

Measuring portfolio salience in Eastern European parliamentary democracies

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Abstract. This article presents the results of an expert survey of 14 Eastern European countries on the subject of portfolio salience. Respondents provided ratings of the relative value of all ministerial portfolios in these countries over the years 1990–2002. The ratings are unique in the study of Eastern Europe and appear to possess the characteristics of comprehensiveness and reliability. Comparing the results with a similar survey of Western Europe indicates that individual portfolios are rated nearly identically in both regions. Some significant differences, however, emerge when we look separately at more advanced and less advanced Eastern European countries. Various suggestions are made for how scholars can use these new data in future work.

Research on coalition government is one of the most advanced and progressive areas in political science. It has identified a large number of nuanced and well-confirmed regularities about how coalition formation occurs. Yet, most of this literature has built explicitly or implicitly on the experience of Western European parliamentary democracies. This focus leads to a twofold danger. First, we may not learn the proper domain of these relations. Do they apply only to advanced democracies or only to pure parliamentary systems? Or is their application wider? Are they in fact universal regularities? Second and relatedly, we have little idea about what contextual factors are necessary or sufficient for these relations to hold. Scholars have attempted recently to remedy this problem by expanding the range of cases to include new democracies in Latin America (Amorim Neto & Samuels 2003) and Eastern Europe (Benoit & Laver 2006; Druckman & Roberts 2005). A critical element in continuing this research is the construction of data sets comparable to those developed for Western Europe (e.g., data on party positions – see Benoit & Laver 2006). This paper provides exactly such a data set.

The data set concerns the salience of ministerial portfolios. Over the last several years, the value of ministerial portfolios has become one of the most contested issues in coalition research (cf. Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Warwick & Druckman 2001, 2006; Druckman & Warwick 2005; Carroll & Cox 2005). Portfolios are perhaps the pre-eminent payoff in coalition politics. They are at

the heart of the ‘who gets what’ wrangling central to bargaining over coalitions (Laver & Schofield 1990); yet much research has treated portfolios as equal and interchangeable – the foreign affairs portfolio is no different than the transportation portfolio, defense no more or less valuable than social welfare, and so on. This assumption is almost certainly false (see Warwick & Druckman (2001) for discussion), but until recently there has been little systematic data on the actual salience of individual portfolios (exceptions for Western European data include: Laver & Hunt 1992; Müller & Strøm 2000; Druckman & Warwick 2005).

In this article, we provide data on portfolio salience for 12 countries in Eastern Europe. (As we will discuss, we collected data for 14 countries, but could not obtain sufficient data for two of these countries.) To date, research on Eastern Europe has only considered the quantitative distribution of ministries (Druckman & Roberts 2005; Amorin Neto & Samuels 2003). What is lacking is data on portfolio salience. Druckman and Warwick (2005) have gathered such data for Western Europe through an expert survey. This article repeats their approach for 12 countries in Eastern Europe. It also offers a comparative analysis of the new data from Eastern Europe with Druckman and Warwick’s Western European data.

The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we discuss briefly the debate over portfolio salience. In the second section, we outline our expectations about salience in Eastern Europe. In the third section, we describe the construction of our expert survey. In the fourth section, we present our results. In the fifth section, we suggest how future work can use these new data.

Portfolio salience

In parliamentary democracies, elections that do not produce a party with a clear majority typically lead to bargaining among multiple parties in order to form a governing coalition. The object of this bargaining is not only to agree on a governing program, but also on a distribution of ministerial portfolios among the parties that agree to form the government. Anecdotal evidence indicates that parties drive hard bargains to receive the portfolios they desire. This is no surprise as control of a portfolio gives a party access not only to patronage, but also to a high degree of policy making latitude. One prominent theory of coalition bargaining in fact assumes that parties in control of a ministry have the power to realize completely their own preferences in policies that fall under that ministry (Laver & Shepsle 1996).

To date, most work on the allocation of portfolios assumes that they are all alike (for discussion, see Warwick & Druckman 2001). For example, the prime

ministry is no different than the social welfare or the transportation ministry. What is important in this work is the *number* of portfolios a party receives, not the *value* (or in our terms, the *salience*) of the portfolio. While most scholars agree that this assumption is empirically suspect, there has been little attempt to replace it with a more empirically valid one.¹ Just such a valid measure is a necessity for testing a number of recent theories about the allocation of portfolios (e.g., Morelli 1999; Mershon 2001; Baron & Ferejohn 1989; Ansola-behere et al. 2005; Carroll & Cox 2005). In this paper, we follow the work of Druckman and Warwick (2005) in developing a reliable measure of the salience of ministerial portfolios. Though there have been attempts prior to Druckman and Warwick to measure the value of portfolios in Western Europe (e.g., Laver & Hunt 1992; Müller & Strøm 2000), none of them possesses all five of the characteristics that Druckman and Warwick argue a reliable indicator should exhibit.² First, the measure should be cross-national to allow comparisons. Second, it should be country-specific; it should allow the value of portfolios to vary across countries, since it is unlikely that ministries are similarly valuable in all countries. Third, it should cover the full range of ministries in each country rather than only some of them. Fourth, it should be based on the evaluations of multiple experts – in order both to limit idiosyncrasies and to assess consensus. Finally, the measure should be based on an interval rather than an ordinal scale; this enables testing of theories based on the total portfolio payoffs that parties receive.

In 2001–2002, Druckman and Warwick conducted an expert survey that satisfied all five of these criteria. Their survey covered 14 Western European countries and produced ratings by multiple experts that included virtually all of the ministries in these countries. Their ratings, moreover, possessed a high degree of reliability both in terms of consensus among raters and agreement with previous measures.

As with previous research, however, their sample of countries was restricted to the advanced parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. We believe there are good reasons to collect data on the new democracies of Eastern Europe. Confining research on coalition formation to Western Europe is a severe example of selection bias. These countries share a large number of historical and cultural similarities that potentially influence the process of coalition formation. Without investigating countries that differ from Western Europe, we will know little about whether and how contextual factors affect the value of portfolios (see, e.g., Druckman & Roberts 2005).

Eastern Europe is a particularly promising area for comparison for several reasons. In the first place, the institutions of coalition government are quite similar to those in Western Europe (e.g., Blondel 2001). Indeed, in most cases they were borrowed directly from Western Europe. Of particular relevance for

this study is the fact that these countries tend to possess very similar numbers and types of ministries as Western Europe. And though we have little direct evidence on the subject, we believe that individual ministers have similar formal powers in the context of their portfolios as ministers in Western European states. At the least, we have no evidence that they are systematically more or less powerful. These similarities give us a good basis for comparison.

Hypotheses

We would thus like to know whether the salience results from Western Europe hold as well in Eastern Europe. The main substantive result (apart from data on the ratings themselves) from Druckman and Warwick's survey concerns what Bueno de Mesquita (1979) calls the 'redistributive' portfolios – that is, the portfolios that purportedly have the capacity to affect the electoral prospects of the party that holds them. These posts are the prime ministership, defense, interior, foreign affairs, agriculture and finance (also see Laver & Schofield 1990). Druckman and Warwick find that these portfolios are more salient than the average other ministry, but are not as a group more salient than the next six highest rated posts. They find that only the prime ministership, finance and perhaps foreign affairs are clearly distinct from other portfolios. We are curious if this same result – which holds in all 14 Western European countries – holds in Eastern Europe as well.

H1: The 'redistributive' portfolios as a group are not more salient than the next (six) highest rated posts. Only the prime ministership and finance stand out as distinctively valued. (This follows the Western Europe result.)

More interestingly, there are good reasons to suspect that the salience of portfolios might differ between Eastern and Western Europe. The specific context of the transition from communism to capitalism and democracy may have systematic effects on the value of individual ministries. In the first place, these countries are exiting from an extremely centralized and dictatorial regime. Political decisions under communism were made unequivocally by a very small group of central leaders and often by a single individual (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1965; Hough & Fainsod 1979). We hypothesize that this tradition may lead these countries to place an inordinate value on the top governing posts. In particular, we may expect to see the prime ministership to have a much higher value than in Western Europe.³ This effect may extend to such ministries as finance, foreign affairs and interior, which typically form part of the inner circle of government.

H2: The prime ministership and, to a lesser extent, the finance, foreign affairs and interior ministries will be more salient in Eastern than in Western Europe. (This is partly but not completely contrary to *H1*.)

The wide-ranging reforms being undertaken in Eastern Europe might also lead to predictable effects. The most dramatic changes in the region are in the area of economic policy. Indeed, at the start of the transition, the state controlled virtually all of society's productive assets and imposed draconic regulations on all economic activity. Divesting these assets and easing regulations have been both controversial and enormously consequential. Privatization, for example, can and has been used on a massive scale both to create and reward political supporters.⁴ We might thus expect ministries in charge of distributing economic assets and regulating economic activity to be exceptionally desirable in Eastern Europe (Greskovits 1998; Kornai et al. 2001).⁵ While these posts are of course also desirable in Western Europe, they typically do not engage in the sort of wholesale reorganization of the economy that is standard in Eastern Europe. Thus, ministries like finance, economic affairs, privatization and foreign trade should receive higher rankings than is the case in Western Europe.

H3: Ministries concerned with economic policy should be more highly valued in Eastern than in Western Europe.

On the other hand, the necessity of expenditure cuts may make spending portfolios less salient. All of these countries have experienced severe recessions, which have put large pressures on the state budgets (Kornai 1994). At the same time, post-communist states had far more generous social programs than their wealth would predict, leading Kornai (1992) to label them 'premature welfare states'. This means that ministries in charge of distributing money or benefits to citizens may find themselves forced to engage in unpopular retrenchment.

Citizens of these countries for their part are both used to generous social guarantees from communism and continue to be in favor of a large state role in the economy (Cook 1993; Rose & Makkai 1995; Kornai 1997; Lipsmeyer 2003). Exacerbating the problem, they appear to have little awareness of the necessity of cutting spending (Csontos et al. 1998). This should make spending ministries less popular among politicians. The health ministry, for example, should be less valuable to the extent that health benefits have to be cut. Studies have in fact found that reforms of the welfare system have been contentious and unpopular (Cook et al. 1999; Kapstein & Mandelbaum 1997). We thus predict that ministries such as labor and social affairs, health, education and transport to be systematically less salient than in Western Europe.

H4: Spending ministries should be less highly valued in Eastern than in Western Europe.

One of the most distinctive aspects of the transition to communism in these countries has been their connection to nationalism. As Beissinger (2002) and Bunce (1999), among others, have noted, the changes in Eastern Europe were both caused by and manifested themselves in a sense of national awakening. By the 1980s, communism in almost all of Eastern Europe came to be seen as a foreign imposition and many democratic transitions had their roots in resurgent national feeling. This sense of national awakening might show itself in a higher salience being given to portfolios concerned with national and cultural expression. The ministries of culture and education come to mind here. These ministries are in charge of rewriting school textbooks and curricula and reorganizing museums and symbols to represent the country's new self-image. The salience of this project in all of the countries considered here might be manifested in a higher salience of the ministries responsible for these tasks.

H5: Ministries connected with cultural expression should be more valued in Eastern than in Western Europe.

Finally, there are significant differences within Eastern Europe. While some countries have had a fairly smooth transition to democracy and capitalism and might be termed 'consolidated democracies', others have had a rougher time. Indeed, about half the countries in our sample have experienced an undemocratic spell as measured by Freedom House and several have been denied admission to the European Union. We believe that there may be systematic differences between what we call the more advanced and less advanced Eastern European countries (Ekiert & Hanson 2003; Vachudova 2005). We expect that in the less advanced countries, portfolios connected with the repressive arm of the state take on greater value because they enable undemocratic governments to stay in power (Levitsky & Way 2002).⁶ These portfolios include interior, defense and justice. Indeed, it is precisely these 'power ministries' that the communists attempted to control during their takeover after the Second World War. We propose that these ministries might be in general more salient in less democratic countries because they contain the tools used for control of the citizenry.

H6: Power ministries should be more valued in the less advanced Eastern European countries than in the more advanced.

The ratings

In this section, we describe the mechanics of our survey – the results we will use to test our hypotheses. We chose to use an expert survey to assess salience because, as Druckman and Warwick (2005: 19) note, alternative measures of salience like number of laws passed or spending give a misleading impression of salience. Laws come in an almost infinite variety of shapes and sizes – limiting their comparability – while spending may take the form of mandatory expenditures over which ministries have no control and often does not correlate with power to shape policy. There is also, of course, a long tradition of expert surveys in coalition politics (cf. Laver & Schofield 1990; Laver & Hunt 1992; Benoit & Laver 2006).

To start, we identified all of the portfolios in 14 Eastern European countries. We followed Druckman and Warwick (2005) by looking not just at the current time period, but at the entire post-communist period. We found these data both in *Keesing's Record of World Events* and in supplemental sources for a handful of countries on which *Keesing's* was incomplete. Table 1 presents a list of these countries and the years that our assessment covered.

Next, we identified country experts for each country from a variety of sources. These sources included experts listed in the directory of members of the European Consortium for Political Research, literature searches on databases of political science articles and a list of experts generously provided to us by Kenneth Benoit (see Benoit & Laver 2006). We sent out surveys to over a thousand of our country experts either by regular mail or email in the spring of 2004 and sent out two follow ups in the fall of 2005.⁷

Our response rate, unfortunately, was low. We attribute this partly to the flux of transition (we believe that many of our letters may not have reached their addressees), language difficulties (we sent our surveys in English⁸) and the novelty of this methodology in Eastern Europe. We also believe that many experts did not answer because they did not consider themselves experts (despite our efforts to send the surveys only to scholars who study the given country). Many of these countries are quite small (e.g., Slovenia has only two million citizens) and thus have few political experts.

Laver and Hunt (1992) and Druckman and Warwick (2005) recommend a minimum of five responses to consider the rating of a post valid. Because of difficulties in obtaining responses, we reduced this minimum to four. Even with this reduction, we had to exclude two countries – Latvia and Macedonia – from our analysis because they did not meet our minimum.⁹ Table 1 presents the number of expert respondents for each country.

Our questionnaire followed almost exactly the format in Druckman and Warwick. This was important so as to ensure our data are comparable to

Table 1. Countries and experts: Total number of respondents who rated any ministries (not all respondents rated all ministries)

Country	Years of first and last government	Number of expert respondents	Number of posts rated	Advanced democracy
Albania	1992–2002	7	43	No
Bulgaria	1990–2001	13	27	No
Croatia	2000–2001	6	21	No
Czechoslovakia	1990–1992	10	18	Yes
Czech Republic	1993–2002	14	22	Yes
Estonia	1992–2002	7	26	Yes
Hungary	1990–2002	11	28	Yes
Latvia	1993–2000	2	20	Yes
Lithuania	1996–2001	10	19	Yes
Macedonia	1994–2000	1	21	No
Poland	1989–2001	12	45	Yes
Romania	1991–2000	17	47	No
Slovakia	1993–1998	11	21	No
Slovenia	1993–2000	14	20	Yes
All countries	1989–2002	135	378	–

theirs. A sample questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1. The questionnaire lists all of the ministries present in that country in the years 1990–2002 and asks respondents to rate their importance. Table 1 lists the number of posts rated for each country.

Since our goal was to obtain interval-level ratings of government portfolios, we provided our experts with an anchor. As was the case in Druckman and Warwick's survey, experts were asked to give a score of '1' to all portfolios that they viewed as 'average' or 'normal' portfolios. An above-average or below-average portfolio would then be scored by the percentage more or less valuable it was than an average portfolio. Thus, a post 50 per cent more valuable than average would be assigned a score of '1.5' and one 50 per cent less valuable would be assigned a score of '0.5'. We allowed the experts to use their discretion in assigning scores. Like Druckman and Warwick, we did not explicitly mention any criteria for determining value.

In the data analysis below, we have combined the data gathered from these surveys with data on 14 Western European countries from Druckman and Warwick (2005). Aside from the dates, the methodology and content of the surveys are identical. As a result, the data should be fully comparable.

As mentioned, for purposes of analysis, we divided our sample of countries into two groups. What we call the 'more advanced' countries are ones rated 'partially free' by Freedom House from 1990 on. The 'less advanced' countries are ones that were rated only 'partially free' for some or all of the 1990s. Table 1 shows which countries were identified as more and less advanced. This distinction is common in other work on Eastern Europe (cf. King 2000; Vachudova & Snyder 1997) and is correlated with a large number of variables such as economic reforms, growth rates and corruption (cf. Commander & Frye 1999; specific statistics comparing the two sets of countries are available from the authors). We suspect it may also be related to the process of coalition formation (e.g., Druckman & Roberts 2005).

Results

In this section, we present an overview of our results. The results themselves, in the form of mean ratings (together with respondent numbers and standard deviations) for each cabinet post in each of the countries covered by the survey, are presented in Appendix 2. Table 2 describes the average scores for all ministries and the maximum and minimum scores for all 12 Eastern European countries. These scores only include ministries rated by at least four respondents and exclude idiosyncratic ministries added to the survey by

Table 2. Eastern Europe portfolio scores

Country	Average portfolio score ¹	Maximum score ²	Minimum score	Cronbach's Alpha
Albania	1.19 (0.67; 43)	3.71 (2.95; 7)	0.49 (0.28; 4)	0.76
Bulgaria	1.03 (0.29; 27)	2.19 (0.93; 13)	0.58 (0.25; 12)	0.94
Croatia	1.16 (0.28; 21)	2.27 (0.69; 6)	0.79 (0.36; 6)	0.88
Czechoslovakia	0.96 (0.29; 18)	1.49 (0.30; 10)	0.52 (0.25; 10)	0.93
Czech Republic	0.99 (0.31; 22)	1.96 (0.97; 14)	0.43 (0.26; 13)	0.94
Estonia	0.89 (0.24; 26)	2.25 (0.52; 7)	0.20 (0.14; 5)	0.96
Hungary	1.06 (0.39; 28)	3.34 (3.01; 11)	0.66 (0.23; 11)	0.87
Lithuania	1.01 (0.26; 19)	2.13 (0.54; 10)	0.57 (0.29; 9)	0.96
Poland	0.96 (0.30; 45)	2.21 (0.82; 11)	0.46 (0.25; 12)	0.93
Romania	1.08 (0.57; 47)	2.85 (2.05; 17)	0.41 (0.23; 17)	0.92
Slovakia	0.95 (0.30; 21)	2.17 (0.88; 11)	0.55 (0.20; 11)	0.94
Slovenia	1.12 (0.43; 20)	1.56 (0.34; 13)	0.66 (0.31; 9)	0.81
Cross-national average	1.03 (0.09; 12)	2.34 (0.66; 12)	0.53 (0.15; 12)	–

Notes: ¹ Average ministry score by country (and then for all countries). It is an average of averages, since each ministry score itself (which is being averaged) is an average of respondent scores. The figures in parentheses are the standard deviation (the deviation among the averages) and the N (the number of ministries scored by at least four respondents). (Any ministry not scored by at least four respondents is excluded.) ² In every case, the prime ministry received the highest average score, although in Czechoslovakia the finance ministry received nearly an identical average score and had a higher median score. This column, thus, reports the average prime ministry score across respondents for each country (and then for all countries). The reported standard deviation is the deviation among respondents and the N provides the number of respondents who rated the prime ministry.

respondents. Nevertheless, we can say that our ratings are comprehensive in that they include nearly all ministries that existed in these countries.

Our ratings also possess the characteristic of reliability in the sense that our respondents largely agree in their ratings. To check the degree of consensus among our experts, we calculated Cronbach's alpha for each country. Cronbach's alpha ranges from 0 to 1 according to the similarity of each respondent's ratings. Scores above 0.7 or 0.8 indicate a high degree of consensus and are considered high enough to establish reliability. As Table 2 makes clear, our ratings show a high degree of reliability. Most are around or above 0.9, and only Albania and Slovenia are somewhat lower and even these exceed 0.75. Ideally, we would compare our results to other rating schemes (as Druckman and Warwick do) to further establish their reliability, but to our knowledge no other ratings exist for Eastern Europe.

A further result from Table 2 gives us additional confidence in our results. As mentioned above, we asked respondents to anchor their scores at 1 for an average ministry. Our results show that the average score of ministries across all countries is 1.03, which is almost exactly what it should be. These country averages also fell in a fairly tight range, from a maximum of 1.19 to a minimum of 0.89 (compared to 1.11 and 0.93 in Warwick and Druckman). More interesting for us, though, is the degree of variation we found. As we expected, there is variation both within and between countries. The average maximum score is 2.34, meaning that the highest ranking post (in all cases, the prime ministership) is more than twice as valuable as the average and the average minimum is 0.53 meaning that the lowest ranking post is about half as valuable as the average. These results are quite close to Druckman and Warwick's in Western Europe where the average maximum and minimum were 2.24 and 0.50, respectively.

Figure 1 presents more detailed results by showing the maximum, minimum and average score for those common ministries that appear in at least five of our countries. The ordering of ministries confirms our expectations. The prime ministership stands above the other posts – it was rated highest in all countries – and is followed by finance, foreign affairs and interior. At the bottom are environment, communications and culture. We see the same gradually upward sloping curve as in ratings of Western European portfolios.

We suggested in *HI* that Eastern Europe would mirror the Western European result in the value of so-called 'redistributive ministries'. Druckman and Warwick found that in Western Europe these six ministries were more valuable than the average other ministry, but were not more valuable than the next tier of six ministries.¹⁰ We see a slightly different picture in Eastern Europe. Table 3 presents our results. As in Western Europe, the average of the six redistributive ministries is significantly higher than the average other ministry. Unlike Western Europe, however, this result holds up even when comparing

the redistributive ministries with the next tier of six ministries. The differences are significant at or near the 0.1 level for 9 of the 12 countries and for all of the more advanced countries. *H1* thus holds only partially in Eastern Europe.

We believe that this result may tell us something important about Eastern European politics. Bueno de Mesquita (1979) hypothesizes that the redistributive portfolios are more valuable because of their role in the electoral connection. It was thus something of a surprise that they were not much more important in Western Europe than the next tier of ministries. Perhaps their importance in Eastern Europe indicates the electoral connection in these countries is stronger than commonly believed. While this conclusion is admittedly speculative, it gains weight from the fact that these results hold to a stronger degree for the more democratic countries in the sample.

We now turn to the ways in which Eastern Europe might differ from the West. Figure 2 compares the averages for portfolios from Eastern Europe with those that Druckman and Warwick found in Western Europe. Overall, they appear quite similar. Both show gradually upward sloping trends. With perhaps two exceptions, above average posts in Western Europe are also above average in Eastern Europe and below average posts are below average in both. In its rough outlines, portfolio salience is similar in both halves of Europe.

Indeed, virtually none of our hypotheses about differences between Eastern and Western Europe were confirmed. *H2*, which asserted that communist legacies would produce a more salient inner circle of decisive posts, was disconfirmed. The inner circle, including the prime ministership, looks to have




Figure 1. Eastern European cross-national portfolio values.

Table 3. Analyzing 'redistributive' ministries

Country	Average redistributive ministry score	Average non-redistributive ministry score	Significance of average redistributive versus non-redistributive	Average score of six top-rated non-redistributive ministries	Significance of average redistributive versus six top-rated non-redistributive
Albania	2.03 (1.03; 6)	1.03 (0.42; 36)	$t_0 = 4.25$ $p \leq 0.01$ (one-tailed)	1.76 (0.36; 6)	$t_{10} = 0.60$ $p \leq 0.30$
Bulgaria	1.40 (0.32; 6)	0.91 (0.19; 20)	$t_{24} = 4.19$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.12 (0.11; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.60$ $p \leq 0.10$
Croatia	1.42 (0.49; 6)	1.04 (0.23; 14)	$t_{18} = 2.40$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.25 (0.20; 6)	$t_{10} = 0.79$ $p \leq 0.25$
Czechoslovakia	1.31 (0.20; 5)	0.80 (0.24; 12)	$t_{15} = 4.30$ $p \leq 0.01$	0.98 (0.20; 6)	$t_6 = 2.80$ $p \leq 0.01$
Czech Republic	1.34 (0.35; 6)	0.85 (0.24; 15)	$t_{19} = 3.73$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.07 (0.18; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.65$ $p \leq 0.10$
Estonia	1.46 (0.55; 6)	0.71 (0.33; 19)	$t_{23} = 4.16$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.10 (0.20; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.50$ $p \leq 0.10$
Hungary	1.67 (0.93; 6)	0.90 (0.15; 21)	$t_{25} = 3.34$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.08 (0.07; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.31$ $p \leq 0.11$
Lithuania	1.39 (0.45; 6)	0.84 (0.26; 13)	$t_{17} = 3.36$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.06 (0.23; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.59$ $p \leq 0.10$
Poland	1.49 (0.44; 6)	0.86 (0.24; 38)	$t_{42} = 5.33$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.23 (0.12; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.40$ $p \leq 0.10$
Romania	1.78 (0.62; 6)	0.97 (0.35; 40)	$t_{44} = 4.77$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.58 (0.10; 6)	$t_{10} = 0.76$ $p \leq 0.25$
Slovakia	1.27 (0.49; 6)	0.80 (0.15; 14)	$t_{18} = 3.31$ $p \leq 0.01$	0.94 (0.10; 6)	$t_{10} = 1.62$ $p \leq 0.01$
Slovenia	1.35 (0.19; 6)	1.05 (0.10; 13)	$t_{17} = 4.53$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.13 (0.03; 6)	$t_{10} = 2.78$ $p \leq 0.01$
All countries	1.49 (0.57; 71)	0.91 (0.29; 255)	$t_{324} = 11.67$ $p \leq 0.01$	1.19 (0.29; 72)	$t_{10} = 3.93$ $p \leq 0.01$

Note: The figures in parentheses are the standard deviation and the N.

almost identical ratings in Eastern and Western Europe. *H3*, which postulated that economic portfolios would be more highly rated in Eastern Europe, was also disconfirmed with the small and partial exception of the foreign trade portfolio, which was more salient in the East. Finance and economic affairs, however, were non-distinguishable between the two regions. The same goes for *H4*, which suggested that spending ministries should be less valuable in Eastern Europe. Labor and social affairs, health and transport were quite similar in both regions. *H5* on national awakening was disconfirmed most dramatically. While we postulated that the culture and education portfolios would be more highly valued in Eastern Europe, just the opposite was the case. Education was considered much more important in Western than in Eastern Europe (for education, $t_{18} = 4.38$; $p < 0.01$ for a two-tailed test; for culture, $t_{18} = 0.45$; $p < 0.70$ for a two-tailed test).

These results, we believe, indicate that politics in Eastern Europe takes much the same form as in Western Europe. That is to say, the issues that matter for politicians (and presumably for the public) are similar in the two regions. It is economics, foreign affairs and internal security that occupy the decisive place in political bargaining in both Eastern and Western Europe. This result is somewhat surprising given the enormous changes taking place in Eastern Europe. One might have expected a different set of priorities than in the richer, more stable and post-materialist societies of Western Europe. To a large




Figure 2. Eastern and Western European portfolio values.

extent, these differences did not materialize. There does not appear to be distinctive 'transition' politics where certain policy areas are highlighted and others downgraded.¹¹

We do, however, find a small number of differences between the two regions. What surprised us were the portfolios in which these differences manifested themselves. As mentioned above, education received considerably lower rankings in Eastern Europe than in the West despite the massive changes in education that included rewriting textbooks and national histories. We are not sure how to explain this result. Perhaps these changes were taken for granted or perhaps budget problems made education a portfolio subject to budget cuts. Similarly, we were surprised that the defense portfolio was more highly valued in Eastern than in Western Europe ($t_{23} = 1.97$; $p < 0.10$ for a two-tailed test). Our weak prior was that defense would not be particularly important because the armed forces could only lose power and influence from their inflated position under communism.¹² Looking back on these results, we believe that we may have underestimated the prestige that the military gained from joining NATO and participating in international missions as well as from avoiding the corruption and hard decisions of other portfolios. The higher value of the foreign trade post in the East does fit with our belief, expressed in *H3*, that economic affairs would be particularly valuable. Indeed, the opening of borders was one of the first and most momentous moves to a market economy. Furthermore, these countries have taken great pains to attract foreign investment and there may be considerable prestige related to these investments. It is not clear, though, why this higher value did not extend to the more salient finance and economic affairs ministries.

Finally, we turn to the distinction we mentioned above between more and less advanced Eastern European countries. Figure 3 presents average salience values for both groups. Here we see a good deal of variation with less advanced countries placing greater weight on the prime ministership, deputy prime ministership and the interior, justice, industry and trade, and transport posts. (The number of cases is small, which results in marginal significance levels; specifically, the respective tests, using two-tails, are $t_{10} = 1.38$; $p < 0.20$; $t_9 = 1.56$; $p < 0.15$; $t_{10} = 1.74$; $p < 0.15$; $t_9 = 1.69$; $p < 0.15$; $t_4 = 2.07$; $p < 0.15$; $t_6 = 2.29$; $p < 0.10$.)

These may be the most interesting results of our survey. In the first place, the divergent values of the prime ministership bear noting. We mentioned in *H2* that communist legacies might lead to a higher value of the leading ministries. While this hypothesis was not confirmed for the entire sample of Eastern European countries, it is for the less advanced countries (notice that given our directional prediction for the prime ministership, a one-tailed test would have been appropriate, thereby yielding a significant result at the 0.10 level). Indeed,

this is what we would expect. These countries have been singled out by area studies scholars for their strong communist legacies both at the elite and mass level (Barany & Volgyes 1995; Ekiert & Hanson 2003). By contrast, the average salience of the prime ministership in the more advanced countries of 2.13 is quite close to the average of 2.24 in Western Europe, indicating that these countries have broken more clearly with the communist legacy of a leading post and adopted the more egalitarian norm of Western Europe.

The higher value of the interior and justice posts in the less advanced countries also provides partial confirmation of *H6* that posts connected with the repressive forces of government will be more valued in less democratic states. The one exception to this hypothesis is the similar rating of defense in both groups. This fits with our speculation above that NATO membership may have given an artificial boost to this portfolio in the more advanced countries.¹³

We did not expect to see the greater salience of the industry and trade portfolio, but in retrospect it makes sense given the continued large role of the state in the economies of the less advanced countries. We do not have a ready explanation for the higher salience of the transportation ministry.

These latter results are consistent with Druckman and Roberts' (2005) finding that there are different dynamics to coalition government in the more and less advanced countries of Eastern Europe. In accord with their finding that large parties tend to be overcompensated with ministries in the less advanced countries, we find that the leading portfolios are also more salient, perhaps increasing this overcompensation. We likewise see that power minis-




Figure 3. Non-advanced and advanced Eastern European portfolio values.

tries and ministries related to state control of the economy are more salient in the region for fairly understandable reasons. While the more advanced countries of Eastern Europe approximate the politics of Western Europe, the less advanced countries appear to be somewhat distinct.

Future directions

The main contribution of this article is its introduction of a new data set on portfolio salience in Eastern Europe. Research on coalition government has long been plagued by the limited data offered by the existing parliamentary regimes in Western Europe. With the establishment of stable parliamentary democracies in Eastern Europe, this no longer need be the case. It is in the interest of scholars, then, to develop data sets that allow comparisons between Western Europe and other parliamentary democracies. That is what we attempt to do in this article.

The preliminary analyses that we undertake here suggest that such data sets will yield considerable fruit. In the main, we have found that the salience of portfolios is quite similar between Eastern and Western Europe. With a few exceptions, individual ministerial posts have about the same value in the two regions. And this occurs despite large differences in political, economic, social and cultural context. This leads us to believe that the countries in Eastern Europe rapidly have come to be dominated by the same sort of political issues as the established democracies of Western Europe. Though we suggested in our hypotheses a number of, in our view, plausible ways in which individual ministries might be more or less valued in Eastern Europe, in most cases these hypotheses were not confirmed. While this does not constitute definitive proof that the substance of politics is the same in two regions, it does at least put the ball in the other court for those who see differences.

We do qualify this result somewhat. The similarities between Eastern and Western Europe appear to be stronger for the more advanced countries of Eastern Europe. This is not surprising given that all of these countries have recently joined the European Union. More interesting is that there appear to be distinct dynamics in the less advanced countries. These countries put more weight on the prime ministership and the power ministries, which tells us that communist legacies and non-democratic politics may be producing a distinct style of politics. It would be interesting to see whether these results extend to other less democratic countries; indeed, our study is the first to extend assessments of portfolio salience to less than fully democratic countries.

Apart from these preliminary results, we believe these data will be useful in testing theories of coalition government. We can think of at least five additional

applications. First, they can be used in work on portfolio allocation. Most research on portfolio allocation assumes that all portfolios are of equal weight. As this survey shows, this is not true. The empirically presented salience weights derived here allow us to provide a more realistic test of theories of allocation by weighting portfolios according to their salience. Such an analysis has been undertaken by Warwick and Druckman (2001, 2006) for Western Europe. We intend to see whether salience weights change the patterns in Eastern Europe.

Second, we would be interested to know if institutional differences affect the salience of portfolios. One institution that may matter is semi-presidentialism, which is common in both our sample and in Western Europe. Semi-presidential regimes often reserve specific powers – particularly in foreign policy and defense – for presidents. This might be expected to reduce the salience of portfolios where presidents have special powers. There may also be differences between countries that are home to single-party governments compared to those with coalition governments. In the former case, portfolios are largely immune to the sort of horse-trading common in countries characterized by coalition governments. While it is not clear how this would affect the relative salience of portfolios, we believe it is worth examining potential differences.

Third, we are also interested in whether salient ministries differ from non-salient ones in terms of ministerial turnover. Is it the case that the occupants of the more salient ministries change more often because they are more sought after? Fourth, it has previously been shown that in comparison to the West, more ministries in Eastern Europe are held by non-partisans (Amorin Neto & Samuels 2003). Do these non-partisans tend to receive more or less salient ministries and why? Fifth, these salience weights would enable tests of the Laver-Shepsle model of government in Eastern Europe. We hope that other scholars will find additional uses for these data.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Mike Parkin for excellent research assistance.

Appendix 1. Example survey

A Survey of Portfolios in East European Democracies Czech Republic (1993–2002)

Name: _____
(this is for identification purposes only and will not be included in the data set)

Do you wish to receive a copy of this data set? If so, please supply an e-mail address: _____

Instructions for completing the survey

Our objective is to develop estimates of the importance of the various posts represented in Czech Republic cabinets that were formed between 1993 and 2002. Although the importance of any cabinet post may vary over time or across parties, we ask only for a single overall estimate for each post.

To facilitate the task of evaluation further, we ask that you apply a score of '1' to all posts whose importance approximately equals that of an 'average' or 'normal' portfolio. For cases where a post is clearly above or below average in importance, your score should reflect the proportion by which the post in question deviates from the average. For instance, if you believe the Finance portfolio is about 50 per cent more important than an average portfolio, it should be given a score of 1.50; similarly, if the Trade portfolio carries only two-thirds the importance of an average portfolio, it would receive a score of 0.67; and so forth. The value of cabinet posts held by ministers without portfolio should also be evaluated relative to an average portfolio.

How we selected portfolios

The list of posts to be evaluated was derived by reviewing the cabinet compositions of all Czech Republic governments that were formed between 1993 and 2002, as presented in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1990–2002). The composition of cabinet portfolios tends to change from government to government so we have noted the years that certain infrequent posts existed. We have not included any dates for those posts that always existed in the coalition governments. We have also left room for you to suggest and rate any omitted portfolios that, in your opinion, should be included.

Portfolios often combine more than one area of responsibility (e.g., 'Youth and Culture' or 'Health and Social Welfare'). Whenever areas of responsibility are never separated, we have listed the combination as a single post. It occasionally happens, however, that certain responsibilities that are now combined in a single portfolio have been allocated to different ministers or even combined with other responsibilities in some previous government. In these cases, we have listed each of these areas of responsibility as a separate post. If an item listed below in fact constitutes a partial portfolio, it should be given a correspondingly small importance score.

Importance of posts in Czech Republic cabinets

Post	Score (1 = Average)	Post	Score (1 = Average)
Prime Minister		State Control (1993–1996)	
Deputy Prime Minister (1993–1995 & 2002–present)		Privatization (1993–1996)	
Finance		Environment	
Agriculture		Justice	
Foreign Affairs		Economic Competition (1993–1996)	
Industry & Trade		Defense	
Economy (1993–1996)		Transport	
Health		Housing & Regions (1996–1997 & 2002–present)	
Interior		Information (2002–present)	
Culture		Without Portfolio (1996–1997)	
Education		Other	
Labor & Social Affairs			

Appendix 2. Portfolio ratings by country

Albania

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	7	3.71	2.95
Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet	7	1.81	1.01
Justice	7	1.27	0.28
Defense	7	1.11	0.49
Foreign Affairs	7	1.85	1.02
Industry, Mining and Energy Resources (1992–1996)	6	0.85	0.48
General Secretary of the Cabinet (1992–1996)	5	0.53	0.23
Transport and Communications (1992–1996)	6	1.24	0.53
Construction and Housing (1992–1996)	6	0.99	0.53
Education (1992–1996)	7	0.99	0.13

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Tourism (1992–1996)	7	0.78	0.18
Industry, Transport and Trade (1997)	5	0.92	0.67
Education and Sports (1997)	5	0.80	0.45
Information (1997–2001)	4	0.49	0.28
Legislative Reforms and Parliamentary Relations (1997–2001)	5	1.57	0.90
Public Works and Transportation (1997–2001)	6	1.32	0.42
Public Works, Land Use and Tourism (1997 and 2001–present)	6	0.94	0.46
Health (1997–present)	6	0.98	0.17
Higher Education and Scientific Research (1997–present)	6	0.91	0.32
Public Economy and Privatization (1997–present)	6	1.58	0.38
Local Government (1997–present)	6	1.11	0.52
Government Coordination (1998–2001)	5	0.87	0.69
Finance (and Economy) (1992–1996 and 2001–present)	7	2.12	1.36
Culture, Youth and Sports (1992–1996 and 1998–present)	7	0.94	0.31
Public Order (1992–1994 and 1998–present)	7	2.23	1.27
Agriculture and Food (1992–1996 and 1997–present)	7	0.86	0.33
Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (1992–1996 and 1998–present)	7	1.12	0.54
Health and Environmental Protection (1992–1996 and 1997)	7	0.92	0.13
Labor, Emigration and Social Assistance (Social Problems) (1992 and 1997–present)	7	0.97	0.30
Interior (1994–1997)	6	2.53	1.28
Trade and Tourism (1997)	7	0.60	0.32
Energy and Mining (1997)	7	0.77	0.41
Culture and Youth (1997)	7	0.76	0.32
Transport (2001–present)	7	1.25	0.46
Environment (2001–present)	6	0.65	0.31
Minister of State	6	0.53	0.31
Minister of State to Chair of Council of Ministers (1997)	5	0.65	0.22
Minister of State (Energy) (2001–present)	6	0.63	0.21
Minister of State Without Portfolio for Local Government Affairs (1994)	6	0.60	0.24
Secretary of State (Interior) (1997)	6	2.20	2.88
Secretary of State (Defense) (1997)	6	1.37	1.30
Secretary of State (Foreign Affairs) (1997)	6	1.62	2.15
Secretary of State (European Integration) (1998–present)	7	1.07	0.86

Appendix 2. Continued.**Bulgaria**

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	13	2.19	0.93
Deputy Chair	13	1.31	0.34
Justice	13	0.99	0.21
Defense	13	1.10	0.20
Internal Affairs/Interior	13	1.34	0.27
Agriculture (and Food)	13	1.05	0.34
Environment	13	0.70	0.21
Finance	13	1.46	0.34
Health	12	0.85	0.21
Foreign Affairs	13	1.26	0.35
Industry, Trade and Services (1990–1991)	12	1.16	0.33
Foreign Economic Relations (1990–1991)	13	0.87	0.28
Transport (1990–1991 and 1995–1997)	13	0.95	0.22
Labor and Social Welfare (Affairs)	13	0.94	0.26
Education (1990–1991)	13	0.76	0.27
Science and Higher Education (1990–1991)	12	0.68	0.29
Culture (1990–1991 and 1995–1997)	13	0.59	0.23
Economic Development (1995–1997)	13	0.94	0.27
Regional Development and Construction (Public Works) (1996–1997 and 2001–present)	13	1.01	0.25
Trade and Foreign Economic Cooperation (1995–1997)	13	0.89	0.29
Industry (1995–1997)	12	1.10	0.32
Education, Science and Technology (1996–1997 and 2001–present)	13	0.80	0.28
Economy (2001–present)	13	1.16	0.28
State Administration (2001–present)	12	0.93	0.25
Transport and Communication (2001–present)	13	0.92	0.18
Emergencies (2001–present)	12	0.58	0.24
Other: European Integration	4	1.29	0.06

Croatia

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	6	2.27	0.69
Deputy Prime Minister	5	1.16	0.23

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Finance	6	1.65	0.33
Defense	6	1.13	0.26
Interior	6	1.13	0.22
Foreign Affairs	6	1.43	0.18
Immigration, Development and Reconstruction	6	1.38	0.45
Economy	6	1.42	0.40
Croatian Homeland War Defenders	6	0.95	0.34
Small and Medium Businesses	6	0.79	0.36
Agriculture and Forestry	6	0.92	0.20
Transport and Telecommunications	6	0.92	0.20
Justice	6	1.48	0.29
Health	6	1.05	0.12
Education and Sports	6	0.99	0.13
Labor and Social Welfare	6	0.98	0.12
Tourism	5	0.87	0.24
Urban Development, Construction and Housing	6	0.84	0.39
Science and Technology	6	0.91	0.33
Culture	6	0.85	0.21
European Integration (2000–2001)	6	1.18	0.20

Czechoslovakia

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	10	1.49	0.30
Federal Deputy Premier	10	1.08	0.31
Federal Deputy Premier for Human Rights (1990–1992)	9	0.85	0.39
Federal Deputy Premier for Economic Reform (1990–1992)	10	1.31	0.47
Foreign Affairs	10	1.35	0.17
National Defense (1990–1992)	10	1.03	0.27
Interior	10	1.20	0.32
Finance	10	1.49	0.39
Foreign Trade	10	0.91	0.22
Labor and Social Affairs	10	1.01	0.22
Economy	10	1.06	0.35
Economic Strategy	10	0.74	0.27
Transport	9	0.66	0.19
Communications	9	0.62	0.18

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Economic Competition (1992–1993)	9	0.69	0.28
Environment (1992–1993)	9	0.61	0.25
Strategic Planning (1992–1993)	10	0.52	0.25
Federal Minister (1990–1992)	8	0.60	0.30

Czech Republic

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	14	1.96	0.97
Deputy Prime Minister (1993–1995 and 2002–present)	14	1.15	0.36
Finance	14	1.50	0.31
Agriculture	14	1.08	0.24
Foreign Affairs	14	1.26	0.35
Industry and Trade	14	1.12	0.24
Economy (1993–1996)	14	1.10	0.21
Health	14	0.83	0.21
Interior	14	1.19	0.28
Culture	14	0.59	0.20
Education	14	0.71	0.22
Labor and Social Affairs	14	1.06	0.21
State Control (1993–1996)	14	0.70	0.33
Privatization (1993–1996)	14	1.37	0.38
Environment	14	0.64	0.31
Justice	14	0.85	0.23
Economic Competition (1993–1996)	13	0.81	0.24
Defense	13	1.03	0.32
Transport	14	0.78	0.21
Housing and Regions (1996–1997 and 2002–present)	14	0.95	0.29
Information (2002–present)	14	0.74	0.31
Without Portfolio (1996–1997)	13	0.43	0.25

Estonia

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	7	2.25	0.52
Deputy Prime Minister (1995–1996)	6	0.86	0.41
Internal Affairs	7	1.24	0.18

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Justice	7	1.38	0.34
Foreign Affairs	7	1.65	0.29
Defense	7	0.92	0.38
Social Affairs	7	1.06	0.10
Economy and Privatization (1994–1995)	7	1.21	0.22
Economic Affairs (1992–1994 and 1995–2002)	7	1.21	0.22
Finance	7	1.84	0.47
Agriculture	7	0.87	0.20
Transport and Communication (1992–1996 and 1999–2002)	7	0.90	0.21
Education (1995–1996 and 1999–present)	7	0.88	0.19
Culture and Education (1992–1995)	7	0.86	0.19
Environment	7	0.71	0.17
Culture (1999–present)	7	0.63	0.13
Population (2002–present)	7	0.54	0.21
Regional Affairs (1999–present)	7	0.39	0.24
Ethnic Affairs (1999–2002)	7	0.54	0.21
Energy (1992–1994)	7	0.66	0.27
Reforms (1992–1994)	6	0.55	0.20
Minister Without Portfolio (1992–1995)	5	0.46	0.09
Minister Without Portfolio for Culture (1995–1999)	6	0.38	0.13
Minister Without Portfolio for European Reforms (1995–1999)	6	0.53	0.23
Minister Without Portfolio for Regional Affairs (1995–1999)	7	0.33	0.21
Baltic Cooperation (1994–1995)	5	0.20	0.14

Hungary

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister (Premier)	11	3.34	3.01
Deputy Prime Minister (1994–1998)	9	1.42	0.56
Culture and Public Education (1990–1998)	11	0.95	0.31
Justice	11	0.95	0.29
Industry and Commerce/Trade (1990–2002)	11	1.11	0.34
Defense	11	0.80	0.22
Labor Affairs (1990–1998 and 2002–present)	11	0.81	0.23
Interior	11	1.28	0.33
Foreign	11	1.51	0.37
Finance	11	1.62	0.28

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
International Economic Relations (1990–1994)	10	0.97	0.41
Environmental Protection (1990–1994 and 1998–2002)	11	0.69	0.30
Environmental Protection and Regional Development (1994–1998)	10	0.80	0.33
Environmental Protection and Water Management (2002–present)	11	0.65	0.23
Agriculture (1990–1998)	11	0.89	0.20
Agriculture and Regional Development (1998–present)	11	1.17	0.43
Transport and Communications (1990–1994)	9	0.96	0.27
Transport, Telecommunications and Water Management (1994–2002)	10	0.92	0.19
Information Technology and Telecommunications (2002–present)	11	0.85	0.34
Social Welfare (1990–1994)	9	0.80	0.25
Public Health (1994–2002)	11	0.97	0.16
Education (1998–present)	11	1.04	0.22
National Cultural Heritage (1998–present)	11	1.05	0.40
Social and Family Affairs (1998–present)	11	0.78	0.27
Children, Youth and Sports (2002–present)	11	0.68	0.25
Health, Social and Family Affairs (2002–present)	11	0.89	0.18
Economy and Transport (2002–present)	11	1.12	0.20
Minister Without Portfolio	7	0.73	0.43

Lithuania

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	10	2.13	0.54
Finance	10	1.74	0.40
Agriculture (and Forestry)	10	1.08	0.26
Foreign Affairs	10	1.27	0.22
Culture	9	0.57	0.29
National Defense	10	1.07	0.20
Economics	10	1.47	0.40
Environment	10	0.66	0.29
Health	10	0.97	0.10
Justice	10	0.88	0.12
Social Security and Labor	10	1.20	0.24

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Public Administration Reforms and Local Authority (1996–2000)	10	0.61	0.28
Transportation (1996–2000)	10	0.80	0.20
Education and Science (1996–1998 and 1999–present)	10	0.88	0.18
Interior (1996–2000 and 2001–present)	10	1.04	0.27
Industry and Trade (1996–1998)	10	0.70	0.23
Communications and Information (1996–1998)	10	0.67	0.20
Construction and Urban Development (1996–1998)	10	0.60	0.14
Transport and Communication (2000–present)	10	0.96	0.26

Poland

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	11	2.21	0.82
Deputy Prime Minister (1989–1991 and 1992–present)	12	1.42	0.50
Finance	12	1.73	0.65
Agriculture (1991–1992, 1993–1995 and 1997–2001)	12	0.98	0.23
Agriculture, Forestry and Food Economy (1989–1991, 1992–1993 and 1995–1996)	12	0.99	0.24
Agriculture and Economy (1996–1997)	12	1.00	0.23
Agriculture and Rural Development (with other post) (2001–present)	12	0.98	0.23
Science and Technology	12	0.59	0.27
Internal Affairs (Interior) (1991–1997 and 2001–present)	12	1.39	0.46
Council of Ministers (1989–1991, 1993–1997 and 1997–2001)	12	1.44	0.44
Justice	12	1.18	0.29
Culture and (Arts) (1989–1991 and 1993–present)	12	0.65	0.32
Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (1989–1992 and 1993–present)	12	0.71	0.31
Health and Social Welfare (1989–1991 and 1992–1997)	12	0.83	0.32
Health (1991–1992 and 1997–present)	12	0.84	0.34
Labor and Social Policy	12	0.98	0.38
Domestic Market (1989–1991)	12	0.64	0.36
Housing and Construction (1989–1991)	12	0.46	0.25
National Education (1989–2001)	12	0.83	0.32
Education and Sport (2001–present)	12	0.83	0.31
National Defense	12	1.17	0.45

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Foreign Affairs	12	1.44	0.21
Foreign Economic Cooperation (1989–1991 and 1992–1997)	12	1.10	0.33
Industry (1989–1991)	12	1.05	0.19
Industry and Trade (1992–1997)	12	0.97	0.08
Transport, Shipping and Communications (1989–1991)	12	0.76	0.22
Transport and Shipping (1993–1997)	12	0.75	0.22
Transport (1992–1993 and 1997–2001)	12	0.73	0.23
Communications (1992–2001)	12	0.78	0.22
Central Planning Office (1989–1991, 1993–1996 and 1996–1997)	12	0.69	0.27
Economic Affairs (1991–1993)	12	1.05	0.33
Economy (1997–present)	12	1.24	0.22
Political and Social Affairs (1991–1993)	12	0.97	0.26
Town and Country Planning (1992–1993 and 1995–1997)	12	0.60	0.25
Privatization (1992–1997)	12	1.14	0.17
Treasury (1997–present)	12	1.28	0.23
Infrastructure (1991–1992 and 2001–present)	12	0.72	0.26
Without Portfolio: Central Planning Office (1992–1993)	11	0.61	0.30
Without Portfolio: Health, Cultural, Education in Rural Areas (1989–1991)	11	0.48	0.25
Without Portfolio: Communications (1989–1991)	10	0.52	0.27
Without Portfolio: Cooperation with Political Organizations and Associations (1989–1991 and 1992–1993)	11	0.55	0.32
Without Portfolio: Government Economic Council (1989–1991)	10	0.72	0.34
Without Portfolio: Integration with European Communities (1992–1993 and 1997–present)	11	1.03	0.35
Without Portfolio: Private Enterprise (1992–1993)	11	1.04	0.28
Without Portfolio: Council of Ministers Office (1992–1993)	10	0.97	0.12

Romania

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	17	2.85	2.05
Deputy Prime Minister (1991 and 1999–present)	16	1.41	1.27
Reform and Relations with Parliament (1991–1996)	17	0.99	0.59
Relations with Parliament (1996–1999)	17	0.71	0.32

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Reform (1996–1999)	17	1.21	0.47
Finance (1994–present)	17	1.81	0.80
Economy and Finance (1991–1994)	17	1.76	0.80
Foreign Affairs	17	1.89	0.60
National Defense	17	1.51	0.63
Budget (1991–1994)	16	1.46	0.89
Interior	17	1.65	0.75
Justice	17	1.54	0.77
Industry (1991–1996)	17	1.55	0.75
Industry and Trade (1996–present)	17	1.58	0.71
Trade and Tourism (1991–1994)	17	0.99	0.62
Trade (1994–1996)	17	1.03	0.57
Tourism (1994–1999)	17	0.65	0.30
Agriculture and Food Industry	17	0.97	0.42
Communications (1991–1999)	17	0.65	0.29
Public Information (1998)	16	0.56	0.27
Transport	17	1.43	0.73
Public Works and Physical Planning (1991–1998 and 1998–present)	17	1.08	0.66
Education and Science (1991–1994)	17	0.79	0.44
Education (1994–1999)	17	0.80	0.42
Research and Technology (1994–1998)	16	0.59	0.37
Environment (1991–1994)	17	0.41	0.23
Waters, Forestry and Environmental Protection (1994–present)	17	0.59	0.26
Culture	17	0.68	0.31
Health	17	0.82	0.39
Labor and Social Security	17	1.14	0.64
Youth and Sports (1991–present)	17	0.49	0.26
Privatization (1998–1999)	17	1.61	0.81
Local Public Administration (1998–present)	17	1.27	0.73
Secretary of State: Agriculture and Food, Responsible for Privatization (1991)	16	0.78	0.48
Secretary of State: Finance (1996–1998)	17	0.95	0.35
Secretary of State: Defense (1996–1998 and 1998–1999)	17	0.86	0.35
Secretary of State: Industry and Trade (1996–1998)	16	0.79	0.42
Minister of State (1991, 1996–1998 and 1998–1999)	15	1.09	0.72
Minister of State for Industry and Commerce (1991)	16	1.17	0.74

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Minister of State for Quality of Life and Social Security (1991)	16	0.89	0.71
Minister of State at Education (1991–1994)	16	0.88	0.48
Minister without Portfolio (1991)	14	0.48	0.30
Chair of the Council for Economic Coordination, Strategy and Reform (1994–1996)	17	0.94	0.51
Delegate Minister to Prime Minister (General Secretariat) (1996–1999)	17	1.09	0.42
Delegate Minister to Prime Minister (Public Information) (1996–1998)	17	0.79	0.45
Delegate Minister to Prime Minister (European Integration) (1996–1998 and 1998–1999)	17	1.03	0.50
Delegate Minister to Prime Minister (National Minorities) (1996–present)	17	0.63	0.31

Slovakia

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	11	2.17	0.88
Deputy Prime Minister	11	1.15	0.37
Foreign Affairs	11	1.02	0.33
Economy	11	1.02	0.29
Finance	11	1.38	0.48
Labor, Social Affairs and the Family (1993–1994 and 1998–present)	11	1.00	0.29
Environment (1993–1994 and 1998–present)	11	0.55	0.20
Administration and Privatization of National Property	11	0.77	0.34
Transport (1993–1994)	11	0.75	0.35
Land Management (1993–1994)	10	0.59	0.19
Culture (1993–1994 and 1998–present)	11	0.76	0.28
Education and Sciences	11	0.87	0.24
Health (1993–1994 and 1998–present)	11	0.83	0.24
Interior	10	1.28	0.21
Justice	11	1.05	0.12
Chair State Defense Council (1994)	8	0.84	0.20
Defense	11	0.94	0.20
Agriculture (1994 and 1998–present)	11	0.82	0.25
Transport, Communications and Public Works (1994)	11	0.78	0.29

Appendix 2. Continued.

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Transport, Posts and Telecommunications (1998–present)	10	0.74	0.33
Construction and Public Works (1998–present)	10	0.66	0.20

Slovenia

Ministry	N	Average	S.D.
Prime Minister	13	1.56	0.34
Vice Prime Minister	9	0.66	0.31
Foreign Affairs	14	1.47	0.91
Finance	14	1.53	0.26
Internal Affairs (1993–2000 and 2000–present)	14	1.19	0.37
Defense	14	1.16	0.46
Economic Relations and Development	14	1.11	0.32
Education and Sport (1993–2000 and 2000–present)	14	1.04	0.31
Justice (1993–2000 and 2000–present)	14	1.05	0.31
Transport and Communications	14	1.13	0.58
Agriculture and Forestry	14	1.18	0.41
Health	13	1.10	0.33
Science and Technology	13	1.00	0.45
Labor, Family and Social Affairs (1993–2000 and 2000–present)	14	1.18	0.60
Culture (1993–2000 and 2000–present)	14	0.82	0.26
Economic Activities	14	1.15	0.38
Conservation and Environmental Planning	14	0.99	0.51
Minister without Portfolio (1997–2000 and 2000–present)	13	1.07	0.51
Labor (2000)	14	1.09	0.36
Small Enterprise and Tourism (2000–present)	14	0.92	0.68

Notes

1. We suspect that the strong empirical finding known as Gamson's Law, which depends only on the quantity of portfolios, may have inhibited research in this area.
2. For evaluations of previous indicators, see Druckman and Warwick (2005).
3. Under communism, of course, the real power lay with the Central Committee of the Communist Party rather than with the prime minister or the council of ministers. Nevertheless, traditions of strong executive leadership would, under the parliamentary systems considered here, transfer to the prime minister.
4. For a description of the subtle ways that the state can use economic policy to reward friends and punish enemies, see Hellman (1996).

5. Benoit & Laver (2006) find that privatization is one of the main axes of party competition in the region.
6. Another difference between the two groups is the higher level of corruption in the less advanced countries. We believe that this might affect the salience of portfolios – portfolios that allow more kickbacks might be seen as more desirable – but we do not have strong beliefs about which ministries are most affected by corruption.
7. We found no significant differences in response rates for e-mail as compared to regular mail surveys.
8. In a handful of countries with few responses, we followed up with a translated survey.
9. We are still attempting to obtain data for these countries. Contact the authors for updates.
10. In this analysis, as in Druckman and Warwick (2005), we exclude the deputy prime minister.
11. Of course, it is possible that similar titles of ministries mask different activities in the two regions. We do not have systematic evidence on this point.
12. One need only remember the May Day parades of military hardware to get an idea of the prestige of this portfolio in the past.
13. Several of the less advanced countries, including Bulgaria and Romania, joined NATO as well.

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