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Abstract (max 100 words): Political parties are closely associated with pivotal turning points in American political development. Surprisingly little attention, however, has been given to how the parties, themselves, change over time. Whether they are conceptualized as formal organizations or as networks of groups, studying parties from a historical-institutional perspective directs attention to their structural arrangements and the processes through which those arrangements change. Identifying mechanisms of change and specifying the conditions under which different types of change may occur, the historical-institutional approach promises to elucidate the relationship between party change and political change more broadly.

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20. Political Parties in American Politics

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Scholars have long observed that the most pivotal turning points in American political development have involved significant changes in the political parties and what they do. Changes in party composition and operation have been linked to the rise and fall of partisan regimes, to the formation and preservation of durable policy coalitions, and to the changing terms of "organizational combat" that define American politics (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Surprisingly little effort, however, has been devoted to understanding the processes and mechanisms through which the parties, themselves, actually change.

One reason for this oversight involves the pervasive influence of functionalism in the study of American political parties. Functionalist premises appear in different guises: sometimes parties are understood to be reflections of actors' preferences (Aldrich 1995), socioeconomic conditions (Burnham 1970), or the structure of the political system (Lowi 1967). In each case, parties are presumed to change automatically or reflexively when their broader environment changes, with changes in their forms following changes in their functions. Eliding the complex organizational logic (and oftentimes laborious work) through which parties are actually reconfigured and redirected to new purposes over time, functionalist approaches obscure underlying processes of party change.

The historical-institutional approach thus offers a particularly attractive alternative in this area of study. Refusing to accept that party development can be

reduced to changes in actors' preferences or environmental conditions, it argues that what parties *do* is fundamentally shaped by what they *are*—specifically, how they are *structured*. It thus begins with an inquiry into the parties' component parts—their institutional arrangements, coalitional structures, and group alliances—and then examines the mechanisms and processes through which those arrangements change. Only then does it move to consider the relationship between those changes and observed shifts in the parties' functions. Inverting the functionalist paradigm in this way, the historical-institutional approach treats party change as structurally delimited and historically constrained. It views party change as both an organizational *problem* and a political *process*—and both require explanation.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of functionalist perspectives in American parties scholarship and then discusses historical-institutional alternatives for studying the two most common conceptualizations of parties: (1) parties as formal organizations and (2) parties as networks or "long coalitions" of groups. Finally, it considers how these alternative approaches can help to illuminate broader patterns of order and change in American political development.

VARIETIES OF FUNCTIONALISM IN AMERICAN PARTIES SCHOLARSHIP

From the normative perspective that parties *should* serve particular democratic functions for the American polity (Wilson 1908; Merriam 1923; Schattschneider 1942; American Political Science Association 1950; Ranney 1954; Broder 1972) to the structural-functional view of parties as constitutive of, and

selected for, the peculiarities of the American constitutional system (Banfield 1961; Lowi 1967; Epstein 1986), scholars have long evaluated parties with reference to the "roles" they are said to play in American politics. At issue is the perceived utility of political parties for the political system: are they fulfilling their democratic, integrative, or constituent purposes? If not, why not?

Those older varieties of functionalism have lost much of their appeal in contemporary political science, but two more modern variants—what Pierson (2004) has termed "societal functionalism" and "actor-centered functionalism"—remain widely influential. These perspectives, though more empirically grounded and theoretically explicit than their predecessors, still treat parties as solutions to, or reflections of, the problems faced by society or by the actors who design them. The main challenge is to specify those problems and ascertain the parties' relationship to them. Both sidestep the question of whether the structural arrangements of the parties might, themselves, be integral to the processes through which they change.

Consider realignment theory, perhaps the most influential conceptual framework in the history of U.S. parties scholarship (Burnham 1970; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Sundquist 1983). The theory holds that growing tensions between socioeconomic changes, on one hand, and non-adaptive political institutions, on the other, serve as a driving force of American political development. When those tensions escalate to a breaking point, citizens express their discontent in "critical" elections that usher in durable new partisan alignments. Parties, in this framework, are not engines of change, but forces of inertia. They are constitutive of

"normal" periods, in which "systematically patterned" political activities, institutional relationships, and policy structures have "obvious functional utility in fulfilling dominant system and elite needs," writes the best-known proponent of realignment theory (Burnham 1970, 185). Far from "action instrumentalities," parties are passive and serve as obstacles to change. Their routines are "disturbed not by adaptive change within the party-policy system, but by the application of overwhelming external force" (183).

This perspective offers a subtle variation of the societal-functionalist conceit that "a particular institution *X* exists because it constitutes an effective response to some kind of societal problem" (Pierson 2004, 105). If and when parties change, it is because their environment—the societal problem—has changed. The structural form of the party does not make much of an appearance—nor do the relationships between party organizations, interest groups, political activists, and elected officials. Whether those party structures, networks, and relationships might make a difference in how and when they change is left unexamined.

Whereas "societal functionalism" treats parties as reflections of broad social forces, the "actor-centered functionalism" that has risen to prominence in recent years treats parties as reflections or instantiations of actors' preferences (Schlesinger 1985, 1991; Aldrich 1995; Cox 1997). Consistent with traditional rational choice theory, this perspective conceptualizes parties as "endogenous institutions" that exist to solve the problems of the politicians who create them (Aldrich 1995, 19). The explanation for party change is thus relatively straightforward: when actors' problems change, so too will the parties' forms.

Actor-centered accounts are more attuned to the importance of the parties' institutional forms than societal-functional perspectives, but they still treat changes in those forms as far too easy. When actors find that existing party structures have become inadequate to address the new problems they are facing, they simply choose new institutional forms to replace the old ones. Which forms they pick are wholly contingent on actors' preferences: theoretically, all institutional possibilities are on the table, so long as they promise to solve the actors' new problems. The primary obstacle to change is not institutional, it is behavioral: it is the difficult task of mobilizing and aligning the interests of a diverse lot of ambitious actors in favor of party change (Aldrich 1995, 284-85). The new party forms that eventually emerge are presumed to reflect the preferences of the politicians who use them. This proposition, of course, is difficult—if not impossible—to refute, since politicians always seem to get what they want from their parties (or at least, they always want what they can get from them).

The problem, therefore, is not what goes into the model, but what it leaves out: the institutional attributes of the parties. By making politicians' problems and preferences the main object of inquiry, the actor-centered functionalist account is unable to make all but the most basic observations about the how parties are structured or the processes through which they change.

BEYOND FUNCTIONALISM: A HISTORICAL-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

Both societal and actor-centered functionalist accounts treat parties as highly susceptible to change when their environment changes. The implicit suggestion is

that structural change in the parties is easy—either automatic or inevitable—and peripheral to the main action, which is external to the party itself. But what if the internal process of change in the parties is not so seamless or inconsequential? What if the parties' institutional attributes are, themselves, important factors in their own development?

If the institutional arrangements of the parties are, in fact, important omitted variables, then functionalist accounts may be systematically overestimating the power of societal forces and actors' preferences to produce party change. By assuming that exogenous variables are the primary catalysts for party change, they may also be failing to capture important endogenous changes in the parties that occur during "normal" periods, such as incremental and cumulative changes that might, over time, amount to major transformations in party form and function.

The process of party change, I wish to argue, needs to be explained, not assumed. This is where a historical-institutional approach is uniquely well positioned to add value. By examining how parties are arranged and investigating the mechanisms through which their structures and operations change over time, it aims to identify internal processes of development and specify conditions under which different types of change may occur. It does not jettison the functionalists' motivating concerns about whether, when, and how parties perform (or do not perform) particular functions—it simply flips the analysis around, arguing that the best way to get an empirical handle on those questions is to begin with the parties' institutional attributes. As Frank Sorauf (1975) has written:

> "A meaningful approach to political parties must be concerned with parties as organizations or structures performing activities, processes, roles, or

> functions…The logical intellectual and analytical point of reference is the party as a structure. Activity (or function) is certainly important, but *one must begin by knowing who or what is acting*" (38, italics added).

The historical-institutional approach thus tends to emphasize internal processes of party change. While exogenous forces are expected to push for or inhibit party change, it is assumed that their effects will be mediated by the parties' internal attributes. But while we already know a great deal about the former, there is still much to learn about the latter. This is precisely the point made by comparativists Panebianco (1988) and Harmel and Janda (1994) in their agenda-setting work on the subject, as well as by comparative politics scholars including Koelble (1992), Kitschelt (1994), Murillo (2001), Grzymala-Busse (2002), Levitsky (2003), and Burgess (2004), and others, who have shown that preexisting, inherited party arrangements interact with environmental pressures to narrow or widen the possibilities for party change.

The following two sections consider the two most prominent conceptualizations of parties in the U.S. setting—(1) parties as formal organizations and (2) parties as "networks" or "long coalitions" of groups—and discuss how a historical-institutional approach can provide new insights and open new lines of inquiry in both areas of research. In the first part, I discuss how the investments actors make in their formal parties' institutional *resources* can generate gradual, incremental change over long stretches of time, expanding the parties' organizational capacities and altering their institutional "functions." In the second part, I consider how modifications made to the *links* connecting groups, activists, and party organizations—that is, reconfigurations of the broader party network—

can produce significant changes in party goals and activities. Both types of inquiries are shown to offer promising paths forward for historical-institutional research.

Investments in Party Resources

The largest and most traditional area of scholarship on U.S. parties treats the Democratic and Republican parties as formal, "quasi-public institutions" that are comprised of national, state, and local committees and other "official" party structures (Epstein 1986; Bibby and Shaffner 2008). One of the key findings of this literature is that both parties have become increasingly institutionalized and nationalized over the last hundred years or so, turning into primarily campaign-service vendors for party candidates. Through a gradual process of adaptation, adoption of new technologies, and development of new organizational capacities, the formal party organizations have undergone a dramatic transformation in their forms and functions (Cotter and Bibby 1980; Cotter et al. 1984; Kayden and Mahe 1985; Schlesinger 1985; Aldrich 1995; Shea 1999; Herrnson 2002; Galvin 2012).

One way to explain these changes is to emphasize environmental shifts and changed actor preferences. Actor-centered functionalist accounts, for example, posit that both parties were transformed from "mass parties" to "parties in service" to their candidates in and around the "critical era of the 1960s," when a series of "sweeping and fundamental" changes in public opinion and electoral behavior created new problems for ambitious politicians that existing party arrangements were ill-equipped to solve (Schlesinger 1985; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Niemi 1996). In an increasingly fractious, candidate-centered era, "mass" parties could no

longer control campaigns or satisfy their candidates' needs. This "mismatch between form and problem" prompted party actors to dismantle old party forms and create new ones that better served their purposes—and "parties in service" were the result (Aldrich 1995, 286).

Closer consultation of the historical record, however, reveals that precisely the same forms and functions said to characterize the modern "party in service" began to emerge three decades earlier in the Republican Party (in the 1930s) and two decades later in the Democratic Party (in the 1980s) than the actor-centered punctuated-equilibrium model allows (Galvin 2012). Indeed, the 1960s did not represent a critical breakpoint in either party's institutional development.

This temporal discrepancy might be shrugged off as a mere historical oversight if it did not so clearly expose the main theoretical fault line between functionalist and historical-institutional approaches. Consider how the issue is investigated. The actor-centered functionalist model begins with new observed party functions (e.g., services to candidates), and then works backward to attribute those new functions to observed changes in the environment (e.g. the tumultuous 1960s), which are presumed to have presented political actors with new problems they needed to solve. New party forms are thus said to have emerged *because* they solved those new problems, irrespective of whether they actually did, or whether they were created for those purposes in the first place.

The historical-institutional approach, in contrast, begins with a close examination of party structures, examines how they change over time, and only then moves to consider the relationship between those changes and new party activities

("functions"). Moving from form to function enables the researcher to stay true to the historical record while allowing potentially new findings to turn up and new mechanisms of change to come to light.

In a recent study of structural change in the two national party committees, for example, I find that the parties' accumulation, renovation, and conversion of their institutional *resources*—meaning their money, information assets, technology, human resources, and the like—helps to explain how each evolved into a modern "service" party and why each made its transition on such different timetables (Galvin 2012). Resource investments had multiplying effects on party activities, opening the door to unexpected changes in what each party did and how it did it. For example, investments in human resources—in party personnel and their knowledge and skills—enhanced each party's adaptive capacities, enabling it to solve new problems, pursue new purposes, and engage in myriad activities. Likewise, investments in information assets—proprietary information like voter data, or any other intellectual resource of value—multiplied the range of political activities each party could undertake in the future.

Rather than "lock in" specific patterns of behavior or "remove certain options from the menu of political possibilities" as in path-dependent processes (Pierson 2004, 12), the development of party resources gradually *expanded* the menu of options facing party actors in the future. As new party actors inherited existing institutional resources, added to them, altered them, and deployed them in pursuit of new and oftentimes unexpected purposes, they contributed to a gradual process of party change. This process may be understood as a variant of what Kathleen

Thelen has termed "institutional conversion," whereby old institutions remain in place but are directed to new purposes (2004, 36-7; see also Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The two national parties were not dismantled, but their primary functions were altered over time.

Aldrich (1995) is thus correct that the primary functions of formal party organizations in America changed dramatically over time. But *how* did those changes come about? And what does that tell us about the overarching theory of parties and party change? The historical-institutional approach suggests these changes were not reflexive responses to new actor preferences or to changed environmental conditions: rather, the emergence of new "service" functions in both parties resulted from long, drawn-out processes of gradual institutional development involving the dynamic interplay of both structure and agency. The range of activities the parties could undertake and the extensiveness of the services they could provide—and the ways in which those capacities were exploited by ambitious actors—expanded only slowly as their institutional resources became increasingly operational, effective, and technologically sophisticated over time.

Thus, it is simply not possible to specify a date—or even a short span of years (e.g., Aldrich's "critical era" of the 1960s)—when the national committees can be said to have been functionally transformed. Not only did each party follow its own distinct timetable, but different candidate-service capacities emerged within each party at different times: some appeared immediately, some were more fully realized in the medium-term, and some developed over the "longue durée," as the utility of

specific institutional resources spilled into new realms of activity and gradually expanded the range of the national committees' campaign service offerings.

Empirically, then, it makes little sense to begin the inquiry with a search for new party functions. Rather, one must begin with changes in specific party forms, and only then consider changes in party functions. Proceeding in that fashion enables the researcher to identify the discrete mechanisms of change at work. Of course, this approach need not only apply to the study of formal party structures. Other potentially fruitful areas of investigation might include the influence of institutional resource investments on (1) levels of grassroots activism; (2) party rules, nomination processes, and other decision-making activities; (3) coordination and collective action across party units; and (4) relationships between formal and informal party structures, including interest groups, nonprofits, and other party-like organizations.

Directing attention to endogenous mechanisms of change in the parties thus gives extra weight to the "internal" side of the story and helps to counterbalance studies that focus exclusively on "external" factors. But it also has a substantive payoff: it helps us to recognize forward-moving trajectories *as they happen* and develop a better understanding of where a party might be headed. The alternative requires us to wait for exogenous shocks to disrupt the status quo while we remain agnostic about the shape the new equilibrium will take.

Change in the Party Network

Parties, however, consist of more than just the DNC, RNC, state parties, and other formal party structures. As a growing body of scholarship has demonstrated, parties may also be fruitfully envisioned as informal "networks" or "long coalitions" of interest groups, activists, campaign professionals, non-profit organizations, social movement groups, media outlets, formal party organizations, and other various groups working toward common purposes (Bernstein and Dominguez 2003; Cohen et al. 2008; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009; Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012). Most effort, thus far, has been put toward defining these networks and establishing their existence. Partly because of this careful work—and partly because recent changes in the campaign finance system have thrust party networks into the political spotlight—the value of this more expansive definition of party is no longer seriously questioned. Parties *are* usefully conceptualized as networks, and when viewed as such, they can illuminate a great deal about the workings of American politics.

A number of paths for future research have opened up along these lines, including deeper engagement with, and wider application of, social network analysis (Fowler et al. 2011; Heaney et al. 2012; Noel 2012b; Sinclair 2012). For historical-institutional researchers, however, perhaps the most promising path forward involves comparative case studies of how different party networks—in different temporal or spatial settings—change over time, through what mechanisms, and with what downstream consequences for party activities, institutional arrangements, and political development.

As Peter Hall (2014) has suggested, studying how coalitions form, persist, and change over time can generate key insights into broader processes of

institutional change. Indeed, to the extent that institutions are "creatures of coalitions," getting a better handle on the underlying coalitional dynamics of party networks should illuminate how American party politics is structured across time and place. Comparative-historical studies of party networks in the U.S.—across states, for example, or over time—can thus bolster our understanding of party networks and their significance in American political development.

Research along these lines begins with the structural arrangements of party network. Which groups and actors are "in" the network, which are on the boundaries, and which are "outside"? How do groups move in and out of the network? How do they relate to one another? How should we conceptualize and identify the "ties" or "links" that bind them together?[i] Changes in the broader party network—in *what* it does, *how* it does it, *when* it changes, and *why*—should register in those connections, alliances, and other structural features. Studies of these ties are still in their infancy, and the data are notoriously difficult to get. Even the mechanisms of collaboration around candidate nominations are admittedly "hard to study and poorly documented" (Bawn et al. 2012, 572; see also Cohen et al. 2008). But we know enough, at present, to say with confidence that network ties at the activist, elite, and organizational levels do exist and are of central importance to what networks actually do.

Recent scholarship has documented several points of contact, overlap, and exchange among diverse groups, and begun to flesh out their effects. Heaney et al. (2012), for example, find that formal party organizations, policy-focused interest groups, and social movement organizations share robust, overlapping activist

membership bases that are distinct for each party network. Those shared membership ties appear to help build solidarity and facilitate collaboration across the network while reinforcing partisan polarization. Likewise, Skinner, Masket, and Dulio (2012) show that there is a revolving door of sorts between parties, non-profit groups, and candidates' campaigns, as professional staff members regularly move between organizations. And as Koger et al. (2009, 2010) have demonstrated, parties, interest groups, and myriad non-profit and for-profit organizations regularly share valuable information assets across organizational boundaries, suggesting significant inter-group cooperation despite the sometimes very different goals pursued by each group.

Learning more about these ties is important because they lend the party network *organizational capacity*—they determine what it is able to do. For example, to the extent that "policy demanding" groups are able to coordinate their endorsements and collectively mobilize other sources of support, they can influence candidate selection and nomination processes and exert influence over policy outcomes (Masket 2007; Cohen et al. 2008; Dominguez and Grossman 2009; Masket 2009, 2011). Indeed, some see coordination around nominations as the *sine qua non* of party activity (Bawn et al. 2012). *Changes* to those ties, therefore, should affect the party's capacity to carry out its essential activities.

Particularly illuminating extensions of this idea include Karol (2009), which shows that changes in group alliances and coalitional arrangements can prompt elected officials to adopt new issue positions, and Noel (2012a), which shows how the ideologies crafted by intellectuals can help to shape and reshape party

coalitions. These studies strongly suggest that the configuration of groups in the network and the nature and extent of their coordination are major factors that shape what parties do, what purposes they pursue, and how they interact with other political institutions (also see Allern and Bale (2012)).

Numerous questions emerge from these findings. Perhaps most importantly, how does coordination and collaboration actually occur within party networks? How institutionalized or routinized are the links between network participants? How susceptible are those links to change? How do groups enter and exit the network? What effects do changes in the composition of the network have on the politicization of existing groups' identities, the creation of new politically relevant groups, or on the party's aggregate organizational capacities and the goals it pursues? How is collective responsibility fostered among diverse groups? These questions suggest only a few of the many research opportunities for historical-institutional scholarship in this area. They also suggest a research strategy: begin with the configuration of a given party network, examine its mechanisms of change, then seek to explain the variation in effects observed over time and across cases.

Consider, for example, inquiries into the relative *resilience* of party networks. What factors influence the party's capacity to adapt to environmental change? What kinds of network ties make a difference, and how? Numerous comparative studies have found, for example, that industrial labor unions tend to act as a "drag" on party adaptation efforts in the context of globalization and deindustrialization. The more central industrial labor unions are to the broader party network—the more power union officials wield over party nominations and policy positions—the more likely

the party is to suffer electoral decline. Kitschelt (1994) finds confirmation of this dynamic in his extensive study of left-of-center parties in Europe, where adaptation was more difficult for parties dominated by labor unions. The same logic is also on display in Levitsky's (2003) study of the Argentine PJ party, in which party adaptation was easier in no small part because labor unions were only loosely integrated in the party. Swapping out labor organizations for new clientelist mechanisms at the local level, the party was able to maintain its mass base while freeing itself to shift dramatically to the right.

Although one might expect a different pattern to adhere in the U.S. two-party system, the same kinds of assumptions animate the ongoing debate over the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party. Centrist "third way" Democrats have long attributed the party's electoral challenges since the late 1970s to the outsized influence of organized labor in the party (Galston and Kamarck 1989; Baer 2000; From 2013). Those on the other side tend to lament labor's *diminished* influence within the Democratic Party and argue that its decline has contributed to the party's rightward drift, abandonment of core values, and loss of enthusiasm at the grassroots (Meyerson 1986; Kuttner 1987; Dreyfuss 2001; Francia 2006). Both sides thus agree that a negative relationship exists between the party's ties to organized labor and its adaptive capacities: they differ only in how much of the former they are willing to trade for the latter.

Theory-building is a collective enterprise. One study at a time, historical-institutional scholars can begin to flesh out the differential effects produced by:

(1) links of different *kinds* (e.g., financial ties vs. personnel overlap vs. separate organizations engaged in joint operations);

(2) links of different *strength* (e.g. deeply rooted cultural ties between groups vs. short-term policy-specific alliances vs. more contentious relationships; different degrees of institutionalization, routinization, and susceptibility to change)

(3) different *types of groups* in a network (e.g. labor unions vs. issue advocacy groups vs. social movement groups; and differences within group-type—e.g., UAW vs. SEIU vs. public sector unions).

By examining the variation along each of these dimensions—and by developing stronger and more dynamic theories of how network links are formed, reinforced, and fragmented over time—one can develop a deeper appreciation for how party networks operate internally, as well as how they impinge upon their broader environment. Clarifying how these processes unfold over time promises shed light on the underlying dynamics of American political development.

CONCLUSION: PARTIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Whether parties are conceptualized as formal organizations or networks, studying them from a historical-institutional perspective directs attention to the mechanisms and processes through which they change over time. It also promises to elucidate the relationship between *party* change and *political* change more broadly.

Several key organizing principles in the study of American political development, for example, imply the existence—and central political significance—

of parties as networks of groups. These conceptual frameworks are particularly amenable to further historical-institutional study along the lines suggested above. Consider the concept of *partisan regimes* (Skowronek 1993; Plotke 1996; Polsky 2012). According to Andrew Polsky, political coalitions drive the formation of partisan regimes and are responsible for their subsequent maintenance and breakdown over time. Treating those coalitions as party networks structured by various links and mechanisms of coordination would tackle the question of regime formation and dissolution from a theoretically fresh and rigorously empirical angle.

The related concept of *policy regimes* can be approached in a like manner. As Patashnik (2008) has shown, without the support and buy-in of broad coalitions of interest groups, party actors, and activists, major policy reforms tend to be more susceptible to dismantlement or drift. How those coalitions are constructed, reinforced, and weakened over time thus emerges as a pressing question (see also Hall 2014). Hacker and Pierson (2010, 2012) have gone so far as to depict such "durable policy coalitions" as the key players in the main drama of American politics, which they term "politics of organized combat." Examining the mechanisms of change in those networks over long stretches of time can thus illuminate critical shifts in American politics, including the rise and fall of policy regimes, the restructuring of the American economy, and the dramatic rise of income inequality since the 1970s.

Party networks and policy coalitions also figure prominently in studies of how leaders and entrepreneurs seek to alter their structural confines and reshape the political landscape. Presidents, congressional leaders, and other political actors

who seek to reinforce, exploit, or undermine partisan regimes, for example, often target existing party networks for strategic reconfiguration (Ginsberg and Shefter 1988; Skowronek 1993; Sheingate 2003; Karol 2009; Galvin 2010; DiSalvo 2012; Krimmel 2013). Paying more attention to the structure and process of change in those networks thus promises to illuminate both the causes and effects of entrepreneurial innovation in politics.

Party organizations and party networks, in sum, are constitutive of American political development. They can be observed to motivate partisan regime cycles, sustain or undermine discrete policy regimes, and serve as crucial explanatory factors in major substantive shifts in American politics. They are, in short, important drivers of "durable shifts in governing authority" (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Examining what makes them more or less resilient and capable of operating forcefully on the broader political environment thus offers an exciting path forward for historical-institutional scholarship in this area.

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[i] These links are also called “ties,” “lines,” or “edges” in social network analysis terminology. See Noel (2012b).