Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets

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Abstract

We investigate the effects on targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it mandated, due to privacy regulations, or the result of the transition from a centralized to a decentralized market structure). We build a model of many-to-many matching in which preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. In the absence of uniform-price obligations, platforms maximize profits through price customization, using information on structural elasticities. We show how uniform pricing may either increase or decrease targeting, and identify conditions under which it is beneficial to consumer surplus. The analysis has implications for online retailing, ad exchanges, and media markets.

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1 Introduction

Over the last two decades, new technologies have permitted the development of matching intermediaries of unprecedented scale engaging in unparalleled level of targeting. Notable examples include ad exchanges, matching publishers with advertisers, business-to-business platforms, matching firms with mutually beneficial commercial interests, and dating websites, matching agents with common passions. The same advances in technology that favored high levels of targeting also enabled greater

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price customization, whereby the price of a match finely depends on characteristics of the matching partners.

In advertising exchanges, for example, the assignment of, and payments from, advertisers depend on scores that summarize the compatibility of the ads with each publisher’s content.\textsuperscript{1} A similar trend can be found in other markets, not traditionally analyzed through the lens of matching. In online shopping, for example, it is common practice among retailers to use customers’ personal data to set personalized prices. In one of the most publicized cases, Orbitz, an online travel agency, reportedly used information about customers’ demographics to charge targeted customers higher hotel fees.\textsuperscript{2} Similarly, Safeway, an online grocery chain, often proposes individualized price offers and quantity discounts to customers with certain profiles.\textsuperscript{3} The retailers’ knowledge about consumers’ characteristics often comes from data brokers, who collect and sell personal information (in the form of demographics, geolocation, browsing history, etc).\textsuperscript{4}

In the markets mentioned above, price customization is easy to enforce, as the agents’ “horizontal” characteristics are observable (for instance, in ad exchanges, the advertisers’ profile is often revealed by the ads’ content) or can be learnt from third parties (for example, in online retailing, information about consumers can often be obtained from data brokers or affiliated websites). In other markets, instead, the agents’ horizontal characteristics that are relevant for price customization have to be indirectly elicited, and this may require bundling.\textsuperscript{5} A case in point is that of media markets (for instance, satellite/cable TV providers) where sophisticated pricing strategies are used to condition payments on the entire bundle of channels selected by the subscribers.\textsuperscript{6}

While having a long history in the policy debate, price customization has attracted renewed attention due to the two-sided nature of matching intermediaries and the amount of information now available for target pricing.\textsuperscript{7} The concern is that, by leveraging the platforms’ market power,\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1}See, for example, https://support.google.com/adxseller/answer/2913506?hl=en&ref_topic=3376095. Moreover, ad exchanges use advertiser-specific reservation prices which are easily automated using proxy-bidding tools. Ad exchanges also price discriminate on the publisher side, by making the payments to the publishers depend on the publishers’ profile and on the volume of impressions.

\textsuperscript{2}See the article “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels,” the Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012.


\textsuperscript{4}According to The New York Times, the data broker industry’s revenue reached $156 billion in 2013 (see the article “The Dark Market for Personal Data,” August 16, 2014). See also Montes et al. (2018) for a discussion of the value of privacy in online markets.

\textsuperscript{5}For instance, ad exchanges have recently developed new contractual arrangements that allow them to bundle different ads as a way of screening the publishers’ unobservable preferences (see, Mirrokni and Nazerzadeh (2017)).

\textsuperscript{6}Most satellite/cable TV providers price discriminate on the viewer side by offering viewers packages of channels whereby the baseline configuration can be customized by adding channels at a cost that depends on the baseline configuration originally selected (see, among others, Crawford (2000), and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012)). For example, in the US, Direct TV offers various vertically differentiated (i.e., nested) packages (both in English and in Spanish). It then allows viewers to add to these packages various (horizontally differentiated) premium packages, which bundle together channels specialized in movies, sports, news, and games. In addition, viewers can further customize the packages by adding individual sports, news, and movie channels.

\textsuperscript{7}In the case of media markets, see, for example, the Federal Communications Commission 2004 and 2006 reports
price customization hinders the efficiency gains permitted by better targeting technologies. Recent regulations speak directly to these issues. In the European Union, for example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the ePrivacy Regulation (ePR) mandate that businesses ask for consumers’ consent prior to collecting and transmitting personal data. Such regulations hinder price customization based on data from third parties.\textsuperscript{8,9}

Market decentralization poses yet another challenge to price customization. The same technological progress of the last few years that has facilitated the growth of matching markets is now expected to favor a gradual transition of some of these markets from a centralized structure, where matching is controlled by platforms, to a more decentralized structure where one side (typically, the “seller” side) posts stand-alone prices, while the other side (typically, the “buyer” side) constructs the matching sets. For example, in the market for media content, most analysts now believe that the increase in the speed of fiber-optic and broadband internet connection will favor a gradual transition to a market structure whereby viewers will pay directly the content providers, bypassing the intermediation of media platforms (such as satellite or cable TV providers).\textsuperscript{10} In decentralized markets, price customization can be hindered by the difficulty to collect data about consumers’ tastes (for instance, due to privacy regulation), along with the difficulty of tracking consumers’ purchases with other vendors. In contrast, in centralized markets, price customization can often be implemented, even in the absence of data on consumers’ preferences, through bundling (see footnote 5).

The aim of this paper is to understand how targeting and price customization shape the matching opportunities offered by profit-maximizing platforms, and study the impact on targeting and consumer welfare of uniform pricing (whereby payments to the platforms do not depend on the “horizontal characteristics” of the agents’ profiles), be it a result of regulation or market decentralization.

To examine these issues, we develop a model where agents’ preferences exhibit elements of both vertical and horizontal differentiation. Certain agents value being matched with agents from the other side of the market uniformly more than others (vertical differentiation). At the same time, agents from the same side may disagree on the relative attractiveness of any two agents from the opposite side (horizontal differentiation). We capture the two dimensions of differentiation by letting agents’ types be located on a cylinder, where the height represents the vertical dimension, while the radial position determines the horizontal preference (see Figure 1).

\textsuperscript{8}See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

\textsuperscript{9}In the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recommended in 2014 legislation increasing the transparency of the data broker industry and giving consumers greater control over their personal information. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker-industry-be-more.

\textsuperscript{10}A similar trend is also taking place in online advertising, where many publishers now prefer employing direct-sales channels so as to avoid the commissions charged by the platforms. See, for instance, https://digiday.com/media/advertisers-are-often-left-flying-blind-in-ad-exchanges/.
Each agent’s utility from interacting with any other agent from the opposite side increases with the agent’s vertical dimension. Fixing the vertical dimension, each agent’s utility is single-peaked with respect to the horizontal dimension. More specifically, we identify each agent’s radial position with his bliss point. Accordingly, each agent’s utility for interacting with any other agent from the opposite side decreases with the circular distance between the agent’s bliss point (his radial position) and the partner’s location (the partner’s radial position). Such preference structure, in addition to its analytical convenience, mirrors the one in the “ideal-point” models typically used in the empirical literature on media and advertising markets (see, for example, Goettler and Shachar 2001).

A key element of our analysis is the focus on matching tariffs, which describe how the payments asked by the platform vary with the matching sets demanded by the agents. A tariff exhibits uniform pricing if all agents from a given side face the same price schedule for different quantities of the matches with agents at a given location on the opposite side. Formally, uniform tariffs are tariffs that do not condition an agent’s payment to the platform on the agent’s own radial position (i.e., the horizontal dimension of the agent’s preferences). A particularly simple type of uniform pricing often proposed as a potential regulatory remedy to the market power enjoyed by media platforms is stand-alone linear pricing (for a discussion, see Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012).

Absent any regulation, platforms typically offer customized tariffs on both sides, whereby the customization is obtained by offering agents menus of matching plans. Each plan is defined by its baseline configuration (i.e., a baseline set of partners from the opposite side), a baseline price, and a collection of prices describing the cost to the subscriber of customizing the plan by adding extra matches. The cost of the customization is typically non-linear in the volume of matches of any given type added to the plan (second-degree price discrimination). Importantly, the cost of the customization is also a function of the baseline plan selected by the subscriber. Because different plans target agents from different “locations,” such tariffs thus also display a form of third-degree price discrimination.

Our first main result derives properties of the demands under profit-maximizing tariffs. We then offer a convenient representation of the profit-maximizing tariffs in terms of elasticities on both sides of the market. The representation yields a formula describing the price each agent from each given location has to pay to include in his matching set any feasible amount of matches from any location on the opposite side of the market. The formula links location- and volume-specific prices to the
various local elasticities of the demands on the two sides of the market. In this sense it constitutes
the analog in a matching market of the familiar Lerner-Wilson formula of optimal non-linear pricing
(see, for instance, Wilson (1993)). The formula differs from the traditional one in that it accounts
for (a) the reciprocity of the matching, and (b) the fact that the platform combines second-degree
price discrimination (higher vertical types self-select into larger matching plans) with third-degree
price discrimination (the total price paid by each subscriber depends on the horizontal dimension of
the subscriber’s preferences).

We also leverage on this characterization to study the interplay between targeting and market
power. Specifically, we derive conditions (both in terms of elasticities and in terms of the agents’
match values and type distributions) under which the under-provision of matches under profit maxi-
mization (relative to the efficient level) is either magnified or alleviated as the distance of a partner’s
location from an agent’s bliss point increases. This analysis has no parallel in the standard models
of price discrimination, which are not amenable to study the effects of market power on targeting
levels.

Our second set of results investigates the effects on prices, the composition of the matching
demands, and consumer welfare of uniform pricing on a given side of the market. Analogously to the
generalized Lerner-Wilson formula discussed above, we provide a novel representation of the optimal
price schedules that uses local elasticities to describe the prices agents on each side have to pay per
quantity of matches from each location on the opposite side. Relative to the case of customized
pricing, this new pricing formula identifies the relevant aggregate elasticities in environments where
location-specific pricing is not possible. The typical marginal revenue and marginal cost terms (which
determine the optimal cross-subsidization pattern) are now averages that take into account not only
the uniformity of prices, but also how the procurement costs of matches are affected by the horizontal
component of the agents’ preferences. From a more theoretical perspective, the characterization
contributes to the mechanism design literature by developing a novel technique to handle constraints
on the transfer rule employed by the principal (as opposed to the familiar constraints on the allocation
rules, which are typically easier to analyze using standard techniques).

We then put this characterization to work, revealing how uniform pricing affects targeting and
welfare. Intuition might suggest that uniform pricing should increase targeting by preventing plat-
forms from charging higher prices for the matches involving the most preferred partners. This simple
intuition, however, may fail to account for the fact that platforms re-optimize their entire price
schedules to respond to aggregate elasticities. Perhaps surprisingly, uniform pricing can either de-
crease or increase the equilibrium level of targeting, depending on how match-demand elasticities
vary with location. We also relate elasticities to match values and type distributions and identify
conditions under which targeting is higher (alternatively, lower) under uniform pricing (alternatively,
customized pricing).

We then use such characterization to look into the welfare effects of uniform pricing. Exploiting
a novel connection between uniform pricing in matching markets and the literature on third-degree
price discrimination, we show how to adapt the elegant analysis in Aguirre et al. (2010) to the matching markets under examination. The results identify sufficient conditions (both in terms of elasticities and in terms of match utilities and type distributions) for uniform pricing to increase consumer surplus (in the side where prices are uniform). These results, once combined with appropriate empirical work, can guide the design of regulatory interventions in platform markets where price customization is a concern.

Lastly, we show how the same analysis that permits us to uncover the welfare effects of uniform pricing can be adapted to shed light on the welfare effects of a transition from a centralized to a decentralized market structure (where sellers independently post stand-alone prices), thus contributing a novel angle to the policy debate over whether or not such a transition should be encouraged.

Outline of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Below, we close the introduction by briefly reviewing the pertinent literature. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 identifies properties of profit-maximizing tariffs and of the induced matching demands. Section 4 studies the effects of uniform-pricing obligations, whereas Section 5 discusses the effects of the transition from a centralized to a decentralized market structure. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix at the end of the document.

Related Literature
This paper studies many-to-many matching (with monetary transfers) in markets where the agents’ preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. Particularly related are Jeon, Kim and Menicucci (2017) and Gomes and Pavan (2016). The first paper studies the provision of quality by a platform in a setting where quality provision enhances match values. The second paper studies the inefficiency of profit maximization in many-to-many matching markets. Both papers abstract from the possibility that agents’ preferences be horizontally differentiated (in tastes and match values), thus ignoring the issues of targeting and price customization that are the heart of the analysis in the present paper. Fershtman and Pavan (2019) considers many-to-many matching in a model with a rich preference structure similar to the one in the present paper, combining elements of vertical and horizontal differentiation. Contrary to the present paper, however, it focuses on dynamic markets in which agents learn the attractiveness of the partners and experience shocks to their preferences over time.

Related are also Jullien and Pavan (2018), and Tan and Zhou (2019). The former paper studies platform competition in markets where agents’ preferences for different platforms are heterogenous but where agents value homogeneously the interactions with agents from the opposite side of the market. The latter paper studies price competition in a model where multiple platforms compete by offering differentiated services to the various sides of the market, and where agents’ preferences are heterogenous and exhibit both within-side and across-sides network effects. While considering rich preference structures, both papers abstract from price discrimination. The latter is examined in
Damiano and Li (2007) and Johnson (2013). Contrary to this paper, these works consider markets where matching is one-to-one and agents’ preferences are differentiated along a vertical dimension only.

This paper considers a many-to-many matching market where agents might disagree on the relative attractiveness of any two agents from the other side (horizontal differentiation). Similar preferences structures are examined in the matching literature surveyed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) (for a more recent treatment, see Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)), and in the literature on the school assignment problem (see, for example, Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth (2005a, 2005b) and Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)). These literatures are methodologically distinct from the current paper, in that they focus on solution concepts such as stability and do not allow for transfers.

More broadly, markets where agents purchase access to other agents are the focus of the broad literature on two-sided markets (see Belleflamme and Peitz (2017) for the most up-to-date overview). Most of this literature, however, restricts attention to a single network, or to mutually exclusive networks. Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2016) relax this structure by proposing a model of competing media platforms with overlapping viewsherships (i.e., multi-homing). By contrast, we stick to a monopolistic market, but introduce a richer preferences structure (allowing for horizontal tastes for matches), which enables us to study targeting and price customization in such markets.

Our discussion of market decentralization is related to Loertscher and Niedermayer (2017), who compare the agency and wholesale business models by a platform that faces competition from an independent bilateral exchange. To focus on the substitutability between market places, that paper, however, abstracts from targeting and price customization.

The study of price customization is related to the literature on price discrimination. In the case of second-degree price discrimination, Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1983), and Wilson (1993) study the provision of quality/quantity in markets where agents possess private information about a vertical dimension of their preference. Our analysis differs from this literature in two important dimensions. First, the platform’s feasibility constraint (namely, the reciprocity of the matches) has no equivalent in standard markets for commodities. Second, agents’ preferences are differentiated along both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. This richer preferences structure calls for a combination of second- and third-degree price discrimination and leads to novel cross-subsidization patterns.\(^{11}\)

The paper also contributes to the literature on third-degree price discrimination. In addition to the paper by Aguirre et al. (2010) mentioned above, see Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) for an excellent overview of this literature and for recent developments. The latter paper characterizes all combinations of producer and consumer surplus that arise from different information structures about

\(^{11}\)Related is also Balestrieri and Izmalkov (2015). That paper studies price discrimination in a market with horizontally differentiated preferences by an informed seller who possesses private information about its product’s quality (equivalently, about the “position” of its good in the horizontal spectrum of agents’ preferences). The focus of that paper is information disclosure, while the focus of the present paper is matching, targeting, and price customization.
the buyers’ willingness-to-pay (alternatively, from different market segmentations). The present paper differs from the above two papers in the assumed preferences structure and in the two-sidedness of the platform’s problem, reflecting features of the matching applications under consideration.

Related is also the literature on bundling (see, among others, Armstrong (2013), Hart and Reny (2015), and the references therein). The present paper differs from that literature in two important aspects. First, while preferences are multi-dimensional both in the present paper and in that literature, in our setting, preferences can be decomposed into a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The bundling literature, instead, assumes a more general preference structure, which, however, hinders the characterization of the optimal price schedules, except in certain special cases. Second, reflecting the practices of many-to-many matching intermediaries, we assume that sales are monitored, so that prices can condition on the entire matching set of each agent. The bundling literature, by contrast, typically assumes that purchases are anonymous.

Lastly, the paper contributes to the literature on targeting in advertising markets (see, for example, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011, 2015) and Kox et al. (2017) and the references therein). Our work contributes to this literature by introducing a richer class of (non-linear) pricing strategies and by comparing the matching outcomes that emerge under a decentralized structure to their counterparts in platform markets where the matching between the advertisers and the publishers (or content providers) is mediated. Contrary to some of the papers in this literature, however, we abstain from platform competition. Importantly, we also assume that agents can perfectly communicate their preferences and face no informational frictions regarding the desirability of the matches. Eliaz and Spiegler (2016) relax these assumptions and consider the mechanism design problem of a platform that wants to allocate firms into search pools created in response to noisy preference signals provided by the consumers. Relatedly, Eliaz and Spiegler (2017) consider the problem of a profit-maximizing advertising platform eliciting the advertisers’ profiles so as to match them to consumers with preferences for diversity. These papers do not investigate the effects of uniform pricing, but rather focus on the incentives of firms to truthfully reveal their “ideal audiences.”

2 Model

A monopolistic platform matches agents from two sides of a market. Each side \( k \in \{a, b\} \) is populated by a unit-mass continuum of agents. Each agent from each side \( k \) has a bi-dimensional type \( \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \in \Theta_k \equiv V_k \times X_k \) which parametrizes both the agent’s preferences and the agent’s attractiveness.

The parameter \( v_k \in V_k \equiv [v_{\underline{k}}, v_{\overline{k}}] \subseteq \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\} \) is a shifter that captures heterogeneity in preferences along a vertical dimension. It controls for the overall utility the agent derives from interacting with a generic agent from the opposite side, before doing any profiling. The parameter \( x_k \in X_k \equiv [0, 1] \), instead, describes the agent’s location and captures heterogeneity in preferences along a horizontal dimension. It controls for the agent’s relative preferences over any two agents
from the opposite side. Figure 1 depicts the above structure. The cylinder on each side represents
the population on that side of the market. Each individual is located on the external surface of the
cylinder, with the height of the cylinder measuring the vertical type and the position on the circle
measuring the horizontal type.

Agents derive higher utility from being matched to agents whose locations are closer to their
own. Their utility also increases, over all locations, with their vertical type. We assume the utility
that an agent from side $k$ with type $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ derives from being matched to an agent from side
$l \neq k$ with type $\theta_l = (v_l, x_l)$ is represented by the function

$$u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|),$$

where $|x_k - x_l|$ is the circular (minimal) distance between the two agents’ locations. The function
$u_k$ is Lipschitz continuous, bounded, strictly increasing in $v_k$, and weakly decreasing in $|x_k - x_l|$. To
make things interesting, we assume $u_k$ is strictly decreasing in $|x_k - x_l|$ on at least one side.\(^\text{12}\)

Each agent’s type $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ is an independent draw from the absolutely continuous distri-
bution function $F_k$ with support $\Theta_k$. The total payoff that type $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ obtains from being
matched, at a price $p$, to a set of types $s_k \subseteq \Theta_l$ from side $l \neq k$ is given by

$$\pi_k(s_k, p; \theta_k) = \int_{s_k} u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) dF_l(\theta_l) - p. \quad (1)$$

The payoff that the same agent obtains outside of the platform is equal to zero.\(^\text{13}\)

We assume that the vertical dimensions $v_k$ are the agents’ private information. As for the horizon-
tal dimensions, $x_k$, to ease the exposition, in the main text, we assume they are publicly observable.
In the Appendix, however, we explain how the analysis can accommodate for the possibility that
locations are also private information, under additional assumptions on the distributions $F_k$ that
guarantee that the platform can screen the agents’ locations without leaving extra informational
rents to agents (see the proof of Lemma 1).

\(^\text{12}\)Allowing the vertical types to also contribute to the agents’ attractiveness amounts to a simple increase in the
dimensionality of the parameters that are responsible for the agents’ attractiveness. In a previous version, we considered
a more general structure that accommodates for such a higher dimensionality and verified that it does not contribute
to any important new effect. The agents’ vertical types should thus be interpreted as the usual vertical shifter that
is responsible for the overall importance each individual assigns to interacting with agents from the opposite side and
not as a proxy for an individual own vertical quality.

\(^\text{13}\)The representation in (1) assumes the agent is matched to all agents from side $l \neq k$ whose type is in $s_k$. That
matching sets are described by the agents’ types, as opposed to identities, reflects the property that, under both the
welfare- and the profit-maximizing tariffs, each agent from each side $k$ who decides to include in his matching set some
agent from side $l \neq k$ whose type is $\theta_l$ optimally chooses to include in his matching set all agents from side $l$ whose
type is $\theta_l$. The specification in (1) also implies that the utility that agent $i$ from side $k$ derives from being matched to
agent $j$ from side $l \neq k$ is invariant to who else the agent is matched with, as well as who else from the agent’s own
side is matched to agent $j$. In a previous version, we considered a more general setting where such assumptions are
relaxed. We opted here for the representation in (1) because it permits us to simplify the exposition and favors sharper
conclusions.
Let $F_k^v$ (alternatively, $E_k^v$) denote the marginal distribution of $F_k$ with respect to $v_k$ (alternatively, $x_k$), and $F_k^{v|x}$ the distribution of $v_k$ conditional on $x_k$. Then let $f_k^v$ be the density of $F_k^v$ and $\lambda_k^v \equiv f_k^v/[1 - F_k^v]$ its hazard rate. An analogous notation applies to the densities and hazard rates of the conditional distributions $F_k^{v|x}$. Finally, let $\text{Int}[V_k]$ denote the interior of the set $V_k$ and $\Sigma(\Theta_l)$ the collection of all $F_l$-measurable subsets of $\Theta_l$. Hereafter, we assume that the “virtual values”

$$\varphi_k (\theta_k, \theta_l) \equiv u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|) - \frac{1 - F_k^{v|x}(v_k|x_k)}{f_k^{v|x}(v_k|x_k)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v} (v_k, |x_k - x_l|)$$

respect the same rankings as the true values, which is the natural analog of standard regularity conditions (e.g., Myerson (1981)) in matching environments.\(^\text{14}\) The following examples illustrate the type of markets the analysis is meant for.

**Example 1. (ad exchange)** The platform is an ad exchange matching advertisers from side $a$ to publishers from side $b$. The expected profit that an advertiser of type $\theta_a = (v_a, x_a)$ obtains from an impression at the website of a publisher of type $\theta_b = (v_b, x_b)$ is given by $u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|) = v_a \phi (|x_a - x_b|)$, where $v_a$ is the advertiser’s profit per sale and where the strictly decreasing function $\phi : [0, 1/2] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ describes how the probability of a conversion (i.e., the probability the ad view turns into a sale) varies with the distance between the publisher’s profile, $x_b$, and the advertiser’s ideal audience, $x_a$. The matching (dis)utility $u_b(x_b, |x_a - x_b|)$ that a publisher of type $\theta_b = (v_b, x_b)$ obtains from displaying the ad of advertiser $\theta_a = (v_a, x_a)$ may reflect both the opportunity cost of not using the advertisement space to sell its own products, or from not selling the ad slot outside of the platform, as well as the (positive or negative) impact that the ad may have on the publisher’s viewership. Both the advertisers’ ideal type of audience, $x_a$, and each content provider’s profile, $x_b$, are observable by the platform.\(^\text{15}\) ♦

**Example 2. (media platform)** The platform is a media outlet matching viewers from side $a$ with content providers from side $b$. The utility $u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|)$ that a viewer of type $\theta_a = (v_a, x_a)$ derives from the content of a provider of type $\theta_b = (v_b, x_b)$ is increasing in the overall importance that the viewer assigns to having access to content, captured by the parameter $v_a \in V_a \subset \mathbb{R}_+$, and decreasing in the distance between the viewer’s ideal type of content, $x_a$, and the provider’s content, $x_b$. The matching (dis)utility $u_b(x_b, |x_a - x_b|)$ of the content provider may reflect the extra revenue from advertisers (which may depend on the type of viewers reached, as advertisers typically pay more to content providers with a higher exposure to viewers of certain characteristics), or the expenses from broadcasting rights paid to third parties (which are typically invariant to the type of audience reached). While each content provider’s profile (the type of content provided) is observable, each

\(^{14}\)By this we mean the following. Take any pair $(\theta_k, \theta_l), (\theta'_k, \theta'_l) \in \Theta_k \times \Theta_l$. Then $\varphi_k (\theta_k, \theta_l) \geq \varphi_k (\theta'_k, \theta'_l)$ if and only if $u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|) \geq u_k (v'_k, |x'_k - x'_l|)$.

\(^{15}\)Another example that shares the preference structure of Example 1 is that of a lobbying firm (platform) matching interest groups from side $a$ with public officials from side $b$ (see Kang and You (2016) for a detailed description of this market).
viewer’s ideal type of content may be known to the media outlet (for example, when the latter has access to data about viewers’ characteristics), or be private information (for example, as the result of privacy-protecting regulations).\footnote{The structure of this example follows closely the one typically assumed in the empirical literature on media markets (see, e.g., Goettler and Shachar 2001).}

Another example that shares the preference structure of Example 2 is that of an online intermediary matching consumers from side a with sellers from side b. Each seller’s location, \( x_b \), identifies the seller’s product variety, whereas each buyer’s location, \( x_a \), identifies the buyer’s most preferred variety. In turn, the vertical parameters \( v_a > 0 \) and \( v_b < 0 \) capture heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay and in sellers’ marginal costs, respectively.

### Tariffs and Matching Demands

The platform offers matching tariffs on each side of the market. A matching tariff \( T_k \) specifies the (possibly negative) total payment \( T_k(s_k|x_k) \) that each agent from each location \( x_k \in X_k \) is asked to pay to be matched to each set of types \( s_k \) from the opposite side of the market.\footnote{In their most general form, matching tariffs might depend on locations (which are observable by the platform), but not on the agents’ vertical dimensions, which are the agents’ private information.} To guarantee participation by all agents, we require that, for all \( x_k \), \( T_k(s_k|x_k) = 0 \) if \( s_k = \emptyset \).

Given the tariff \( T_k \), we say that the function \( s_k : \Theta_k \rightarrow \Sigma(\Theta_l) \) is a matching demand consistent with the tariff \( T_k \) if, for any \( \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \in \Theta_k \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{s}_k(\theta_k) &\in \arg \max_{s_k \in \Sigma(\Theta_l)} \left\{ \int_{\Theta_l} u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) \ dF_l(\theta_l) - T_k(s_k|x_k) \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{(2)}\]

**Definition 1.** The tariff profile \((T_k)_{k=a,b}\) is feasible if there exists a pair of matching demands \((s_k)_{k=a,b}\) consistent with \((T_k)_{k=a,b}\) satisfying the following reciprocity condition, for all \((\theta_k, \theta_l) \in \Theta_k \times \Theta_l, k, l \in \{a, b\}, l \neq k:\)

\[
\theta_l \in \mathbf{s}_k(\theta_k) \iff \theta_k \in \mathbf{s}_l(\theta_l).
\]

\[\text{(3)}\]

That is, if an agent from side \( k \) with type \( \theta_k \) finds it optimal to be matched to all agents from side \( l \neq k \) with type \( \theta_l \), then all agents from side \( l \) with type \( \theta_l \) find it optimal to be matched to all agents from side \( k \) with type \( \theta_k \).

The platform’s problem consists of choosing a pair of feasible tariffs \((T_k)_{k=a,b}\) along with a pair of matching demands \((s_k)_{k=a,b}\) consistent with the selected tariffs, that jointly maximize the platform’s profits, which are given by

\[
\sum_{k=a,b} \int_{\Theta_k} T_k(s_k(\theta_k)|x_k)dF_k(\theta_k).
\]

\[\text{(4)}\]

A pair of tariffs \((T^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) is profit-maximizing if there exist matching demands \((s^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) consistent with \((T^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) such that the platform’s profits under \((T^*_k, s^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) are at least as high as under any
other quadruple \((T_k, s_k)_{k=a,b}\), where \((T_k)_{k=a,b}\) is a pair of feasible tariffs and \((s_k)_{k=a,b}\) are demands consistent with \((T_k)_{k=a,b}\). Hereafter we denote by \((T^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) a pair of profit-maximizing tariffs, and by \((s^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) the matching demands that, together with with \((T^*_k)_{k=a,b}\), maximize the platform’s profits.

3 Customized Tariffs

We now introduce a class of tariffs that plays an important role in the analysis below. Under such tariffs, which we call customized, the platform offers to each side-\(k\) agent a baseline matching set at a baseline price, along with a collection of personalized prices that the agent can use to customize his matching set. The total price of the customization is separable in the type of matches added to the baseline configuration, with each side-\(k\) agent located at \(x_k\), a form of third degree price discrimination. Customized tariffs capture important features of real-world matching plans offered by platforms such as cable TV providers, ad exchanges, and online retailers. Before proceeding to the definition, we need to introduce the following piece of notation: Given any matching set \(s_k\), any location \(x_l\), we let \(q_{x_l}(s_k)\) denote the “mass” of side-\(l\) agents located at \(x_l\) included in the matching set \(s_k\).

Definition 2. The tariff \(T_k\) is customized if there exists a collection of triples

\[
\{ (s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot); x_k) : x_k \in X_k \},
\]

one for each location \(x_k \in X_k\), such that each side-\(k\) agent located at \(x_k\) choosing the matching set \(s_k \in \Sigma(\Theta_l)\) is asked to make a total payment equal to

\[
T_k(s_k|x_k) = T_k(x_k) + \int_0^1 \rho_k(q_{x_l}(s_k)|x_l;x_k) dx_l,
\]

with \(\rho_k(q_{x_l}(s_k)|x_l;x_k) = 0\) for all \(x_l \in X_l\).

A customized tariff can thus be thought of as a collection of matching plans, one for each location \(x_k\). Each plan comes with a baseline configuration, given by the default set of types \(s_k(x_k)\) from side \(l \neq k\) included in the package, and a baseline price \(T_k(x_k)\). Each agent under the plan \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot); x_k)\) can then customize his matching set by adding extra matches. The cost of the customization is separable in the type of matches added to the baseline configuration, with each schedule \(\rho_k(q_{x_l}|x_l;x_k)\) describing the non-linear fee for raising the amount of \(x_l\)-agents from the default level \(q_{x_l}(s_k(x_k))\) to \(q_{x_l}\).\(^{19}\) Importantly, each price \(\rho_k(q_{x_l}|x_l;x_k)\) depends on the baseline plan,

\(^{18}\)Hereafter, we abuse of terminology by referring to the density of agents of a certain type as the “mass” of agents of that type.

\(^{19}\)The schedules \(\rho_k(q_{x_l}|x_l;x_k)\) also specify the price for reducing the amount of \(x_l\)-agents below the default level. However, as we show in the Appendix, in equilibrium, under both the profit-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing tariffs, the induced demands are such that \(s_k(\theta_k) \supseteq s_k(x_k)\) for all \(\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)\), \(k = a, b\).
Figure 2: Matching sets under profit-maximizing tariffs. The shaded area in the figure describes the matching set for an agent from side $a$ located at $x_a = 1/2$.

which is conveniently indexed by the location of the agents targeted by the plan. The dependence of the price $\rho_k(q_{xl}|x_l;x_k)$ on the plan $x_k$ is a manifestation of a particular form of bundling. In particular, note that a customized tariff combines elements of second-degree price discrimination (each price function $\rho_k(q_{xl}|x_l;x_k)$ is possibly non-linear in $q_{xl}$) with elements of third-degree price discrimination (each non-linear price function $\rho_k(q_{xl}|x_l;x_k)$ depends on the plan, and hence the location, of the side-$k$ agents).

Clearly, not all tariffs are customized, in the sense of Definition 2. For instance, tariffs that condition the price for the $x_l$-matches on the demand for the $x'_l$-matches are not customized.

The following result shows that the platform can attain maximal profits by offering a pair of customized tariffs.

**Lemma 1.** *(properties of the optimum)* The following are true:

1. there exists a pair of customized tariffs $(T_k^*)_{k=a,b}$ that are profit-maximizing;

2. the matching demands $(s_k^*)_{k=a,b}$ consistent with the profit-maximizing customized tariffs $(T_k^*)_{k=a,b}$ are described by threshold functions $t_k^* : \Theta_k \times X_l \rightarrow V_l$ such that

$$s_k^*(\theta_k) = \{(v_l,x_l) \in \Theta_l : v_l > t_k^*(\theta_k,x_l)\},$$

with the function $t_k^*$ non-increasing in $v_k$ and non-decreasing in $|x_k - x_l|$.

Under the profit-maximizing tariffs, for any given location $x_k$, the matching sets demanded by those agents with higher vertical types are supersets of those demanded by agents with lower vertical types. Moreover, side-$l$ agents located at $x_l$ with a low vertical type $v_l$ are included in the matching sets of the side-$k$ agents located at $x_k$ only if the latter’s vertical types $v_k$ are large enough. Finally,
the range of vertical types that an agent of type $\theta_k$ is matched to at location $x_l$ is smaller the larger is the distance $|x_k - x_l|$ between locations. Figure 2 illustrates these properties.

To gain intuition, note that the marginal profits the platform obtains by matching type $\theta_l = (v_l, x_l)$ from side $l$ to type $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ from side $k$ are positive if, and only if,

$$
\varphi_k (\theta_k, \theta_l) + \varphi_l (\theta_l, \theta_k) \geq 0.
$$

(6)

Echoing Bulow and Roberts (1989), the above condition can be interpreted as stating that two agents are matched if, and only if, their joint marginal revenue to the platform is weakly positive (we elaborate on this point further in the next subsection). That virtual values respect the same rankings as the true values implies existence of a threshold $t^*_{k}(\theta_k, x_l)$ such that Condition (6) is satisfied if, and only if, $v_l \geq t^*_{k}(\theta_k, x_l)$, with the threshold $t^*_{k}(\theta_k, x_l)$ non-increasing in $v_k$ and non-decreasing in $|x_k - x_l|$. Jointly, these properties imply that, as $v_k$ increases, the matching set of type $\theta_k$ expands to include new agents with lower vertical types. Moreover, as $v_k$ increases, the vertical type of the marginal agents located at $x_l$ added to the matching set $s^*_k(v_k, x_k)$ are higher the “farther” away the location $x_l$ is from $x_k$.

Remark 1. In the Appendix, we show that the result in Lemma 1 extends to markets in which locations are private information provided two extra requirements are satisfied. First, the distributions are symmetric across locations, in which case, when the tariffs are also symmetric, the matching demands of any two types $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ and $\theta'_k = (v_k, x'_k)$ with the same vertical dimension are location translations of one another. This guarantees that the platform can screen the agents’ locations without leaving extra informational rents to the agents. Moreover, this condition also rules out the optimality of bunching and lotteries over matching sets, thus permitting us to highlight the role of targeting and price customization in the simplest possible manner. Second, the platform is able to restrict the set of permissible customizations the agents can choose from. This permits the platform to restrict the agents to select only those customizations that would be selected by some agents under complete information about locations. Restricting the set of permissible customizations may be necessary to prevent the agents from misreporting their locations so as to pay cheaper prices for the matches they like the most.

3.1 Lerner-Wilson formula for matching schedules

We now derive further properties of the customized tariffs that maximize the platform’s profits. Consider first the problem of a side-$k$ agent of type $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ under the plan $x_k$. The mass of agents located at $x_l$ demanded by type $\theta_k$ is given by

$$
\hat{q}_{x_l}(\theta_k) \in \arg \max_{q \in [0, f_l^*(x_l)]} \left\{ u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) \cdot q - \rho_k(q|x_l; x_k) \right\}.
$$

\(^{20}\)Recall that the maximal amount of side-$l$ agents that are located at $x_l$ is $f_l^*(x_l)$. 


Assuming the price schedule \( \rho_k(\cdot|x_l;x_k) \) is convex and differentiable in \( q \), with derivative \( \rho'_k(\cdot|x_l;x_k) \), it follows that \( \hat{q}_{x_l}(\theta_k) \) is a solution to the following first-order condition\(^{21}\)

\[
u_k(v_k,|x_k-x_l|) = \rho'_k(\hat{q}_{x_l}(\theta_k)|x_l;x_k)
\]

whenever \( \hat{q}_{x_l}(\theta_k) \) is interior, i.e., whenever \( \hat{q}_{x_l}(\theta_k) \in (0,f_l^*(x_l)) \).

Next, for any pair of locations \( x_k, x_l \in [0,1] \), and any “interior” marginal price \( \rho'_k \in \{ u_k(v_k,|x_k-x_l|), u_k(\bar{v}_k,|x_k-x_l|) \} \), let \( \hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho'_k|x_k) \) denote the value of \( v_k \) that makes each agent from side \( k \) located at \( x_k \) indifferent between adding the extra \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_l \)-agents or not, given the marginal price \( \rho'_k \). Note that, irrespective of \( q \), \( \hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho'_k|x_k) \) is implicitly defined by

\[
u_k(v_k,|x_k-x_l|) = \rho'_k.
\]

If, instead, \( \rho'_k \notin \{ u_k(v_k,|x_k-x_l|), u_k(\bar{v}_k,|x_k-x_l|) \} \), let \( \hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho'_k|x_k) = v_k \) for all \( \rho'_k < u_k(v_k,|x_k-x_l|) \), and \( \hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho'_k|x_k) = \bar{v}_k \) for all \( \rho'_k > u_k(\bar{v}_k,|x_k-x_l|) \).

Note that, because the price function \( \rho_k(\cdot|x_l;x_k) \) is strictly convex over the range of quantities purchased in equilibrium, the marginal price \( \rho'_k \) uniquely identifies the quantity \( q \). Furthermore, because agents with higher vertical types demand larger matching sets, the demand for the \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_l \)-agents by the \( x_k \)-agents, at the marginal price \( \rho'_k \), is given by\(^{22}\)

\[
D_k(\rho'_k|x_l;x_k) \equiv \left[ 1 - F_k^{\rho'_k}(\hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho'_k|x_k) \mid x_k) \right] f_k^*(x_k),
\]

where, as above, we dropped the arguments \( (q|x_l;x) \) of the marginal price to lighten the notation. Accordingly, \( D_k(\rho'_k|x_l;x_k) \) coincides with the mass of agents from side \( k \) located at \( x_k \) whose vertical type exceeds \( \hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho'_k|x_k) \).

Using (9), we then define the elasticity of the demand by the side-\( k \) agents located at \( x_k \) (in short, the \( x_k \)-demand) for the \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_l \)-agents with respect to its marginal price \( \rho'_k \) by (once again, the arguments of the marginal price \( \rho'_k \) are dropped to ease the notation)

\[
\varepsilon_k(\rho'_k|x_l;x_k) \equiv - \frac{\partial D_k(\rho'_k|x_l;x_k)}{\partial (\rho'_k)} \cdot \frac{\rho'_k}{D_k(\rho'_k|x_l;x_k)}.
\]

The next proposition characterizes the price schedules associated with the profit-maximizing customized tariffs of Lemma 1 in terms of the location-specific elasticities of the demands on both sides of the market. To ease the exposition, the dependence of the marginal prices, \( \rho_k^{x_l} \), the demands \( D_k \), and the elasticities, \( \varepsilon_k \), on the locations \( (x_a,x_b) \) is dropped from all the formulas in the proposition.

\(^{21}\)The strict convexity of the price function \( \rho_k(\cdot|x_l;x_k) \) over the set of quantities purchased in equilibrium is a direct implication of the supermodularity of the agents’ payoffs \( u_k(v_k,|x_k-x_l|) \cdot q \) in \( (v_k,q) \).

\(^{22}\)By the demand for the \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_l \)-agents by the \( x_k \)-agents, we mean the mass of agents from side \( k \) located at \( x_k \) who demand at least \( q \) matches with the \( x_l \)-agents.
Proposition 1. \textit{(Lerner-Wilson price schedules)} The price schedules $\rho^a_k$ associated with the profit-maximizing customized tariffs $T^*_k$ are differentiable and convex over the equilibrium range.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, for all pair of locations $(x_a, x_b)$, and all interior pairs of demands $(q_a, q_b)$ such that $q_a = D_b(\rho^a_k(q_b))$ and $q_b = D_a(\rho^a_k(q_a))$,\textsuperscript{24} the marginal prices $\rho^a_k(q_a)$ and $\rho^b_k(q_b)$ jointly satisfy the following Lerner-Wilson formulas

\[
\frac{\rho^a_k(q_a)}{\text{net effect on side-}a \text{ profits}} \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon_a(\rho^a_k(q_a))} \right) + \frac{\rho^b_k(q_b)}{\text{net effect on side-}b \text{ profits}} \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon_b(\rho^b_k(q_b))} \right) = 0. \tag{11}
\]

The Lerner-Wilson formulas (11) jointly determine the price schedules on both sides of the market. Intuitively, these formulas require that the marginal contribution to profits from adding to the matching sets of the $x_k$-agents the $q_k$-th unit of the $x_l$-agents coincide with the marginal contribution to profits from adding to the matching sets of the $x_l$-agents the $q_l$-th unit of the $x_k$-agents, where $q_k$ and $q_l$ are jointly related by the reciprocity condition in the proposition. As for the standard Lerner-Wilson formula for monopoly/monopsony pricing, on each side, the marginal contribution to profits of such an adjustment has two terms: the term $\rho^a_k$ captures the marginal benefit from adding the extra agents, whereas the semi-inverse-elasticity term $\rho^a_k[\varepsilon_a(\rho^a_k)]^{-1}$ capture its associated inframarginal losses.

Importantly, as anticipated above, the quantities $q_k$ and $q_l$ at which the conditional price schedules are evaluated have to clear the market, as required by the reciprocity condition (3). The result in the proposition uses the fact that the demands under the optimal tariffs satisfy the threshold structure in Lemma 1 to establish that the mass of $x_k$-agents that, at the marginal price $\rho^*_k(q_k)$, demand $q_k$ agents or more of type $x_l$ coincide with the mass $D_k(\rho^*_k(q_k))$ of $x_k$-agents with vertical type above $\hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho^*_k|x_k)$, where recall that $\hat{v}_{x_l}(\rho^*_k|x_k)$ is the threshold type for whom the utility of interacting with the $x_l$-agents equals the marginal price $\rho^*_k$, as defined in (8). Together with reciprocity, Lemma 1 then also implies that the mass $q_k$ of $x_l$-agents that, at the marginal price $\rho^*_k(q_k)$, demand $q_l = D_k(\rho^*_k(q_k))$ or more of the $x_k$-agents coincides with the mass of $x_l$-agents with vertical type above $\hat{v}_{x_k}(\rho^*_k|x_l)$.

Finally, that the price schedules $\rho^a_k(q_k)$ are convex in $q_k$ reflects the fact that the matching demands of the $x_k$-agents for the $x_l$-agents are increasing in the vertical types $v_k$. As a result, the marginal price $\rho^a_k(q_k)$ for the $q_k$-unit of the $x_l$-agents has to increase with $q_k$.

The formulas in (11) also reveal how profit-maximizing platforms optimally cross-subsidize interactions among agents from multiple sides of the market while accounting for heterogeneity in preferences along both vertical and horizontal dimensions. In particular, the price schedules offered at any two locations $x_k$ and $x_l$ are a function of the \textit{location-specific demand elasticities} $\varepsilon_k(\cdot|x_l; x_k)$ at these locations. This reflects the fact that, at the optimum, platforms make use of information about horizontal preferences to offer matching tariffs that extract as much surplus as possible from

\textsuperscript{23}Namely, at any $q_l \in (q_{x_l}(s_b(x_k, x_l + 0.5)), q_{x_l}(s_b(x_k, x_l)))$, $k, l = a, b, l \neq k$.

\textsuperscript{24}The pair $(q_a, q_b)$ is interior for a location pair $(x_a, x_b)$ if $q_k \in (0, f^l_l(x_l))$ for all $k, l \in \{a, b\}$.
agents from both sides. As we show below, the ability to tailor price schedules to locations (a form of third-degree price discrimination) has important implications for the composition of the demands prevailing under optimal tariffs.

The formulas in (11) define a system of structural equations that relate the cut-off types on both sides of the market. The spirit of these formulas is the same as in the reduced-form approach pioneered by Saez (2001) in the context of optimal taxation. As such, they can be used by the econometrician to estimate the distribution of the agents’ preferences from data on price schedules and match volumes. The work by Kahn and You (2016) follows a related strategy in the matching market for lobbying, but abstracts from horizontal differentiation.

3.2 Distortions and Horizontal Differentiation

We now investigate how market-power distortions in the supply of matching opportunities vary with the agents’ horizontal preferences. In particular, we are interested in whether, relative to efficiency, agents are primarily precluded from interacting with partners whom they like the most (closer to their bliss point), or the least (further away from their bliss point). The analysis in this section, which, to the best of our knowledge, has no parallel in the price discrimination literature, has important implications for how policy makers may consider intervening in certain platform markets.

Let
\[ \sum_{k=a,b} \int_{\theta_k} s_k(\theta_k) u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) dF_l(\theta_l) dF_k(\theta_k), \]
(12)
denote the welfare associated with a pair of matching demands consistent with the feasible tariffs \( T_k \), \( k = a, b \). It is straight-forward to see that a pair of feasible tariffs \((T_k^*)_{k=a,b}\) is welfare-maximizing if and only if there exist matching demands consistent with the tariffs \((T_k^*)_{k=a,b}\) satisfying the following property: For any two agents with types \( \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \) and \( \theta_l = (v_l, x_l) \),
\[ \theta_l \in s_k(\theta_k) \iff u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) + u_l(v_l, |x_k - x_l|) \geq 0. \]
In turn, this means that there exist threshold functions \( t_k^* (\cdot) \) such that the tariffs \((T_k^*)_{k=a,b}\) are welfare-maximizing if and only if the matching demands they induce are such that \( \theta_l \in s_k(\theta_k) \) if and only if \( v_l \geq t_k^* (\theta_k, x_l) \), for any \( \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \in \Theta_k \), any \( \theta_l = (v_l, x_l) \in \Theta_l \), \( k, l \in \{a, b\}, l \neq k \).

Arguments similar to those establishing Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 then imply that the matching demands that maximize welfare can be induced by offering customized tariffs \( T_a^e \) and \( T_b^e \) where the associated marginal price schedules \( \rho_k^e \)' jointly solve
\[ \rho_a^e(q_a) + \rho_b^e(q_b) = 0, \]

25To see this, fix \((x_a, x_b)\) and drop it to ease the notation. For any \( q_a \in [0, f_a^*(x_b)] \), the result in Lemma 1 implies that the most economical way of giving the \( x_a \)-agents access to \( q_a \) agents located at \( x_b \) is to match them to all \( x_b \)-agents whose vertical type is above \( \tilde{v}_b \), with \( \tilde{v}_b \) defined by \([1 - F_a^*(\tilde{v}_b, x_b)]f_b^*(x_b) = q_a \). For any \( q_b \in [0, f_b^*(x_a)] \), the marginal price \( \rho_b^e(q_b) \) is then equal to \( u_b(\tilde{v}_b, x_a - x_b) \). Given \( q_a \) and \( \rho_b^e(q_b) \), the marginal price \( \rho_a^*(q_a) \) is then given by equation (11). Once \( \rho_a^*(q_a) \) is identified, the threshold \( v_a = t_b^*(\tilde{v}_b, x_b, x_a) \) is given by the unique solution to \( u_a(v_a, x_a - x_b) = \rho_a^*(q_a) \).
Figure 3: The welfare-maximizing demand threshold $t^e_a(\theta_a, x_b)$ (dashed blue curve) and the profit-maximizing demand threshold $t^a(\theta_a, x_b)$ (solid black curve) for agents on side $a$ located at $x_a = .5$ in a market in which the side-$b$ preferences are location-invariant and the side-$a$ distortions decrease with distance.

for ant pair of locations $(x_a, x_b)$ and any pair $q_a$ and $q_b$ such that $q_a = D_b(\rho'_b(q_b))$ and $q_b = D_a(\rho'_a(q_a))$.

We are now ready to formalize the idea that distortions due to market power increase (alternatively, decrease) with distance.

**Definition 3. (distortions and distance)** Distortions on side $k \in \{a, b\}$ decrease (alternatively, increase) with distance if, and only if, for any $\theta_k \in \Theta_k$,

$$
\Delta(\theta_k, x_l) \equiv u_l(t^e_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_k|) - u_l(t^e_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_k|)
$$

decreases (alternatively, increases) with $|x_k - x_l|$.

Hence, fixing the type $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ of a side-$k$ agent, distortions decrease with distance when the difference between the minimal utility asked by a profit-maximizing platform and by a welfare-maximizing platform to an $x_l$-agent to be matched with each side-$k$ agent of type $\theta_k$ decreases with the distance between the two agents’ locations. Note that the difference in utilities reduces to the difference in the thresholds when the side-$l$’s preferences are invariant to locations. Figure 3 illustrates the case of a market in which distortions decrease with distance and the side-$b$ preferences are invariant to locations.

The next definition identifies the key property of the matching demands that is responsible for whether distortions increase or decrease with distance.

**Definition 4.** The semi-elasticities of the side-$k$ matching demands are increasing (alternatively, decreasing) in distance if, and only if, given any $x_k \in X_k$, any $\rho'_k \in \mathbb{R}$, the function

$$
\frac{\varepsilon_k(\rho'_k | x_l; x_k)}{\rho'_k}
$$

(13)
is increasing (alternatively, decreasing) in $|x_l - x_k|$. The semi-elasticities are increasing (alternatively, decreasing) in price if, and only if, for any pair $(x_k, x_l) \in X_k \times X_l$, the function in (13) is increasing (alternatively, decreasing) in $\rho_k^l$.

**Proposition 2. (distortions under customized pricing)** Either one of the following two sets of conditions suffice for distortions on side $k$ to decrease with distance:

(1.a) the side-$k$ semi-elasticities are increasing in distance and decreasing in price, whereas the side-$l$ semi-elasticities are increasing in both distance and price;

(1.b) $u_k$ submodular, $x_l$ and $v_l$ independent, the hazard rate for $F^v_l$ increasing in $v_l$, $u_l$ submodular and concave in $v_l$.

Either one of the following two sets of conditions suffice for distortions on side $k$ to increase with distance:

(2.a) the side-$k$ semi-elasticities are decreasing in distance and increasing in price, whereas the side-$l$ semi-elasticities are decreasing in both distance and price.

(2.b) $u_k$ supermodular, $x_l$ and $v_l$ independent, the hazard rate for $F^v_l$ decreasing in $v_l$, $u_l$ supermodular and convex in $v_l$.

Recall that, under the matching demands induced by the profit-maximizing tariffs, a pair of agents with types $\theta_k$ and $\theta_l$ is matched if, and only if, $\varphi_k (\theta_k, \theta_l) + \varphi_l (\theta_l, \theta_k) \geq 0$. Instead, under the demands induced by the welfare-maximizing tariffs, the same pair is matched if, and only if, $u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|) + u_l (v_l, |x_k - x_l|) \geq 0$. Also note that the virtual values $\varphi_k (\theta_k, \theta_l)$ differ from the true values $u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|)$ by the “markup handicaps”

$$
\frac{1 - F^v_l (v_k|x_k)}{f^v_l (v_k|x_k)} \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v_k} (v_k, |x_k - x_l|)
$$

which control for the surplus the platform must leave to the agents to induce them to reveal their private information and naturally reflect the platform’s profit-maximization objective. When prices are interior, the handicaps are equal to the inverse of the semi-elasticities of the matching demand, that is,

$$
\frac{1 - F^v_l (v_k|x_k)}{f^v_l (v_k|x_k)} \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v_k} (v_k, |x_k - x_l|) = \frac{\rho'_{lk}}{\varepsilon_k (\rho'_{kl} |x_l; x_k|)} |_{\rho'_{kl} = u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|)} \quad .
$$

To understand the distortions brought in by profit-maximization (vis-à-vis welfare maximization), it is convenient to consider the wedge

$$
\Delta (\theta_k, x_l) = \frac{1 - F^v_l (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l) |x_l)}{f^v_l (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l) |x_l)} \frac{\partial u_l}{\partial v_l} (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|) + \frac{1 - F^v_l (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l) |x_l)}{f^v_l (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l) |x_l)} \frac{\partial u_l}{\partial v_l} (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|)
$$

$$
= \frac{\rho'_{lk}}{\varepsilon_k (\rho'_{kl} |x_l; x_k|)} |_{\rho'_{kl} = u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|)} + \frac{\rho'_{lk}}{\varepsilon_l (\rho'_{lk} |x_k; x_l|)} |_{\rho'_{lk} = u_l (t^*_k (\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|)} \quad .
$$

26Strictly so, if at least one of the properties is strict.

27That is, when $\rho_k \in [u_k (v_k, |x_k - x_l|), u_k (\bar{v}_k, |x_k - x_l|)]$.

19
The results in parts (1.a) and (2.a) in the proposition then follow directly from the monotonicities of the handicaps (equivalently, of the semi-elasticities), along with the fact that, fixing \( \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \), as the distance \( |x_k - x_l| \) between \( \theta_k \) and \( \theta_l \) increases, the maximal price \( \rho_k' = u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) \) that type \( \theta_k \) is willing to pay to interact with the \( x_l \)-agents declines, whereas the price \( \rho_l' = u_l(t_k^*(\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|) \) that the platform asks to the \( x_l \)-agents to interact with type \( \theta_k \) increases.

The results in parts (1.b) and (2.b), instead, use the specific relation between the demand elasticities and the primitives in (15) to identify joint conditions on match values and type distributions guaranteeing that the sum of the markups on the two sides is monotone in distance, accounting for the joint variations in the marginal prices. Importantly, both the conditions involving the demand elasticities as well as those involving the match values and the type distributions can be empirically estimated using techniques similar to those in the empirical auction literature. Whether the econometrician may prefer working with the elasticities or with the primitive conditions is likely to depend on the application under consideration and, in particular, on the type of data available.

As we show in the next two sections, conditions similar to those in Proposition 2 are also responsible for whether targeting and welfare are higher under customized or uniform pricing, as well as for whether welfare is higher in a decentralized or in a centralized market.

4 Uniform Pricing

Stringent regulations on the transfer of personal data together with restrictions on bundling imposed on certain platforms are expected to hinder the customization of prices and favor instead uniform pricing. In this section, we study platforms’ behavior when subject to uniform-pricing obligations.

Uniform Pricing and Aggregate Demand Elasticities

**Definition 5.** The tariff \( T_k \) is consistent with **uniform pricing** if there exists a collection of (possibly non-linear) price schedules \( p_k(q|x_l) \), one for each location \( x_l \in X_l \), such that the total payment asked by the platform to the side-\( k \)-agents for each matching set \( s_k \in \Sigma(\Theta_l) \) is given by

\[
T_k(s_k) = \int_0^1 p_k(q_{x_l}(s_k)|x_l)dx_l.
\]  

(16)

Hence, under uniform pricing, the tariff offered by the platform to the side-\( k \)-agents consists of a collection of non-linear price schedules, \( (p_k(q|x_l))_{x_l \in [0,1]} \), one for each type of the side-\( l \) agents, with each schedule \( p_k(q|x_l) \) specifying the total price each side-\( k \) agent has to pay to be matched to \( q \) agents from side \( l \neq k \) located at \( x_l \in [0,1] \). Importantly, contrary to the case of price customization, the price \( p_k(q|x_l) \) is independent of the agent’s own location, \( x_k \).

Suppose the platform is forced to adopt a uniform price schedule \( p_a(\cdot|x_b) \) on side \( a \) (with marginal schedule \( p'_a(\cdot|x_b) \)). Recall that, for each location \( x_b \in [0,1] \), and each quantity \( q \in [0, f^*_b(x_b)] \), such a schedule specifies the price that the side-\( a \) agents have to pay to be matched to \( q \) agents from side \( b \)
located at \(x_b\). Under such a schedule, the aggregate demand (over all locations \(x_a\)) for the \(q\)-th unit of the \(x_b\)-agents at the marginal price \(p'_a(q|x_b)\) is equal to

\[
D_a(p'_a|x_b) = \int_0^1 D_a(p'_a|x_b;x_a) \, dx_a = \int_0^1 \left\{ 1 - F_a^{u|x}(\hat{\varepsilon}_x(p'_a|x_a|x_a) \right\} f_a^x(x_a) \, dx_a,
\]

where, as in the previous section, \(D_a(p'_a|x_b;x_a)\) denotes the mass of agents located at \(x_a\) that demand \(q\) units or more of the \(x_b\)-agents, and where, as in the previous section, the arguments \((q|x_b)\) of the marginal prices \(p'_a(q|x_b)\) have been dropped, to ease the exposition.

The elasticity of the side-\(a\) aggregate demand for the \(q\)-th unit of the \(x_b\)-agents with respect to the marginal price \(p'_a\) is then equal to

\[
\tilde{\varepsilon}_a(p'_a|x_b) = -\frac{\partial D_a(p'_a|x_b)}{\partial (p'_a)} \cdot \frac{p'_a}{D_a(p'_a|x_b)} = \mathbb{E}_{\bar{H}(x_a|x_b,p'_a)} \left[ \varepsilon_a(p'_a|x_b;\hat{x}_a) \right],
\]

where \(\varepsilon_a(p'_a|x_b;\hat{x}_a)\) is the elasticity of the demand by the \(x_a\)-agents, as defined in (10), and where the expectation is over \(X_a = [0,1]\), under the distribution \(\bar{H}(\cdot|x_b,p'_a)\) whose density is equal to

\[
\bar{h}(x_a|x_b,p'_a) = \frac{D_a(p'_a|x_b;x_a)}{\int_0^1 D_a(p'_a|x_b;x'_a) \, dx'_a}.
\]

Hereafter, we refer to \(\tilde{\varepsilon}_a(\cdot|x_b)\) as the aggregate elasticity of the side-\(a\) demand for the \(q\)-th unit of the \(x_b\)-matches. This elasticity measures the percentage variation in the mass of agents from side \(a\) that demand at least \(q\) matches with the side-\(b\) agents located at \(x_b\) in response to a percentage change in the marginal price for the \(q\)-th unit of the \(x_b\)-agents. It is also equal to the average (over the side-\(a\) locations) elasticity of the \(x_a\)-demands for the \(q\)-th unit of the \(x_b\)-agents with respect to the marginal price \(p'_a\), where the average is under a distribution that assigns to each location \(x_a\) a weight proportional to the mass of agents \(D_a(p'_a|x_b,x_a)\) located at \(x_a\) demanding \(q\) units, or more, of the \(x_b\)-agents.

The next proposition derives properties of the profit-maximizing tariffs \(T_{a}^u\) and \(T_{b}^u\) offered by a platform that is constrained to price uniformly on side \(a\). To ease the exposition, the dependence of the marginal price \(p'_a\) and of the aggregate elasticity \(\tilde{\varepsilon}_a\) on \(x_b\), as well as the dependence of the marginal price \(\hat{\rho}'_{b}\) and of the local elasticity \(\varepsilon_b\) on \((x_a,x_b)\), are dropped from all the formulas in the proposition.

**Proposition 3. (uniform pricing)** Suppose the platform is constrained to price uniformly on side \(a\), but is free to offer any tariff on side \(b\). The profit-maximizing tariffs \((T_{k}^u)_{k=a,b}\) are such that \(T_{b}^u\) is customized. The price schedules \(p_a^u\) and \(\hat{\rho}_b^u\) associated with the profit-maximizing tariffs \((T_{k}^u)_{k=a,b}\) are differentiable and convex over the equilibrium ranges.\(^{28}\) Moreover, for all locations \(x_b \in X_b\), and all interior quantity pairs \((q_{a},q_{b}(\bar{x}_a))\), \(\bar{x}_a \in X_a\), such that

\[
q_a = D_b(\hat{\rho}'_{b}(q_{b}|x_b;x_a)|x_b;x_a) \quad \text{and} \quad q_{b}(\bar{x}_a) = D_a(p_a^{u'}(q_{a})|x_b;x_a),
\]

\(^{28}\)Namely, at any \(q_{a} \in [q_{a}(s_{b}(\bar{v}_{a},x_{b}+5)),q_{a}(s_{a}(\bar{v}_{a},x_{b}))]\) and \(q_{b} \in [q_{b}(s_{b}(\bar{v}_{b},x_{b})),q_{b}(s_{b}(\bar{v}_{b},x_{b}))]\).
the marginal prices schedules \( p^u_a \) and \( \rho^u_b \) jointly satisfy the following optimality condition:

\[
p^u_a(q_a) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\varepsilon}_a(p^u_a(q_a))} \right) + \mathbb{E}_{H(\hat{x}_a|x_b,p^u_a(q_a))} \left[ \rho^u_b(q_b(\hat{x}_a)) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\varepsilon}_b(\rho^u_b(q_b(\hat{x}_a)))} \right) \right] = 0, \tag{17}
\]

where \( H(x_a|x_b,p^u_a) \) is the distribution over \( X_a \) whose density is given by

\[
h(x_a|x_b,p^u_a) = \frac{\partial D_a(p^u_a|x_b;x_a)}{\partial (p^u_a)} \left( \frac{\partial D_a(p^u_a|x_b)}{\partial (p^u_a)} \right)^{-1}.
\]

The result in the proposition provides structural equations similar to those in Proposition 1, but adapted to account for the imposition of uniform pricing on side \( a \). Such structural conditions jointly determine the price schedules on both sides of the market. Under uniform pricing, the price schedule on side \( a \) for the sale of the \( x_b \)-agents cannot condition on the location of the side-\( a \) agents. As a result, the markup for the sale of the \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_b \)-matches is constant across all side-\( a \) locations \( x_a \). The relevant elasticity for determining this markup is then the aggregate elasticity \( \bar{\varepsilon}_a(\cdot|x_b) \), rather than the location-specific elasticities \( \varepsilon_a(\cdot|x_b;x_a) \) in the Lerner-Wilson formula (11). Interestingly, even if the platform can price discriminate on side \( b \) by offering different price schedules \( \rho^u_b(q|x_a;x_b) \) to the side-\( b \) agents as a function of their locations, \( x_b \), when it is constrained to price uniformly on side \( a \), the cost of procuring the \( x_b \)-agents is the average (mark-up augmented) price

\[
\mathbb{E}_{H(\hat{x}_a|x_b,p^u_a(q_a))} \left[ \rho^u_b(q_b(\hat{x}_a)) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\varepsilon}_b(\rho^u_b(q_b(\hat{x}_a)))} \right) \right]
\]

charged to the \( x_b \)-agents for their interactions with the various \( x_a \)-agents demanding \( q_a \), or more, of the \( x_a \)-matches.

Also note that, by virtue of the reciprocity condition (3), the quantities \( q_a \) and \( q_b \) at which the price schedules are evaluated have to clear the market for any pair of locations \((x_a,x_b)\). For this to be possible, it is important that the platform be able to price discriminate on side \( b \), as this ensures that the platform has enough price instruments to procure the side-\( b \) matches demanded by the side-\( a \) agents, while respecting reciprocity.

Finally, as in the case where price discrimination is allowed on both sides, the convexity of the price schedules \( p^u_a(\cdot|x_b) \) and \( \rho^u_b(\cdot|x_a;x_b) \) in \( q_a \) and \( q_b \), respectively, reflects the fact that the matching demands of those agents with a higher vertical type are supersets of those with a lower vertical type.

As revealed by the pricing formulas (11) and (17), the effects of the imposition of uniform pricing on side \( a \) on the composition of the matching sets on both sides hinge on the comparison between the aggregate inverse-elasticity \( 1/\bar{\varepsilon}_a(\cdot) \) and the location-specific inverse-elasticities \( 1/\varepsilon_a(\cdot|x_a) \) on side \( a \), as well as the comparison between the average inverse-elasticity \( \mathbb{E}_{H(\hat{x}_a|p^u_a)} [1/\bar{\varepsilon}_b(\cdot|x_a)] \) of the \( x_b \)-demands for the various \( x_a \)-matches and the inverse-elasticities \( 1/\varepsilon_b(\cdot|x_a) \) of the same demands for the specific matches. In turn, such comparisons naturally reflect how the average virtual valuations
on both sides compare to their location-specific counterparts. To see this, first note that, given the 

\[
\frac{1}{\varepsilon_a(p_a')} = \mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a|x_b,p_a') \left[ \frac{1}{\varepsilon_a(p_a'|x_b;\tilde{x}_a)} \right].
\]

(18)

That is, the inverse aggregate elasticity of the side-a demand for the q-th unit of the x_b agents, 

\[\frac{1}{\varepsilon_a(p_a')}\] is equal to the average of the various location-specific inverse elasticities of the side-a agents for the same unit of the same x_b-matches, where the average is under the same measure \(H(x_a|x_b,p_a')\) introduced in the proposition.

Next, let \(\tilde{v}_b\) be implicitly defined by

\[
\left(1 - F^v_{x_b}(\tilde{v}_b|x_b)\right) f^x_b(x_b) = q.
\]

Note that \(\tilde{v}_b\) denotes the value of the vertical dimension of the x_b-agents such that the mass of x_b-agents with a vertical type higher than \(\tilde{v}_b\) is equal to q. Using the characterization in Lemma 1, we then have that the optimality condition (17) can be re-written as

\[
\frac{\mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a|x_b,p_a')}{\varepsilon_a(p_a')} \left[ \varphi_a(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p_a'|\tilde{x}_a)\mathbb{I}(\tilde{x}_a) - \tilde{x}_a,\tilde{v}_b,x_b) \right] + \frac{\mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a|x_b,p_a')}{\varepsilon_a(p_a')} \left[ \varphi_b(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p_a'|\tilde{x}_a)\mathbb{I}(\tilde{x}_a) - \tilde{x}_a,\tilde{v}_b,x_b) \right] = 0.
\]

(19)

Hereafter, we assume that the left-hand side of (19) is monotone in the marginal price \(p_a'\), which amounts to quasi-concavity of the platform’s profit function with respect to the marginal price, after accounting for the cost of procuring the x_b-agents, as explained in the proof of Proposition 3. The above property implies that the necessary condition in (19) is also sufficient for optimality.

Now recall that, under price customization (on both sides), the platform matches a pair of agents \(\theta_a = (v_a,x_a)\) and \(\theta_b = (v_b,x_b)\) if, and only if, type-\(\theta_a\)’s virtual value for interacting with type \(\theta_b\) is large enough to compensate for the virtual value that type \(\theta_b\) derives from interacting with type \(\theta_a\) (formally, \(\theta_a\) and \(\theta_b\) are matched if, and only if, \(\varphi_a(\theta_a,\theta_b) + \varphi_b(\theta_b,\theta_a) \geq 0\)). Under uniform pricing (on side a), instead, the platform matches the above pair of agents if, and only if, the following is true: if all side-a agents with the same true value for interacting with type \(\theta_b\) as type \(\theta_a\) were to be matched to type \(\theta_b\), the average virtual value among such agents for the match with type \(\theta_b\) would compensate for the average virtual value that type \(\theta_b\) derives from being matched with all such agents. Formally, under uniform pricing (on side a), types \(\theta_a\) and \(\theta_b\) are matched if, and only if, when \(p_a' = u_a(v_a,|x_b - x_a|),\)

\[
\mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a|x_b,p_a') \left[ \varphi_a(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p_a'|\tilde{x}_a)\mathbb{I}(\tilde{x}_a) - \tilde{x}_a,\tilde{v}_b,x_b) \right] + \mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a|x_b,p_a') \left[ \varphi_b(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p_a'|\tilde{x}_a)\mathbb{I}(\tilde{x}_a) - \tilde{x}_a,\tilde{v}_b,x_b) \right] \geq 0.
\]

This observation plays an important role in determining how targeting and welfare are affected by the imposition of uniform pricing, as we show below.
4.1 Targeting under Uniform and Customized Pricing

Digital technology is often praised for its ability to increase match precision (or targeting) in a variety of markets. Yet, technology alone is no guarantee of large targeting gains, as the matches enjoyed by the agents obviously depend on the pricing practices followed by platforms. Price customization allows a platform to charge the agents prices that depend on the agents’ own horizontal preferences (either directly, when the latter are observable, or indirectly, through bundling). To the extent that agents value the most those matches of higher proximity, one might expect price-customization to hinder targeting, as it permits platforms to set higher prices for those matches the agents like the most. Without further inquiry, this observation seems to lend support to policies that impose uniform pricing. Indeed, recent proposals requiring stringent protection of consumer privacy (de facto banning price customization), stand-alone pricing for media content (thus banning bundling), or anonymous pricing for advertising slots, appear to follow this line of reasoning. This intuition is, however, incomplete, as it ignores the (endogenous) changes in prices that platforms undertake in response to uniform-pricing obligations. The analysis below provides some guidelines when it comes to the effects of uniform and customized pricing on targeting.

**Definition 6. (targeting)** Customized pricing (on both sides) leads to more targeting than uniform pricing (on side \(a\)) if, for each \(\theta_a = (v_a, x_a)\), there exists \(d(\theta_a) \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
t^*_a(\theta_a, x_b) &- t^u_a(\theta_a, x_b) \begin{cases} < 0 & \text{if } |x_a - x_b| < d(\theta_a) \\ > 0 & \text{if } |x_a - x_b| > d(\theta_a) \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

Conversely, uniform pricing on side \(a\) leads to more targeting than customized pricing on both sides if, for each \(\theta_a = (v_a, x_a)\), there exists \(d(\theta_a) \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
t^*_a(\theta_a, x_b) &- t^u_a(\theta_a, x_b) \begin{cases} > 0 & \text{if } |x_a - x_b| < d(\theta_a) \\ < 0 & \text{if } |x_a - x_b| > d(\theta_a) \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

Intuitively, customized pricing (on both sides) leads to more targeting than uniform pricing (on side \(a\)) if, under the profit-maximizing customized tariffs, agents demand more matches close to their ideal points, and less matches far from their ideal points, relative to what they do under uniform pricing. Accordingly, the threshold function \(t^*_a(\theta_a, x_b)\) under customized pricing is below the corresponding threshold function \(t^u_a(\theta_a, x_b)\) for nearby matches (i.e., for locations \(x_b\) such that \(|x_a - x_b| < d(\theta_a)\)), and above \(t^u_a(\theta_a, x_b)\) for more distant matches (for which \(|x_a - x_b| > d(\theta_a)\)). Figure 4 illustrates the situation captured by the above definition.

Note that, because matching is reciprocal, the above definition has an analogous implication for side \(b\). Namely, when customized pricing (on both sides) leads to more targeting than uniform pricing (on side \(a\)), then the side-\(b\) threshold function under customized pricing, \(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a)\), also single-crosses its counterpart under uniform pricing, \(t^u_b(\theta_b, x_a)\), only once, and from below, as a function of the distance \(|x_a - x_b|\).
The next proposition identifies conditions under which uniform pricing on side $a$ (for short, uniform pricing) leads to more targeting than customized pricing on both sides (for short, customized pricing). For simplicity, the result is for a market in which preferences on side $b$ are location-invariant.

**Proposition 4.** (comparison: targeting) Suppose preferences on side $b$ are location-invariant.

1. Uniform pricing (on side $a$) leads to more (alternatively, less) targeting than customized pricing (on both sides) when the side-$a$ semi-elasticities are increasing (alternatively, decreasing) in both distance and price.

2. The side-$a$ semi-elasticities are increasing in both distance and price when $x_a$ and $v_a$ are independent, the hazard rate for $F_a^v$ is increasing in $v_a$, and $u_a$ is submodular and concave in $v_a$ (alternatively, they are decreasing in both distance and price when $x_a$ and $v_a$ are independent, the hazard rate for $F_a^v$ is decreasing in $v_a$, and $u_a$ is supermodular and convex in $v_a$).

Consider Part 1 and fix the side-$b$ location $x_b$. Under uniform pricing, the elasticity of the aggregate demand by the side-$a$ agents for the $q$-th unit of the $x_b$-agents is invariant to the distance $|x_b - x_a|$, as the marginal price for the $q$-th unit of $x_b$-matches is the same for all $x_a$-locations. As a consequence, when the semi-elasticities of the side-$a$ demands increase (alternatively, decrease) with distance, the marginal price for the $q$-th unit of $x_b$-matches charged to the $x_a$-agents under customized pricing is lower than the corresponding price under uniform pricing when locations are far apart, whereas the opposite is true at nearby locations. Accordingly, there is more targeting under uniform pricing than under customized pricing. The result in Part 2 then uses the characterization of the matching demands in the previous section to translate the result in Part 1 in terms of conditions on match values and type distributions.

**Remark 2.** To simplify the exposition, Proposition 4 assumes that, on side $b$, preferences are location-invariant. A similar result, however, applies more generally. Let $t^*_k(\cdot)$ be the threshold functions
describing the matching demands optimally induced by the platform when it can offer customized tariffs on both sides of the market. Let \( L : X_a \times \Theta_b \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) be the function defined by

\[
L(x_a | \theta_b) \equiv \varphi_b(\theta_b, (t_b^*(\theta_b, x_a), x_a)) - \frac{1 - F_a^{|x|} (t_b^*(\theta_b, x_a) | x_a)}{f_a^{|x|} (t_b^*(\theta_b, x_a) | x_a)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial \theta_b} (t_b^*(\theta_b, x_a), |x_a - x_b|)
\]

\[
= \rho_b^y \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_b(\rho_b^y | x_a | x_b)}\right) \rho_b^y = u_b(v_b | x_a - x_b)) - \frac{\rho_b^y}{\varepsilon_b(\rho_b^y | x_a | x_b)} \rho_b^y = u_a(t_b^*(\theta_b, x_a), |x_a - x_b|)
\]

As we show in the Appendix, uniform pricing (on side \( a \)) leads to more (alternatively, less) targeting than customized pricing, on both sides, if, for any \( \theta_b \), the function \( L(\cdot | \theta_b) \) is non-decreasing (alternatively, non-increasing) in \( |x_b - x_a| \). When preferences on side \( b \) are location-invariant, the above property reduces to the monotonicity conditions in the proposition. More generally, uniform pricing (on side \( a \)) leads to more targeting than customized pricing (on both sides) when the semi-elasticities on both sides of the market increase sufficiently sharply with distance relative to the utility that the side-\( b \) agents derive from interacting with the side-\( a \) agents when the distance increases.

### 4.2 Welfare under Uniform and Customized Pricing

The result in Proposition 4 can also be used to study the welfare implications of uniform-pricing obligations. To see this, suppose that targeting is higher under uniform pricing than under customized pricing. Then, under uniform pricing on side-\( a \), the side-\( a \) agents face lower marginal prices \( p_a^*(q | x_b) \) for the \( x_b \)-agents they like the most and higher marginal prices for those side-\( b \) agents whose location is far from their bliss point.

The above findings permit us to adapt results from the third-degree price discrimination literature to the matching environment under consideration here to identify conditions under which welfare of the side-\( a \) agents increases with the imposition of uniform pricing on side \( a \). Formally, recall that, under uniform pricing, the demand by the \( x_a \)-agents for each \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_b \) matches at the marginal price \( p_a^* \) is given by

\[
D_a (p_a^* | x_b; x_a) = \left[1 - F_a^{|x|} (\hat{v}_{x_a} (p_a^* | x_a) | x_a) \right] f_a^{|x|} (x_a)
\]

where, to ease the notation, we dropped \( (q | x_b) \) from the arguments of the marginal price \( p_a^*(q | x_b) \). Now let

\[
CD_a (p_a^* | x_b; x_a) = -\frac{\partial^2 D_a (p_a^* | x_b; x_a)}{\partial (p_a^*)^2} \left( \frac{\partial D_a (p_a^* | x_b; x_a)}{\partial (p_a^* )} \right)^{-1} p_a^\prime
\]

denote the convexity of the demand by the \( x_a \)-agents for the \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_b \)-agents with respect to the marginal price \( p_a^* \).\(^{29}\) Before proceeding, we have to impose the following regularity condition.

\(^{29}\)Note that \( CD_a (p_a^* | x_b; x_a) \) is also the elasticity of the marginal demand \( \partial D_a (p_a^* | x_b; x_a) / \partial p_a^* \) with respect to the marginal price \( p_a^* \).
Condition 1. [NDR] Nondecreasing Ratio: For any \((x_a, x_b) \in X_a \times X_b\), any \(q \in [0, f^*_b(x_b)]\), the function
\[
z_a (p'_a | x_b; x_a) \equiv \frac{p'_a}{2 - CD_a (p'_a | x_b; x_a)}
\]
is nondecreasing in the marginal price \(p'_a\) for the \(q\)-th unit of the \(x_b\)-agents.

We then have the following result:

**Proposition 5. (comparison: welfare)** Suppose Condition NDR holds and either one of the following alternatives is satisfied:

1. targeting is higher under uniform pricing than under customized pricing and, for any \(p'_a\) and \(x_b\), \(CD_a (p'_a | x_b; x_a)\) declines with \(|x_a - x_b|\).

2. targeting is higher under customized pricing than under uniform pricing and, for any \(p'_a\) and \(x_b\), \(CD_a (p'_a | x_b; x_a)\) increases with \(|x_a - x_b|\).

Then welfare of the side-\(a\) agents is higher under uniform pricing on side \(a\) than under customized pricing on both sides.

Condition NDR, as well as the convexity properties of the demand functions in Proposition 5, parallel those in Aguirre et al (2010). The value of the proposition is in showing how our results about the connection between targeting and customized pricing also permit us to apply to the environment under examination here the welfare results from the third-degree price discrimination literature. Note that Proposition 4 is key to the result in Proposition 5. It permits us to identify “stronger markets,” in the sense of Aguirre et al. (2010), with those for matches involving agents from closer locations (Part 1) or more distant locations (Part 2). Once the connection between targeting and price customization is at hand, the welfare implications of customized pricing naturally parallel those in the third-degree price discrimination literature.

Also note that the result in Proposition 5 is just an illustration of the type of welfare results that Proposition 4 permits. Paralleling the analysis in Proposition 2 in Aguirre et al. (2010), for example, one can also identify primitive conditions under which welfare is higher under price customization than under uniform pricing, as well as conditions under which price customization impacts negatively one side of the market and positively the other.

## 5 Centralized vs Decentralized Markets

In the market for media content, several analysts believe that the increase in the speed of fiber-optic and broadband internet connection will favor a gradual transition of the market to a structure whereby viewers will pay directly the content producers, thus bypassing current market intermediaries such as cable TV providers. This corresponds to a decentralized market (where matching is governed by agents on one side of the market posting prices for their matches with the other side), as opposed to the centralized markets considered so far in this paper (where matching and pricing are controlled
by a platform). As it turns out, the results above also permit us to assess the effects of market decentralization on matching allocations and welfare.

To illustrate, consider a matching market where side $a$ is populated by “buyers” and side $b$ is populated by “sellers”. Unlike in the baseline model, suppose sellers post prices independently and sell the “match” directly to the buyers (i.e., the market is decentralized). Absent data about consumers’ tastes (for instance, due to privacy regulation), we can assume that buyers’ locations are private information, whereas sellers’ locations (their product variety) is observable by the buyers. In this environment, provided sellers are not able to monitor the purchases that each buyer makes with the other sellers (which amounts to no bundling), customized pricing on side $a$ is infeasible. This is to be contrasted to a centralized matching market, where, as explained in the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix, location-dependent prices can be implemented by the platform, through bundling, even when locations are private information.

Therefore, a move from a centralized to a decentralized structure is akin to the imposition of uniform-pricing obligations in a centralized market, in that sellers have to set (for lack of information and pricing instruments) the same prices for all buyers. But there is more: Decentralization also brings a reduction in the prices set by the sellers, due to the elimination of the monopsony mark-up applied by the platform in a centralized market. Combining this extra effect with the ones identified in Propositions 4 and 5 permits us to conclude that, whenever uniform pricing increases the welfare of the side-$a$ agents, so does market decentralization. The conditions in Proposition 5 are therefore sufficient to conclude that consumer surplus (i.e., the welfare of the side-$a$ agents) is higher in a decentralized market than in a centralized one. This observation may help policymakers identify markets where the transition to a decentralized structure should be promoted, for example through fiscal incentives and/or direct subsidies.

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper studies many-to-many matching in markets in which agents’ preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. The analysis delivers the following results. First, it characterizes properties of the matching demands when profit-maximizing platforms engage in price customization, that is, they offer agents the possibility to customize their matching set by including partners of different profiles based on their horizontal preferences, with the price for such customization varying with the configuration of the baseline plans. As the matching sets expand, the marginal agents from each location included in the set are always those with the lowest value for matching. The composition of the pool of marginal agents, however, naturally respects horizontal differences in preferences.

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30 To facilitate the comparison with the centralized case, we assume that, in a decentralized market, each seller of variety $x_b$ sells a single unit to each buyer (unit demands). The marginal price schedule $p'_a(q|x_b)$ should then be interpreted as the inverse aggregate market supply curve resulting from the aggregation of the behavior of different sellers posting different stand-alone prices as a function of their different marginal costs (captured by the term $v_b$).
with most of the marginal agents coming from “locations” close to the agent’s bliss-point. We then provide a formula relating the optimal prices to location-specific elasticities of the demands on both sides of the market that can be used in empirical work for testing and structural estimation and that permits us to study how the distortions in the provision of matching services vary with the horizontal dimension of the agents’ preferences.

Second, the paper studies the effects on prices, the composition of matching sets, and welfare, of uniform-pricing obligations that hinder platforms’ possibility to condition prices on agents’ “locations”, as in the case of privacy regulations preventing online retailers from conditioning prices on buyers’ age, gender, of physical location. Finally, the paper contributes to the policy debate about the desirability of intermediation in matching markets by offering a new angle relating the welfare effects of decentralization to the targeting and price-customization implications of different market structures.

We believe the results have useful implications for various markets. Consider, for example, online shopping. As mentioned in the introduction, recent regulations requiring consumers’ consent for the diffusion of personal information are expected to hinder price customization when third-party data are needed. Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis shows that this may either increase or decrease targeting levels, depending on testable characteristics of consumer demand. Related conditions can also be used to evaluate whether or not the imposition of uniform-pricing obligations increase consumer welfare.

Another natural application of our framework is the market for online advertising (see, among others, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) for an overview of such markets). Ad exchanges such as AppNexus, AOL’s Marketplace, Microsoft Ad Exchange, OpenX, Rubicon Project Exchange, and Smaato, use sophisticated pricing algorithms where prices depend not only on volumes but also on advertisers’ and publishers’ profiles. Such algorithms thus enable price-customization practices that appear similar, at least in spirit, to those studied in the present paper. While such algorithms have initially been praised for the customization possibilities they offer, more recently they have been associated with targeting and price-discriminatory practices often seen with suspicion by consumers and regulators. The policy debate about the desirability of regulations imposing uniform pricing, or about the pros and cons of market decentralization, lacks a formal model shedding light on how matching demands and welfare are affected by such changes. Our paper contributes to such debate by offering a stylized yet flexible framework that one can use to study both the distortions associated with price customization, as well as the market outcomes under uniform pricing.

Next, consider the market for cable TV. Most providers price discriminate on the viewer side by offering viewers packages of channels whereby the baseline configuration can be customized by adding channels at a cost that depends on the baseline configuration originally selected (see, among others, Crawford (2000), and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012)). Such industry is evolving fast and many analysts predict a transition to a market structure whereby viewers will purchase content directly from the channels, thus bypassing the intermediation of the current providers. Our analysis
sheds some light on how prices set by individual channels compare to their counterparts in markets where the interactions between the channels and the viewers are mediated by cable companies, and identifies conditions under which the transition to a decentralized structure is advantageous to the viewers.

We conclude by discussing a few limitations of our analysis and venues for future research. First, our analysis abstracts from platform competition. Second, and related, it assumes platform have the power to set prices on both sides of the market. While these assumptions are a plausible starting point, there are many markets where multiple platforms compete on multiple sides and their ability to set prices is hindered by their lack of bargaining power. For example, the market for cable TV is populated by multiple providers. Furthermore, as indicated in Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), large channel conglomerates enjoy nontrivial bargaining power vis-a-vis cable TV providers, which suggests that prices are likely to be negotiated on the channel side instead of being set directly by the platforms. Extending the analysis to accommodate for platform competition and limited bargaining power on one, or multiple, sides of the market is an important step for future research.

Furthermore, certain platforms, most notably B2B platforms, have recently expanded their services to include e-billing and supply-management. These additional services open the door to more sophisticated price-discriminatory practices that use instruments other than the composition of the matching sets. Extending the analysis to accommodate for such richer instruments is another interesting direction for future work (see Jeon, Kim, and Menicucci (2016) for related ideas).

Lastly, in future work, it would be desirable to extend the analysis to accommodate for “within-side” network effects (e.g., congestion and limited attention) and dynamics (whereby agents gradually learn the attractiveness of the partners and platforms indirectly control the speed of such learning with their pricing strategies). All the above extensions are challenging but worth exploring.

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7 Appendix

In this Appendix, we provide the proofs for all the results in the main text. The proofs are established for more general environments in which, in addition to possessing private information about the vertical dimensions, $v_k$, the agents may possess private information also about their horizontal dimensions, i.e., about their locations $x_k$. In particular, we consider the following four scenarios:

- **Scenario (i)**: Locations are public on both sides;
- **Scenario (ii)**: Locations are private on side $a$ and public on side $b$;
- **Scenario (iii)**: Locations are public on side $a$ and private on side $b$;
- **Scenario (iv)**: locations are private on both sides.

All the results in the main body are for Scenario (i). Below, we discuss how the results extend to Scenarios (ii)-(iv) provided a certain combination of the following two conditions holds.

**Condition 2.** [I$_k$] **Independence on side** $k$: for any $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \in \Theta_k$, $F_k(\theta_k) = F^x_k(x_k)F^v_k(v_k)$.

Condition I$_k$ requires that the vertical dimensions $v_k$ be drawn independently from the locations $x_k$. This condition implies that knowing an agent’s “bliss point” carries no information about the overall importance the agent assigns to matching with agents from the opposite side.

**Condition 3.** [Sy$_k$] **Symmetry on side** $k$: for any $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \in \Theta_k$, $F_k(\theta_k) = x_kF^v_k(v_k)$.

Condition Sy$_k$ strengthens the independence condition by further requiring that locations be uniformly distributed over $X_k = [0, 1]$, as typically assumed in models of horizontal differentiation.$^{31}$

To accommodate the possibility that locations are private information, we need to generalize the notion of customized tariffs, as follows:

**Definition 7.** The tariff $T_k$ is **customized** if there exists a collection of quadruples

$$\{(s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot|\cdot; x_k), \mathcal{S}_k(x_k)) : x_k \in X_k\},$$

one for each location $x_k \in X_k$, such that each side-$k$ agent selecting the plan indexed by $x_k$ and then choosing the customization $s_k \in \mathcal{S}_k(x_k)$ from the set of permissible customizations $\mathcal{S}_k(x_k)$ is asked to make a total payment equal to$^{32}$

$$T_k(s_k|x_k) = T_k(x_k) + \int_0^1 \rho_k(q_{x_l}(s_k)|x_l; x_k)dx_l,$$

(20)

$^{31}$Similar assumptions are typically made also in the targeting literature; see, for example, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011, 2015), and Kox et al. (2017).

$^{32}$The payment specified by the tariff for any non-permissible customization $s_k \notin \cup \mathcal{S}_k(x_k) : x_k \in X_k$ can be taken to be arbitrarily large to guarantee that no type finds it optimal to select any such customization. The existence of such payments is guaranteed by the assumption that $u_k$ is bounded, $k = a, b$. Furthermore, in case locations are private information on side $k$, the collection of matching plans is required to have the property that for any set $s_k \in \mathcal{S}_k(x_k) \cap \mathcal{S}_k(x_k')$, the total payment associated with $s_k$ is the same no matter whether the set is ob-
where \( \rho_k(q_{x_i} (S_k(x_k)) | x_i; x_k) = 0 \) for all \( x_i \in [0, 1] \).

Relative to Definition 2 in the main text, Definition 7 adds the requirement that a customization must be permissible, that is, it has to belong to the collection of possible customizations \( S_k(x_k) \subseteq \Sigma(\Theta_I) \). As we show below, when locations are public on side \( k \), without loss of optimality the platform can set \( S_k(x_k) \equiv \Sigma(\Theta_I) \), in which case Definitions 2 and 7 coincide.

**Proof of Lemma 1.** The proof below establishes the following result, for which the claim in the main text is a special case. *Suppose the environment satisfies the properties of one of the following four cases: Scenario (i); Scenario (ii) along with Conditions I\(_a\) and Sy\(_b\); Scenario (iii) along with Conditions Sy\(_a\) and I\(_b\); Scenario (iv) along with Conditions Sy\(_a\) and Sy\(_b\). Then,*

1. there exists a pair of customized tariffs \((T^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) that is profit-maximizing;
2. the matching demands \((s^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) consistent with the profit-maximizing customized tariffs \((T^*_k)_{k=a,b}\) are described by threshold functions \( t^*_k : \Theta_k \times X_l \rightarrow V_l \) such that
   \[
   s^*_k(\theta_k) = \{(v_l, x_i) \in \Theta_I : v_l > t^*_k(\theta_k, x_i)\},
   \]
   with the threshold function \( t^*_k \) non-increasing in \( v_k \) and non-decreasing in \( |x_k - x_l| \).
3. When locations are public on side \( k \in \{a, b\} \), \( S_k(x_k) = \Sigma(\Theta_I) \), for all \( x_k \in X_k \).

Conditions I\(_k\) and Sy\(_k\) guarantee that the platform can price discriminate along the agents’ locations, without leaving the agents rents for the private information the agents may possess regarding their locations. That is, in Scenarios (ii)-(iv), these conditions guarantee that the platform obtains the same profits as when locations are public on both sides, as in Scenario (i). To gain some intuition, consider first Scenario (ii). Under Conditions I\(_a\) and Sy\(_b\), the platform’s pricing problem on side \( a \) is symmetric across any two locations. This is because of two reasons. First, the location of any agent from side \( a \) provides no information about the agent’s vertical preferences (this is guaranteed by Condition I\(_a\)). Second, when the platform offers the same tariffs as in Scenario (i), the gross utility that each type \( \theta_k = (v_a, x_a) \) obtains from the matching set \( s^*_a(\theta_k) \) coincides with the gross utility obtained by type \( (v_a, x_a + d) \) from choosing the matching set \( s^*_a(v_a, x_a + d) \), \( d \in [0, 1/2] \). This occurs because the matching set \( s^*_a(v_a, x_a + d) \) is a parallel translation of the matching set \( s^*_a(v_a, x_a) \) by \( d \) units of distance, along the horizontal dimension (this is guaranteed by Condition Sy\(_b\)). As a result, when, in Scenario (ii), the platform offers the same matching plans and tariffs as in Scenario (i), the matching sets demanded by any two agents with types \( (v_a, x_a) \) and \( (v_a, x_a + d) \) are parallel translations of one another, and are priced identically. Note that, to guarantee that agents faced with a tariff specifying a single price for each set.
reveal their locations when the latter are the agents’ private information, the platform may need to restrict the set of possible customizations at each location, \( S_k(x_k) \), to coincide with the matching sets demanded under Scenario (i). The above properties, together with a judicious restriction on the set of possible customizations \( S_k(x_k) \), imply that the matching demands and payments induced in Scenario (i) are implementable also under Scenario (ii). A symmetric situation applies to Scenario (iii). Arguments similar to the ones above for Scenarios (ii) and (iii) imply that, in Scenario (iv), where locations are private on both sides, when the platform offers the same matching plans and tariffs as in Scenario (i) to each side, agents continue to choose the same matching sets as in Scenario (i), provided that Condition \( S y_k \) holds on both sides of the market.

We establish the above results using mechanism design techniques. Let 

\[
(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))\big|_{\theta_k \in \Theta_k}^{k=a,b}
\]

denote a direct revelation mechanism, where agents are asked to report their types and where \((s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))\) denotes the allocation (matching set and total transfer) specified by the mechanism for each side-\( k \) agent reporting \( \theta_k \).

By familiar envelope arguments, a necessary condition for each type \( \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \in \Theta_k, k = a, b \), to prefer reporting truthfully to lying with respect to the vertical dimension \( v_k \) while reporting truthfully the horizontal dimension \( x_k \) is that transfers satisfy the envelope conditions

\[
p_k(\theta_k) = \int_{s_k(\theta_k)} u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) dF_l(\theta_l) - \int_{v_k} \int_{s_k(y, x_k)} \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v}(y, |x_k - x_l|) dF_l(\theta_l) dy,
\]

where \( U_k(v_k, x_k) \) is the payoff of a side-\( k \) agent with type \((v_k, x_k)\).

Using (21), the platform’s profits under any incentive-compatible mechanism can then be written as

\[
\sum_{k=a,b} \int_{\Theta_k} \left\{ \int_{s_k(\theta_k)} u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) \frac{1 - F^a|_{(v_k|x_k)}}{F^a_{(v_k|x_k)}} \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v}(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) dF_l(\theta_l) - U_k(x_k, v_k) \right\} dF_k(\theta_k).
\]

Using the definition of the virtual-value functions \( \varphi_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) \) in the main text, we then have that the platform’s profits are maximal when \( U_k(v_k, x_k) = 0 \) for all \( x_k \in X_k, k = a, b \), and when the matching sets are chosen so as to maximize

\[
\sum_{k=a,b} \int_{\Theta_k} \left\{ \int_{s_k(\theta_k)} \varphi_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) dF_l(\theta_l) \right\} dF_k(\theta_k)
\]

subject to the reciprocity condition

\[
\theta_l \in s_k(\theta_k) \iff \theta_k \in s_l(\theta_l), \quad l, k \in \{a, b\}, \quad k \neq l.
\]

\[33\text{In the absence of such restrictions, an agent of type } \theta_k = (v_k, x_k) \text{ misrepresenting his location to be } x_k' \neq x_k \text{ may find it optimal to select a matching set that no agent located at } x_k' \text{ would have demanded under Scenario (i).} \]
Hereafter, we first describe the matching sets that maximize (22) subject to the above reciprocity condition and then show that, under the assumptions in the lemma, the platform can implement the allocations \((s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))_{\theta_k \in \Theta_k}^{k = a,b}\), where the functions \(s_k(\cdot)\) are those that maximize (22) subject to (23), and where the functions \(p_k(\cdot)\) are as in (21), with \(U_k(\underline{v}_k, x_k) = 0\), all \(x_k \in X_k, k = a, b\).

Define the indicator function \(m_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) \in \{0, 1\}\) taking value one if and only if \(\theta_l \in s_k(\theta_k)\), that is, if and only if the two types \(\theta_k\) and \(\theta_l\) are matched. Then define the following measure on the Borel sigma-algebra over \(\Theta_k \times \Theta_l\):

\[
\nu_k(E) \equiv \int_E m_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) dF_k(\theta_k) dF_l(\theta_l).
\]  

(24)

Reciprocity implies that \(m_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) = m_l(\theta_l, \theta_k)\). As a consequence, the measures \(\nu_k\) and \(\nu_l\) satisfy \(d\nu_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) = d\nu_l(\theta_l, \theta_k)\). Equipped with this notation, the expression in (22) can be rewritten as

\[
\sum_{k,l = a,b, l \neq k} \int_{\Theta_k \times \Theta_l} \varphi_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) d\nu_k(\theta_k, \theta_l)
\]

\[
= \int_{\Theta_k \times \Theta_l} \triangle_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) m_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) dF_k(\theta_k) dF_l(\theta_l),
\]  

(25)

where, for \(k, l = a, b, l \neq k\),

\[
\triangle_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) \equiv \varphi_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) + \varphi_l(\theta_l, \theta_k).
\]

Note that the functions \(\triangle_a(\theta_a, \theta_b) = \triangle_b(\theta_b, \theta_a)\) represent the marginal effects on the platform’s profits of matching types \(\theta_a\) and \(\theta_b\). It is then immediate that the rule \((m_k(\cdot))_{k = a,b}\) that maximizes the expression in (25) is such that, for any \((\theta_k, \theta_l) \in \Theta_k \times \Theta_l, k, l = a, b, l \neq k\), \(m_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) = 1\) if and only if

\[
\triangle_k(\theta_k, \theta_l) \geq 0.
\]

That the virtual values \(\varphi_k(\theta_k, \theta_l)\) are strictly increasing in \(v_k\), \(k, l = a, b, l \neq k\), then implies that the matching rule that maximizes (22) subject to the reciprocity condition (23) can be described by means of a collection of threshold functions \(t^*_k : \Theta_k \times X_l \rightarrow V_l; k, l = a, b, l \neq k\), such that, for any \(\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)\), any \(\theta_l = (v_l, x_l)\), \(\theta_l \in s_k(\theta_k)\) if, and only if, \(v_l \geq t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)\). The threshold functions \(t^*_k(\cdot)\) are such that, for any \(\theta_k \in \Theta_k\), any \(x_l \in [0, 1]\), \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l) = \underline{v}_l\) if \(\triangle_k(\theta_k, (\underline{v}_l, x_l)) > 0\), \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l) = \bar{v}_l\) if \(\triangle_k(\theta_k, (\bar{v}_l, x_l)) < 0\), and \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)\) is the unique solution to \(\triangle_k(\theta_k, (t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), x_l)) = 0\) if

\[
\triangle_k(\theta_k, (\underline{v}_l, x_l)) \leq 0 \leq \triangle_k(\theta_k, (\bar{v}_l, x_l)).
\]

That the virtual values \(\varphi_k(\theta_k, \theta_l)\) are increasing in \(v_k\) and decreasing in \(|x_k - x_l|\) also implies that, for any \(x_k, x_l \in [0, 1]^2\), the threshold \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)\) is decreasing in \(v_k\), and that, for any \(v_k\), \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)\) is non-decreasing in \(|x_l - x_k|\).

Equipped with the above result, we now show that, in each of the environments stated in the generalized version of the lemma reported above, the platform can implement the allocations \((s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))_{\theta_k \in \Theta_k}^{k = a,b}\), where \(s_k(\theta_k)\) are the matching sets described by the above threshold rule, and where the payment functions \(p_k(\theta_k)\) are the ones in (21), with \(U_k(\underline{v}_k, x_k) = 0\), all \(x_k \in X_k, k = a, b\).
First observe that the payoff that each type $\theta_k$ obtains in the above direct revelation mechanism when reporting truthfully is equal to

$$U_k(\theta_k) = \int_{v_k}^{v_k} \int_{s_k(y,x_k)} \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v} (y, |x_k - x_l|) dF_l(\theta_l) dy.$$ 

That $U_k(\theta_k) \geq 0$ follows directly from the fact that $u_k$ is non-decreasing in $v_k$. This means that the mechanism is individually rational (meaning that each type $\theta_k$ prefers participating in the mechanism and receiving the allocation $(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))$ to refusing to participate and receiving the allocation $(\emptyset, 0)$ yielding a payoff equal to zero).

Below we show that either the above direct mechanism is also incentive-compatible (meaning that each type $\theta_k$ prefers the allocation $(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))$ designed for him to the allocation $(s_k(\theta_k'), p_k(\theta_k'))$ designed for any other type $\theta_k'$), or it can be turned, at no cost to the platform, into a mechanism implementing the same allocations as the above ones which is both incentive compatible and individually rational.

**Definition 8. (nested matching)** A matching rule $s_k(\theta_k)$ is nested if, for any pair $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ and $\hat{\theta}_k = (\hat{v}_k, \hat{x}_k)$ such that $x_k = \hat{x}_k$, either $s_k(\theta_k) \subseteq s_k(\hat{\theta}_k)$, or $s_k(\theta_k) \supseteq s_k(\hat{\theta}_k)$. A direct revelation mechanism is nested if its matching rule is nested.

Clearly, the direct mechanism defined above where the matching rule is described by the threshold function $t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)$ is nested. Now let $\Pi_k(\theta_k; \hat{\theta}_k)$ denote the payoff that type $\theta_k$ obtains in a direct revelation mechanism $(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))^{k=a,b}_{\hat{\theta}_k \in \Theta_k}$ by mimicking type $\hat{\theta}_k$.

**Definition 9. (ICV)** A direct revelation mechanism $(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))^{k=a,b}_{\hat{\theta}_k \in \Theta_k}$ satisfies incentive compatibility along the $v$ dimension (ICV) if, for any $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ and $\hat{\theta}_k = (\hat{v}_k, \hat{x}_k)$ with $x_k = \hat{x}_k$, $U_k(\theta_k) \geq \Pi_k(\theta_k; \hat{\theta}_k)$.

The following property is then true (the proof is standard and hence omitted):

**Property 1.** A nested direct revelation mechanism $(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))^{k=a,b}_{\hat{\theta}_k \in \Theta_k}$ satisfies ICV if, and only if, the following conditions jointly hold:

1. For any $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$ and $\hat{\theta}_k = (\hat{v}_k, \hat{x}_k)$ such that $x_k = \hat{x}_k$, $v_k > \hat{v}_k$ implies that $s_k(\theta_k) \supseteq s_k(\hat{\theta}_k)$;
2. The payment functions $p_k(\theta_k)$ satisfy the envelope formula (21).

Clearly, the direct revelation mechanism where the matching rule is the one corresponding to the threshold functions $t^*_k(\cdot)$ described above and where the payment functions $p_k(\theta_k)$ are the ones in (21), with $U_k(\theta_k, x_k) = 0$, all $x_k \in X_k$, $k = a, b$, is not only nested but satisfies the two conditions in the lemma. It follows that such a mechanism satisfies ICV.

Equipped with the above results, we now show that, in each of the environments corresponding to the combination of conditions described in the general version of the lemma presented above, the above direct revelation mechanism is either incentive-compatible, or it can be augmented to implement the same allocations prescribed by $(s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))^{k=a,b}_{\hat{\theta}_k \in \Theta_k}$ at no extra cost to the platform.
Consider first Scenario (i). Recall that, in this case, locations are public on both sides. That the mechanism is ICV implies that any deviation along the vertical dimension is unprofitable. Furthermore, because locations are public on both sides, any deviation along the horizontal dimension is detectable. It is then immediate that the platform can augment the above direct revelation mechanism by adding to it punishments (in the form of large fines) for those agents lying along the horizontal dimension. The augmented mechanism is both individually rational and incentive compatible and implements the same allocations as the original mechanism \((s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))\) for all \(k=a,b\), at no extra cost to the platform.

Next suppose the environment satisfies the properties of Scenario (ii) and, in addition, Conditions I\(_a\) and Sy\(_b\) hold. Again, because locations are public on side \(b\), incentive compatibility on side \(b\) can be guaranteed by augmenting the mechanism as described above for Scenario (i). Thus consider incentive compatibility on side \(a\). The latter requires that

\[
U_a(v_a, x_a) \geq \Pi_a((v_a, x_a); (\hat{v}_a, \hat{x}_a)),
\]

for all \((x_a, \hat{x}_a, v_a, v_a) \in X^2_a \times V^2_a\). The above inequality is equivalent to

\[
\int_{\Xi_a} \int_{s_a(y, x_a)} \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v_a} (y, |x_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) dy \geq \int_{\Xi_a} \int_{s_a(y, \hat{x}_a)} \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v_a} (y, |\hat{x}_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) dy + \int_{s_a(\hat{v}_a, \hat{x}_a)} [u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|) - u_k(\hat{v}_a, |\hat{x}_a - x_b|)] dF_b(b).
\]

It is easy to see that, for any \(\theta_a = (v_a, x_a) \in \Theta_a\),

\[
\int_{s_a(v_a, x_a)} \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v_a} (v_a, |x_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) = \int_{d \in [0,1/2]} \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v_a} (v_a, d) dW(d; \theta_a),
\]

where \(W(d; \theta_a)\) is the measure of agents whose distance from \(x_a\) is at most \(d\) included in the matching set \(s_a(v_a, x_a)\) of type \(\theta_a\) under the proposed mechanism. It is also easy to see that, under Conditions I\(_a\) and Sy\(_b\), the expression in (27) is invariant in \(x_a\). That is, \(W(d; \theta_a) = W(d; \theta'_a)\) for any \(d \in [0,1/2]\); any \(\theta_a, \theta'_a \in \Theta_a\) with \(v_a = v'_a\).\(^{34}\) This means that

\[
\int_{\Xi_a} \int_{s_a(y, \hat{x}_a)} \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v_a} (y, |\hat{x}_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) dy = \int_{\Xi_a} \int_{s_a(y, x_a)} \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v_a} (y, |x_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) dy.
\]

By the same arguments,

\[
\int_{s_a(\hat{v}_a, \hat{x}_a)} u_a(\hat{v}_a, |\hat{x}_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) = \int_{s_a(\hat{v}_a, x_a)} u_a(\hat{v}_a, |x_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b).
\]

Furthermore, because virtual values respect the same ranking as the true values, the threshold functions \(t_k^* (\theta_k, x_l)\) are non-decreasing in the distance \(|x_l - x_k|\). In turn, this implies that

\[
\int_{s_a(\hat{v}_a, \hat{x}_a)} u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|) dF_b(\theta_b) \leq \int_{s_a(\hat{v}_a, x_b)} u_a(v_a, |x_b - x_a|) dF_b(\theta_b).
\]

\(^{34}\)Conditions I\(_k\), \(k = a, b\), suffice to guarantee that the function \(\Delta_k(\theta_k, \theta_l)\) depends only on \(v_k\), \(v_l\), and \(|x_l - x_k|\). The strengthening of Condition I\(_b\) to Sy\(_b\) is, however, necessary to guarantee that the mass of agents of a given distance \(d\) included in the matching sets of any pair of types \(\theta_a, \theta'_a \in \Theta_a\) with \(v_a = v'_a\) is the same.

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It follows that the right hand side of (26) is smaller than  
\[
\int_{\Sigma_{k}} \int_{S_{k}(y,x_{k})} \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v} (y, |x_a - x_b|) dF_{b}(\theta_b) dy 
+ \int_{S_{k}(\hat{v}_a, x_{k})} [u_a (v_a, |x_a - x_b|) - u_a (\hat{v}_a, |x_a - x_b|)] dF_{b}(\theta_b),
\]
which is the payoff that type $\theta = (v_a, x_a)$ obtains by announcing $(\hat{v}_a, x_a)$ (that is, by lying about the vertical dimension but reporting truthfully the horizontal one). That the inequality in (26) holds then follows from the fact that the direct revelation mechanism \((U \times T)_{\theta_k} \in \Theta_k\) satisfies ICV.

The arguments for an environment satisfying the properties of Scenario (iii) along with Conditions I are symmetric to those for an environment satisfying the properties of Scenario (ii) along with Conditions I and Sy, and hence the proof is omitted.

Finally, consider an environment satisfying the properties of Scenario (iv) along with Conditions Sy and Syb. That the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible follows from the same arguments as for Scenario (ii) above, now applied to both sides of the market.

We conclude that, in each of the environments considered in the general version of the lemma reported above, the allocations \((s_{k}(\theta_k), p_{k}(\theta_k))_{\theta_k \in \Theta_k}\) are the ones specified by the threshold functions \(t_{k}(\cdot)\) described above, and where the payments are the ones in (21) with \(U_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k) = 0\), all \(x_k \in X_k\), \(k = a, b\) can be sustained in a mechanism that is both individually rational and incentive compatible. The result we wanted to establish then follows from the fact that (a) such allocations are profit-maximizing among those consistent with the rationality of the agents (i.e., satisfying the IC and IR constraints), and (b) can be induced by offering customized tariffs

\[
\{\{s_{k}(x_k), T_{k}(x_k), r_k(\cdot; x_k), S_{k}(x_k)\} : x_k \in [0,1]\}
\]
satisfying the properties described below. For each plan \(x_k \in [0,1]\), the baseline configuration is given by

\[
s_{k}(x_k) = s_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k),
\]
the baseline price is given by

\[
T_{k}(x_k) = p_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k) = \int_{s_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k)} u_k (\bar{v}_k, |x_k - x_l|) dF_{l}(\theta_l),
\]
the set of possible customizations is given by

\[
S_{k}(x_k) = \{s_{k}(v_k, x_k) : v_k \in V_k\},
\]
and the price schedules \(p_{k}(q|x_l; x_k)\) are such that, for \(q = q_{x_l} (s_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k))\), \(p_{k}(q|x_l; x_k) = 0\), while for \(q \in (q_{x_l} (s_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k)), q_{x_l} (s_{k}(\bar{v}_k, x_k)))\),

\[
\rho_{k}(q|x_l; x_k) = qu_{k} (v_k(q; x_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|) - \int_{\Sigma_k} q_{x_l} (s_k(y, x_k)) \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v} (y, |x_k - x_l|) dy - \int_{\Sigma_k} \hat{v}_k (s_{k}(y, x_k), |x_k - x_l|) dF_{l}(\theta_l)
\]
(28)
where
\[ v_k(q; x_k, x_l) \equiv \inf \{ v_k \in V_k : q_{x_l}(s_k(v_k, x_l)) = q \} . \]

Any agent selecting the plan \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot; x_k), S_k(x_k))\) and then choosing a matching set \(s_k \notin S_k(x_k)\) is charged a fine large enough to make the utility of such a set, net of the payment, negative for all types. Likewise, when locations are public on side \(k\), any side-\(k\) agent selecting a plan other than \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot; x_k), S_k(x_k))\) is charged a large enough fine to make the choice unprofitable for any type. Note that the existence of such fines is guaranteed by the assumption that \(u_k\) is bounded, \(k = a, b\).

That the above customized tariff implements the same allocations as the direct mechanism \((s_k(\theta_k), p_k(\theta_k))\) then follows from the following considerations. Each type \(\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)\), by selecting the plan \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot; x_k), S_k(x_k))\) designed for agents with the same location as type \(\theta_k\) and then choosing the customization \(s_k(v_k, x_k)\) specified by the direct mechanism for type \(\theta_k\) is charged a total payment equal to
\[
T_k(x_k) + \int_0^1 \left[ q_{x_l}(s_k(v_k, x_k)) u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) - \int_{x_k}^{v_k} q_{x_l}(s_k(v_k, x_k)) \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v} (y, |x_k - x_l|) dy \right] dx_l - T_k(x_k)
\]
\[
= \int_{s_k(\theta_k)} u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) dF(\theta_l) - \int_{s_k(\theta_k)} \int_{s_k(\theta_k)} q_{x_l}(s_k(v_k, x_k)) \frac{\partial u_k}{\partial v} (y, |x_k - x_l|) dF(\theta_l) dy
\]
\[
= p_k(\theta_k),
\]
equally as in the direct mechanism. That each type \(\theta_k\) maximizes his payoff by selecting the plan \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot; x_k), S_k(x_k))\) and then choosing the customization \(s_k(v_k, x_k)\) specified for him by the direct mechanism then follows from the fact that (a) the direct mechanism is incentive compatible, (b) the payment associated with any other plan \((s_k(\hat{x}_k), T_k(\hat{x}_k), \rho_k(\cdot; \hat{x}_k), S_k(\hat{x}_k))\) followed by the selection of a set \(s_k\) is either equal to the payment specified by the direct mechanism for some report \((\hat{x}_k, \hat{x}_k)\), or is so large to make the net payoff of such selection negative.

Finally, to see that, when locations are public on side \(k\), without loss of optimality, the side-\(k\) customized tariff does not need to restrict the agents’ ability to customize their matching sets (that is, \(S_k(x_k) = \Sigma(\Theta_l)\), all \(x_k\) recall that, in this case, each side-\(k\) agent located at \(x_k\) can be induced to select the matching plan \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot; x_k), S_k(x_k))\) designed for agents located at \(x_k\) by setting the fee associated with the selection of any other plan sufficiently high. The separability of the agents’ preferences then implies that, once the plan \((s_k(x_k), T_k(x_k), \rho_k(\cdot; x_k), S_k(x_k))\) is selected, even if \(S_k(x_k) = \Sigma(\Theta_l)\), because the price schedules \(\rho_k(\cdot; x_k)\) satisfy (28), type \(\theta_k\) prefers to select \(q_{x_l}(s_k(v_k, x_k))\) agents from each location \(x_l\) to any other mass of agents from the same location \(x_l\), irrespective of the mass of agents from other locations type \(\theta_k\) includes in his matching set. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Fix a pair of locations \(x_a, x_b \in [0, 1]\). From Lemma 1, the profit-maximizing tariffs are customized and induce agents to select matching sets satisfying the threshold property of Lemma 1. Furthermore, from the proof of Lemma 1, for any \(\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)\), any
Proof of Proposition 2. Take any \((\theta_k, x_l) \in \Theta_k \times [0, 1]\) for which \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), t^*_l(\theta_l, x_l) \in \text{Int}[V_l]\). Recall that, in this case, \(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)\) is given by the unique solution to
\[
\varphi_k (\theta_k, (t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), x_l)) + \varphi_l ((t^*_l(\theta_l, x_l), x_l), \theta_l) = 0.
\]
whereas $t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l)$ is given by the unique solution to
\[ u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|) + u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_k|) = 0. \]
This means that $u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_k|)$ is given by the expression in (15) in the main text. That the conditions in (1.a) and (2.a) suffice for the distortions on side $k$ to decrease (alternatively, increase) with distance then follows from the triangular property, along with the fact that, fixing $\theta_k = (v_k, x_k)$, $\rho'_k = u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|)$ is decreasing in $\mu(x_k, x_l) \equiv |x_k - x_l|$, whereas $\rho'_l = u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_l|)$ is increasing in $\mu(x_k, x_l)$. In turn, these properties follow from the fact that the virtual values respect the same rankings as the true values.

Then consider parts (1.b) and (2.b). Without loss of generality, assume $x_l > x_k$ (the results for the case $x_l < x_k$ are analogous to those for the case $x_l > x_k$, after the obvious change in sign due to the fact that, in this case, increasing distance means decreasing $x_l$). Differentiating the expression in the right-hand-side of the second equality in (15) with respect to $x_l$ at some $x_l$ for which $\mu(x_k, x_l) \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, we obtain that
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_l} \left[ u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_k|) - u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_l - x_k|) \right] = \frac{1 - F_k^l(v_k)}{f_k^l(v_k)} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 u_k(v_k, |x_k - x_l|)}{\partial v_k} \\
- \frac{(\lambda^*_{k})(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l))}{\lambda^*_{k}(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l))} \frac{\partial^*_{k}}{\partial x_l} \left( \frac{\partial u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|)}{\partial t_l} \right) \\
+ \frac{1}{\lambda^*_{k}(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l))} \left( \frac{\partial^*_{l} u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|)}{\partial x_l} + \frac{\partial^*_{l} u_l(t^*_k(\theta_k, x_l), |x_k - x_l|)}{\partial v_l} \right),
\]
where $\lambda^*_{k}(v_l) \equiv f_k^l(v_l)/[1 - F_k^l(v_l)]$ is a shortcut for the hazard rate of the marginal distribution of the vertical dimension $v_l$, when $v_l$ and $x_l$ are independent on side $l \neq k$. By Lemma 1, $\frac{\partial^*_{l}}{\partial x_l} (\theta_k, x_l) \geq 0$. Therefore, under the conditions of Part (1.b), the expression above is negative, whereas, under the conditions of Part (2.b), the above expression is positive. That distortions decrease (alternatively, increase) with distance under the conditions of Part (1.b) (alternatively, (2.b)) then follows from the above properties. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** The platform’s problem consists in choosing a collection of side-$a$ uniform price schedules $p_a(\cdot|x_b)$, one for each side-$b$ location $x_b \in [0, 1]$, along with a collection of side-$b$ price schedules $p_b(\cdot|x_a; x_b)$, one for each pair $(x_a, x_b) \in [0, 1]^2$, that jointly maximize its profits, which can be conveniently expressed as
\[
\int_0^1 \int_0^1 f^*_a(x_a | x_b) \bar{D}_a(p_a'(q|x_b) | x_b) p_a'(q|x_b) dq dx_b \\
+ \int_0^1 \int_0^1 f^*_b(x_a; x_b) D_b(p_b'(q|x_a; x_b) | x_b; x_b) p_b'(q|x_a; x_b) dq dx_a dx_b,
\]
subject to the feasibility constraint (3).

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For any \( x_b, q \leq f_b^x(x_b) \), and \( p'_a(q|x_b) \), let

\[
\hat{v}_{x_b} \left( p'_a | x_a \right) = \begin{cases} 
  v_a & \text{if } p'_a \in \left[ u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|), u_a(\bar{v}_a, |x_a - x_b|) \right] \\
  \bar{v}_a & \text{if } p'_a < u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|) \\
  \underline{v}_a & \text{if } p'_a > u_a(\bar{v}_a, |x_a - x_b|).
\end{cases}
\]

(34)

Given the above definition, we have that the demand by the \( x_a \)-agents for the \( q \)-th unit of the \( x_b \)-agents at the marginal price \( p'_a(q|x_b) \) is equal to

\[
D_a \left( p'_a(q|x_b) | x_b; x_a \right) = \left[ 1 - F_a^{v|x} \left( \hat{v}_{x_b} \left( p'_a | x_a \right) | x_a \right) \right] f_a^x(x_a).
\]

Also, for any \( q \leq f_b^x(x_b) \), recall that \( v'_b(q|x_b) \) is the unique solution to \( \int 1 - F_b^{v|x} \left( v'_b(q|x_b) | x_b \right) f_b^x(x_b) = q \). Reciprocity, along with optimality, implies that the most profitable way to deliver \( q \) units of \( x_b \)-agents to each \( x_a \)-agent demanding to be matched to \( q \) units of \( x_b \)-agents is to match the \( x_a \)-agent to every \( x_b \)-agent whose vertical type exceeds \( v'_b(q|x_b) \). In other words, the optimal tariffs induce matching demands with a threshold structure, as in the case where tariffs are customized on both sides of the market (cfr Lemma 1). Now for each \( x_a, x_b \in [0, 1] \), each \( q \leq f_b^x(x_b) \), let

\[
\hat{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b) = \hat{D}_a \left( p'_a(q|x_b) | x_b; x_a \right).
\]

Given \( p'_a(q|x_b) \), the platform thus optimally selects customized prices for the \( x_b \)-agents for each quantity \( \hat{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b) \) of the \( x_a \)-agents equal to

\[
\rho'_b(\hat{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b) | x_a; x_b) = u_b(\hat{v}_b(q|x_b), |x_b - x_a|).
\]

(35)

Such prices guarantee that, for each \( x_a \in [0, 1] \), \( D_b(\rho'_b(\hat{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b) | x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b) = q \), thus clearing the market.

The function \( p'_a(q|x_b) : \mathbb{R} \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) thus uniquely defines the matching sets on both sides of the market. Now, from the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1, we know that the maximal revenue the platform receives from the side-\( b \) agents when each \( x_b \)-agent with vertical type \( v_b \) is assigned a matching set equal to \( s_b(v_b, x_b) \) is given by

\[
\int_{\theta_b} \left\{ \int_0^1 \left\{ u_b(v_b, |x_b - x_a|) - \frac{1 - F_b^{v|x}(v_b|x_b)}{f_b^{v|x}(v_b|x_b)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_b}{\partial v} (v_b, |x_b - x_a|) \right\} q_{x_a}(s_b(v_b, x_b)) dx_a \right\} dF_b(\theta_b).
\]

In turn, this means that the platform’s problem can be re-casted as choosing a function \( \frac{d\rho_b}{dq}(q|x_b) : \mathbb{R} \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) that maximizes

\[
\int_0^1 \int_0^{f_b^x(x_b)} \left\{ \hat{D}_a \left( p'_a(q|x_b) | x_b \right) p'_a(q|x_b) - C \left[ p'_a(q|x_b) \right] \right\} dq dx_b
\]

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where, for each \( x_b \in [0, 1] \), each \( q \leq f_b^x(x_b) \), the function

\[
\mathcal{C}[p'_a(q|x_b)] = - \int_0^1 \left\{ u_b (v'_b(q; x_b), |x_b - x_a|) - \frac{1-E^{v'_b}_{p'_a}(v'_b(q; x_b)|x_b)}{f_b^{v'_b}(v'_b(q; x_b)|x_b)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_b}{\partial v_b} (v'_b(q; x_b), |x_b - x_a|) \right\} D_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b; x_a) \, dx_a
\]
captures the “procurement costs” of clearing the matching demands of all side-\( x \)-agents that demand at least \( q \) matches with the \( x_b \)-agents. This problem can be solved by point-wise maximization of the above objective function, i.e., by selecting for each \( x_b \in [0, 1] \), \( q \leq f_b^x(x_b) \) (equivalently, for each \((x_b, v_b) \in [0, 1] \times V_b\)), \( p'_a(q|x_b) \) so as to maximize

\[
\bar{D}_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b) p_a(q|x) - \mathcal{C} [p'_a(q|x_b)] .
\]

The first-order conditions for such a problem are given by

\[
p'_a(q|x_b) \frac{\partial \bar{D}_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b)}{\partial p'_a} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b)} \right] - \mathcal{C}' [p'_a(q_a|x_b)] = 0,
\]

where

\[
\mathcal{C}' [p'_a(q_a|x_b)]
\]

\[
= - \int_0^1 \left\{ u_b (v'_b(q; x_b), |x_b - x_a|) - \frac{1-E^{v'_b}_{p'_a}(v'_b(q; x_b)|x_b)}{f_b^{v'_b}(v'_b(q; x_b)|x_b)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_b}{\partial v_b} (v'_b(q; x_b), |x_b - x_a|) \right\} \frac{\partial D_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b; x_a)}{\partial p'_a} \, dx_a .
\]

Now observe that (35) implies that

\[
u_b (v'_b(q; x_b), |x_b - x_a|) - \frac{1-E^{v'_b}_{p'_a}(v'_b(q; x_b)|x_b)}{f_b^{v'_b}(v'_b(q; x_b)|x_b)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_b}{\partial v_b} (v'_b(q; x_b), |x_b - x_a|) \]

\[
= \rho'_b (\tilde{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b) \left( 1 \frac{1}{\varepsilon_b (\rho'_b(\tilde{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b)} \right)
\]

This means that the above first-order conditions can be rewritten as

\[
p'_a(q|x_b) \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b)} \right]
\]

\[+ E_{H(x_a|x_b, p'_a(q|x_b))} \left[ \rho'_b (\tilde{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_b (\rho'_b(\tilde{q}_b(q; x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b)|x_a; x_b)} \right) \right] = 0,
\]

where \( H(x_a|x_b, q) \) is the distribution over \( X_a = [0, 1] \) whose density is given by

\[
h_a (x_a|x_b, p'_a(q|x_b)) \equiv \frac{\partial D_a (p'_a(q|x_b)|x_b; x_a)}{\partial p'_a} .
\]

The above properties imply the result in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. As explained in the main text, the proof below is for the more general case in which the side-\(b\) preferences may depend on the locations.

Fix \(\theta_b = (v_b, x_b)\) and let \(q = f^x_b (x_b) \left[ 1 - F^y_b (v_b) \right]\). The result in Proposition 3 implies that, under uniform pricing on side \(a\) and customized pricing on side \(b\), for any \(x_a \in X_a\) such that \(t^u_b (\theta_b, x_a) \in \text{Int}[V_a]\), \(t^u_b (\theta_b, x_a)\) is such that

\[
u_a(t^u_b (\theta_b, x_a), |x_b - x_a|) - \mathbb{E}_{H(x_a| x_b, p^{u'})} \left[ \frac{1 - F^{u'}_{a}(\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a))}{f^{u'}_{a}(\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a))} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial x} (\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a), |\bar{x}_a - x_b|) \right] (36)
\]

\[+ \mathbb{E}_{H(x_a| x_b, p^{u'})} [\varphi_b (\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a), x_a) ] = 0, \]

where \(H(x_a| x_b, p^{u'})\) is the distribution over \(X_a = [0, 1]\) whose density is given by

\[h (x_a| x_b, p^{u'}) \equiv \frac{\partial D_a(p^{u'}_a | x_a)}{\partial D_b(p^{u'}_b | x_a)} , \]

and where \(p^{u'}_a\) is a shortcut for \(p^{u'}_a(q|x_b)\) with the latter equal to \(p^{u'}_a(q|x_b) = \nu_a(t^u_b (\theta_b, x_a), |x_a - x_b|)\).

Note that, to arrive at (36), we used the result in Proposition 3 along with the property in (18) and the fact that, for any \(x_a\) such that \(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p^{u'}_a | x_a) \notin \text{Int}[V_a]\), \(h (x_a| x_b, p^{u'}) = 0\), whereas for any \(x_a\) such that \(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p^{u'}_a | x_a) \in \text{Int}[V_a]\),

\[
\frac{p^{u'}_a}{\varepsilon_a (p^{u'}_a | x_b; x_a)} = \frac{1 - F^{u'}_{a} (\hat{v}_{x_b}(p^{u'}_a | x_a))}{f^{u'}_{a}(\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a | x_a))} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v} (\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a | x_a), |x_a - x_b|).
\]

We also used the fact that, for any \(x_a\) such that \(h (x_a| x_b, p^{u'}) > 0\) (equivalently, \(\hat{v}_{x_b}(p^{u'}_a | x_a) \in \text{Int}[V_a]\)),

\[
\rho_b (\hat{q}_b (q; x_a; x_b)| x_a; x_b) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_b (\rho_b (\hat{q}_b (q; x_a; x_b)| x_a; x_b))} \right)
\]

\[= \varphi_b (\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a | x_a), x_a), \]

as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.

On the other hand, under customized pricing on both sides, for any such \(\theta_b = (v_b, x_b)\), any \(x_a \in X_a\) such that \(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a) \in \text{Int}[V_a]\), the threshold \(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a)\) is such that

\[
u_a(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a), |x_b - x_a|) = \frac{1 - F^{u'}_{a}(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a))}{f^{u'}_{a}(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a))} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial x} (t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a), |x_a - x_b|) + \varphi_b (\theta_b, (t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a), x_a)) = 0.
\]

It is then immediate that, for any \(x_a\) such that

\[
- \mathbb{E}_{H(x_a| x_b, p^{u'})} \left[ \frac{1 - F^{u'}_{a}(\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a))}{f^{u'}_{a}(\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a))} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial x} (\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a), |\bar{x}_a - x_b|) \right] (36)
\]

\[+ \mathbb{E}_{H(x_a| x_b, p^{u'})} [\varphi_b (\hat{v}_b(p^{u'}_a|\bar{x}_a), x_a) ]
\]

\[\leq - \frac{1 - F^{u'}_{a}(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a))}{f^{u'}_{a}(t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a))} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v} (t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a), |x_b - x_a|) + \varphi_b (\theta_b, (t^*_b(\theta_b, x_a), x_a))\]

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we have that \( t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a) \geq t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a) \), whereas, for any \( x_a \) such that

\[
-\mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a | x_b, p_a^v) \left[ \frac{1 - F_a^v(x_a | p_a^v)}{f_a^v(x_a | p_a^v)} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v} (\hat{v}_b(\tilde{p}_a^v | \tilde{x}_a), |x_b - \tilde{x}_a|) \right]
\]


\[
+ \mathbb{E}_H(\tilde{x}_a | x_b, p_a^v) \left[ \varphi_b (\theta_b, (\hat{v}_b(\tilde{p}_a^v | \tilde{x}_a), \tilde{x}_a)) \right]
\]

we have that \( t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a) \leq t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a) \).

Also note that, by virtue of reciprocity, \( t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a) \leq t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a) \) if and only if

\[
t_b^v((t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a), x_a), x_b) \leq t_a^v((t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a), x_a), x_b)
\]

and, likewise, \( t_a^v(\theta_b, x_a) \geq t_a^v(\theta_b, x_a) \) if and only if

\[
t_a^v((t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a), x_a), x_b) \geq t_a^v((t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a), x_a), x_b).
\]

The above properties imply that uniform pricing (on side \( a \)) leads to more (alternatively, less) targeting than customized pricing (on both sides), if, for any \( \theta_b \), the function

\[
L(x_a | \theta_b) = \varphi_b (\theta_b, (t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a), x_a)) - \frac{1}{f_a^v(x_a | t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a))} \cdot \frac{\partial u_a}{\partial v} (t_b^v(\theta_b, x_a), |x_a - x_b|)
\]

\[
= \rho'_b \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_b(\rho'_b | x_a; x_b)} \right) |\rho'_b = u_a(v_a, |x_a - x_b|) - \frac{\rho'_a}{\varepsilon_a(\rho'_a | x_a; x_b)} |\rho'_a = u_b(v_b, |x_a - x_b|)
\]

is non-decreasing (alternatively, non-increasing) in the distance \( |x_a - x_b| \).

Fixing \( \theta_b \), the function \( L(x_a | \theta_b) \) is nondecreasing in \( |x_a - x_b| \) when the side-\( a \) inverse-semi-elasticities are decreasing in distance and in price and the side-\( b \) preferences are invariant to distance. It is non-increasing in \( |x_a - x_b| \) when the side-\( a \) inverse-semi-elasticities are increasing in distance and in price and the side-\( b \) preferences are invariant to distance. These properties establish the result in Part 1 in the proposition. The result in Part 2 then follows from the result in Part 1 along with the fact that the side-\( a \) inverse-semi-elasticities are decreasing (alternatively, increasing) in both distance and price when \( x_a \) and \( v_a \) are independent, the hazard rate for \( F_a^v \) is increasing in \( v_a \), and \( u_a \) is submodular and concave in \( v_a \) (alternatively, \( x_a \) and \( v_a \) are independent, the hazard rate for \( F_a^v \) is decreasing in \( v_a \), and \( u_a \) is supermodular and convex in \( v_a \)). Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** The proof follows from the combination of the results in Proposition 4 with the results in Proposition 1 in Aguirre et al (2010). When the environment satisfies the conditions in Part 1 of Proposition 4, starting from uniform pricing on side \( a \), the introduction of customized
pricing on side $a$ leads to an increase in prices for nearby locations and a reduction in prices for distant locations. Proposition 1 in Aguirre et al (2010), along with the fact that the environment satisfies Condition NDR and that, for any $x_b$ and $p'_a$, the convexity $CD_a(p'_a|x_b;x_a)$ of the demands by the $x_a$-agents for the $q$-th unit of the $x_b$-agents declines with the distance $|x_a - x_b|$, then implies that welfare of the side-$a$ agents is higher under uniform pricing. Likewise, under the conditions in Part 2 of Proposition 4, that welfare of the side-$a$ agents is higher under uniform pricing follows from the fact that, starting from uniform pricing on side $a$, the introduction of customized pricing on side $a$ leads to an increase in prices for distant locations and a reduction in prices for nearby locations. The welfare implications of such price adjustments then follow again from Proposition 1 in Aguirre et al (2010), along with the fact that Condition NDR holds and that, for any $x_b$ and $p'_a$, the convexity $CD_a(p'_a|x_b;x_a)$ of the demands by the $x_a$-agents for the $q$-th unit of the $x_b$-agents increases with the distance $|x_b - x_a|$. Q.E.D.

References


