

*Curriculum Vitae of*  
**BARON REED**

**CONTACT INFORMATION**

Department of Philosophy  
Northwestern University  
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**EMPLOYMENT**

Northwestern University, Associate Professor	2009-present
Northwestern University, Assistant Professor	2007-2009
Northern Illinois University, Assistant Professor	2003-2007
Pomona College, Lecturer	2001-2003
Pomona College, Visiting Instructor	2000-2001

**EDUCATION**

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Brown University	2002
Dissertation: <i>Knowledge, Agency, and Personhood</i>	
Committee: Ernest Sosa (advisor), Jaegwon Kim, James Van Cleve	
M.A. in Philosophy, Brown University	1998
B.A. in Philosophy with Honors, <i>summa cum laude</i> , University of Iowa	1994

**AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION**

Epistemology, Metaphysics

**AREAS OF COMPETENCE**

Ancient Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy

**PUBLICATIONS**

- [1] "Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 50 (2000): 57-67.
- [2] "Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 39 (2001): 507-26.
- [3] "How to Think about Fallibilism," *Philosophical Studies* 107 (2002): 143-57.
- [4] "The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 23 (2002): 147-80.

- [5] “Accidentally Factive Mental States,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71 (2005): 134-42.
- [6] “Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless,” *Synthese* 148 (2006): 303-8.
- [7] “Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73 (2006): 186-97.
- [8] “The Long Road to Skepticism,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 104 (2007): 236-62.
- [9] “Certainty,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/>
- [10] “A New Argument for Skepticism,” *Philosophical Studies* 142 (2009): 91-104.
- [11] “Self-Knowledge and Rationality,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (forthcoming).
- [12] “A Defense of Stable Invariantism,” *Notes* (forthcoming).

#### REVIEWS

- [13] Review of N.M.L. Nathan’s *The Price of Doubt* (Routledge, 2001), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (2005): 735-9.
- [14] Review of Bryan Frances’ *Scepticism Comes Alive* (Oxford, 2005), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (April 2006): <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6221>

#### WORK IN PROGRESS

##### Book:

*Living with Doubt*

##### Papers:

“Fallibilism” (*Philosophy Compass*, invited)

“Who Knows?”

“Contextualism and Reported Knowledge Attributions”

“Knowledge, Action, and Counterfactual Reasoning”

My overall research project has wide-ranging implications for a variety of issues in contemporary epistemology, including the nature of knowledge, skepticism, fallibilism, virtue epistemology, contextualism, and interest-relative invariantism (also known as subject-sensitive invariantism or pragmatic encroachment). This project has thus far been developed and defended in a number of papers, both published and in progress. It will culminate in a book manuscript titled *Living with Doubt*, in which I articulate and defend a view I call *stable invariantism*. According to stable invariantism, fallibilism properly understood is capable of capturing the intuitions underlying currently popular rival views, such as contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. Moreover, a significant advantage of stable invariantism is its ability to fully account for the value of knowledge—a desideratum that opposing views are unable to satisfy. I then consider stable invariantism as a response to traditional forms of skepticism. Contrary to received wisdom in contemporary epistemology, I argue that *all* forms of fallibilism face the traditional skeptical challenge. This is so even for externalist versions of fallibilism, which take knowledge to be grounded in the first instance in something like

the reliability of one's cognitive faculties. For it is generally recognized, even by externalists themselves, that knowledge is incompatible with the kind of subjective irrationality that arises when one is presented with evidence or reasons that weigh against one's beliefs. But what I show is that the traditional skeptic can pose precisely this sort of rational challenge to individual epistemic agents. Given this rational challenge, then, the epistemic agent is required to make a *rational* response—the mere fact that her cognitive faculties are reliable is no longer a sufficient defense against skepticism. Assuming some form of fallibilism—whether externalist or not—is correct, no decisive response to traditional skepticism is possible. Doubt, therefore, will always remain. It does not follow from this that skepticism is correct, but it does mean that we cannot take knowledge and doubt to be incompatible with one another. Thus I show that the dominant conception in current epistemology is false—knowledge does *not* drive out doubting. The book closes with the presentation of a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form, this argument does not turn upon considerations of rationality but rather on the conditions under which cognitive success can be properly attributed to the epistemic agent. I argue that there are two fundamental underpinnings to our present conception of knowledge: fallibilism and attributabilism (i.e., the claim that knowledge must be attributed to the epistemic agent as a whole). I show, then, that fallibilism and attributabilism are in conflict with one another. Because this argument is original and importantly different from the traditional skeptical challenge, it is unaffected by all of the received responses to skepticism. Consequently, the new argument for skepticism leaves us with doubt about knowledge itself.

### PRESENTATIONS

Symposium on Ernest Sosa's <i>Reflective Knowledge</i> (Oxford, forthcoming) Brazil Epistemology Conference, Porto Alegre, Brazil	June 2010
"Who Knows?" Bled Conference: Epistemic Virtue and Value, Bled, Slovenia	June 2009
"Who Knows? What It Means to Be an Epistemic Agent" University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee	October 2008
"Who Knows? What It Means to Be an Epistemic Agent" Conference on "The Place of Epistemic Agents," Madrid, Spain	October 2008
"A New Argument for Skepticism" Basic Knowledge Seminar, Arché, University of St. Andrews, Scotland	May 2008
"A New Argument for Skepticism" Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Evanston	November 2007
"A Defense of Stable Invariantism" Bled Conference: Contemporary Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia	May 2007
"Self-Knowledge and Rationality" American Philosophical Association, Central Division	April 2007
"A Defense of Stable Invariantism" ATINER Conference, Athens, Greece	June 2006
"Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense"	

American Philosophical Association, Central Division	April 2006
“Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense” Central States Philosophical Association	October 2005
“A Defense of Stable Invariantism” The University of Iowa	February 2005
“The Long Road to Skepticism” American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division	December 2004
“The Long Road to Skepticism” Northern Illinois University	October 2004
“Knowledge, Agency, and Personhood” Southern California Philosophy Conference	October 2001
“The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression” Southern Methodist University	February 2001
“The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression” Claremont Colleges Philosophy Colloquium	October 2000
“The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression” University of Pittsburgh, Ideas in Motion Conference	February 2000
“Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues” Western Illinois University	February 2000

#### COMMENTS

Comment on Jay Newhard’s “Circularity in Ordinary Language Arguments for Epistemic Contextualism” American Philosophical Association, Central Division	April 2008
Comment on Tomoji Shogenji’s “An Externalist Guide to Epistemic Practice” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division	April 2007
Comment on Scott Sturgeon’s “Normative Judgment” Kline Workshop, University of Missouri	September 2006
Comment on Allen Hazlett’s “Grice’s Razor” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division	March 2006
Comment on Minh Nguyen’s “The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions” Central States Philosophical Association	October 2005
Comment on Andy Egan’s “Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion”	

Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference	August 2005
Comment on Jennifer Nagel's "Epistemic Compatibilism in Normal Worlds" American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division	March 2005
Comment on Leo Iacono's "Pragmatics and Epistemic Justification" American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division	March 2004
Comment on Ted Morris's "Dreaming, Deception, and Descartes' Painter Analogy" Illinois Philosophical Association	November 2003
Comment on Michael Pace's "Direct Realism and Blurry Vision" Central States Philosophical Association	October 2003
Comment on Ram Neta's and Guy Rohrbaugh's "Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge" American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division	March 2003
Comment on Jonathan Weinberg's "The <i>A Priori</i> , Externalism, and the Purposes of Justification" American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division	March 2001
Comment on Edward Abrams's "The Varieties of Indeterminism Worth Wanting" Brown University Graduate Student Conference	February 1998
Comment on Gonzalo Rodriguez-Peyrera's "Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community" Brown University Graduate Student Conference	February 1997

#### **AWARDS AND HONORS**

Bernard E. Bruce Award, Brown University	2002
Dissertation Scholar-in-Residence, Ohio University (declined)	2000-2001
Nabrit Fellowship, Brown University	1999-2000
Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellowship for Minorities	1994-1999
Teaching Fellowship, Brown University	1998
University Fellowship, Brown University	1997
Gustav Bergmann Prize in Philosophy, University of Iowa	1994

#### **SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION**

Referee for <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , <i>Synthese</i> , <i>Inquiry</i> , <i>The Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Dialectica</i> , <i>European Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Principia</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , Oxford University Press, Springer, <i>Acta Analytica</i> , <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i>	
Co-organizer, Midwest Epistemology Workshop	2007
Referee, Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy	1997-1998

#### **SERVICE TO THE DEPARTMENT**

Admissions and Fellowships Committee, Northwestern	2007-2009
Metaphysics and Epistemology Search Committee, Northwestern	2008-2009
Graduate Student Affairs Committee	2008-2009
Metaphysics and Epistemology Search Committee, Northwestern	2007-2008
Colloquium Coordinator, NIU	2003-2007
Library Departmental Representative, NIU	2003-2007
Newsletter Editor, NIU	2003-2007
Curriculum and Policy Committee, NIU	2005-2007
Chair Selection Advisory Committee, NIU	2006-2007
Hiring Committee (Metaphysics/Ancient), NIU	2005-2006

### COURSES TAUGHT

*At Northwestern University:*

Metaphysics  
 Freshman Seminar: The Place of Persons  
 1<sup>st</sup>-Year Graduate Proseminar on Descartes  
 Early Modern Philosophy  
 Studies in Modern Philosophy: Descartes and Spinoza  
 Theory of Knowledge

*At Northern Illinois University:*

Skepticism Ancient and Modern  
 Spinoza  
 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Century Rationalism  
 Modern Philosophy  
 Introduction to Philosophy  
 Seminar on Descartes  
 Symbolic Logic

*At Pomona College:*

Freedom and Responsibility  
 Logic  
 Modern Philosophy  
 Problems in Philosophy  
 Seminar on Descartes

*At Scripps College:*

Introduction to Philosophy

*At Brown University:*

Freedom and Responsibility

## REFERENCES

Victor Caston, University of Michigan

Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University

James Van Cleve, University of Southern California