dispute. The data also allow them to develop measures of the key constructs from each of the three contending racial attitudes models. Their results compellingly demonstrate the failure of the nonracial values approach to explain white opinion. The authors present a series of statistical analyses that demonstrate the impact of racial predispositions on opinion, above and beyond individual demographic characteristics. They also make excellent and extensive use of respondents’ own words, from open-ended responses, to show the ways that white Wisconsin residents’ reactions to the Chippewa and to treaty rights are deeply and subtly inflected with racial considerations. These findings underline the conclusion that matters of race are still very much a part of white Americans’ political cognition.

The data are less able to distinguish between the group position and the symbolic racism models. Both models deal with racial prejudice, with important—though subtle—differences in their understanding of prejudice. Bobo and Tuan present compelling evidence that the empirical data are consistent with their group position model. As they acknowledge, however, the data are not incompatible with the symbolic politics model. I believe this is not a failure in their choice of this case study or in the development of their survey questions. Rather, the theoretical distinctions being drawn in the modern versions of these various explanations are fine enough that survey data are hard-pressed to distinguish among them. The measures of the building blocks of the models—stereotyping, group competition, political or group threat, symbolic racism, group affect—are too highly correlated to allow a convincing winner to emerge from head-to-head statistical competition. This means that the authors’ ability to adjudicate between group position and symbolic racism models turns importantly on a subtle reading of the open-ended data.

Despite this, Prejudice in Politics (along with work in the symbolic racism tradition) has important lessons for our understanding of American democracy broadly speaking. There is a long tradition, dating back at least to Alexis de Tocqueville and Gunnar Myrdal, of seeing white Americans’ opposition to the advancement of racial “others” as mere irrational prejudice, fundamentally unconnected to the true essence of American culture, society, and politics. Bobo and Tuan show that whites’ attitudes are to a considerable extent based on racial predispositions and that those predispositions represent far more than irrational individual dislike. Rather, Americans’ racial attitudes connect importantly with the ways that racial categories are constructed and institutionalized in social structure and political conflict. In this sense, they are a fundamental—if distasteful—part of American society and culture.

References and Notes
8. The authors report that they “were unable to sample opinions among any significant number of American Indians, including the Chippewa themselves.”

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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Stoking the Voters’ Passions

James N. Druckman

I
n its defense of the United States Constitution, The Federalist Papers make clear that input from citizens must be limited because they think too emotionally. Federalist 49 states, “The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society.” Further on, toward the end of the essay, the author (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) concludes, “The passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government” (1).

Over two centuries later, this view continues to be the conventional wisdom for many. Social scientists, however, have offered little insight into the role of emotion in shaping citizens’ political decisions. Do emotions play a substantial role? If so, when? And is such a role problematic? With each technological innovation in the mass media that offers politicians new means to play on the public’s emotions, these questions become more pressing. It is such questions that frame the topics Ted Brader addresses in Campaigning for Hearts and Minds.

Brader, an assistant professor at the University of Michigan, begins by noting the development of two recent but largely distinct research programs in political science. One focuses on how mass communication affects citizens’ opinions. Using content analyses, experiments, surveys, and case studies, social scientists from various disciplines have shown—not surprisingly—that what politicians and news sources say can shape what citizens think and believe. Another fairly recent body of work shows citizens’ actions and opin-

Campaigning for Hearts and Minds
How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work

by Ted Brader


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candidates' advertising to see whether they tend to become more politically involved and interested when they feel enthusiastic and tend to become more attentive, information-seeking, and open to attitude change when they feel anxious (2).

Brader impressively brings these two programs together to probe the age-old concern of whether politicians can manipulate emotional whims to their advantage. He specifically focuses on television advertisements, which, he explains, “have become the principal tool of contemporary electioneering” in the United States. After reviewing prior related work and assessing “conventional wisdoms” about advertisements and emotions, Brader offers a psychological theory of emotional appeals.

Brader extends Marcus and colleagues’ aforementioned theory of affective intelligence (2) and research in psychology by Richard Lazarus, Jeffrey Gray, David Watson, and others (3–5) by incorporating the effect of political communication (e.g., advertisements) on different emotions and, consequently, attitudes and behaviors. For example, ads that generate enthusiasm will increase political interest, participation, and confidence, whereas fear-evoking ads will cause people to reevaluate their preferences and potentially change their opinions.

Perhaps the book’s major contribution is to then describe what types of advertisements stimulate enthusiasm or fear, test the impact of such advertisements, and demonstrate the relevance of these advertisements to ongoing political campaigns. The author presents results from a set of compelling experiments that he implemented during the 1998 Massachusetts gubernatorial primary. Brader recruited a diverse set of participants to watch a prerecorded segment of nighttime news along with the accompanying commercials (in a comfortable setting that resembled a living room). He then randomly inserted different versions of a single candidate advertisement into the commercials. Thus participants randomly saw either no advertisement, one of two ads that had little emotional content, or one of those same two ads but with elements meant to stimulate enthusiasm or fear. (He randomly varied other aspects of the ads such as the sponsor of the ad.) Importantly, the elements he used to stimulate enthusiasm or fear have nothing to do with the ads’ contents; rather, he manipulated emotional stimulation entirely by including or excluding certain images and music. For example, the enthusiasm ad added uplifting music and brightly colored images of children playing and smiling, whereas the no-enthusiasm ad had no music and used distant, expressionless pictures.

Although there are some unexpected results, the bottom line is that overall Brader’s evidence shows that in more than three-quarters of their experiments, such advertisements, and demonstrate the relevant of these advertisements to ongoing political contexts. The author presents results from a set of compelling experiments that he implemented during the 1998 Massachusetts gubernatorial primary. Brader recruited a diverse set of participants to watch a prerecorded segment of nighttime news along with the accompanying commercials (in a comfortable setting that resembled a living room). He then randomly inserted different versions of a single candidate advertisement into the commercials. Thus participants randomly saw either no advertisement, one of two ads that had little emotional content, or one of those same two ads but with elements meant to stimulate enthusiasm or fear. (He randomly varied other aspects of the ads such as the sponsor of the ad.) Importantly, the elements he used to stimulate enthusiasm or fear have nothing to do with the ads’ contents; rather, he manipulated emotional stimulation entirely by including or excluding certain images and music. For example, the enthusiasm ad added uplifting music and brightly colored images of children playing and smiling, whereas the no-enthusiasm ad had no music and used distant, expressionless pictures.

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