RESEARCH
Upcoming Presentations
Harvard University, February of 2009
Central Division of the APA, February of 2009 (Commentator)
University of Tennessee, March of 2009
University of Notre Dame, May of 2009
Bled Conference: Epistemic Virtue and Value, Bled, Slovenia, June of 2009
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, August of 2009
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, September of 2009
University of Wisconsin-Madison, October of 2009
St. Cloud State University, November of 2009
Amherst College, March of 2010
Collective Knowledge and Epistemic Trust Conference, Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg, Greifswald, Germany, May of 2010
University of Copenhagen, May of 2010
Epistemology: The Third Brazil Conference, PUCRS, Porto Alegre, June of 2010
Work in Progress
Papers:
“Acting on Knowledge”
"Disagreement and Belief Dependence"
“Why There Is No Epistemic Partiality in Friendship”
Publications
Books:
Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, (2008). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Epistemology of Testimony, co-edited with Ernest Sosa, (2006). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of testimony. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, Richard Moran, Frederick Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve.
Papers:
“Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge,” forthcoming in Jessica Brown and Herman
Cappelen (eds.), Assertion (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
“Testimonial Knowledge,” forthcoming in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge
Companion to Epistemology (London and New York: Routledge).
“Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge from Others,” forthcoming in Alvin Goldman and Dennis
Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
“What Should We Do When We Disagree?” forthcoming in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
“A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” forthcoming in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
“Testimony” forthcoming in Matthias Steup (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell).
“Knowledge and Credit.” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 27-42 .
“What Luck Is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 255-67.
“Perspectives on Testimony.” Episteme 4 (2007): 233-7.
“Norms of Assertion.” Noûs 41 (2007): 594-626.
“Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158 (2007): 345-61.
“Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 209-19.
“Learning from Words.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 77-101.
- Winner of the 2005 Young Epistemologist Prize.
“Introduction,” in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 1-21.
“It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 160-89.
“Knowing from Testimony.” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 1-17.
“The Nature of Testimony.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 177-97.
“Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.” Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 163-90.
“Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 636-58.
“A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Noûs 37 (2003): 706-23.
“Explanation and Mental Causation.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2002): 375-93.
“Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471-90.
- Reprinted in Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd Edition (Blackwell, 2008).
Reviews:
Review of Martin Kusch, Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 235-8.
“Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 284-9.
Review of Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2004).