Karol dubs some issues “groupless” (p. 5). On such issues, politicians enjoy greater autonomy in defining positions, and party positions are more volatile. On issues like defense and fiscal policy, politicians seek to expand coalitions by stealing away “issue ownership” from their opponents, often with little regard for substantive consistency (p. 162).

The vicissitude of party positions Karol demonstrates appears to justify his call for a “reinterpretation of the stability in ‘spatial’ positions” of representatives (p. 3). I won’t open those methodological and theoretical cans of worms, but feel safe suggesting that the book also raises a number of interesting practical questions. How do parties balance hostile groups within their coalitions? How does the electoral importance of a group shape party efforts at coalition management? Do party efforts to expand coalitions on “groupless issues” lead to the formation of groups, and if so, when? While these are unaddressed in this book, Karol’s contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversation about how issues and parties evolve in American politics will probably inspire future interest in these and other questions.

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Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush
352 pp. Paper, $27.95.

Daniel Galvin’s book explains in careful empirical detail the impact of post-1952 presidents upon their respective political parties. Galvin’s method involves comparative case studies based on meticulous research of reliable sources. It is an impressive summary of the actual historical record of president–party interactions.

To Galvin, the central influences shaping these interactions are two: the competitive standing of the president’s party and the party’s organizational arrangements that a president encounters upon assuming office. White House occupants who view themselves as minority-party presidents have a stronger motivation to improve their party’s capacities than do those who view themselves as leaders of electorally dominant majority parties. “Minority-party presidents seek to transfer their broader support onto their weaker party,” while “majority party presidents try to tap into the broader support of their own party and use it for their own purposes” (p. 163). Also, party renewal is less likely when the party itself is in organizational disrepair, making the costs of renewal more burdensome for presidents.

The book presents rich case studies of the post-1960 presidents and their parties. Galvin examines presidential impact on six aspects of party capacity: campaign services to candidates, human capital (via training programs), candidate recruitment, voter mobilization, party finances, and support for internal party activities (p. 246).
The big empirical finding is that post-1952 GOP presidents were all more-energetic party builders than were the Democratic presidents. Republican presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush saw the need to greatly improve their party’s electoral standing, but Democrats were convinced of their party’s strong competitive situation, leading them to either ignore their parties or use them for immediate, personal political advantage. As Democratic Party organization gradually fell into disrepair after 1960, subsequent Democratic presidents found the time and effort required for party renewal to be increasingly costly, further discouraging party-building efforts.

The main contrast between Democratic and Republican presidents occurs at the beginning of the book’s history. Eisenhower energetically sought to develop the GOP’s capacity, while John Kennedy acted as a “party predator” by taking his party for granted and using it to further his immediate political needs. From this time, path-dependency becomes evident in Galvin’s narrative. Subsequent GOP presidents followed Ike’s lead in trying to strengthen their party’s capacities. Subsequent Democrats, from Lyndon Johnson through Bill Clinton’s first term, assumed that their party was dominant electorally and need not be organizationally renewed.

The wake-up call came in 1994, when the GOP won control of Congress. Clinton, viewing this as conclusive evidence that Democrats were no longer a majority party, invested time and effort in renewing his party’s capacities. In two brief final chapters, Galvin notes how both parties in the twenty-first century seem to be constantly renewing their capacities, testament to the absence of a stable majority party presence in the American electoral universe.

A central lesson of the book, then, involves the delayed recognition by Democratic presidents of their party’s increasingly imperiled electoral circumstances. Signs of erosion appeared as early as the mid-1960s, but full presidential recognition of the need to boost their party to counter these trends did not arrive until thirty years later. Why the great delay? That is a riddle suggested by the book that future scholars will have to address.

Students of presidential politics since 1960 will encounter important new findings in this book. Given the no-party dominance of our current electoral politics, Galvin’s research suggests that party building might become an occupational necessity for presidents of both parties. We shall see.

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Many observers struggle to make sense of the presidential nominating process in the United States. Indeed, the peculiarities of this process and the fact that