

THE DYNAMICS OF FARE AND FREQUENCY CHOICE IN URBAN TRANSIT

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Published in :

Transportation Research A, volume 44(10), page 815-829, December 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates the choice of fare and service frequency by urban mass transit agencies. A more frequent service is costly to provide but is valued by riders due to shorter waiting times at stops, and faster operating speeds on less crowding vehicles. Empirical analyses in the 1980s found that service frequencies were too high in most of the cities studied. For a given budget constraint, social welfare could be improved by reducing service frequencies and using the money saved to lower fares. The cross-sectional nature of these analyses meant that researchers were unable to address the question of when the oversupply occurred. This paper seeks to answer that question by conducting a time series analysis of the bus operations of the Chicago Transit Authority from 1953 to 2005. The paper finds that it has always been the case that too much service frequency was provided at too high a fare. The imbalance between fares and service frequency became larger in the 1970s when the introduction of operating subsidies coincided with an increase in the unit cost of service provision.

Keywords: transit, fares, frequency, optimality, subsidy, Chicago

1. Introduction

Economists have long recognized that for a given budget constraint, urban mass transportation firms can choose both the price (“fare”) charged and the frequency at which the buses run (“service level”). The reason is that there is a difference between the units of demand (such as passenger trips) and the units of supply (vehicle miles). Moreover, as described in the seminal paper by Mohring (1972), passengers also contribute to the “production” as well as the consumption of transit services by offering the scarce resource of their own time.

This paper is a time-series empirical investigation of two issues. The first is to determine how the socially optimal combination of fares and service levels has changed over time. The second is whether the combination actually chosen by the transit agency diverges from the socially optimal one, and whether there have been any trends in the magnitude of the divergence. Data for the investigation are annual observations for the Chicago Transit Authority’s bus services for the period from 1953 to 2005.

2. Theoretical Background

The theoretical literature on fare and service level choice developed in the 1970s as transit systems were transitioning from commercial enterprises to highly subsidized publicly-owned organizations. The modeling is relatively straightforward in an urban transit context because there is usually monopoly provision.¹

On the demand side, the literature defines the generalized cost to the rider as a combination of the fare and the valuation of the time taken for the trip. The time taken comprises the access and egress time associated with walking to and from the bus stop, the time taken waiting at the stop, the in-vehicle travel time, and any wasted time at the origin or destination resulting from a mismatch between the traveler’s preferred departure and arrival time and the schedule of the buses. Transit access/egress and wait times are inversely related to the density of routes and the frequency of service. More service provision means that routes will be located closer to the traveler’s origin and destination, and assuming that there is some randomness in when the traveler arrives at the stop, she will have a shorter wait for the bus to arrive. Even if the traveler knows the timetable and arrives shortly before the bus is due, more frequent services makes it more likely that the bus schedule will match the traveler’s preferred departure or arrival time. In-vehicle time is also inversely related to service level. Because demand has been found to be inelastic with regard to service levels,² increased service levels will reduce the average number of people on each bus. Consequently, if service levels are increased, the average trip will be quicker because the bus will stop less often, and for a shorter duration, to allow fellow passengers to board and alight.

In our time-series analysis, demand, measured as the number of annual passenger trips (Q), will be expressed as a function, $q(\cdot)$, of the generalized cost of travel $g(\cdot)$ and a set of exogenous demand variables (X) representing the wide variety of societal changes that have, in general, reduced transit demand over the years. As described in the previous paragraph, the

generalized cost is a function of the average fare paid (P) and vehicle miles (VM) as a proxy for the service level.

Traditionally, costs have been modeled as a function of the number of vehicle miles and/or vehicle hours operated, and the number of vehicles required for peak period service. The total cost function will be expressed as a function, $c(\cdot)$, of vehicle miles, an exogenously determined vector of factor prices (Y), and a set of other exogenous cost factors such as the state of technology (Z). (The empirical analysis in this paper will vary vehicle miles and peak vehicle requirement in proportion to each other, so the stylized cost function will just be expressed in terms of vehicle miles.)

It is analytically important to recognize that while many observers believe the industry displays constant returns to scale, there is an *increasing* marginal cost to providing higher service quality to the rider.³ Consider a route on which a bus can make a round trip in one hour at a cost of \$100, and passengers arrive randomly at stops. To provide a 20-minute frequency, the transit agency must deploy three buses at a cost of \$300 an hour. Passengers wait on average for 10 minutes for a bus to arrive. To double the frequency to every 10 minutes requires three additional buses. The average waiting time is now only five minutes. The reduction in waiting time of five minutes has been achieved at a marginal cost of \$300, or \$60 for each minute of average waiting time saved. To further increase the frequency to every five minutes requires six additional buses. The average waiting time falls by two-and-a-half minutes at a marginal cost of \$600, or \$240 for each minute of average waiting time saved.

Denoting the politically determined level of subsidy as B , an agency with a requirement to break even after subsidies faces a budget constraint given by:

$$(1) \quad P^*q[g(P, VM), X] + B = c(VM, Y, Z)$$

The first term is the revenue collected from passengers, and is known as farebox revenue. This equation is the starting point for the pioneering paper by Nash (1978). Nash points out that there are multiple combinations of the endogenously determined variables P and VM that satisfy equation (1). Moreover, as the equation contains squared (and perhaps even higher power) terms in both price and vehicle miles,⁴ the combinations can be thought of as forming the closed boundary of a shape similar to that illustrated in Figure 1.⁵

Nash discusses alternative management objectives that can be pursued within the budget constraint. These included maximizing vehicle miles, maximizing passenger trips, and maximizing social welfare. The latter two objectives would be analytically identical if the agency just served one market, but would differ if passengers could be segmented into separate markets (such as by route or time of day) with differing demand characteristics.

Social welfare is defined as the combination of passengers' surplus and the transit agency's profit/loss. The former is the area under the demand curve and above the equilibrium level of generalized cost to the user.⁶ As the transit agency has to break even after subsidies, the latter is defined by equation (1) as equivalent to $-B$. The Lagrangian maximization problem subject to a budget constraint is given by:

$$(2) \quad \text{Max } L = \int_{g(P, VM)}^{\infty} q[g(P, VM), X] dg - B - \lambda \{P^* q[g(P, VM), X] - c(VM, Y, Z) + B\}.$$

Diagrammatically, the socially optimal combination is determined by overlaying the budget constraint with the contours of a social welfare “hill.” Transit riders unambiguously prefer more service and lower fares, so welfare is increasing toward the southeast in Figure 1. There will be a tangency point, denoted by A, where welfare is maximized. When fares and service levels are at their optimal combination, denoted by P^* and VM^* , the literature describes them as “balanced.”

Further theoretical examination of the nature of the maximization problem has occupied many writers over the past thirty years (Glaister and Collings, 1978; Panzar, 1979; J.O. Jansson, 1979; Frankena, 1983; K. Jansson, 1993; Savage and Small, 2010). Authors have investigated issues such as allowing endogenous determination of the size of the transit vehicles, contrasting situations where passengers are unaware of the timetable and arrive randomly at stops with situations where they know the timetable and select the departure that most closely coincides with their preferred travel time, and whether the frequency selected by a profit maximizing monopolist differs from the socially optimal frequency.

3. Dynamics in the Theoretical Model

One of the objectives of this paper is to empirically investigate how the balance point may have changed over time due to variation in the exogenous variables B , X , Y and Z . Utilizing Figure 1 to illustrate some comparative static results, an increase in subsidies (B) will shift the relevant portion of the budget constraint moves downward and to the right. For a given level of vehicle miles the agency can afford to reduce the fares (as transit is generally regarded as price inelastic⁷), or for a given level of fares the agency can provide more vehicle miles. The balance point will also move down and to the right indicating that increased subsidies should lead to lower optimal fares and increased vehicle miles.

If exogenous factors reduce demand (X), the budget constraint will move upward and to the left. That is to say, in the reverse direction of that associated with an increase in subsidy. Exogenous decreases in demand will lead to a higher balanced level of fares, and a decrease in vehicle miles.

An increase in exogenous factor prices (Y) or an adverse exogenous change in technology (Z) will make the relevant part of the budget constraint steeper, which is to say it pivots upward relative to the origin. One can unambiguously conclude that the balanced level of vehicle miles will decrease, but is unclear whether the balanced level of fares will increase or decrease. This will depend on the shape of the budget constraint and the contours of the welfare hill.

4. Empirical Literature

An empirical literature in the early 1980s investigated whether actual fares and service levels deviated from the theoretically optimal combination. Glaister (1987), using data from 1982, found that in four of five major British cities there was too much service provided at too high a fare. Dodgson (1987) conducted a similar, but somewhat simplified, analysis for Australian cities using 1982/3 data and unambiguously found that service was overprovided. An analysis of Chicago in 1994 by Savage and Schupp (1997) found results that were in line with the situation in Australia.⁸

A more recent paper by Glaister (2001) re-estimated his models using data from the late 1990s. In the interim, the British bus industry went through privatization and, outside London, deregulation. In contrast to the previous findings, he now found that transit riders would prefer the provision of more service at a higher fare. Moreover, in several cities it would even make commercial sense to provide more service. Glaister does not explain the conundrum of why some transit companies are missing out on the profitable provision of additional service. A possible explanation for the reversal in findings is that deregulation has led to a substantial decline in unit costs, which presumably has made expansion of service less costly and hence relatively more attractive.

Excepting Glaister (2001), the empirical literature suggests that, in actuality, transit agencies have chosen to locate to the northeast of the balance point (for example at point M in Figure 1). The traditional folklore explanation is that transit managers have a preference for attempting to maintain service output and employment in a declining market. Nash (1978) formalized this objective as “bus mile maximization.” The implied reasoning for the managers' preference is twofold. First, because transit is heavily unionized, managers have shied away from the disutility of negotiating job cuts. Second, because they partially rely on taxpayer funding, transit agencies feel obligated to provide service to all neighborhoods, including those that generate limited levels of demand. Moreover, when politicians serve on the boards, or oversight committees, of transit agencies they may insist on minimum levels of service provision in the districts that they represent. The rationale being that the sight of buses out on the street is a tangible indication to voters that their representatives are doing their job in providing the “benefits” of transit.

These explanations would suggest that the incentives for the overprovision of service arose or became stronger in the late 1960s and the 1970s as transit in most developed countries experienced declining demand, the introduction of substantial subsidies, and the taking of many previously privately owned operations into the public sector. However, the cross-sectional nature of the previous literature does not provide any insight into when or why the disparity arose. The current analysis, which utilizes a lengthy time series for one city, aims to investigate the magnitude of the disparity over time, and whether the size of the disparity can be explained by changes in the demand and cost functions, and political decisions on the amount of subsidy available.

5. The Application to Chicago

The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) presents a unique opportunity for a time-series analysis. In most cities it is difficult to obtain a lengthy and/or consistent time series of comparable data because of mergers of neighboring companies, expansion of service into newly developed suburbs, regionalization of finances, and privatization and contracting of service. In contrast, the CTA's basic structure has changed little in sixty years. It has been publicly owned since 1947, was not permitted to expand geographically to serve the new suburbs that emerged after the Second World War,⁹ has been untouched by privatization, and still directly operates its own regular route bus and rail services. While regional mechanisms for transportation financing emerged in the 1970s, the CTA continued to have its own corporate governance, and responsibility for service planning and pricing. In 2005 it provided service with a peak requirement of 1,700 buses, and 1,000 railcars on seven "elevated" rail routes, in the City of Chicago and the older inner suburbs.

An earlier analysis by Savage and Schupp (1997) concerned both bus and elevated rail services in 1994. In contrast, this paper is solely concerned with the bus system, but has a lengthy time series of data. The rail system is not analyzed because changes in service output have primarily been associated with new line construction (in the late 1960s, early 1980s, and mid-1990s). In contrast, changes in the bus system have been more gradual and reflective of social and land use changes. The paper uses the shorthand term "bus" to mean the service on the surface city streets. This service has been provided by a combination of streetcars (which were eliminated by 1958), trolleybuses (which replaced streetcars on many routes but were themselves eliminated by 1973) and motor buses. The analysis starts in 1953 following the acquisition by the CTA of the Chicago Motor Coach Company in October 1952, and continues to 2005.

While the basic structure of the CTA has not changed, there has been considerable variation in the endogenous and exogenous variables. The trends in the two main endogenous variables are shown in Figure 2. Vehicle miles, which are plotted on the right-hand axis, have declined almost continually, and are now 45% below their 1953 value. There were small service increases in the mid-1960s and after 1999. In contrast, real average fare (calculated as farebox revenue divided by ridership, and expressed in 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index), that is plotted on the left-hand axis, has varied considerably. It increased in the 1950s and 1960s, and reached a record high level in the late 1960s. Real fares fell considerably in the 1970s as the nominal fare was held almost constant during an era of high inflation. Real fares started to rise again in the 1980s, but there was another ten year freeze in nominal fares between 1993 and 2003.

Figure 3 shows a graph of ridership on the surface system. Ridership is measured as annual unlinked trips (a journey that requires a transfer to another bus or to the elevated rail system is counted as two trips). Actual ridership, shown as the solid line, fell by two-thirds between 1953 and 2005. Of course, the rise in real fares and the decline in service levels have been partly to blame. A counterfactual estimate of demand based on the holding fares and vehicle miles at their 1953 values can be found by applying elasticities calculated in Savage (2004). This is shown as the dashed line. The continual downward slope of this dashed line represents the relentless erosion of demand due to the exogenous conditions. The exogenous

factors include the end of the six day workweek, the rise of home-based entertainment (television), the rise of automobile ownership, the movement of population from traditional cities to the suburbs, and the outward migration of workplaces. Of course, over the long run, transit policy may have influenced some of these social changes such as the choice of residential and workplace location. There does seem to be some leveling off in the downward trend in recent years due to a modest repopulating and gentrification of the inner city.

Figure 4 shows trends in real unit costs, defined as the surface system operating cost plus the annualized purchase cost of vehicles divided by vehicle miles and expressed in 2005 prices. Real unit costs have increased by 120% from \$4.82 a mile in 1953 to \$10.84 a mile in 2005. Part of this increase is due to exogenous factor price pressures, part due to changes in technology, and part due to changes in efficiency. Unit costs were approximately constant until the mid-1960s, but then doubled in the fifteen years between 1965 and 1980, which coincidentally was the period of the rapid rise in subsidies. There was some unit cost reduction immediately after 1980, followed by twenty years of stability. Unit costs appear to have increased since 2002. Changes in real unit costs are represented by the variables Y and Z in equations (1) and (2), and are assumed to be exogenously determined. Clearly some factor prices are truly exogenous such as fuel prices and the cost of equipment. Wage rates are partly determined by changes in the general Chicago labor market. But changes in technology and deviations from the most efficient production are presumably endogenous to the agency.¹⁰

Therefore, the model in this paper assumes that the transit agency is playing a two stage game. In the first stage any technological change and the level of tolerated (in)efficiency is chosen, and then fares and frequencies are selected in the second stage. The focus of this paper is the second stage. To the author's knowledge there has not been any theoretical literature investigating the first stage of this game, but there has been a literature discussing the empirical linkages between the availability of subsidy and cost efficiency.

Finally, Figure 5 shows trends in surface system real farebox revenue and real total cost. Total costs were constant until the mid-1960s, increased between 1965 and 1980, declined in the following twenty years, and have increased considerably since 2000. Revenue was also reasonably constant until the mid-1960s and has declined almost continuously since. The difference between the two lines is the operating profit or loss. Prior to 1965 the CTA was making a small operating profit (of less than 6% of revenue). It had to do so as it was required to pay principal and interest on bonds that were issued in the 1940s and early 1950s to allow the CTA to purchase the assets of its predecessor companies. Between 1965 and 1980, subsidies increased rapidly. The operating loss will be indicative of subsidy to the bus system, as the CTA is required to present an overall balanced budget each year, after subsidies, when combining together its bus, elevated rail, and subcontracted paratransit service to the elderly and physically challenged. The operating loss is represented by the variable B in equations (1) and (2)

Following a regional transit funding crisis in 1980, a new funding system emerged in 1983. The amount of subsidy received by the CTA became truly exogenous as it was tied to a specific local sales tax levy combined with a set ratio of matching revenues from state government. However, for a period in the early to mid-1990s and in the years between 2002 and 2007 these specific subsidies were insufficient to balance the budget. One-off grants, the

reassigning of capital grants for operating purposes, and underfunding of the necessary contributions to the employees' pension and retirees' healthcare funds covered the shortfall. In early 2008, after a protracted political battle, the State legislature voted to increase the sales tax levy.

6. Methodology and Data

This paper estimates a simplified version of Savage and Schupp's (1997) model for each year from 1953 to 2005. There are three principal simplifications. First, the paper only considers the bus system, whereas Savage and Schupp analyzed both the bus and rail systems. Second, the paper does not disaggregate by time of day and day of week. Third, the external effect on highway users and the congestion they suffer is not included. All monetary data has been adjusted into 2005 prices using the Consumer Price Index. All further discussion of data, variables and results will be in terms of real values.

6.1 Demand Function

The budget constraint means that any fare reductions necessary to reach a balance point will be accompanied by a reduction in service level. Passengers will be trading off lower fares against longer travel times. Consequently demand will change by a smaller percentage than the changes in fares and service levels. If the magnitude of the change is small, we could assume for simplicity that the demand function in any given year is locally linear around the actual observed generalized cost and demand. Indeed, the optimization generally changes demand by less than 5%, and in 39 of the 53 years the increase is 3% or less. Consequently, the demand function for any given year in the region around the actual observed values takes the form:

$$(3) \quad Q = \alpha_t - \beta_t [P + V_W W + V_R R]$$

where W is the average waiting time at stops, R the average in-vehicle time, and V_W and V_R are the values of waiting and in-vehicle time respectively.

The intercept and slope parameters for each year are calculated by taking the observed values for each variable (data sources are discussed in the next section) and the point generalized cost elasticity ($e_{Q,g}$). The latter is calculated by transforming the known price elasticity ($e_{Q,P}$) using the following equation, where the subscript t_0 indicates the observed value of a variable in year t :

$$(4) \quad e_{Q,g} = \frac{P_{t_0} + V_{Wt} W_{t_0} + V_{Rt} R_{t_0}}{P_{t_0}} e_{Q,P} \cdot$$

The same price elasticity will be assumed at the point of actual observed ridership in every year. This elasticity is -0.457, which was estimated by Savage (2004) for the Chicago bus system in a time-series (1948-1997) analysis that also included vehicle miles as an explanatory variable.

6.2 Demand Data

Ridership (Q) is measured as annual unlinked passenger trips, and average fare (P) is measured as total bus farebox revenue per unlinked trip. Information on farebox revenue disaggregated into bus and rail modes has only been available since 2002. Since then the average revenue per trip on the bus system averages 90% of the average for the bus and rail system combined. The analysis assumes that this ratio holds for all years. While the CTA has a flat fare system that does not differentiate by mode or distance traveled, the bus system may have a higher proportion of riders such as school children or seniors who qualify for discounted fares.

A nonlinear waiting time function is used that is derived from a classic paper by Seddon and Day (1974). The function relates average waiting time to the scheduled average interval between buses, known as headway (H). The function (measured in minutes) is:

$$(5) \quad W = 0.1898 + 0.00817H - 0.0000015H^2.$$

In 1994 the weighted average headway was 9.798 minutes when averaged across all routes and time periods and weighted by ridership (excluding the “owl” overnight hours). The estimated headway in other years is calculated by multiplying the 1994 headway by the ratio of the vehicle miles to “directional route miles” in a given year to the equivalent ratio in 1994.¹¹ This permits calculation of an estimate of H_{t0} and hence W_{t0} .

In-vehicle time is endogenous. While it forms part of generalized cost which determines ridership, the level of ridership affects in-vehicle time as a more crowded bus has to stop more often and has longer dwell times to allow passengers to board and alight. In 1994 an average bus passenger’s trip was 2.37 miles long, and he or she would be delayed as a result of 10.81 other passengers boarded the vehicle. The generally accepted average boarding times for the type of vehicles used by the CTA is 2.5 seconds (0.042 minutes). Therefore, based on known average speed, in-vehicle time in minutes is given by the equation:

$$(6) \quad R = 13.212 + 0.042 ((2.37*Q)/VM)$$

If there were no passengers on board, the bus would take 13.212 minutes to travel 2.37 miles. This equation permits calculation of R_{t0} .¹²

A standard approach has been used to valuing time. In-vehicle time (V_R) is valued at half the average wage rate in a given year, and waiting time (V_W) at twice this amount (for a review of the absolute values and the ratios of various components of journey time see Wardman, 2004). Data on average hourly wages for private non-agricultural industries was obtained from the annual *Economic Report of the President* and adjusted using a methodology described by Gordon (1995). Gordon’s modification is based on the labor share of the national income accounts, and includes allowance for increases in overtime payments, and employer paid fringe benefits and social security contributions. Real wages have increased over the past fifty years and the real values of time have similarly increased.¹³ Of course, it is rather heroic to assume that the socioeconomic characteristics of riders have remained constant for fifty years and hence that the value of time of transit riders has remained a constant proportion of the real average

wage rate in the economy. In defense of this assumption, it should be pointed out that even today the CTA has a very diverse ridership, with plenty of middle and upper income riders especially on the busy services along the lakefront. One would imagine that those riders who abandoned transit for the automobile had the highest value of time and were the least price sensitive. This would imply that transit riders today would prefer less frequent service at lower fares compared with their counterparts in the 1950s.

6.3 Bus Operating Costs

Costs are the combination of operating costs and the capital costs of vehicles. Operating cost data disaggregated into bus and rail components are available since 1982. An appendix to Savage (2004) discusses how total CTA operating costs can be disaggregated by mode for earlier years. The annualized cost of vehicles, which would normally appear in the capital budget, is also included, as this will vary as service levels are optimized. The purchase costs are annualized over a twelve year life, and are assumed (as was the case in 1994) to be equivalent to 7.31% of operating costs.

In the 1994 analysis, costs were divided by line item into (1) costs that vary with the number of vehicle hours or miles operated, (2) cost that vary with the number of vehicles owned, and (3) costs that are invariant with the level of service provided (see table 4 in Savage and Schupp, 1997). For the bus system, about 16% of costs fall into the third category. Because this analysis does not disaggregate by time of day or day of week, any changes in vehicle miles will also require a proportionate change in the vehicle requirement. Consequently, items (1) and (2) can be amalgamated and expressed in terms of an average unit cost per vehicle mile. This will also be taken to be the marginal cost of a vehicle mile. In other words, we are assuming that short run marginal cost is constant and equal to average variable cost, and that there are some overhead costs that are fixed in the short run. This is consistent with the finding of a contemporary estimation for bus companies in the U.S. Midwest, including the CTA, by Harmatuck (2005).

Denoting the observed operating costs in a given year as OC_{t0} , the cost function used in the optimization is given by:

$$(7) \quad C_t = 0.16 (1.0731 OC_{t0}) + 0.84 [(1.0731 OC_{t0}) / VM_{t0}] VM_t .$$

6.4 Optimization Process

The basic methodology is to start from the actual observed fare and service level in a given year (P_{t0} and VM_{t0} , respectively), and then move along a fixed budget constraint (at the actual observed level of subsidy B_t) to find the combination of fare and vehicle miles that maximize transit riders' social welfare. Computational simplification was possible because the analysis treats riders as a single market, and does not disaggregate by rider type or by time of day or day of week. Consequently, the combination of fare and vehicle miles that maximizes rider welfare will occur at the point where ridership is maximized.

The analysis assumes that any changes in vehicle miles are manifested as changes in the frequency on existing routes rather than by changes in the network structure. Changes in vehicle miles have an inverse effect on headways:

$$(8) \quad H_t = H_{t0} (VM_{t0} / VM_t) .$$

Hence changes in waiting time can be calculated using equation (5).

Changes in both fare and vehicle miles affect in-vehicle time (R_t) as ridership (Q_t) appears on the right-hand side of equation (6).¹⁴ Of course, ridership is also a function of in-vehicle time. Therefore some manipulation and collecting of terms is necessary. Substituting equation (3) into equation (6) and collecting terms produces:

$$(9) \quad R_t = \left[\frac{1}{1 + 0.09954 \frac{\beta_t V_{Rt}}{VM_t}} \right] \left[13.212 + 0.09954 \frac{\alpha_t - \beta_t (P_t + V_{wt} W_t)}{VM_t} \right] .$$

The mathematics of the optimization is a two stage process. The first stage involves substituting equations (5), (8) and (9) into equation (3), and then substituting equations (3) and (7) into equation (1). The budget constraint then comprises fixed parameters and the fare and vehicle mile variables. The budget constraint can then be manipulated to obtain an expression for fare in terms of vehicle miles. As the budget constraint takes on the closed form illustrated in Figure 1, only the lowest fare for a given level of vehicle miles is used. The second stage involves substituting the relationship between fare and vehicle miles given by the budget constraint back into equation (3) and finding the level of fares that maximizes passenger numbers. This produces the balanced values of fare and vehicle miles for each year (P_t^* and VM_t^* respectively).

7. Other Considerations Excluded from the Optimization

7.1 Road Congestion

Savage and Schupp (1997) also attempted to quantify the benefits of reduced congestion for road users resulting from improvements in transit services. Benefits were assumed to only accrue in peak periods when congestion is the most severe. Reductions in road traffic were associated with the mode switching of a subset of the new transit riders who were formerly auto drivers or taxi passengers. The calculations were problematic. There was comparatively little information of the previous mode choice of new transit riders. Moreover, there was little to no quantitative information available on the level of congestion actually experienced on the city's arterial and local streets. Given the rather heroic assumptions and calculations required in the earlier analysis, this paper does not attempt to extrapolate these benefits to other years.

Savage and Schupp (1997) did have some startling findings. In the weekday peak period, reducing fares on the buses was found to generate additional congestion reduction benefits equivalent to 9% of the benefits accruing directly to bus riders in the peak. However, improving bus service by operating more vehicle miles actually had a negative net effect on traffic congestion! A marginal bus mile was estimated to remove just 1.24 auto miles from the road. Unfortunately, the *Highway Capacity Manual* (TRB, 2000 at page 12:41) recommends that a bus that stops in the roadway rather than in bus bays is counted as the equivalent of 4.37 cars in traffic flow models. Overall, a third of the benefits to bus riders in the weekday peak periods from increased frequencies were offset by the worse road congestion that the additional buses caused.

Therefore, in interpreting the findings of this paper, the reader should remember that incorporating road congestion would reinforce the argument that society would be better off if less transit service was provided at a lower fare. Evidence on the magnitude of this effect is discussed later.

7.2 Other Benefits of Transit

Neither the earlier literature nor this paper quantifies the wider benefits of transit. It is frequently argued that transit serves a social role by providing the ability for persons of modest means and/or those who live in socially segregated areas to access jobs and hence share in the economic vitality of the city (O'Regan and Quigley, 1999). Transit can also affect land use patterns, and bring about agglomeration economies. Chicago is an example of what Thomson (1977) termed a "weak centered city." These cities have to struggle to maintain a downtown, and to discourage economic activity from moving to the suburbs. A subsidized radial transit system is part of the cost of supporting an active and viable downtown.

Compared with fare and travel time savings, it is difficult to assign monetary values to social and land use benefits. However, it is reasonable to assume that the magnitude of these latter benefits will monotonically increase with transit system ridership. Therefore balancing fares and service levels so that demand and rider benefits are maximized should also be associated with maximizing these other benefits within a given budget constraint.

8. Results

The actual and the calculated balanced levels of fares and service levels in each year are shown in Table 1. The table also shows the actual ridership and the estimated ridership at the balance point. Figures can be used to illustrate the answers to the two questions that this paper set out to answer. The first question concerns how the balance point has changed over time. The trajectory of the balance point is shown in Figure 6, with fares are plot on the vertical axis and vehicle miles on the horizontal axis. In general the balance point drifted upwards and to the left (indicating higher fares and less vehicle miles) from 1953 to 1969, and then moved downwards and to the left (lower fares and less vehicle miles) from 1970 onwards. The trajectory is almost vertically downward (lower fares and no change in vehicle miles) in the periods from 1971 to 1980, and from 1999 to 2005.

The second question concerns the divergence between the combination of fares and vehicle miles actually chosen by the transit agency and the balance point. Figure 7 shows the ratios of balanced to actual values for fares, vehicle miles and ridership for each year. A ratio below unity indicates that the balanced value for the variable is lower than the actually observed value. It is immediately clear from Figure 7 that even in 1953 there was “too much service at too high a price.” Therefore one can conclude that the oversupply of service found by researchers in the 1980s and 1990s was, at least in the case of Chicago, not a recent phenomenon.

In analyzing what happened over the years, it is probably beneficial to look at four eras, rather trying to analyze changes from year to year. The four eras are 1953-1965, 1966-1980, 1981-1999, and 2000 to the present.

8.1 The Commercial Era (1953-1965)

The era was marked by a substantial exogenous decrease in demand and constant unit costs. (Savage, 2004, observed that exogenous pressures on costs as real wages increased in the economy in general were counteracted by technology and efficiency gains.) The decline in demand moved the budget constraint upward and to the left. The modeling predicts that the balance point in 1965 has 28% higher fares and 10% lower vehicle miles than the balance point in 1953. The actual changes in these variables were actually quite similar (fares increased by 30% and vehicle miles were cut by 9%). However, because there was already too much service at too high a price in 1953, the imbalance was perpetuated throughout the period. Inspection of the relevant part of Figure 7 shows that the ratios of the balanced to actual values for fares and service levels are remarkably constant.

8.2 The Introduction of Subsidies (1966-1980)

The CTA faced substantial exogenous pressures on both demand and cost in the late 1960s and 1970s. There was a continued exogenous decrease in demand, exacerbated by the social turmoil of the time and the movement of population to the suburbs. Real factor prices increased due to exogenous Vietnam era pressures in the labor market and the energy crises of the 1970s. In addition, Savage (2004) reports that the cost efficiencies achieved in the 1950s and 1960s were reversed. Subsidies were introduced, and grew rapidly during the 1970s.

In terms of the theoretical model, the increased subsidies move the budget constraint downward and to the right. The movement was partly offset by the exogenous declines in demand, which work in the opposite direction. The increased unit costs pivot the budget constraint upward relative to the origin. Theoretically, the increased subsidies should move the balance point so that more service and lower fares result, while the increase in unit costs is predicted to result in less service provision and an indeterminate change in fares. The empirical modeling finds that the negative effect due to increased unit costs overwhelmed the positive effect of increased subsidies on the balanced level of service. The balanced level of fares is predicted to fall by a substantial amount as a result of the massive influx of subsidies.

The balance point in 1980 has vehicle miles that are 26% below the balance point in 1965, and fares that are 43% lower. In actuality, vehicle miles fell by slightly less (25%) and fares declined by considerably less (31%). Therefore, while actual vehicle miles deviated somewhat more from the balance point in 1980 compared with 1965, the disparity for fares was much larger. This is because the increase in unit costs makes the budget constraint steeper. Providing additional vehicle miles above and beyond the balance point necessitates a much higher level of fares to pay for them.

8.3 A Constant Budget Constraint (1981-1999)

The rapid increase in subsidies in the 1970s eventually overwhelmed the taxing abilities of the regional funding authority. The funding system was reconstituted in 1983 and resulted in a consistent and dedicated stream of sales tax revenues that was truly exogenous in magnitude. Not surprisingly, this led to a period of cost containment. After some of the more egregious cost inefficiencies were eliminated in the early 1980s, unit costs were remarkably constant over the following fifteen years. The only major dynamic at work in the theoretical model in the 1980s and 1990s was the continued exogenous decrease in demand. The budget constraint moved upward and to the left. Consequently, the balance point in 1999 has 22% higher fares and 30% fewer vehicle miles compared with the balance point in 1980. In actuality vehicle miles declined by somewhat less (27%) and fares increased by more (33%). As a result, the CTA was still moving away from the balance point.

8.4 Toward Doomsday (2000-2005)

Between 2004 and 2008 there was a lengthy political debate on transit funding that echoed the crises of the early 1970s and early 1980s. Ultimately, the sales tax levy was increased to provide more subsidies, but this only occurred after the CTA had repeatedly threatened “doomsday” service cuts and fare increases.

The current crisis had its origins in dramatic changes in the variables in the theoretical model in the years after 1999. On the positive side, the longstanding exogenous erosion of demand seemed to have lessened. However, unit costs increased starting in 2002 and, after two decades of stability, the deficit in bus operations climbed by 63% between 1999 and 2005. The larger deficit resulted from the increased unit costs, a fare freeze that had been in place since 1993, and an increase in vehicle miles that partially reversed the service cutbacks of the mid-1990s. As discussed earlier, the increased operating deficit required extraordinary funding sources to supplement the regular sources of subsidy.

In modeling terms, the situation was reminiscent of the 1970s. Theoretically, the balance point in 2005 should have had 61% lower fares and 4% fewer vehicle miles compared with the balance point in 1999. In actuality, vehicle miles increased by 9%, and fares fell by only 7%. The deviation from the balance point grew substantially.

9. Discussion

The analysis finds that for the CTA there has “always” been an imbalance whereby too much service is provided at too high a price. This finding would be strengthened if the effects of transit on highway congestion were incorporated into the model.¹⁵ This is because evidence suggests that adding bus mileage exacerbates congestion rather than improving it.

Consequently, the findings of this paper do not answer the question of why the imbalance occurred in the first place, and whether there was ever a time in Chicago transit history when fares and service levels were in balance. The traditional arguments that transit managers are reluctant to shrink service when faced with declining demand were as true in 1953 as they were in 1973 or 1993. Ridership had peaked on the combined system of the CTA predecessor companies in 1927. While there was resurgence during the motoring restrictions of the Second World War, the end of these restrictions and other social changes led to a 40% decline in ridership between 1946 and 1953 (Young, 1998, Table A4).

It is possible that the oversupply had its origins as far back as the period between 1890 and the First World War. Strong competition between various streetcar and elevated train companies, some of the commuter railroads, and (somewhat later) the fledgling motor bus companies led to an overbuilding of facilities (Young, 1998).

An undergraduate audience member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had an interesting alternative explanation for the findings in this paper. He posited that the local politicians, transit managers, and the “political elite” who are vocal in public policy are busy people with higher than average incomes. Consequently, they have lower than average price sensitivity and a greater than average value of time. The observed fare and output decisions may be consistent with maximizing the welfare of these powerful groups when they ride the system, but inconsistent with the preferences of the vast majority of transit riders who would prefer less service at a lower price. Moreover, as the probability of voting is usually regarded as increasing with income, politicians may wish to make transit subsidies more palatable to voters / taxpayers by favoring policies that appeal to those who are more constrained by time than money.

An insight into this argument can be obtained by comparing the actual and balance points in 1994. Moving to the balance point would result in fares declining by \$0.48 at the expense of an increase in waiting time of 1.15 minutes and an increase in in-vehicle time of 0.2 minutes. If waiting time is valued at the wage rate and in-vehicle time at half the wage rate, riders with a wage rate of \$23 or greater per hour would prefer the actual to the balanced combination of fares and service level. This tipping point is about 50% greater than the average wage rate in 1994 of \$16. Based on data from the Census Bureau, this implies that riders in the top 20% of the income distribution would prefer the current fare and service level combination to the balance point.

The paper finds that the magnitude of the disparity between actual and balanced values became larger in time periods characterized by unit costs increases. A counterfactual analysis can address the question of what would have happened to the disparity if cost inefficiencies had not set in after the mid-1960s. This question is relevant to proponents of privatization and

competitive contracting of the type that has emerged in London and elsewhere around the world. The question was partially answered by Savage and Schupp (1997) who modeled the effects of 10%, 20% and 30% cost reductions in 1994. Their results, shown in Table 2, indicate the ratio of the benefits to the increase in subsidy necessary to decrease fares by 10% or increase service levels by 10%.¹⁶ If fares and service levels are in balance, the benefit-cost ratio of a marginal increase in subsidy will be identical irrespective of whether fares were reduced or service was increased.

In interpreting this table it is worth bearing in mind that had the unit cost level in 1966 only increased by an index that measures exogenous factor price increases, then the unit costs in 1994 would be 29.75% lower than they actual were.¹⁷ The peak period is very unfavorable to service level expansions because additional service requires more vehicles, and the added road congestion reduces the benefits. In the weekday off-peak and on the weekends, cost reduction in the low 20% range would bring fares and service levels into balance. Therefore, privatization has dual benefits. The direct benefit is the removal of cost inefficiencies. The indirect benefit comes from moving transit service toward the balance point. This provides an explanation for why Glaister's findings for British cities in the late 1990s differed markedly from his findings in the same cities prior to deregulation and privatization.

Despite the seemingly large disparity between actual and balanced fares and service levels, the consequent effect on the level of ridership is surprisingly small. Excluding the years of unusual financial difficulties (1994-7 and 2002-5), balancing increases demand by less than 5%. In 39 of the 53 years the increase is 3% or less. Despite this, the magnitude of the welfare gains is not trivial. Savage and Schupp (1997) estimated that the benefits of balancing both the bus and rail systems were \$100 million a year, in 2005 prices, or about \$27 per resident of the CTA service area.

While some of the specifics are unique to Chicago, the findings have some generally applicability. This is because the situation in Chicago in the 1960s and 1970s was similar to that in other older "traditional" cities in the United States and Canada, and on other continents. For example, the graph of the constant dollar operating revenues and costs for the CTA bus system, shown in Figure 5, is almost identical to that for the entire U.S. transit industry (Winston and Shirley, 1998, Figure 1-2), and for a large number of cities in Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Bly and Oldfield, 1985, see especially Figure 1). Starting in the mid-1960s and lasting into the early 1980s, subsidies increased considerably as revenue fell and costs increased. Where Chicago, in common with most cities in North America, has differed from other continents is that deregulation and/or privatization did not occur in the 1990s, and consequently there has not been a reduction in unit costs which will tend to bring fares and service levels more into balance.

Finally, while the paper has analyzed a transportation problem, if service level is viewed as a measure of product quality, this problem can be generalized to one that firms face in many industries in both the public and private sectors (see Spence, 1975, and Sheshinski, 1976, for the underlying theory, and Crawford and Shum, 2007, for a recent empirical application). Firms have to decide on the quality as well as the price of their product, given that quality is valued by the customer but costly to provide.

10. Conclusions

Empirical analyses in the 1980s and 1990s found that transit agencies tended to provide more service, at higher fares, than the combination that maximized rider benefits. This literature was typically cross-sectional in nature comparing the experiences in different cities. The cross-sectional nature of these analyses meant that researchers were unable to address the question of when and why the oversupply occurred.

This paper takes a time-series approach and analyses the surface transit (motor bus / trolley bus / streetcar) service provided by the Chicago Transit Authority between 1953 and 2005. The CTA provides the analyst with a unique opportunity to make a time series analysis of a firm that has changed very little in its general structure for more than fifty years, but has witnessed wild swings in price, output and the degree of subsidization.

The paper calculates how the social welfare maximizing combination of fares and service levels has changed over time due to exogenous changes in the demand and cost functions, and political decisions on changing the budget constraint (i.e., subsidy) faced by the agency. The paper also compares the optimal combination with the actual choices made by transit authority management. The paper finds that even in the 1950s, there was too much service provided at too high a fare. The imbalance between fares and service frequency became larger in the 1970s when the introduction of operating subsidies coincided with an increase in the unit cost of service provision.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank David M. Levinson (University of Minnesota) for asking a question at a presentation of my 2004 paper that sparked my interest in undertaking this analysis.

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¹ There is a separate literature, spurred by deregulation in Britain in 1986, on frequency setting in a competitive environment. See, for example, Foster and Golay (1986).

² For empirical surveys see Balcombe (2004) and Transportation Research Board (2004, Chapter 9).

³ For a discussion of economies of scale in urban bus transportation see the review article by Berechman and Giuliano (1985) and a recent paper by Iseki (2008).

⁴ The first term in equation (1) indicates that there will be (at least) a squared term in price. There will also be (at least) a squared term in vehicle miles because average waiting time, which enters the demand function, is calculated by dividing a measure of time and space by vehicle miles. (Think of a route that is 5 miles long. In a given hour the frequency of service is 60 minutes multiplied by 5 miles divided by the number of vehicle miles operated on the route in that hour.)

⁵ Only part of this boundary, the lowest fare consistent with a given level of vehicle miles, is relevant to the analysis. Therefore for the remainder of the paper, the phrase “budget constraint” should be taken to mean the segment that is to the south and to the east.

⁶ Alternatively one could, as did Nash (1978), measure passengers’ total welfare as the area under the inverse demand curve. However, this has the analytical implication that the first order conditions are derived for the quantity of passengers and fares, yet the agency is choosing fares and vehicle miles. We have adopted the alternative surplus specification used by Panzar (1979) in a paper discussing the choice of fares and frequencies by an airline.

⁷ For empirical surveys see Balcombe (2004) and Transportation Research Board (2004, Chapter 12).

⁸ A recent paper by Parry and Small (2009) finds considerable welfare benefits from increasing subsidies to reduce fares in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and London, but does not address the issue of the optimal mix of fares and service levels.

⁹ These suburbs were served by private and municipal systems that ultimately became part of a separate publicly owned suburban bus company in the 1970s and 1980s. The only major exception was the CTA provision of partial replacement service for a defunct private system in

the adjacent suburb of Evanston in 1973. However, the amount of mileage was small, representing a fraction of a percent of CTA output.

¹⁰ Some deviations from efficient production may be exogenously motivated. For example, there is evidence that in the 1970s in Chicago that there was political pressure to improve fringe benefits and introduce more tax scheduling arrangements to avoid the types of crippling strike action that bedeviled other parts of the public sector such as the schools.

¹¹ Directional route miles is a measure of the length of streets that are served by transit service (multiplied by two if service is in both directions). The federal government has collected this data in a consistent way since 1982. The CTA reported an equivalent measure in its annual reports until the early 1970s, but using a different definition which inflated the data by about 25%. After an adjustment is made, route coverage has declined by only about 10% from 1,506 directional route miles in 1953 to 1,359 in 2005. Indeed, there is a remarkable resemblance between the current CTA route diagram, and the 1946 map produced by its predecessor the Chicago Rapid Transit Company (reproduced on page 17 of Ovenden, 2007).

¹² The average trip length of 2.37 miles will be taken to be constant over time. While the federal government data does require reporting of total passenger miles, and hence the ratio to unlinked passenger trips is the average trip length, this data is not definitive. As it charges a flat fare, the CTA only knows the number of boardings. The average trip lengths used to factor this number up to passenger miles is found from annual surveys. The data show an unlikely amount of volatility from year-to-year, and data are not available before 1982. Data on passenger miles for bus transit should normally be treated with some skepticism.

¹³ The analysis also uses the conventional assumption that the intertemporal income elasticity of the value of time is unity. While some authors have argued that the value should be less than unity (eg, Wardman, 2001), there is also recent empirical evidence in favor of the unity assumption (Fosgerau, 2005; Swärdh, 2008). For a general discussion of this issue see section 4 of Hensher and Goodwin (2004).

¹⁴ To give some idea of the variation in in-vehicle time, the average load factor (passenger miles divided by bus miles) declined by 40% from 1953 to 2005, and is estimated to have speeded up the average journey by 18 seconds. The balancing of fares and frequency, taking 2005 as an example, would boost load factors by 49% and lengthen the average journey by 13 seconds. The load factor at the balance point in 2005 would still be lower than the actual load factor in 1953.

¹⁵ As an approximate indication of the magnitude of the highway congestion externality effect, the model was rerun for 1994 incorporating the highway sector parameters estimated by Savage and Schupp. Incorporating the effect on the highway sector required a somewhat larger reduction in vehicle miles of 25.5% to reach the balance point, rather than 24.2% when the highway sector is ignored. When the highway sector is included fares fall by 53.1% to reach the balance point, rather than by 50.7% when congestion effects are excluded.

¹⁶ The shadow value of a dollar of tax revenues used to fund the additional subsidies was \$1.26, so additional subsidies would only be justified if the ratio of benefits per dollar of subsidy exceeds 1.26.

¹⁷ The exogenous factor price index is 90% based of real wages in the national economy (as described earlier), and 10% on real changes in the fuel and power component of the national producer price index (see Savage, 2004). Direct labor expenses represent just less than 80% of operating costs, and the companies that supply other goods and services that the CTA purchases will be subject to similar wage pressures.

Table 1: Actual and balanced fares and service levels

Year	Average Fare			Vehicle Miles (000s)			Ridership (000s)		
	Actual	Balance	Ratio	Actual	Balance	Ratio	Actual	Balance	Ratio
1953	\$0.73	\$0.66	0.91	122,363	108,900	0.89	919,715	926,113	1.01
1954	\$0.76	\$0.69	0.90	120,937	106,700	0.88	847,895	854,623	1.01
1955	\$0.79	\$0.71	0.91	119,402	106,300	0.89	816,966	822,586	1.01
1956	\$0.77	\$0.72	0.93	118,244	108,200	0.92	808,998	812,384	1.00
1957	\$0.83	\$0.74	0.90	117,843	104,300	0.89	751,656	757,407	1.01
1958	\$0.89	\$0.78	0.88	113,617	97,800	0.86	681,963	689,709	1.01
1959	\$0.89	\$0.81	0.91	109,920	98,300	0.89	692,295	696,765	1.01
1960	\$0.91	\$0.83	0.91	109,546	98,000	0.89	674,931	679,320	1.01
1961	\$0.95	\$0.85	0.90	107,536	95,100	0.88	630,222	635,132	1.01
1962	\$0.99	\$0.90	0.91	106,190	94,900	0.89	625,718	629,760	1.01
1963	\$0.98	\$0.88	0.90	105,832	94,300	0.89	607,749	611,956	1.01
1964	\$0.96	\$0.86	0.89	108,584	95,100	0.88	602,540	608,129	1.01
1965	\$0.95	\$0.85	0.90	111,092	98,300	0.88	618,681	623,712	1.01
1966	\$0.93	\$0.85	0.92	112,273	101,800	0.91	649,524	653,024	1.01
1967	\$0.92	\$0.85	0.92	107,074	97,900	0.91	625,920	628,896	1.00
1968	\$1.02	\$0.91	0.89	103,792	92,200	0.89	564,019	568,501	1.01
1969	\$1.21	\$1.03	0.85	102,192	85,800	0.84	529,698	538,039	1.02
1970	\$1.20	\$1.01	0.84	98,314	82,600	0.84	503,342	511,643	1.02
1971	\$1.22	\$1.01	0.83	95,199	79,700	0.84	492,680	501,497	1.02
1972	\$1.17	\$0.92	0.79	95,154	77,900	0.82	488,936	500,796	1.02
1973	\$1.09	\$0.89	0.81	90,702	76,800	0.85	482,397	491,200	1.02
1974	\$0.94	\$0.77	0.82	88,178	76,600	0.87	511,351	519,158	1.02
1975	\$0.84	\$0.66	0.79	88,484	76,400	0.86	502,957	512,227	1.02
1976	\$0.79	\$0.64	0.82	87,468	77,400	0.88	523,876	530,971	1.01
1977	\$0.79	\$0.59	0.75	86,332	73,800	0.85	535,416	547,618	1.02
1978	\$0.73	\$0.56	0.76	83,815	73,000	0.87	545,875	556,207	1.02
1979	\$0.67	\$0.55	0.83	80,021	72,800	0.91	560,905	566,412	1.01
1980	\$0.66	\$0.48	0.73	83,383	73,000	0.88	537,693	550,966	1.02
1981	\$0.80	\$0.56	0.70	81,449	68,300	0.84	492,578	506,994	1.03
1982	\$0.79	\$0.65	0.83	75,884	68,200	0.90	467,110	472,117	1.01
1983	\$0.76	\$0.62	0.82	75,505	67,700	0.90	473,433	479,023	1.01
1984	\$0.73	\$0.65	0.89	72,277	67,700	0.94	482,237	484,298	1.00
1985	\$0.71	\$0.61	0.87	72,183	67,000	0.93	486,515	489,415	1.01
1986	\$0.80	\$0.70	0.87	72,326	66,700	0.92	466,396	469,252	1.01
1987	\$0.81	\$0.67	0.83	72,408	65,200	0.90	438,676	443,312	1.01
1988	\$0.84	\$0.66	0.79	74,154	64,900	0.88	430,089	437,088	1.02
1989	\$0.80	\$0.64	0.80	72,799	64,300	0.88	420,573	426,783	1.01
1990	\$0.80	\$0.63	0.78	72,522	63,600	0.88	421,184	428,305	1.02
1991	\$0.80	\$0.56	0.70	71,737	60,700	0.85	392,088	403,190	1.03

1992	\$0.90	\$0.55	0.62	70,803	57,000	0.81	370,335	386,575	1.04
1993	\$0.97	\$0.56	0.57	69,970	54,700	0.78	326,656	344,297	1.05
1994	\$0.95	\$0.47	0.49	72,686	55,100	0.76	331,521	354,610	1.07
1995	\$0.93	\$0.43	0.46	70,681	53,400	0.76	306,076	328,619	1.07
1996	\$0.94	\$0.56	0.60	67,073	53,600	0.80	302,115	316,181	1.05
1997	\$0.94	\$0.50	0.53	64,933	50,300	0.77	287,628	305,005	1.06
1998	\$0.93	\$0.56	0.60	60,889	49,100	0.81	290,531	303,373	1.04
1999	\$0.88	\$0.59	0.67	61,271	51,300	0.84	299,058	308,358	1.03
2000	\$0.84	\$0.55	0.65	61,869	51,700	0.84	302,090	312,167	1.03
2001	\$0.82	\$0.48	0.59	63,758	52,100	0.82	301,691	314,758	1.04
2002	\$0.79	\$0.40	0.50	65,901	52,500	0.80	303,295	320,638	1.06
2003	\$0.83	\$0.31	0.37	66,378	50,200	0.76	291,804	316,243	1.08
2004	\$0.84	\$0.27	0.32	66,572	49,300	0.74	294,031	322,294	1.10
2005	\$0.82	\$0.23	0.28	66,812	49,300	0.74	303,244	334,241	1.10

Table 2: Benefit-Cost Ratio from Increasing Subsidies to Improve Service Levels by 10% or Reduce Fares by 10% in 1994

	Monday-Friday		Saturday	Sunday
	Peak	Off Peak		
Fares decreased by 10%	1.39	1.77	1.77	1.80
Vehicle Miles increased by 10%	0.21	1.11	1.24	1.16
- with a 10% unit cost reduction	0.23	1.32	1.47	1.37
- with a 20% unit cost reduction	0.27	1.61	1.82	1.68
- with a 30% unit cost reduction	0.31	2.07	2.39	2.17

Source: Savage and Schupp (1997), Tables 6 and 7.




Figure 1: Balancing Fares and Vehicle Miles for a Given Budget Constraint




Figure 2: Trends in Real Average Fare (left axis) and Vehicle Miles (right axis)




Figure 3: Trends in Surface System Unlinked Passenger Trips




Figure 4: Real Cost per Vehicle Mile




Figure 5: Surface System Finances in 2005 Prices




Figure 6: Balanced Combinations of Fare and Vehicle Miles 1953-2005




Figure 7: Ratio of Balanced to Actual Average Fare, Vehicle Miles and Ridership