976). We believe that this rival hypothesis has trouble accounting for our findings. First, high narcissists do not have a monolithic response bias, as they rate themselves negatively (compared with low narcissists) on several traits. Specifically, they rate themselves as exploitative, Machiavellian, angry, hostile, disagreeable, unempathetic, and ungrateful (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2002). Moreover, although high narcissists may rate themselves positively on traits that reflect intellectual ability, they do not do so on traits that reflect morality or concern for others (W. K. Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; see also Paulhus & John, 1998). Finally, Raskin et al. (1991) reported, in a single study, that narcissism was uncorrelated with social desirability, as measured by Edwards’s (1957) Scale. Nevertheless, a direct test of the rival hypothesis is needed in the context of our investigation. This was the objective of Study 4.

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4 We wondered whether narcissists are conducive to their partners’ poor psychological health. This notion did not receive substantive empirical support. The partner’s dyadic adjustment ($\beta = -.04, p < .47$), relationship commitment ($\beta = .02, p < .76$), relationship satisfaction ($\beta = -.03, p < .67$), and, in part, subjective well-being (SWLS: $\beta = .09, p < .22$) were unaffected. Only the partner’s subjective well-being, as assessed by the A. Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) Scale ($\beta = -.19, p < .05$), was influenced negatively by the narcissistic companion. In all, a narcissist is not dangerous to the partner’s health.
1956). This scale consists of 27 items that measure affective, cognitive, and behavioral components of social anxiety. Scores range from 0 to 27, with higher scores reflecting greater social anxiety. In our study, scores ranged from 7 to 25 (M = 9.4, α = .81). Second, as mentioned previously, participants completed the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale. In line with past research (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Boden & Baumeister, 1997), we classified as repressors those participants who scored in the lowest quartile on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and those who scored in the upper half on the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Twenty-five participants met these criteria and were considered repressors.

**Narcissism and self-esteem.** Participants completed the NPI (range = 4–39; M = 17.13; α = .85) and the RSI (1 = do not agree at all; 7 = agree completely; range = 29–70; M = 57.97; α = .85).

**Depression.** Participants completed the CES-D (range = 1–52; M = 14.29; α = .91) and the BDI (range = 0–46; M = 6.39; α = .88).

**Loneliness.** Participants completed the UCLA-LS, Version 3 (range = 20–77; M = 39.40; α = .92) and the ESLS (range = 10–42; M = 20.04; α = .76). As in Study 1, the correlation between the ELS and SLS was significant (r = .31, p < .05).

**Subjective well-being.** Participants completed the SWLS (range = 5–35; M = 25.10; α = .85) and the ABS (range = 1–10; M = 6.48; α = .50). Given the low alpha, we carried out separate analyses for each index of subjective well-being and obtained virtually identical results.

### Results and Discussion

To begin with, we examine whether the findings of this study replicate those of the previous studies. We proceed with two waves of analyses. First, we examine the rival hypothesis that our findings are due to high levels of defensiveness among narcissists. Second, we examine the rival hypothesis that our findings are due to high levels of repression among narcissists.

### Replication

We tested the hypothesis that self-esteem mediates the relation between narcissism and psychological health. We regressed self-esteem on narcissism. This relation was significant (β = .35, p < .01). Next, we regressed each psychological health index on narcissism. Narcissism was inversely related to depression (CES-D: β = -.25, p < .01; BDI: β = -.25, p < .01); was inversely, albeit marginally, related to loneliness (UCLA-LS: β = -.28, p < .08; ESLS: β = -.14, p < .10); and was positively, albeit in one case marginally, related to subjective well-being (SWBS: β = .14, p < .09; ABS: β = .31, p < .01). These findings are consistent with those of Studies 1–3. Also consistent with our past findings, self-esteem predicted psychological health, being inversely related to both measures of depression (CES-D: β = -.61, p < .001; BDI: β = -.62, p < .001) and both measures of loneliness (UCLA-LS: β = -.59, p < .001; ESLS: β = -.53, p < .001), as well as positively related to both measures of subjective well-being (SWBS: β = .56, p < .001; ABS: β = .56, p < .001).

Subsequently, we assessed whether the effects of narcissism on psychological health decreased when self-esteem was entered in the model. When self-esteem was included in the model (for CES-D, β = -.60, p < .001; for BDI, β = -.61, p < .001), narcissism was unrelated both to CES-D (β = -.05, p < .49) and to BDI (β = -.05, p < .52). The indirect effects of narcissism on CES-D (z = 4.01, p < .001) and BDI (z = 4.03, p < .001) were significant: Self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on depression.

Additionally, self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on loneliness. When self-esteem was entered in the model (for UCLA-LS, β = -.56, p < .001; for ESLS, β = -.56, p < .001), narcissism was unrelated both to the UCLA-LS (β = -.09, p < .20) and to the ESLS (β = .05, p < .48). Furthermore, self-esteem significantly and fully mediated the relations between narcissism and the UCLA-LS (z = 3.93, p < .001) and between narcissism and the ESLS (z = 3.86, p < .001).

Also, self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on subjective well-being. When self-esteem was entered in the model (SWLS: β = .58, p < .001; ABS: β = .52, p < .001), narcissism was unrelated to the SWLS (β = -.06, p < .40) and only marginally related to the ABS (β = .12, p < .09). Furthermore, self-esteem significantly mediated the association between narcissism and the SWLS (z = 3.94, p < .001) and between narcissism and the ABS (z = 3.83, p < .001).

### Rival Hypothesis I: Defensiveness

Our next wave of analyses tested the rival hypothesis that the above-mentioned findings are due to narcissistic defensiveness. The potential for defensiveness to complicate our mediational analyses was evident: Defensiveness correlated significantly both with self-esteem (r = .29, p < .0001) and with every index of psychological health except the BDI (UCLA-LS: r = -.23, p < .001; ESLS: r = -.18, p < .05; ABS: r = .32, p < .0001; SWLS: r = .254, p < .001; CES-D: r = -.20, p < .01; BDI: r = -.11, p < .20). It did not, however, correlate with narcissism directly (r = -.13, p < .11).

First, we examined whether defensiveness mediates the relations between narcissism and psychological health. When defensiveness was entered in the model, narcissism continued to predict scores on depression (CES-D: β = -.29, p < .001; BDI: β = -.27, p < .01), loneliness (UCLA-LS: β = -.32, p < .001; ESLS: β = -.16, p < .05), and subjective well-being (SWLS: β = .18, p < .03; ABS: β = .35, p < .001). Defensiveness did not mediate the relations between narcissism and psychological health.

Moreover, controlling for defensiveness, self-esteem continued to mediate the relations between narcissism and psychological health. First, when self-esteem was entered in the model (for CES-D, β = -.58, p < .001; for BDI, β = -.63, p < .001), narcissism was unrelated both to CES-D (β = -.06, p < .40) and to BDI (β = -.03, p < .70). The indirect effects of narcissism on CES-D (z = 4.44, p < .001) and BDI (z = 4.56, p < .001) were significant, indicating that self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on depression. Second, when self-esteem was entered in the model (for UCLA-LS, β = -.52, p < .001; for ESLS, β = -.54, p < .001), narcissism was unrelated both to the UCLA-LS (β = -.12, p < .11) and to the ESLS (β = .05, p < .54). Furthermore, self-esteem significantly and fully mediated the relations between narcissism and the UCLA-LS (z = 4.24, p < .001) and between narcissism and the ESLS (z = 4.23, p < .001). Third, when self-esteem was entered in the model (SWLS: β = .54, p < .001; ABS: β = .44, p < .001), narcissism was unrelated to the SWLS (β = -.03, p < .66) but related to the ABS (β = .18, p < .02). Furthermore, self-esteem mediated the relation between narcissism and the SWLS (z = 4.33, p < .001) and between narcissism and the ABS (z = 3.95, p < .001). In summary, there is no evidence for the rival hypothesis that the results are due to narcissistic defensiveness.
Rival Hypothesis II: Repression

Our final wave of analyses tested the rival hypothesis that the findings are due to correlated levels of repression. Again, the potential for repression to complicate our mediational analyses was evident: Repression, dichotomously scored, correlated significantly with self-esteem ($r = .32, p < .0001$), as well as with every index of psychological health (UCLA-LS: $r = -.34, p < .0001$; ESLS: $r = -.19, p < .02$; ABS: $r = .28, p < .001$; SWLS: $r = .24, p < .003$; CES-D: $r = -.32, p < .0001$; BDI: $r = -.29, p < .0001$). It did not, however, correlate with narcissism directly ($r = .07, p < .38$).

We began by examining whether repression mediates the relations between narcissism and psychological health. When controlling for the effects of repression, narcissism was inversely related to depression (CES-D: $\beta = -.24, p < .001$; BDI: $\beta = -.24, p < .001$) and to loneliness (UCLA-LS: $\beta = -.27, p < .001$; ESLS: $\beta = -.13, p < .12$) and was positively related to subjective well-being (SWLS: $\beta = .13, p < .11$; ABS: $\beta = .20, p < .001$). Repression did not mediate the relations between narcissism and psychological health.

Furthermore, controlling for repression, self-esteem continued to mediate the relations between narcissism and psychological health. First, when self-esteem was entered in the model (CES-D: $\beta = -.56, p < .001$ BDI: $\beta = -.58, p < .001$), narcissism was unrelated both to CES-D ($\beta = .05, p < .45$) and to BDI ($\beta = -.05, p < .48$). The indirect effects of narcissism on CES-D ($z = 3.89, p < .001$) and BDI ($z = 3.92, p < .001$) were significant, indicating that self-esteem completely mediated the effect of narcissism on depression. Second, when self-esteem was entered in the model (CES-D: $\beta = -.52, p < .001$, for the UCLA-LS: $\beta = -.54, p < .001$, for the ESLS), narcissism was unrelated both to the UCLA-LS ($\beta = -.10, p < .17$) and to the ESLS ($\beta = .05, p < .49$). Furthermore, self-esteem significantly and fully mediated the relations between narcissism and the UCLA-LS ($z = 3.79, p < .001$) and between narcissism and the ESLS ($z = 3.77, p < .001$). Finally, when self-esteem was entered in the model (SWLS: $\beta = .57, p < .001$; $\beta = .49, p < .001$), narcissism was unrelated to the SWLS ($\beta = -.06, p < .42$) but marginally related to the ABS ($\beta = .13, p < .09$). Furthermore, self-esteem mediated the relation between narcissism and the SWLS ($z = 3.85, p < .001$) and between narcissism and the ABS ($z = 3.70, p < .001$). In summary, there is no evidence for the rival hypothesis that the results are explicable in terms of repression.

Study 5

The aim of Study 5 was to replicate and extend the findings of the previous studies, thereby further bolstering our claim that self-esteem fully mediates the link between narcissism and psychological health and does so independently of response bias. As before, we used four key indexes of psychological health: depression, loneliness, subjective well-being, and anxiety. In addition, we used a new index of psychological health: neuroticism. This index reflects the dispositional tendency to experience negative affect (John, 1990) and is inversely related to successful coping and good psychological adjustment (Costa & McCrae, 1987; McCrae & John, 1992; Stoeber, 2003). We also used alternative indexes of depression and anxiety.

Furthermore, we used two additional self-esteem indexes. One was a global trait self-esteem index (Pliner et al., 1990). The other distinguished between self-competence derived esteem and self-liking derived esteem (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). The inclusion of the latter scale allowed us to test the possibility that narcissistic esteem is based to a disproportionate degree on self-competence. If so, then competence-based, compared with liking-based, esteem should emerge as a more potent mediator of the link between narcissism and health.

Finally, we included an alternative measure of response bias—impression management—to test whether self-esteem would continue to mediate fully the link between narcissism and psychological health even when the tendency to “fake good” was taken into account.

Method

Participants

Participants were 155 (131 women, 24 men) University of Southampton undergraduate students, volunteering in exchange for course credit. Most participants described themselves as Caucasian (85%) and British (91%).

Recruitment and Procedure

The study was run entirely on computer. Participants signed up by e-mailing a research assistant (RA) after reading a posted ad. The RA replied, providing participants with an identification number and password and directing them to a Web site from which to download the program that ran the study. This program took the form of a stand-alone .exe file created by Aiden P. Gregg. Participants completed each study session either on their own computer or on a publicly available machine. They were urged to begin each session only if they felt confident that they would remain free from distraction. When each session ended, the program stored participants’ data as a coded .rtf file on the C:/ drive of their computer. Participants promptly returned each stored data file to the RA by e-mail attachment. In total, six sessions were run, each on a different day. The data for the current study are derived from a subset of the measures administered during Sessions 1, 2, and 4. Twenty participants had data deleted from at least one measure because they (a) responded with suspicious haste or tardiness (6 or more responses lasting less than 1,000 ms or more than 15,000 ms on any one measure) or (b) furnished suspiciously extreme scores (scores less than the 25th percentile or greater than the 75th percentile by a margin of three times the interquartile range). Sample sizes in various analyses varied from 131 to 151.

Measures

Unless otherwise indicated, all questionnaires (a) were administered during Session 1 and (b) featured 7-point scales (1 = not at all like me, 7 = very much like me) to which participants responded by clicking on the appropriate digit.

Narcissism. Participants completed the NPI (range = 2–32; $M = 11.50$; $\alpha = .82$). The forced-choice format was duplicated by having participants click on one of two buttons for Option A or Option B.

Self-esteem. Participants completed two different measures during Session 2 and again during Session 4 at least 1 week later. The first measure was the RSI. Participants responded to each RSI item using a vertical 4-point scale featuring clickable buttons (from the top: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). The data obtained during Sessions 2 and 4 (RSI-A, RSI-B, respectively) were descriptively similar (ranges = 14–40 and 13–40; $M_s = 29.07$ and 29.25; $\alpha_s = .91$ and .93, respectively) and remained consistent over a period of at least 8 days ($r_{AB} = .89$).

The second measure was the Fear of Inadequacy Scale (FIS; Janis & Field, 1959; revised by Fleming & Courtney, 1984). The original 36-item inventory measured global self-esteem aggregated across five specific subscales: Self-Regard, Social Anxiety, Academic Self-Esteem, Physical...
Attractiveness, and Physical Prowess. A further 6-item Body Esteem subscale was appended (Pliner et al., 1990) to yield a 42-item scale. For most items, the same pair of contrasting adjectives spanned the 7-point semantic differential (1 = never, 7 = always), though idiosyncrasies of item wording necessitated an occasional variation (e.g., 1 = not at all, 7 = always). Scores were reversed so that higher scores denoted greater self-esteem. A sample item is “do you ever think that you are a worthless individual?” The data obtained during Sessions 2 and 4 (FIS-A, FIS-B, respectively) were descriptively similar (ranges = 12–55 and 14–62; M = 39.58 and 39.96; α = .96 and .96, respectively) and remained consistent over a period of at least 8 days (τsl = .96).

Participants also completed a further measure of self-esteem during Session 1, the Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale (SLS; Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). Balanced for positively and negatively worded items, the questionnaire contained 10 two-item subscales, one assessing self-liking (S-L; range = 13–68; M = 43.97; α = .95), the other assessing self-competence (S-C; range = 18–70; M = 51.11; α = .92). Sample items are “I like myself” (S-L) and “I am talented” (S-C).

Depression and anxiety. Participants completed the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1982). The HADS contained two seven-item subscales, one assessing depression (DEP; range = 7–22; M = 10.56; α = .71), the other assessing anxiety (ANX; range = 8–28; M = 15.31; α = .83). Every item was accompanied by an idiosyncrastically worded vertical 4-point scale featuring clickable buttons. Sample items are “I feel cheerful” (DEP—reverse scored) and “I feel tense or wound up” (ANX).

Loneliness. Participants completed the UCLA-LS, Version 3 (range = 27–68; M = 42.00; α = .92).

Subjective well-being. Participants completed the SWLS (range = 5–35; M = 22.08; α = .86).

Impression management. Participants completed the 8-item Neuroticism subscale (NEU; range = 9–39; M = 25.23; α = .87) from the 44-item Big Five Inventory (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). Participants responded to each item using a vertical 5-point scale featuring clickable buttons (from top: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). A sample item is “I see myself as someone who can be moody.”

Rival Hypothesis III: Impression Management

We once again tested whether the link between narcissism and psychological health, and the role of self-esteem in mediating that link, could be put down to a general positive response bias—on this occasion, the tendency to provide socially desirable answers to inquiries about oneself. Such a bias, we reasoned, might artificially inflate correlations between our three key indexes: People keen to portray themselves positively might endorse items indicative of psychosocial success on all three indexes, whereas people unconcerned about portraying themselves positively might fail to do so. The finding, this time, of a significant zero-order correlation between our index of narcissism and impression management (r = -.23, p < .005) suggests that impression management might well play a role in accounting for our mediational findings.

Our data analytic strategy, therefore, was to rerun the regressions described above, only this time including, at each stage, our impression management index as a predictor variable. If socially desirable responding accounted, in whole or in part, for the self-esteem mediated link between narcissism and psychological health, then the strength and significance of findings previously obtained would be decisively attenuated.

So, with impression management included in the model, we began by separately regressing each of six indexes of self-esteem (RSI-A, RSI-B, FIS-A, FIS-B, S-L, S-C) on narcissism. All indexes remained significant predictors (.47 < β < .65, all ps < .001). Indeed, if anything, impression management served as a mild suppressor variable. Impression management itself was not significantly related to any self-esteem index.

Next, with impression management again included in the model, we separately regressed each psychological health index on narcissism. Narcissism remained inversely related to depression.
(DEP: $\beta = -25, p < .01$), anxiety (ANX: $\beta = -35, p < .001$), loneliness (UCLA-LS: $\beta = -37, p < .001$), and neuroticism (NEU: $\beta = -21, p < .05$). In addition, narcissism remained positively related to subjective well-being (SWLS: $\beta = .35, p < .001$). Although impression management showed no significant zero-order correlations with any index of psychological health, it did weakly predict subjective well-being (SWLS: $\beta = .20, p < .05$) in these regressions.

For completeness, we also separately regressed each psychological health index on each of the six indexes of self-esteem, again including impression management in each model. Significant relations (all $p < .001$) emerged in all cases (DEP: $-.43 < \beta < -.49$; ANX: $-.52 < \beta < -.66$; UCLA-LS: $-.48 < \beta < -.57$; SWLS: $-.45 < \beta < -.59$; NEU: $-.54 < \beta < -.73$). Here, impression management was consistently unrelated to all psychological health indexes ($-.08 < \beta < .07$) with the exception of subjective well-being, which it significantly predicted in tandem with FIS-B ($\beta = .13 \pm .14, p < .05$) and marginally predicted in tandem with the four remaining self-esteem indexes ($-3 < \beta < .11$; $06 < p < .13$).

Crucially, we also tested whether, in a series of simultaneous regressions, the inclusion of each self-esteem index eliminated or reduced the capacity of narcissism to predict each psychological health index when impression management also served as a predictor variable.

As before, self-esteem’s contribution to each model persisted, whereas narcissism’s contribution dwindled (with one exception). Specifically, for each psychological health index, every self-esteem coefficient remained significant (all $p < .001$) in the competitive model (DEP: $-.43 < \beta < -.53$; ANX: $-.48 < \beta < -.65$; UCLA-LS: $-.42 < \beta < -.54$; SWLS: $-.41 < \beta < -.56$; NEU: $-.48 < \beta < -.69$), whereas every narcissism coefficient (but one) became nonsignificant (DEP: $-.03 < \beta < .11$; ANX: $-.07 < \beta < .10$; UCLA-LS: $-.12 < \beta < -.06$; SWLS: $-.01 < \beta < .10$; NEU: $-.13 < \beta < .03$). Once more, impression management was consistently unrelated to all psychological health indexes ($-.13 < \beta < .05$) with the exception of subjective well-being, which it weakly but significantly predicted in tandem with RSI-B ($\beta = .16, p < .03$), FIS-B ($\beta = .17, p < .03$), and S-C ($\beta = .15, p < .03$) and marginally predicted in tandem with the three remaining self-esteem indexes ($-.12 < \beta < -.14; .06 < p < .08$).

Finally, self-esteem mediated completely the relations between narcissism and each health index (all $p < .0001$), regardless of which index of self-esteem served as mediator (DEP: $-4.96 < z < -4.14$; ANX: $-.627 < z < -.474$; UCLA-LS: $-.368 < z < -.455$; SWLS: $3.99 < z < 6.05$; NEU: $-5.57 < z < -4.32$).

In summary, Study 5 replicated and extended the finding of previous studies that self-esteem mediated the link between narcissism and psychological health and obtained no evidence that this finding could be alternatively explained in terms of impression management. Additionally, the study obtained no evidence that narcissistic self-esteem is based more on self-competence than self-liking.

**Dangerous Curves?**

All the bivariate associations and mediational analyses reported so far have assumed that narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health are linearly related. However, if the relations between them do depart significantly from linearity, then our interpretation of our results so far might merit revision or qualification.

Suppose, for example, that across all our studies, the links between narcissism and self-esteem and those between self-esteem and psychological health were linear but that the links between narcissism and psychological health were nonlinear. If so, we would have consistently underestimated the true association between narcissism and psychological health and, thereby, overestimated the role of self-esteem in mediating that association by focusing only on linear components. This would then have biased our analysis in favor of confirming our central hypothesis. (The neglect of other patterns of nonlinearity, though not as damaging to our conclusions, would nonetheless have rendered inexact our interpretations of mediation.) Moreover, even at a purely descriptive level, it is obviously important to characterize properly any nonlinearity obtaining between narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health because such nonlinearity would contain valuable supplementary information. For example, suppose that the positive relation between narcissism and psychological health was not only significantly linear but also significantly quadratic and decelerating. This would imply that the positive link between narcissism and psychological health decreases as narcissism increases, that is, that the positive link between narcissism and psychological health is more pronounced for persons lower in narcissism.

Rather than report the level of linearity observed for every association already reported—a service for which few readers would forgive us—we instead present the results of analyses conducted on aggregate data across studies. Not only do such analyses allow us to address the issue of linearity more briskly, but they also permit us to run more powerful statistical tests.\(^5\)

Our five studies did not overlap perfectly in the measures that they used and, when they did, sometimes featured different response scales. We therefore rescaled all of our measures along a common metric (0–100) before assembling three aggregate datasets that featured selected indexes of psychological health. In particular, we collated data from Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5 on subjective well-being (SWLS),\(^6\) from Studies 1, 4, and 5 on loneliness (UCLA-LS), and from Studies 1 and 4 on depression (BDI and CES-D). Each of these three aggregate datasets included corresponding scores for narcissism (NPI) and self-esteem (RSI),\(^7\) available across all five studies.\(^8\)

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5 The substantive picture does not change whether or not levels of linearity are assessed within or across studies. Further details are available from the authors on request.

6 In Study 3, scores were analyzed individually, without regard to couple status. However, because no significant correlations emerged between members of the same couples on indexes of interest ($r_{NPI} = .07, p < .57$; $r_{RSI} = .13, p < .26$; $r_{SWLS} = .20, p < .08$) the assumption of independence of observations appears tenable.

7 The two measures of RSI data obtained in Study 5 were averaged to provide a single measure.

8 Preliminary analyses revealed considerable homogeneity across all five studies in the to-be-aggregated indexes. First, the standard deviations of each index were highly comparable across all five studies. Second, the
Following data transformations aimed at minimizing collinearity,9 we arrived, across different samples, at independent estimates of the linear and quadratic association between (a) narcissism (NPI) and self-esteem (RSI), (b) narcissism (NPI) and each of the four indexes of psychological health (SWLS, UCLA-LS, BDI, and CES-D), and (c) self-esteem (RSI) and each of the four indexes of psychological health (SWLS, UCLA-LS, BDI, and CES-D). The results are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The tables feature standardized coefficients representing the independent linear and quadratic components of the relations of interest. Such components can be computed by treating either variable in the relation as the predictor or criterion (e.g., NPI could be regressed on RSI and its quadratic product RSI$^2$ or RSI could be regressed on NPI and its quadratic product NPI$^2$). The results of both types of computation are presented.

Unsurprisingly, substantial and highly significant linear relations emerged (all $p < .0001$) between (a) narcissism and self-esteem, (b) narcissism and psychological health, and (c) self-esteem and psychological health. However, no unequivocal evidence was found of additional quadratic relations. Despite sporadically attaining significance,10 none of the quadratic coefficients ever exceeded .11 in absolute magnitude. (Note that this represents approximately 1% of the variance, whereas linear relations accounted for between 4% and 34% of the variance across different analyses.)11 We conclude that relations among our key constructs are adequately captured by a linear model, and that the conclusions of our correlational and mediational analyses do not require revision.

General Discussion

The current investigation had several objectives. The first objective was to provide a compelling empirical account for the previously obtained weak link between normal narcissism and psychological health. Specifically, past research had reported an inverse relation between narcissism and depression (Watson & Biderman, 1993; Wink, 1992), narcissism and anxiety (Watson & Biderman, 1993), and narcissism and subjective well-being (Rose, 2002). Additionally, one study had reported a null finding regarding the association between narcissism and loneliness (Joubert, Biderman, 1993), and narcissism and subjective well-being (Rose, 1986), whereas, to our knowledge, no prior research had examined the relations between narcissism and neuroticism.

To this end, we conducted five studies. In Study 1, participants completed one-time measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, and subjective well-being). In Study 2, they completed one-time measures of repression, narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, and subjective well-being). In Study 3, participants completed one-time measures of repression, narcissism, and psychological health (i.e., subjective well-being, and couple well-being). In Study 4, they completed one-time measures of repression, narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, and subjective well-being). Finally, in Study 5, participants completed one-time measures of narcissism and psychological health (i.e., depression, loneliness, subjective well-being, anxiety, and neuroticism), as well as repeated measures of some self-esteem indexes.

9 To estimate the quadratic relation between a predictor and criterion above and beyond any linear relation between them it is common practice to center the predictor scores, manually compute their products, and then regress the criterion scores on both the centered predictor scores and their products. The centering eliminates any collinearity between the linear and quadratic terms attributable to the metric in which they were originally scaled (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). However, the skew of the underlying distribution of predictor scores remains a potent source of collinearity. Specifically, unless the predictor scores are symmetrically distributed, their skew will inflate the size of the correlation between them and their products. Consequently, the partial coefficients estimated in a polynomial regression will vary depending on the skew of the original predictor scores and, potentially, in complex ways (for example, if suppression occurs). One awkward consequence is that the partial regression coefficients estimated when the roles of predictor and criterion variables are reversed will tend to differ more than they otherwise would, leading to the uncomfortably contradictory conclusion that a quadratic relation between two variables, above and beyond any linear relation, both does and does not exist, depending on how one looks at it. For example, in our largest aggregate dataset ($n = 604$), if NPI scores are regressed on centered RSI scores and their products, then the quadratic beta is not significant ($\beta = .02, t(602) = .51, p < .61$), whereas if the centered RSI scores are regressed on the NPI scores and their products, then the quadratic beta is highly significant ($\beta = -.16, t(602) = -4.5, p < .0001$). Given that many of our target variables were highly skewed (most people have high self-esteem, are not depressed, etc.), we opted for a collinearity-reducing strategy that yielded the mostparsimonious result. Specifically, we nonlinearly transformed our variables to reduce their skew to zero (by selecting the precise power function for the purpose; see McClendon, 2000; Mosteller & Tukey, 1977) and then linearly transformed them (to $z$ scores) in order to center their scores and equalize their highly discrepant variances. Only then did we compute a set of products for each set of predictor scores. Now the predictors and their products were fully orthogonal, making their zero-order correlations with the criterion exactly equal to the beta weights computed by regressing the criterion onto those predictors and products. Hence, both the linear and quadratic coefficients we computed, whether construed as correlations or betas, represent wholly independent components of the relation between the variables. They are thus susceptible of direct comparison.

10 That the quadratic coefficients are unequal in absolute magnitude when the predictor and criterion are switched (one would expect the sign of the quadratic term to reverse for limited curves) reflects the fact that the product scores are skewed due to residual idiosyncrasies in the parent distribution of predictor scores. Because the skew of the product scores varies depending on the idiosyncrasies of the predictor, and skew moderates the magnitude of linear correlations, the correlations of the product scores also depend on the idiosyncrasies of the predictor. Although the skew of the product scores could be eliminated through transformation, this would, in turn, be liable to create the very correlation between the predictor scores that our analytic strategy attempted to remove.

11 Exploratory analyses confirmed that the same pattern was observed for all subscales of the NPI, albeit in an attenuated form. Details are available from the authors.
These studies established that normal narcissism is (a) inversely related to dispositional depression (Studies 1, 3–5) and daily sadness (Study 2); (b) inversely related to dispositional loneliness (Studies 1, 4, 5) and daily loneliness (Study 2); (c) positively related to dispositional subjective well-being (Studies 1, 3–5), daily subjective well-being (Study 2), and couple well-being (Study 3); (d) inversely related to dispositional anxiety (Study 5) and daily anxiety (Study 2); and (e) inversely related to dispositional neuroticism (Study 5). The findings are thus consistent with the emerging portrait of the high narcissist as a psychologically healthy person (W. K. Campbell, 2001; Rose, 2002; Sedikides & Gregg, 2001). Thus, high narcissists may be socially callous, but that is no reason for them not to be psychologically healthy. To use a far-fetched metaphor, the mind of a narcissist is like a sports utility vehicle. It is great to be in the driving seat, but fellow motorists must watch out, lest a collision with this mobile fortress demolish their more humble hatchbacks.

High narcissists have elevated levels of self-esteem, and self-esteem is a correlate of psychological health. We therefore hypothesized that it is thanks to their elevated self-esteem that high narcissists are relatively free of worry and gloom. This we duly established. Self-esteem emerged consistently as a mediator of the psychological health benefits, this is due to its overlap with self-esteem. Moreover, additional analyses indicated that the relations among narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health are predominantly linear.

High narcissists have been considered relatively high on agency but low on communion (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Paulhus & John, 1998). This may have implications for the narcissistic bases of self-esteem. That is, narcissistic self-esteem may derive more from self-perceptions of competence than from self-perceptions of likability. If so, then the self-competence dimension of narcissistic self-esteem should emerge as a more potent mediator of the relation between narcissism and psychological health than the self-like dimension. This hypothesis was discredited in a preliminary test (Study 5). Apparently, high narcissists derive self-esteem by considering the self both very competent and very likable. Both dimensions of self-esteem mediate the link between narcissism and psychological health.

Can the results be accounted for simply by a response bias? Is the reporting of good psychological health a symptom of a rigid, positive, or socially desirable response bias on the part of narcissists? Stated otherwise, can our findings be accounted for in terms of high levels of narcissistic defensiveness, repression, or impression management? Studies 4 and 5 ruled out these hypotheses. Our
results (i.e., the link between narcissism and psychological health, and the mediational role of self-esteem) held even after controlling for level of defensiveness, repression, or impression management. Normal narcissism predicts psychological health, not a mere illusory exaggeration of psychological health.

Nevertheless, given that the current investigation is the first to address fully and directly the mediational role of self-esteem in the link between normal narcissism and psychological health, the findings ought to be subject to further verification. Although we believe that self-reports have a place in psychological research, especially when response biases are accounted for, we also believe that additional measurements and procedures need to be recruited and used in future relevant research. Are the obtained findings replicated (a) with implicit measures of narcissism, self-esteem, and psychological health, especially in longitudinal designs; (b) by observer (in particular, close other) reports of narcissistic self-esteem and psychological health; or (c) when narcissists are placed under conditions of psychological threat? Finally, does the stability (Kernis, 2003) or contingency (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1995) of self-esteem mediate the relation between narcissism and psychological health—a possibility consistent with the finding that narcissists report relatively high self-esteem instability (Rhodewalt, in press; Rhodewalt et al., 1998)?

The current investigation established that the self-esteem component of normal narcissism accounts for the link between normal narcissism and psychological health. However, self-esteem may not account exclusively for that link. Future research needs to test at least three other components of narcissism. The first is control: High narcissists have an inflated sense of personal control over their environment (Watson, Sawrie, & Biderman, 1991). The second is power: Narcissism is associated with a heightened need for their environment (Watson, Sawrie, & Biderman, 1991). The second is power: Narcissism is associated with a heightened need for achievement (Pajares, 1997).

In conclusion, results from five studies, involving over 600 participants from two countries, disconfirmed the prevailing view that high narcissists, given their interpersonal deficits, must suffer ill psychological health. Although high narcissists are interpersonally exploitative and abrasive, they also are psychologically healthy. Their good health is due, at least to a considerable degree, to their elevated levels of self-esteem.

References


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**New Editor Appointed for History of Psychology**

The American Psychological Association announces the appointment of James H. Capshew, PhD, as editor of *History of Psychology* for a 4-year term (2006–2009).

As of January 1, 2005, manuscripts should be submitted electronically via the journal’s Manuscript Submission Portal (www.apa.org/journals/hop.html). Authors who are unable to do so should correspond with the editor’s office about alternatives:

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Manuscript submission patterns make the precise date of completion of the 2005 volume uncertain. The current editor, Michael M. Sokal, PhD, will receive and consider manuscripts through December 31, 2004. Should the 2005 volume be completed before that date, manuscripts will be redirected to the new editor for consideration in the 2006 volume.