WORKING PAPERS

"Militarism and the Median Voter: Evidence from Cross-National and Israeli Surveys" shows the redistributional potential of the public good of defense.  Analysis of public opinion data across a number of democracies supports the theory's prediction that respondents with lower relative income are more likely to support increased defense spending. A closer inspection of Israeli public opinion shows that lower household expenditure corresponds to increased willingness to rely on military might and unwillingness to make concessions to avoid conflict.

 

"Power Or Profit? The United States and the International Arms Trade," with Ethan B. Kapstein, argues that the United States takes advantage of its defense industrial market power and globalization’s efficiency gains to achieve geopolitical gains rather than collect economic rents. A new data set on the prices paid by client states for American weapons provides support for this claim. The data also point to declining American market share over time.  Some of the paper's findings underpin our September/October Foreign Affairs article (ungated html version here).


"Aiming At Doves: Experimental Evidence Of Military Images' Political Effects," with Yanna Krupnikov, theorizes the conditions under which individuals can be primed to take more hawkish policy views.  Using survey experiments we determined if images of the U.S. President in front of varying backgrounds, including uniformed soldiers, affect support for defense and non-defense spending. Exposure to the soldiers image, and only the soldiers image, causes respondents to shift their preferences in favor of defense and away from education.  Respondents exposed to the military image also evaluated non-specific "budget cuts" to be damaging to national security.  Interestingly, the soldiers image has the largest effect on the most partisan Democrats, and the strongest supporters of the President (please contact authors for the most recent version).

 
PUBLICATIONS

"Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly about Causation." International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11), pp. 124-143.  Civil-military agreement on warfighting strategy does not undermine the assumption that civilian leaders, and ultimately the public, play an essential role in its determination.  The Johnson administration ensured that the U.S. military emphasized the fight against conventional enemy units, relied on the use of firepower for the fight against Vietcong insurgents, and rejected suggestions that the U.S. military adopt more labor-intensive pacification approaches.

         Eyes only telegram from William Westmoreland to Earle Wheeler.

"Power and Democratic Weakness: Neoconservatism and Neoclassical Realism."  Millenium 38, no. 3 (May 2010), pp. 593-614. Inspecting the range of neoconservative thought reveals a unifying theme: the enervating effects of democracy on state power and the will to wield it in a dangerous world.  Viewing regime type through the prism of state power extraction in a competitive, anarchic world puts neoconservatism squarely in the neoclassical realist camp.  The paper concludes by examining the policy implications of this "neo-neo" debate.


"The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam."  International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10), 119-157.  Democracies will select and fight small wars using a firepower-intensive military strategy because such a doctrine reduces the costs of conflict for the average voter more than it reduces the benefits from an ineffective strategy.  The paper supports the theory with a case study of Vietnam War counterinsurgency.


“United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense.”  Security Studies 16, no. 4 (October–December 2007), 597–613.  The paper proposes a theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive military R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance.  Through this technology policy, the U.S. promotes a form of defense industrial globalization that extends its international political influence.