Communist Successor Parties
And Coalition Formation
In Eastern Europe

One of the most distinctive features of new democracies is the presence of political parties associated with the old, repressive regime. This article investigates whether or not the Eastern European variant of these parties, which we call communist successor parties (CSPs), has affected coalition politics. It finds that CSPs do have significant effects on the dynamics of coalition formation. CSPs are less likely than other parties to be included in governing coalitions; coalitions that include CSPs are more likely to be oversized (that is, to include superfluous parties); and CSPs that make it into government are penalized, insofar as they receive less than their fair share of governing portfolios. We attribute these results to the salience of the regime divide—the affective dislike of many citizens for the legacies of communism. Our results extend research on coalition behavior to Eastern European contexts and show how affective dislike combined with vote-seeking motivations can affect governing behavior.

How do coalitions form and function in new democracies? Most existing theories suggest that coalition formation in these countries should be driven by the same factors as in established democracies: the size and ideology of parties and the institutional framework in which they operate (see Martin and Stevenson 2001 for a summary of theories).

In this article, we look at one significant fact about new democracies that may produce a different sort of coalition politics. Most new democracies are distinguished by the presence of successors to the former ruling parties. These successors may simply be accepted as normal players in the democratic game, but there are good reasons to believe they will be treated differently by other parties. After all, the successor parties are associated with regimes that, at best, restricted fundamental human rights and, at worst, murdered or imprisoned significant portions of their countries’ populations. It is thus reasonable
to expect that these parties will be seen as more than simply bearers of legislative strength and ideology.

To address this issue, we examine coalition politics in 15 Eastern European countries. Specifically, we studied the effect on coalition formation of what we call communist successor parties (CSPs), the parties that are the organizational successors to the former ruling communist parties.

We focused on three aspects of coalition politics: Do CSPs enter government to the same extent as other parties? Do the governments that CSPs enter differ from governments composed of other parties? And are CSPs allocated a proportional share of ministries when they enter government? In all three cases, we found evidence that CSPs are treated differently than other parties, even when we controlled for their legislative strength and ideology.

We believe that these anomalies stem from a combination of affective dislike on the part of voters and party activists for CSPs and the vote-seeking motivations of party leaders. Party leaders appear to follow the lead of their electorates and party activists in shunning CSPs or limiting the CSPs’ influence on politics.

Our findings are particularly interesting because there has been relatively little study of coalition formation in new democracies. Consistent with recent institutional theories of coalition behavior (for example, Martin and Stevenson 2001 and Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994), the results imply that understanding coalitional politics requires contextual knowledge about the substance of national politics. Specifically, our findings suggest that scholars should pay more attention to the affective attitudes of party electorates and elites toward rival parties. In cases where there is strong affective dislike of a particular party, vote-seeking motivations may be as, or perhaps even more, important than office- and policy-seeking motivations of parties.

I. Communist Successor Parties

Few topics in postcommunist politics have been studied as intensively as communist successor parties, the parties that are the organizational successors to the old ruling parties. A review of the literature on this topic reveals at least two books, two edited volumes, and 18 articles devoted exclusively to the comparative analysis of these parties. Taking into account articles devoted to individual successor parties or to the place of CSPs in party systems substantially adds to this total. No other type of party—liberal, agrarian, nationalist, or even extremist—has received comparable study.
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Why have these parties attracted so much attention? In the first place, it came as a surprise to many scholars that these parties survived and, in some cases, transformed themselves. It was assumed that parties so closely associated with a repressive dictatorship would quickly fall by the wayside when faced with genuine competition. Moreover, it seemed unlikely that these parties would be able to change their ways, given the heavy baggage that they carried from the past. Scholars expected these parties to remain as authoritarian and ideologically extreme as they had always been. For this reason, the ability of CSPs to win elections, first in Lithuania and Poland and later in other countries, led many observers to worry about a possible reversion to nondemocratic politics. When the election of these parties did not portend a return to communism, scholars wanted to know how some of these parties were able to transform themselves into democratic parties. Finally, students of postcommunist politics were interested in how citizens and politicians would react to these parties. CSPs were intimately connected with some of the most repressive regimes in human history. Would citizens be able to forgive and forget after the fall of communism? Or would they hold grudges against these parties for the destruction their predecessors had inflicted? How important, in short, were legacies of the past?

A survey of the literature devoted to these parties finds that it is focused almost entirely on party development. Virtually all of this work addresses the same two questions: (1) What explains the success of CSPs, either in merely surviving or in winning elections? and (2) What explains a CSP’s ability or inability to transform into a normal democratic party? Most of this literature can thus be classed as addressing the causes of these parties rather than their effects. Instead of revisiting this research, we ask a different, and in some sense, more-consequential question: do CSPs matter politically? Research has not yet shown that these parties have had a definite effect on politics in the region. Did it matter that CSPs managed to survive or transform themselves in the countries of Eastern Europe? Did they actually affect the substance of politics in the region? In essence, ours is the “so what?” question. We focus specifically on the dynamics of government formation and portfolio allocation. These areas are particularly good for tests of these questions because they have bred a large literature (giving us a baseline of comparison) and they are readily quantifiable.

We believe that these questions are significant not only because their answers may provide a validation of previous work, but also because they have important consequences for governance in the region.
Government formation and the allocation of portfolios have been shown in numerous studies to shape policy outcomes and general well-being (see, for example, Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994 and Lijphart 1999). Thus, if CSPs alter the dynamics of coalition politics, then this influence could ultimately have profound effects on the politics of the region.

II. CSPs and Coalition Theory

Just as studies on Eastern European politics have paid scant attention to how CSPs affect coalition governance, the literature on coalition behavior has given limited consideration to governing dynamics in Eastern Europe, instead focusing largely on Western Europe (see, however, Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001; Druckman and Roberts 2005, N.d., and Grzymala-Busse 2001). That said, coalition theory, more generally, provides reasons to expect CSPs to matter.

Over the last 20 years, researchers have shown how various external constraints affect coalition behavior (see, for example, De Winter 1995; Druckman and Thies 2002; Huber 1996; Laver and Schofield 1990, 195–215; Martin and Stevenson 2001, 35–38; and Mershon 1996). Most of these constraints come from institutions and include such things as formation rules (for instance, investiture rules), cabinet operation rules (such as votes of no confidence), legislative rules (such as dissolution rules), and party rules.

Most relevant for us, given our interest in CSPs, is the impact of party rules. Strøm, Budge, and Laver (1994) explain that

Party leaders may declare that they will, or will not, form particular coalitions. . . . The systematic exclusion of certain parties from coalition bargaining is the most striking party constraint found with any regularity. . . . The examples of the Gaullists or Communists in the French Fourth Republic, Sinn Féin in Ireland, or the Italian Communists in the 1950s show that certain parties, as a consequence of their strong “antisystem” stance, can effectively be discounted as members of any potential government. (317)

CSPs in Eastern Europe differ from these parties insofar as they have generally not been systematically excluded from government formation (Strøm, Budge, and Laver focus on Western Europe; also see Martin and Stevenson 2001, 37, 46; and Mershon 1994, 57; 2002, 40–41). Yet the basic idea that specific types of parties can alter the dynamics of coalition bargaining extends to the case of CSPs. Indeed, Strøm, Budge, and Laver (1994, 317) even acknowledge that “Besides antisystem parties [with whom other parties refuse to bargain], taboos are often
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attached to parties associated with the previous political regimes, especially undemocratic ones.” These types of parties impose incentives “that change the calculus of the decision maker” (Laver and Schofield 1990, 202).

In the case of CSPs, constraints come from the internal party politics and party electorates of the nonsuccessor parties (see Strøm 1990a). That is, party activists and voters of the other parties may oppose coalitions with CSPs for affective reasons unrelated to party strength and ideology. Party leaders will heed these preferences because, in addition to pursuing office and policy, they pursue votes and need to maintain support from activists and voters.

The underlying reason for these attitudes is what a considerable literature has referred to as the “regime divide”—the affective dislike of former opponents of communism for those associated in any way with the communist system (Kitschelt et al. 1999). The brutality of the communist regime is said to have led victims of the regime to visceral distaste for representatives of that regime. In societies flattened by communism—and thus lacking many of the political cleavages found in established democracies—the division between supporters and opponents of the old regime appears to be one of the strongest political cleavages. Just as the Civil War generated lasting political cleavages in the United States, the trauma of 40 years of communism should leave a lasting imprint on postcommunist politics.

This emotional distaste may be so great that it overwhelms the desire of some CSPs to draw a thick line between themselves and the previous ruling parties and to present themselves as normal players in the democratic game. For many citizens, and even politicians, the mere thought of a CSP provokes a negative emotional reaction. We should add that such a reaction is not usually in response to the current ideology of the party—several of these parties have quite moderate ideologies—or to its legislative strength—none of these parties dominates politics in the way that the former rulers did.

We believe there are two ways in which the regime divide might affect coalition politics. First, it is possible that party elites affectively dislike CSPs so intensely that the elites sacrifice some of the benefits of office and policy in order to punish CSPs. This dislike may reflect instrumental consequences generated by intraparty politics. Strøm, Budge, and Laver (1994, 318) explain that “senior politicians interact with activists in their own parties. Party leaders may believe that some coalitions would be sufficiently detrimental to their recruitment of candidates or activists to be avoided under all circumstances. Or they may believe that the benefits of a potential coalition would be
outweighed by the costs their own activists would impose in irate retaliation. . . . [T]hese risks may induce party leaders to refrain from otherwise attractive coalitions [for example, with CSPs].”

Second, and perhaps more important, the regime divide may work through the general electorate. In addition to seeking office and policy outcomes, parties also seek to maximize the votes they receive in present and future elections (Strøm 1990a). If party electorates are sufficiently opposed to coalitions with CSPs for the affective reasons we mentioned, then party elites will likely follow the electorates’ lead. Elites will avoid such coalitions or find ways to distance themselves from CSPs or keep CSPs in check within such coalitions. All of these strategies are motivated by a desire to avoid losing votes in future elections.7

As evidence of this vote-seeking motivation, Grzymala-Busse (2001) has shown that parties that form coalitions with CSPs are punished more strongly at the polls than parties that do not. Anecdotal evidence supports this view as well. Consider the active movement in the Czech Republic, spanning from left to right, called “One Doesn’t Speak with Communists” or the recent mobilizations of the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) against the vestiges of communism embodied in quite liberal CSPs. The fact that parties in many states of the region campaign on the anticommunism and anti-CSP issue even today, 15 years after the transition, indicates that the issue must still touch a nerve with voters.8

III. Hypotheses

Given this logic, we expect that the presence of CSPs and this regime divide will affect at least three areas of coalition formation. The first is participation in government. While CSPs surely desire to participate in government, it is possible that they are rarely invited to join governments. This exclusion could occur because of some combination of affective dislike, intraparty consequences, and/or fear of electoral consequences. Theories of the regime divide would thus predict that CSPs are less likely to serve in government, all other things being equal. The same conclusion could flow from a consideration of the CSPs themselves. If they are so rigid because of their authoritarian past that they are unable to compromise with other parties, then they will be less likely to participate in coalition governments.

It is important to consider the ceteris paribus clause here. Are CSPs less likely to serve in government, all else being equal? The
important control variable is party ideology. CSPs may be discriminated against because they are extremists, that is, because they have not broken ties with the past and renounced the politics of the old regime. A number of theories of government formation argue that ideology matters for government participation (for instance, Laver 1998). We wished to determine if the mere fact of being a CSP leads to decreased participation regardless of ideology. Does the CSP variable add any explanatory power above and beyond ideology? Are these parties excluded from power merely for being who they are? We discuss our test of this hypothesis in Section V.

The second possible effect of the regime divide is on cabinet types. If there is intense affective dislike for CSPs, then they might only enter government as part of surplus majority coalitions. This is for two reasons. First, oversized coalitions help other parties to distance themselves from the former communists in the eyes of voters and thus minimize electoral punishment. Second, the inclusion of extra parties helps to moderate the possibly extreme or reactionary policy proposals of the CSPs and the concomitant uncertainty that a CSP may bring to governing (Dodd 1976; Riker 1962). The formation of an oversized coalition with the former communists was widely noted after the Hungarian elections of 1994.9 We aimed to determine if this tendency toward oversized coalitions has more-general applicability. We discuss our test of this hypothesis in Section VI.

The third effect of CSPs is on the allocation of portfolios once a coalition has formed. In Western Europe, coalition parties tend to receive portfolios in nearly one-to-one proportion to their seat share, with a slight small-party bias.10 Dislike for CSPs, however, may lead the successor parties to be compensated less than proportionally, as other parties try to put distance between themselves and the former communists for the benefit of their electorates or party activists. Even when CSPs form governments, they may have to offer their coalition partners excess portfolios in order to induce the other parties to join the government. On the other hand, the possible authoritarian tendencies of these parties may lead them to demand more than their proportionate share. We discuss our test of these hypotheses in Section VII.

One final note is that there are reasons to expect, contrary to our hypotheses, that CSPs are treated the same as other parties. If other parties care mainly about office and policy, as has been emphasized in many theories, then these parties have strong incentives to negotiate with CSPs as they would with other parties. There are likely to be costs to discriminating against CSPs, and parties concerned only about office or policy should try to avoid these costs.
Our null hypothesis is thus that CSPs are not treated anomalously in government formation. If we cannot reject the null, then we are left to conclude that the party-specific history of the CSPs in Eastern European politics is not a significant factor in explaining government formation in this region. We would view a rejection of the null as evidence consistent with how constraints stemming from party rules (Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994) in general and Eastern European CSPs in particular shape coalition politics.

IV. Data

We tested these hypotheses with a new dataset that includes government formation decisions in Eastern Europe. The Eastern European data come from nearly all coalitions in the 15 Eastern European countries listed in Table 1, starting with the first democratically elected government in each country and continuing through 2002. This sample thus includes all of the parliamentary democracies in Eastern Europe for the lifetime of their existence. We collected the bulk of these data from *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, although in a few instances we drew on country-specific sources, including data directly from the country’s legislative archives.

For each government, we identified all parties in government, every party with at least one seat in parliament (at the point of government formation), whether or not the party served in the previous government, the seat share of the party, whether or not the party was a communist successor party, the party type of each party, and the partisan affiliation of each minister.

To determine if a party was a CSP, we followed Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002). We drew the party type variable from Armingeon and Careja’s (2004) work. This variable labels each party as one of 17 types specified by Lane, McKay, and Newton (1997): communist, postcommunist, left-socialist, socialist, pensioners, greens, agrarian, liberal, religious, conservative, nationalist, ultra-right, ethnic, regional, alliance, protest, and no-label. We labeled a small number of parties not included in their dataset ourselves. We used the party types as a proxy for ideology in the absence of more-direct measures. We should note that CSP is not a party type but a separate dummy variable; for example, some CSPs are classified as “communists,” while others are “socialists.” (We will discuss the details shortly.)

For most of the article, our unit of analysis is the party, since we are interested in explaining the inclusion of a party in government and the proportion of portfolios each party receives. We also use the
# Table 1
Description of Eastern European Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Governments</th>
<th>Number of Parties in Leg.(^a)</th>
<th>Number of Parties in Gov.(^b)</th>
<th>Years of First and Last Gov.</th>
<th>Number of CSPs in Leg.</th>
<th>Number of CSPs in Gov.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1992–2002</td>
<td>13% (8/64)</td>
<td>18% (6/33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1990–2001</td>
<td>18% (4/22)</td>
<td>33% (4/12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2000–2001</td>
<td>7% (2/30)</td>
<td>18% (2/11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1990–1992</td>
<td>12% (2/17)</td>
<td>0% (0/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1993–2002</td>
<td>11% (2/19)</td>
<td>0% (0/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1992–2002</td>
<td>0% (0/46)</td>
<td>0% (0/15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1990–2002</td>
<td>13% (5/39)</td>
<td>14% (2/14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1993–2000</td>
<td>9% (6/70)</td>
<td>0% (0/35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1996–2001</td>
<td>11% (3/28)</td>
<td>0% (0/12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1994–2000</td>
<td>13% (4/30)</td>
<td>15% (2/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1989–2001</td>
<td>10% (9/94)</td>
<td>16% (5/32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1991–2000</td>
<td>14% (9/63)</td>
<td>19% (6/31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13% (1/8)</td>
<td>50% (1/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1993–1998</td>
<td>8% (2/25)</td>
<td>14% (2/14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1993–2000</td>
<td>13% (5/38)</td>
<td>11% (2/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1989–2002</td>
<td>11% (62/593)</td>
<td>13% (32/256)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Includes any party with at least one legislature seat, over the cases of all governments formed. There were 76 total governments that included a total of 256 parties out of a total of 593 parties in the legislatures.

\(^b\)Seven parties entered a government despite having no legislative seats: four parties in a single Albanian government, one party in two Bulgarian governments, and one party in one Hungarian government.
coalition as our unit when we consider the influence of CSPs on cabinet types. In total, there are 76 coalition governments, 593 parties in the legislature, and 256 parties in government. In Table 1, we report, for each Eastern European country, the number of governments, the number of parties in the legislature and government, the years of the first and most recent governments, and the frequency of CSPs in the legislature and in government.

V. Government Participation

Are CSPs discriminated against in government formation? Table 1 gives an indication of the prevalence of CSPs in Eastern Europe. Of the 593 parties that received legislative sets in our dataset, 62 (11%) were CSPs. As far as government participation goes, CSPs constituted 32 of 256 parties (13%) in government. On the surface there does not appear to be discrimination, but these results do not control for party size and ideology.

Table 2 is a cross-tabulation of CSP and party type. As mentioned, CSPs come from various different types (that is, party type reflects ideology, whereas CSP status reflects historical origin). The table shows that CSPs fall into five different party types: communist, postcommunist, left-socialist, socialist, and ethnic. Note that CSPs make up only 31% (62/202) of these five party types (the other 69% of these party types are not CSPs). This distinction will later allow us to control for ideology. There are other parties that share the same ideological space but do not carry the historical baggage of the CSPs.

To determine the causes of government participation, we would, ideally, examine the factors that lead to the creation of different coalitions. This analysis would require specifying all of the possible coalitions that might form and then measuring all factors that might affect formation, including ideology and institutional variables (Martin and Stevenson 2001).

We did not have access to all of these variables, and thus we conducted a more-exploratory analysis to determine if there is any basis for believing that CSPs are treated differently than other parties. Our dependent variable in these regressions is whether or not a party participated in government. Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we used logit regressions in all of the analyses that follow.

We identified a number of independent variables that might affect government participation. First, conventional theories of size predict that larger parties are more likely to participate in government (Martin and Stevenson 2001). To account for this possibility, one of our
TABLE 2
CSP Legislative Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Type</th>
<th>Not CSP</th>
<th>CSP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (number)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11% (row %)</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1% (column %)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcommunist</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-socialist</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table includes only the parties belonging to the 5 listed party types. Not included are the following other party types, comprising 391 parties: Pensioners, Green, Agrarian, Liberal, Religious, Conservative, Nationalist, Ultraright, Regional, Alliance, Protest, Non-Label/others, for a total of 17 types (and 593 legislative parties).


independent variables is the seat share of each party in parliament. A second variable that might affect participation is incumbency (Martin and Stevenson 2001; Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994). Parties that have served in the previous government are more likely to serve in the current government; they are part of the status quo.

Finally, we included a measure of party ideology. Most theories of government formation postulate that parties are at least partially motivated by policy. Parties thus judge the suitability of coalition partners by their policy stances. As a result, a party’s ideology will help to determine whether or not it enters government. Our measure of ideology is less precise than those of other studies, which use expert
judgments or analyses of party manifestos to pinpoint specific ideological locations; such measures are not yet publicly available for Eastern Europe. We therefore sought to capture ideology with Armingeon and Careja’s (2004) coding of party types for all political parties in Eastern Europe. As previously noted, this measure classifies all parties in Eastern Europe into one of 17 party types, and each CSP is classified into one of these party types. Because CSP itself is not a party type, when we added party type controls we were able to control for the ideology of CSPs (see Table 2).

We ran all analysis with and without the incumbency variable, because including incumbency reduces the size of the data (from 593 to 475 parties), since the initial governments are excluded. Fortunately, the results are virtually identical, regardless of whether or not we include incumbency; thus, in Table 3, we only present the results that include incumbency (since it is itself significant). We therefore report results with 475 cases rather than 593. We report one-tailed tests because we clearly predicted a negative relationship between CSP, our key variable, and government participation.

Model 1 tests whether or not seat share and incumbency states predict participation in government. The results for both variables are highly significant and in the correct direction. Larger parties and incumbents are more likely to participate in government. In Model 2, we introduced the variable in which we are interested theoretically. The communist successor party variable is highly significant, substantively large, and, as expected, has a negative sign. CSPs are far less likely to serve in governments than are other parties with the same seat share.

We next introduced controls for ideology, aiming to determine if the penalty for being a CSP is due to the party’s ideology or to the mere fact of being a CSP. In Model 3, we added dummy variables for all five party types of the CSPs (communist, postcommunist, left-socialist, socialist, and ethnic). The results indicate that the CSP penalty is robust to the addition of these ideological controls: the CSP variable emerges as both negative and significant, while four of the five dummies are insignificant (postcommunists are marginally advantaged).14

To get a sense of the substantive impact of the CSP effect, we conducted a simulation using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999). Setting all other variables at their means, we found that being a CSP reduces a party’s chances of serving in government on average by 19% (from 42% to 23%).15 This appears to us to be a quite substantial effect. In sum, we have found that communist successor parties are less likely than other parties to participate in government, even when we control for size, incumbency, and ideology.
TABLE 3
Determinants of Government Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative seat share</td>
<td>5.95**</td>
<td>6.57**</td>
<td>6.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.99)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>1.37**</td>
<td>1.35**</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>–0.70*</td>
<td>–1.08**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.41)</td>
<td>(.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist party</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcommunist party</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-socialist party</td>
<td>–0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist party</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party</td>
<td>–0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–1.56**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>–268.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of cases reduces to 475 because we exclude all first governments in which there were no incumbents. Results are robust if we instead include all first governments without the incumbency variable.

Note: Entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. ***p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .1, one-tailed tests.

VI. Cabinet Types

Although CSPs are discriminated against in government formation, some CSPs do ultimately enter cabinets. In this section, we address the question of what these cabinets look like: what sort of cabinets do CSPs enter? Most theories of government formation predict the formation of some form of minimal winning coalition, but there have
been several attempts to account for minority and oversized coalitions (see Martin and Stevenson 2001; Strøm 1990b; and Volden and Carrubba 2004). What these theories explicitly do not hypothesize is that certain parties will tend to join one type of coalition more than others.

We argue, however, that the desire of most democratic parties to distance themselves from communist successor parties might lead them to be part of distinctive coalitions. In particular, CSPs should more commonly end up in oversized coalitions. Oversized coalitions would serve two purposes for non-CSPs. First, they would help protect non-CSPs’ reputations. Accountability is harder in large coalitions because of the difficulty in pinpointing responsibility. Parties that have to enter coalitions with the former communists might demand to add extra parties, so as not to look like they are too close to the CSPs. Second, extra parties would help to restrain the communists and promote consensus in policymaking (and also lessen the uncertainty involved with predicting CSP behavior; see Dodd 1976 and Riker 1962). The more parties that are included in the coalition, the less influence the communists will have, since voting in the council of ministers typically gives each minister one vote.

Our data confirm this expectation. Table 4 shows the percentage of cabinet types including and not including CSPs. A full 78% (25/32) of governments with CSPs are oversized, compared to only 43% (19/44) of governments without CSPs ($z = 3.05; p < .01$ for one-tailed difference-of-proportions test). While minimal winning coalitions and minority coalitions are common—constituting 56.5% (9/44 are minority and 16/44 are minimal winning) of the total—in governments without CSPs, they are quite rare—only 21.5% (3/32 are minority and 4/32 are minimal winning)—in governments that include a CSP.

These results raise an intriguing question: if coalitions add surplus parties to protect themselves against CSPs, then why do they include CSPs in the first place? We have some preliminary evidence that suggests that, in most cases, governing parties include CSPs because it is necessary if the parties hope to maintain a governing majority. We show this necessity by exploring the rate at which CSPs in government are pivotal. A party is pivotal when its removal changes a majority coalition to a minority coalition (Schofield and Laver 1985). We found that 69% (22/32) of the CSPs in government are pivotal, compared to only 39% (87/224) of non-CSPs in government ($z = 3.21; p < .01$ for two-tailed difference-of-proportions test). Moreover, nearly all of the ten nonpivotal CSPs in government belonged to exceptional coalitions: three of them belonged to minority coalitions in which no party was
Coalition Formation in Eastern Europe

TABLE 4
Cabinet Types in Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet Type</th>
<th>No CSPs in Government</th>
<th>A CSP in Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>20.5% (9)</td>
<td>9.0% (3)</td>
<td>16% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal Winning</td>
<td>36.0% (16)</td>
<td>12.5% (4)</td>
<td>26% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversized</td>
<td>43.0% (19)</td>
<td>78.0% (25)</td>
<td>58% (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (44)</td>
<td>100% (32)</td>
<td>100% (76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

pivotal by definition, and six of them belonged to near-unity coalitions. In the latter cases, parties controlled approximately 91% of the legislative seats, meaning that, to be pivotal, a particular party would have to be composed of a near majority itself.17

In short, we find that CSPs are usually included in governments because they are necessary for a majority. Of course, one may question the desirability of having a majority when a minority without a CSP is sustainable (see, for example, Strøm 1990b). But there are good reasons why parties might prefer to join majority coalitions in transition countries. Majorities should help coalitions to pass legislation. In times of major reforms, and particularly reforms with enormous distribu-
tional consequences, parties would like the security of having a reliable majority in parliament. Also, parliamentary voting in new democracies tends to be unstable, and parties may not be able to discipline their members (Andrews 2002). There is also a high rate of party switching among members of parliament (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004). This switching makes majorities even more important, and we suspect it enables CSPs to enter governments—governments which, in turn, try to protect themselves from CSPs by forming oversized coalitions that dilute the visibility and influence of the former communists.18

VII. Ministerial Allocation

We now turn to our third dependent variable. The way that portfolios are allocated to parties in a governing coalition has been closely studied in Western Europe. This research has revealed one of the strongest relations in political science. Gamson’s Law postulates that each coalition party receives portfolios in direct proportion to the percentage
of seats that it contributes to the coalition (see Gamson 1961). For example, a party with 30% of the seats in a coalition receives about 30% of the portfolios.

It is not clear if Gamson’s Law is a universal law, applying in all contexts, or is specific to the circumstances of Western Europe. One possible challenge to the law comes from communist successor parties in Eastern Europe. If these parties behave differently or are treated differently than other parties, then this bias might show up in the process of portfolio allocation.

Indeed, the regime divide theory argues that rival parties harbor negative feelings toward CSPs. This ill will may result in CSPs being undercompensated relative to proportionality. Other parties may be reluctant to grant CSPs their fair share of ministries. In turn, CSPs may be willing to sacrifice some of their fair share in order to be allowed into governments. On the other hand—and contrary to the general regime-divide theoretical framework—if CSPs maintain their authoritarian ways from communism, then they might be expected to demand more than their fair share of portfolios. Winner-take-all norms were common under communism and might be expected to persist, particularly for successor parties. In this case, we would expect CSPs to receive more than their fair share of portfolios.

To test these possibilities, our dependent variable is the percentage of portfolios allocated to the party in question. Previous work has identified two independent variables that affect the percentage of portfolios that a party receives. One is the percentage of legislative seats that a party contributes to the coalition (a la Gamson’s Law; see, for example, Browne and Franklin 1973). We refer to this variable as seat share. The other variable is whether or not a party is a formateur. There remains controversy, however, about whether formateurs tend to be under- or overcompensated (see Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Harrington 1990; Morelli 1999; and Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006). We add to these variables a new variable indicating whether or not a party is a communist successor party. This is the variable we are interested in theoretically.

Following Warwick and Druckman (2001), we ran OLS regressions without an intercept, although the results are robust to alternative specifications, such as including an intercept. Because we left out the intercept, we did not include main-effect dummy variables, as this step would have been akin to including an intercept. Thus, both the formateur variable and the CSP variable are interacted with the seat share variable. If the CSP interaction term is significant, then this result indicates that CSPs are allocated portfolios nonproportionally.
Table 5 presents our regression results.\textsuperscript{21} (We report two-tailed significance tests because of our dueling hypotheses about the CSP effect.) In Model 4, we included only the seat share variable. The variable is highly significant and nearly proportional (beta = 0.94). Model 5 included the formateur interaction term. This variable is insignificant, indicating that formateurs are neither under- nor over-compensated relative to their seat shares. The seat share variable remains significant and substantively almost identical.

We next included the CSP interaction variable. Model 6 shows that this variable is both highly significant and substantively important. The negative sign on the variable indicates that CSPs receive less than their proportional share of portfolios. The effect is also substantively important. Communist successor parties receive approximately 17\% less than their fair share of portfolios. We also see in this regression that, once we control for CSP status, formateurs receive a slight bonus. Thus, non-CSP formateurs take more than their share. This pattern differs from that found in Western Europe, a distinction we have explored in other work (see Druckman and Roberts 2005).

In short, CSPs are penalized in portfolio allocation. The fact that they are penalized lends itself to an important interpretation. At the outset of this section, we suggested two possible outcomes to allocation: If CSPs act like their predecessors, then they will demand over-compensation. If they are the object of other parties’ disdain, then CSPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Party’s share of portfolios</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.94***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur status x Seat contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP x Seat contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–0.17***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are OLS unstandardized slope coefficients, with intercepts set equal to 0.

\(* * * p \leq .01; ** p \leq .05; * p \leq .1,\) two-tailed tests.
will be undercompensated. Our finding of undercompensation indicates that the decisive factor is not the CSPs themselves but the attitude of other parties toward them.

VIII. Time and Space

These results convince us that CSPs elicit distinctive coalition dynamics in Eastern Europe, but there may also be variations across time or space. First, our theory is based on the affective dislike of voters and elites toward the former communists. It is likely that these emotions will diminish over time as memories fade and the former communists become accepted players in the democratic game. To probe this possibility, we reran our analyses, cutting our sample at its midpoint of 1996. We found that the two time periods looked very similar. All of the aspects of CSP discrimination we uncovered in the previous analyses appear both before and after 1996. (We experimented with various other time splits, and in no instance did we find a significant time effect.)

While this result strikes us as surprising, it does correspond with qualitative observations of the region. In three of the most recent elections in the region (in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), a key—perhaps the dominant—element in the campaigns of right-wing parties was an evocation of the dangers or injustice of letting CSPs rule. The regime divide appears to have considerable power to structure politics even 15 years after the transition.

Eastern Europe also features considerable variation over space. As Kitschelt et al. (1999) note, Eastern Europe exhibits considerably more spatial diversity than other regions in the world. Indeed, many analyses have divided the region into more-advanced and less-advanced halves (King 2000; Vachudova and Snyder 1997). By “more advanced,” we mean countries widely considered to have attained standards of democracy and development close to those of the established democracies of Western Europe. By contrast, “less-advanced” countries have significant shortcomings in the functioning of both democracy and the economy. The more-advanced countries entered the European Union (EU) in May 2004, they have been more democratic as measured by Freedom House, and they have higher incomes and higher scores on the World Bank’s Human Development Index. The less-advanced countries did not enter the EU and have significantly lower ratings on the other measures.

For the purposes of our analyses, the key fact would be whether or not attitudes toward the former communists differ between these two groups of countries. We do not have direct evidence on this point,
but we have some reason to believe that there are differences. More-advanced countries have a considerably larger middle class, which sees communism as having limited its opportunities to attain Western standards of living. These individuals are thus more likely to hold a grudge against the CSPs and punish cooperation with them. In less-advanced countries, by contrast, the middle class is much smaller, and there is a much larger lower class whose position has worsened since the end of communism. As a result, there should be greater acceptance of the representatives of the old regime.

It is possible, of course, that we may witness the opposite effects. In less-advanced countries, the communist regime was typically more repressive than in the more-advanced ones. As a result, it is possible that CSPs will be viewed more negatively in less-advanced countries and discrimination will be more extreme there.

To test these ideas, we divided the sample into two groups. The main variable we used to distinguish them was their average Freedom House score during the 1990s. Our advanced countries included Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia; our non-advanced countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. This division also corresponds to the first wave of accession to the EU, with the exception of Slovakia, which is classed as less advanced (the results are robust to classifying Slovakia as more advanced).

To determine if CSPs are treated differently when it comes to government formation in the two groups of countries, we added two variables to Table 3, Model 3: a dummy variable distinguishing between more-advanced and less-advanced countries, and an interaction between this more-advanced/less-advanced variable and the CSP variable. The interaction is marginally significant ($p \leq .15$).

It is thus possible that the regime divide is stronger in the more-advanced countries. Citizens of these countries might view the old regime as having impeded their development and thus wish to punish the successors to these parties. Citizens of less-advanced countries are less likely to harbor negative affect toward communism and thus are less likely to penalize parties associated with the old regime. We emphasize, however, that this supposition is quite speculative, given the marginal significance of the result. Also, when we turn to cabinet types and portfolio allocation, we find no significant differences across regions. Cabinets with CSPs have a higher likelihood of being oversized than those that do not include CSPs, in both less-advanced and more-advanced countries, and portfolio allocation in both types of countries awards less than a proportional number of portfolios to CSPs.
IX. Conclusion

Although scholars of parliamentary government have often recognized that the identity of individual parties matters for coalition formation, this fact has not often been included in quantitative studies. Preference has been given to the more analytically tractable concepts of legislative strength and ideology.

The experience of Eastern European countries provides an interesting example of how party identity may matter for coalition formation. These countries have recently emerged from dictatorships that have left important scars on the polity. These scars remain fresh because representatives of the old regime continue to contest elections in the new regime. There are thus good reasons to believe that other parties, and particularly their electorates, will view communist successor parties not only in terms of their legislative strength and ideology, but also in terms of their identity as representatives of the old regime.

In this article, we have shown that this bias emerges in three facets of government formation. Communist successor parties are less likely to enter government than other parties, and when they do enter government, they tend to be part of oversized coalitions and to be allocated less than their proportional share of portfolios. CSPs do suffer discrimination at the hands of other parties purely for what they are. While we do not have direct evidence on why CSPs suffer from discrimination, these results appear to be consistent with theories of the regime divide in the region. The most plausible explanation is that the electorates of parties associated with the opposition to communism still hold affective dislike for their former oppressors and wish to penalize them. Parties will presumably heed these preferences, because they would lose votes by doing otherwise.

The implication is that scholars researching other new democracies may want to pay more attention to the coalition preferences of voters. It is in these countries that the affective feelings of voters toward particular parties are likely to be the strongest, and parties thus face considerable pressure to attend to these preferences.

This research validates both the suggestion of coalition theorists that party identity may matter in coalition formation and the idea that vote-seeking plays an important role in parties’ decisions about coalitions. Neither idea is new, but both have been neglected in the quantitative study of coalition politics. Our results suggest that scholars should pay more attention to affective dislike between supporters of rival parties and the consequences this bias has for parties that, in addition to seeking office and policy outcomes, worry about their future electability.
We believe two extensions of this research to be especially compelling (in addition to the aforementioned need to analyze coalition formation using Martin and Stevenson’s approach). First, scholars might ask if CSPs affect other facets of coalition government, such as government duration and, most important, policy choices. Studies of Western Europe suggest that the composition of governments does affect policy, but this influence has yet to be shown in Eastern Europe. The second extension would be to investigate whether or not these legacies of the old regime matter in other new democracies. Are representatives of the old regime penalized more generally, or are our results specific to the postcommunist world?

James N. Druckman (druckman@northwestern.edu) is Associate Professor of Political Science and Andrew Roberts (aroberts@northwestern.edu) is Assistant Professor of Political Science, both at Northwestern University, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208.

NOTES

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2. This expectation is frequently exaggerated. Even the most repressive dictatorships serve some constituency that might be expected to continue its support after a democratic transition.

3. Exceptions include Bunce 2002; Grzymala-Busse 2001, 2002b; and Ishiyama 1999c. In fact, Grzymala-Busse’s (2001) article considers the same issue as this article—the effect of the communist legacy on coalition formation. Our article extends her work by taking a large-N approach, allowing the inclusion of control variables, and looking at additional aspects of coalition formation.

4. Kitschelt et al. (1999, 65) define the regime divide as the phenomenon wherein “memories about old-regime performance, periodically updated by more recent events, affect people’s orientation toward the pre-democratic incumbents.” Grzymala-Busse (2001, 85) calls it “the depth and character of the persisting conflict between the successors to the pre-1989 Communist parties and the parties emerging from the Communist-era opposition.”

5. All of the successor parties considered here have proclaimed, rhetorically at least, support for the democratic process.
6. Grzymala-Busse (2001) suggests an additional way, the desire of parties to build reputations. While we agree with this outlook, we believe that this desire works through the vote-seeking motivation that we emphasize, as Grzymala-Busse herself seems to suggest.

7. We would add the possibility that CSPs elicit distinctive dynamics because they behave differently than other parties, perhaps by retaining their authoritarian ways. We later discuss this possibility in more detail, but we do not find any confirmation of it. It is worth noting that this expectation generates predictions that are the opposite of those suggested by the regime divide theory.

8. There are additional reasons why vote seeking might be particularly important in Eastern Europe. First, voters have punished incumbents quite heavily in the region. Vote losses in the double digits are the norm rather than the exception for sitting governments (Roberts 2006). Further, parties appear and disappear with great frequency in the region (Rose and Munro 2003). A single poor election result is often enough to push a party into oblivion. Parties thus have good reason to weigh carefully the possibility of offending their electorates, even if they are tempted by the spoils of office and policy influence.

9. The Hungarian Socialist Party won 54% of the seats in this election and yet still entered a coalition with the second-place party, the Alliance of Free Democrats.

10. As we will discuss later, there is an active debate about whether formateurs are advantaged or disadvantaged in portfolio allocation (see Warwick and Druckman 2006).

11. We excluded caretaker governments, technocratic (nonpartisan) governments, and single-party governments. We also included only those governments that passed an investiture vote (if one was held). A government begins when an election occurs, the head of government changes, the party membership of the government changes, or the government resigns (Warwick and Druckman 2001, 633). Data details are available from the authors.

12. Following all other work on the topic, we did not count the puppet allies of the communist party, such as the Polish Peasants’ Party. Citizens surely realized that these parties did not exercise any power, and thus the parties should not have been blamed for the regime’s crimes.

13. Martin and Stevenson (2001) have found that it is not size per se that affects entry into government but rather formateur status. Parties that are formateurs are more likely to enter government. Because all of the formateurs in our dataset entered government (that is, we coded only successful formateurs, for the purposes of portfolio allocation), we cannot test this possibility here. Since, however, size is related to formateur status—larger parties are more likely to be formateurs—this omission should not bias our results. Indeed, in our dataset, the average seat share of formateurs is 37% compared to 11% for nonformateurs.

14. We conducted several robustness checks on these results. First, since our data include different numbers of coalitions in each country (e.g., one in Serbia, nine in Poland), some countries may influence the results more than others. We thus reran our regressions using country weights, and we found no substantive difference from the results reported in Table 3. Second, participation by the same parties in the same coalition-formation episode is not independent. We thus ran specifications that used clustering on the formation episode and robust standard errors. Again, we found no
Coalition Formation in Eastern Europe

difference in results using this specification. Third, we added dummies for parties on the far right—nationalist and ultra-rightist parties. Again, the CSP variable remains highly significant, although we did find that nationalists are penalized as well. Strangely, ultra-rightist parties are not treated differently. Finally, we included an interaction term between CSP and seat share, as the impact of CSP status may depend on seat share. The interaction term is marginally significant at first (as CSPs grow larger, they are advantaged relative to other parties), but the significant effect disappears when we control for incumbency. The main effect of CSPs remains, despite these controls.

15. Details, including standard errors, are available from the authors.

16. There are no cases of multiple CSPs in government. We also conducted regression analyses that control for the number of parties in the coalition, the number of parties in the legislature, and the types of parties in the coalition. Even with the inclusion of these controls, the presence of a CSP still makes a coalition significantly more likely to be oversized.

17. The one exception was the first Slovenian government, which was neither a minority nor a near-unity coalition, although it did control 68% of the legislative seats. We also note that, among majority governments, 46.5% (87/187) of non-CSPs were pivotal, compared to 75% (22/29) of CSPs ($z = 2.86, p < .01$ for a two-tailed difference-of-proportions test).

18. Note two other points. First, CSPs are not more likely to be pivot parties when we control for party size. This result is of limited interest, however, because it simply reveals the tautology that larger parties are more likely than smaller parties to be pivotal. The fact is that when such larger parties are CSPs, they are included, presumably because of their pivotal status. In other cases, CSPs tend not to be included, whereas other parties are. Second, we found that, in many cases, a CSP in government is the only pivotal party. Among majority coalitions, only 13% (11/87) of non-CSPs are the single pivotal party in a coalition. The analogous figure for CSPs is 59% (13/22).

19. There is typically some deviation from proportionality in the form of a small-party bias, such that small parties receive a bit more than their share and large parties, including the formateurs, receive less (see Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006).

20. We did not include controls for ideology or incumbency in this analysis. Prior work has not considered these variables, and we do not see any reason why they should affect portfolio allocation. Furthermore, ideology controls would suffer from multicollinearity with the CSP variable, as the ideologies of CSPs that enter government are much more limited than the types that receive legislative seats. When we regress the CSP interaction on the country dummy interactions, the $R^2$ is .89.

21. As in the analysis of participation, we also ran regressions with country weights to account for the fact that some countries have more coalitions than others. These weights do not affect the substantive results.

22. Ideal would be comparative public opinion data on attitudes toward CSPs as acceptable members of government. We would be particularly interested in the intensity of these feelings, as that would give us an idea of whether or not there would be electoral punishment for forming coalitions with CSPs. We did find data from the New Democracies Barometer on attitudes toward the old regime in general
These data indicate that advanced countries are slightly more likely to view the communist regime negatively, but the differences are not large.

23. In other work, we have found that the formateur effect differs between the two groups of countries; this finding does not have implications for CSPs per se, however (see Druckman and Roberts 2005).

REFERENCES


