Do Disagreeable Political Discussion Networks Undermine Attitude Strength?

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How attitudes change and affect behavior depends, in large part, on their strength. Strong attitudes are more resistant to persuasion and are more likely to produce attitude-consistent behavior. But what influences attitude strength? In this article, we explore a widely discussed, but rarely investigated, factor: an individual’s political discussion network. What prior work exists offers a somewhat mixed picture, finding sometimes that disagreeable networks weaken attitudes and other times that they strengthen attitudes. We use a novel national representative dataset to explore the relationship between disagreeable networks and attitude strength. We find, perhaps surprisingly, no evidence that disagreements in networks affect political attitude strength. We conclude by discussing likely reasons for our findings, which, in turn, provide a research agenda for the study of networks and attitude strength.

KEY WORDS: political discussion, networks, attitude formation, attitude strength

Few topics have received as much scholarly attention as attitude formation. Scholars have isolated how socialization, daily experiences, communications, and social context influence the attitudes people hold (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; O’Keefe, 2016). Yet attitudes only seem to shape behavior when they are “strong,” and a growing body of evidence shows “strong” attitudes resist change and influence behavior (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Krosnick & Smith, 1994; Miller & Peterson, 2004; Visser, Bizer, & Krosnick, 2006). While various factors have been shown to influence attitude strength—including cognitive elaboration, attitude relevant experiences, age, self-interest, and value relevance—much remains to be done.¹ Visser et al. (2006) explain that “Attitude strength has been a focus of serious empirical interest among psychologists for decades, yet our understanding of this

complex construct, its constituents, and the causal processes in which it plays a part is at an early stage” (p. 59)

One potential influence on the strength of citizens’ issue attitudes that has received discussion, but relatively little empirical study, is the nature of one’s political discussion network. While the influence of discussion networks on the content of citizen attitudes and on political participation has received a great deal of attention (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Lupton, Singh, & Thornton, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Nir, 2005), the role of social networks on the strength of issue attitudes is less well understood (Visser & Krosnick, 1998, p. 1403). For example, we are aware of only one nationally representative study focusing specifically on the relationship between citizens’ real-world discussion networks and attitude strength regarding political issues (Visser & Mirabile, 2004), one which suggests that disagreeable networks weaken issue attitudes. We contribute to this work, as well as related studies concerning network disagreement and ambivalence toward political candidates (e.g., Mutz, 2002b) and research on disagreement in small-group deliberative contexts (e.g., Farrar, Green, Green, Nickerson, & Shewfelt, 2009; Levendusky, Druckman, & McLain, 2016; Wojcieszak & Price, 2010), with a larger, representative dataset across a host of political issues and multiple measures of political disagreement within discussion networks. These attributes of our study enable us to make a more generalized statement regarding the relationship between interpersonal disagreement and issue attitude strength than prior work.

We find scant evidence that disagreeable political networks vitiate attitude strength. In other words, individuals appear to be able to hold strong political attitudes even in generally disagreeable social contexts. Our study thus contributes to the literatures on attitude strength and political discussion networks by highlighting theoretical reasons for positive or negative relationship between disagreement and attitude strength. Importantly, our “nonresults” (i.e., finding neither a positive nor a negative relationship) provide a clear blueprint for future research on attitude strength and networks—the details of which we discuss in our conclusion. More generally, our findings have implications for the viability of deliberative politics and contribute to our knowledge of how networks shape democratically relevant attitudes and behaviors.

**Previous Research**

Strong attitudes are, by definition, those that endure and impact cognition and behavior (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Attitude strength was originally seen as an explanation for why some attitudes lead individuals to take actions, while other attitudes do not. Put simply, “strong attitudes matter” (Wojcieszak, 2012, p. 225). Attitudinal strength is a continuum across which higher strength coincides with increasing degrees of influence on thinking and behavior. Beyond this basic definition, strong attitudes may be characterized by a variety of attributes, including subjective importance, certainty, and extremity, inter alia (e.g., Miller & Peterson, 2004; Visser et al., 2006). While these attributes are often positively correlated, they nevertheless represent distinct attributes of strong attitudes that may possess different antecedents and consequences (Visser et al., 2006; Wojcieszak, 2012). Our specific focus will be on these strength-related features and, particularly, the characteristics of extremity, that is, an attitude report near the ends of a continuum (Abelson, 1995) and importance, which refers to the “amount of psychological significance a person ascribes to an attitude” (Visser et al., 2006, p. 3).

Scholars have identified various drivers of strong attitudes or, more specifically, important and/or extreme attitudes (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, and Fabrigar (1995) highlight three key antecedents of subjective importance: self-interest, social identification (i.e., is the attitude relevant or important to a cherished group), and value-relevance. The connection between an attitudinal object and these three factors may occur through social communication, as in Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook’s (2014) study of party cues and their influence on importance. Meanwhile, a variety of factors have been identified as proximate causes of extreme attitudes (Judd & Brauer, 1995;
Tesser, Martin, & Mendolia, 1995). Elaboration and the “use” of the attitude play a particularly important role in this process, with frequent cognitive elaboration on, and expression of, an attitude leading to greater extremity (Abelson, 1995; Judd & Brauer, 1995; Tesser et al., 1995). On the other hand, extremity may be undercut by the acquisition of new beliefs inconsistent with the prior attitude, which thereby leads to greater ambivalence (i.e., a strength characteristic negatively related to extremity; Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; Keele & Wolak, 2008; Mutz, 2002a). Notably, Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, and Fabrigar (1995) postulate a connection between the two characteristics; importance motivates thinking about an attitude, as well as biased information search, which in turn prompts further extremity.

Our focus concerns how the composition of an individual’s political discussion network affects the extremity and importance, and hence overall strength, of their issue attitudes. By network we refer “to the people with whom a given person communicates on a direct one-to-one basis” (Mutz, 2006, p. 10). By “composition,” we refer to the extent of disagreement present in the network. Notably, there remains a lack of insight and study concerning how social networks, including political discussion networks, affect the strength of citizens’ issue attitudes. This is a particularly glaring gap given the fundamental role of networks in affecting what political and nonpolitical opinions people hold: “Social relationships define our fundamental human experience, from our sense of self to our preferences. . . [Individuals] are the products of their social environment. They reflect. . .norms of their social networks and not their own individual preferences” (Sinclair, 2012, pp. xi, xvi).

What relationship should we expect to see between the disagreeable discussion networks attitude strength (in terms of extremity and importance)? Existing research and theory suggest two divergent outcomes which we review below. Ultimately, the presence of these competing lines of thought necessitates further empirical explorations of how these variables relate to each other.

Negative Effects. One prominent line of thinking suggests a negative relationship; that is, individuals in disagreeable networks should express attitudes that are less extreme, important, and so on, than those in agreeable networks. This difference is typically cast in terms of the informational content of discussions in these environments. Disagreeable discussion partners may provide individuals with considerations that conflict with their prior attitudes; to the extent that these considerations are accepted and stored in long-term memory (Zaller, 1992), individuals should become more ambivalent on the issue and hence report less extreme attitudes given that that extremity is “necessarily negatively correlated” with ambivalence (Visser et al., 2006, p. 56). Likewise, the presence of disagreement may prompt individuals to engage in less biased information searches as a prelude to the social defense of attitudes, which may also lead to the acquisition of considerations that contrast with the prior attitude (Levitan & Wronski, 2014). These new considerations may also prompt a weakening of attitude importance by, for instance, changing perceptions of the connection between a political issue and one’s self-interest, group identities, or personal values. Alternatively, the presence of disagreement may mean that individuals are exposed to social pressures from both sides of the issue, which may lead to weakened attitudes as individuals remain unclear about the connection between the attitude and their group. Regardless of the specific mechanism, this line of reasoning nevertheless points to a negative relationship between extremity, importance, and disagreeable discussion networks.

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2 There exist alternative uses of the term “network” in political science, as in studies focused on the network qua network (Ward, Stovel, & Sacks, 2011). Our use of the term is consistent with the broader literature on interpersonal discussion groups (e.g., Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2002a).

3 The literature on political discussion networks frequently mixes terms such as “disagreeable,” “diverse,” and “heterogeneous.” We use the term “disagreeable” in part due to the nature of our measures of discussion network composition, one of which refers explicitly to “disagreement” between discussion partners.

4 We do not study differences between discussion and no discussion. It may be that discussion per se affects attitude strength, but we are interested in how exposure to different types of networks affects attitude strength conditional on participating in some discussion. Few individuals report having no discussion partners, and we exclude these individuals from our analyses.
There is some existing empirical work suggesting the validity of the foregoing argument. First, studies concerning the results of structured discussions or deliberations often show evidence of attitude change, which is an indicator of weakened attitudes (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Barabas, 2004; Gastil, Black, & Moscovitz, 2008; Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002). In addition, the literature on political discussion networks has tended to show a positive relationship between disagreeable networks and candidate ambivalence (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2002a). While suggestive, neither literature may be dispositive for our question: whether nonstructured interpersonal discussions with disagreeable peers weakens attitudes. While the literature on structured discussions/deliberations does provide strong evidence that discursive disagreement can lead to weakened issue attitudes, these studies focus on a very particular context, one that typically features the provision of high-quality information and design aspects that may prompt enhanced motivation to consider this information with an open mind (see Kuklinski, Quick, Jerit, & Rich, 2001). These features are potentially crucial for the underlying finding of weaker attitudes, but ones that are likely lacking in realistic, less structured environments. Moreover, while attitude change is the general finding of this literature, some work on this topic shows an inconsistent and weak relationship between disagreement and attitudes (Farrar et al., 2009; Farrar, Fishkin, Green, List, Luskin, & Paluck, 2010; Wojcieszak & Price, 2010). The latter literature on nonstructured discussions and candidate ambivalence is perhaps more relevant but ultimately focuses on a distinct attitudinal object (candidates) that may elicit distinctive processes of attitude formation and updating (cf. Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989; Zaller, 1992).

The most substantial evidence that nonstructured disagreeable discussions lead to weakened issue attitudes is offered by Visser and Mirabile (2004), who describe four studies: two involving student participants who briefly participated in computerized discussion groups (i.e., manipulated, artificial social networks) on the issue of a mandatory community service requirement for university students; a third study involving student participants who described their real social networks and the disagreeableness of their network members’ opinions on the issue of capital punishment; and a fourth study similar to the previous one but using a nationally representative telephone survey of U.S. adults. Visser and Mirabile found that individuals in disagreeable networks reported attitudes that were less extreme and subjectively important, and also less certain and more ambivalent, than those in more agreeable networks. However, in their studies Visser and Mirabile also provide respondents with strong persuasive messages following group discussion and before attitude expression. Thus, while this is important evidence supporting a negative relationship between disagreeable networks and strength, it may be the case that disagreeable discussions only negatively affect issue attitudes in the presence of strong or high-quality information, which may be lacking from most peer discussions given the generally low levels of political interest and knowledge held by citizens (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).

**Positive Effects.** There is good evidence to suggest that disagreeable discussions with peers in a nonstructured setting may weaken an individual’s issue attitudes. However, there are also reasons to expect that stronger attitudes may also emerge. While disagreeable networks may provide an individual with evidence concerning alternative viewpoints, there is no guarantee that citizens process this information with an accuracy motivation in mind. Indeed, in many cases individuals will come to social discussion with prior attitudes, which can trigger processes of defensive bolstering (Lerner &

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5 Levitan and Visser (2008, 2009) also explore the relationship between attitude strength (as measured by stability and change) and network disagreement. However, neither study measures the attributes we are interested in here and thus must infer that disagreement is weakening attitudes because of their influence on these characteristics.

6 In addition, subjects were told prior to the experiment that they would have to engage in social discussions with the other subjects in the experiment, which likely primed a social accountability motivation that enhanced adherence to group norms (à la Tetlock, 1983). Moreover, the discussion occurred in a captive-audience environment where subjects could not readily avoid disagreeable information as other work on social disagreement suggests they might try to do. Thus, their results are perhaps suggestive that disagreeable discussion is associated with greater attitude change and weaker attitudes in specific types of discursive interactions, but not necessarily of groups or disagreeable conversations per se.
Tetlock, 1999). In particular, when encountering disagreeable information individuals may automatically retrieve their prior attitude on the subject, which will in turn bias resulting cognitions in favor of this attitude and motivate the individual to counterargue the incoming information with an end result being a strengthening of the original attitude (Lodge & Taber, 2006; Redlawsk, 2002; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). As noted earlier, this type of cognitive elaboration is generally associated with an increase in attitude extremity (Tesser et al., 1995). Importance may also increase insofar as these experiences of disagreement prompt feelings of identity threat from those on the other side, and associated feelings of anger, which may prompt even more biased styles of cognition (as in MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010). This line of thinking thus suggests the possibility of positive effects on attitude strength emanating from disagreeable networks due to a backlash effect.7

There exists empirical evidence from the literatures on structured and nonstructured discussions that support the foregoing expectation. First, Eveland (2004) shows that anticipated interpersonal discussions of politics prompts greater cognitive elaboration which is a strong correlate of strength. Second, while Levitan and Wronski (2014) show that disagreeable groups prompt information gathering, they cannot rule out that this occurs due to the operation of a disconfirmation bias that would prompt the type of backlash effect noted earlier and thus stronger attitudes. Third, Price, Cappella, and Nir (2002) show that engagement in structured deliberations led to increases in respondents’ awareness not just of rationales for opposing viewpoints but also for the respondent’s own attitude, which could theoretically be used to both counterargue opposing viewpoints and reaffirm one’s own (see also Wojcieszak, 2012). These three studies support the possibility that heterogeneous discussion prompts individuals to elaborate on the issue and, importantly, the reasons why they believe what they believe. Cognitive elaboration and attitude rehearsal, as has been noted, is positively related to attitude extremity (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Visser et al., 2006). Meanwhile, in generating reasons for supporting a particular position on an issue, an individual is likely to better see the potential connection between the causes of attitude importance (e.g., perceived self-interest or value relevance) and their attitudes, potentially leading to enhanced importance as well (Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, & Fabrigar, 1995).

More direct evidence supportive of this subject comes from a series of studies by Wojcieszak (2010, 2012; Wojcieszak and Price, 2010). Wojcieszak and Price (2010), for instance, show that exposure to disagreement in online group discussions concerning same-sex marriage did not prompt attitude change in the aggregate but did lead those predisposed to oppose same-sex marriage to take even more extreme attitudes on the matter. Likewise, Wojcieszak (2010) shows that participants in a neo-Nazi online group reported more extreme attitudes when they also reported having peers with generally dissimilar political views. Finally, Wojcieszak (2012) finds that extreme participants in a structured deliberation on sexual minority results polarized, that is, reported more extreme attitudes, after participation and exposure to disagreement. Notably though, participants that deemed their attitude important prior to engagement did not polarize and experienced less anger due to participation, suggesting some potential for differences across importance and extremity. The results of these studies are consistent with the theoretical account offered earlier and indeed are based on a similar theoretical explanation rooted in biased cognitions, and thus they provide important evidence in support of the positive effects expectations.

Ultimately, the important point of the preceding sections is that there are sound theoretical reasons to expect a variety of responses to network disagreement, including responses that vary by dimension of strength (e.g., less extremity but no change in importance, etc.) and that more evidence is required.

7 Note that while individuals with strong prior attitudes may be best able to engage in this type of counterarguing, even individuals with weak priors may engage in this type of elaborated thought rehearsal and hence experience more extreme, and perhaps important, attitudes as a result. Indeed, those with weak priors would seem to have more room for positive movement in terms of strength than those who already possess strong attitudes due to a ceiling effect among the latter.
Empirical Analysis

To test the impact of disagreeable, as opposed to agreeable, political discussion networks, we expand on the aforementioned test by Visser and Mirabile (2004) in a number of ways. First, we examine issue attitude strength across eight political opinions whereas most studies focus on a single issue at a time. Variation in issue content helps guard against the possibility that effects differ across various issue categorizations (e.g., hard vs. easy, moral vs. economic). Second, we rely on a nationally representative sample of the U.S. adult population. This is crucial because younger individuals tend to report weaker attitudes and, thus, the use of a convenience (e.g., student) sample, as in Visser and Mirabile (2004), may make the likelihood of finding shifts in attitude strength more likely than they would be in a general population; we discuss and analyze this possibility later. These attributes of our study provide us with some room for making a more generalized statement regarding the relationship between interpersonal disagreement and attitude strength than prior work.

Third, we use two distinct measures of network disagreement that reflect recent methodological debate within the discussion literature. How to properly conceptualize, and thus measure, social disagreement is a knotty problem as Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg (2013, pp. 122–124) discuss. Existing work within political science has fallen into two camps on this point. One, associated most closely with Huckfeldt et al. (2004), utilizes a measurement where disagreement occurs when a respondent and their discussant either vote for different candidates or identify with different parties. The other camp, associated with Mutz (2006), includes questions tapping the respondent’s perception of disagreement (i.e., questions asking respondents to indicate how much they agree/disagree with the political views of their partners). Visser and Mirabile (2004) utilize this latter strategy in their survey-based studies. In our analyses, we will utilize both types of disagreement measures, enabling a test of the robustness of any observed differences to issues of measurement. The measures we use are thus “general” and not an issue-specific disagreement measure, which may affect our conclusions insofar as they lead to noisier estimates as disagreements in general accompany agreements on specific issues (or vice versa). We will return to this important point in the conclusion.

Ultimately, the use of a nationally representative sample necessarily has trade-offs, including the obviously observational nature of the data. Yet for the reasons just stated, we believe that we are better positioned to provide generalizable claims regarding the influence of social networks on attitude strength than much prior work.

Data and Methods. We use data from the American National Election Studies’ (ANES) 2008–2009 Panel Study to test for the relationship between network composition and attitude strength. The panel was completed online with monthly surveys conducted between January 2008 and September 2009. Participants in the panel were recruited via random digit dialing methods. We analyze data from Waves 9 and 10 of the panel, where attitude strength and network characteristics were measured. Wojcieszak (2012) makes clear that, in studying the impact of discussion networks, one must differentiate various components of attitude strength including importance, extremity, certainty, and

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8 In addition, in their sole study using a national sample, Visser and Mirabile (2004) analyze only respondents who reported pro-death penalty attitudes making the actual sample nonrepresentative (e.g., it is likely skewed in a conservative direction), which may matter insofar as conservatives and liberals exhibit different styles of cognitive reasoning (Lyons, Sokhey, McClurg, & Seib, 2016) that influences the relationship between disagreement and strength; we make no such restrictions. While several related studies rely on subsets of nationally representative samples to study investigator-orchestrated deliberations (cf. Wojcieszak & Price, 2010, 2012), our work follows the approach used by Visser and Mirabile to focus on the impact of respondents’ “ecological,” or naturally occurring, discussion networks.

9 The response rates (AAPOR RR3) for both waves was 26% (see DeBell, Krosnick, & Lupia, 2010, Table 11). Analyses of attrition effects suggest that attrition for the panel was “modest” in nature (DeBell et al., 2010, 71). All analyses use poststratification weights to account for potential biases introduced by differential rates of survey participation and attrition.
intensity (as differential effects are possible). We focus on two measures available on the ANES: extremity and importance.

Our measures of attitude extremity and attitude importance were included on Wave 10. Respondents were asked for their opinion on a 1–7 scale on the eight policies measured in the panel study. Issue extremity is simply the folded issue scale with higher scores indicating more extreme responses to the original issue attitude question. Issue importance was measured in a follow-up question wherein respondents were asked to indicate “how important is this issue to you personally” on a 1–5 scale ranging from “Not at all important” (1) to “Extremely important” (5). Table 1 lists the eight issues as well as summary statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Topic</th>
<th>Preference (1–7 scale; higher = more liberal)</th>
<th>Extremity (1–4 scale; higher = more extreme)</th>
<th>Importance (1–5 scale; higher = more important)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There Should Be a Constitutional Amendment Banning Same-Sex Marriage</td>
<td>4.32 (2.34)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.26)</td>
<td>2.88 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise Taxes on Those Making $200,000/year</td>
<td>4.88 (2.13)</td>
<td>2.99 (1.16)</td>
<td>3.26 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t Should Pay for Prescription Drugs for Low-Income Seniors</td>
<td>5.49 (1.83)</td>
<td>3.08 (1.11)</td>
<td>3.43 (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Gov’t Should Pay for Necessary Medical Care for All Americans</td>
<td>3.96 (2.35)</td>
<td>3.04 (1.17)</td>
<td>3.71 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected Terrorists Should Have Habeas Corpus Rights</td>
<td>5.03 (2.09)</td>
<td>3.03 (1.14)</td>
<td>3.44 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gov’t Should Obtain a Court Order to Wiretap Suspected Terrorists</td>
<td>4.78 (2.25)</td>
<td>3.12 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.50 (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Immigrants Can Have a Three-Year Work Stay Before Leaving</td>
<td>3.16 (2.15)</td>
<td>2.98 (1.19)</td>
<td>3.46 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants</td>
<td>3.99 (2.23)</td>
<td>2.93 (1.12)</td>
<td>3.35 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Cell entries are sample means with standard deviations in parentheses.

Our core independent variable is political disagreement within one’s discussion network. Respondents were asked a battery of social discussion network items on Wave 9 of the Panel. Respondents were first asked to indicate whether they had talked with anybody about “government and elections” over the past six months; 82.9% indicated that they had and were asked the remainder of the networks battery beginning with a name-listing exercise where the respondent could name up
to eight discussion partners. Nearly three-fourths of respondents (71.7%) provided three or more names. Respondents were then asked a battery of items concerning the first three named discussants.\textsuperscript{13} While this measure is based upon perceived disagreement, there is some evidence that such perceptions are more consequential than actual disagreement within a deliberative group setting (Wojcieszak & Price, 2012).

The network battery allows us to create two distinct measures of network disagreement (see Klofstad et al., 2013). First, respondents were asked to indicate “in general, how different are (Discussant Name)’s opinions about government and elections from your own views” with responses ranging from “Not Different at All” (1) to “Extremely Different” (5). General Disagreement is a measure formed by taking the average of responses for all named partners ($M = 2.25$, $SD = 0.79$; Range: 1–5). Meanwhile, respondents were also asked to indicate the partisan loyalties of their named discussion partners. Partisan Disagreement is a measure created by first taking the absolute difference between the respondent and each discussant and then averaging across those differences ($M: 1.50$, $SD: 1.28$; Range: 0–6). The two measures are positively correlated ($r = 0.50$). Following Klofstad et al. (2013), we will analyze separate models for each disagreement variable.

The results reported in the following section stem from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.\textsuperscript{14} We include in our models a variety of individual-level control variables, many of which have been shown to be associated with attitude strength.\textsuperscript{15} These controls include political interest, ideology, partisanship, and demographics (age, age squared, education, income, race, and gender). These variables are not only related to factors that may lead to stronger attitudes such as increased elaboration (e.g., interest), self-interest (e.g., age for attitudes on medical support for older Americans), and the relationship between an attitude and the respondents’ values (e.g., ideology), but they also serve as controls for homophily-related processes (see fn. 13). We also include network-related controls that may affect the nature and extent of political information available in one’s social network; these include network size, additional indicators of tie diversity (gender, religious, and race; see fn. 12), tie strength, and network sophistication (Lyons & Sokhey, 2014; Sinclair, 2012; Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). Details on the coding of these independent variables can be found in the online supplementary information. We will focus just on the effects of network disagreement in our figures below; the supplementary information contain the full model results which are consistent with the results shown in the text.

### Results

Figures 1 graphs the OLS coefficients (i.e., marginal effect) of network disagreement on issue extremity and importance by issue; see the online supplementary information for full regression results. Figure 1 tells a rather clear story: There is little evidence that individuals within disagreeable networks report less extreme or important issue attitudes than those in agreeable networks. Across the 32 marginal effects reported in Figure 1, only one of them shows a statistically significant effect at $p < 0.05$, one which is in the negative direction (general disagreement reduces attitude extremity on same sex marriage). That we fail to see effects across an array of issues is important because it suggests that the lack of significant effects is not tied to the particular characteristics of any one issue, although we must be cautious here given that our data is observational in nature and the nature of our measures.

\textsuperscript{13} Those who indicated they had no discussions with anyone were obviously not asked to identify discussion partners and are therefore excluded from the analysis.

\textsuperscript{14} We provide replications of our results using ordered logistic models in the online supplementary information; our conclusions are the same.

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, age (Visser & Krosnick, 1998) and race, gender, and income (Bolsen & Leeper, 2013; Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995).
There is one case in Figure 1 where a significant, and negative, coefficient does emerge, which raises the question of why this issue (same-sex marriage) deviates from the broader pattern. We believe the results are likely being driven by a confluence of factors that highlight the potentially hard to meet conditions under which disagreeable discussion networks may undermine issue strength characteristics. First, the issue was likely rendered more salient due to an exogenous political shock in the form of a California State Supreme Court decision striking down the state’s ban on same-sex marriage in May 2008. Notably, a Google Trends search for the terms “same-sex marriage” and “gay marriage” shows a spike in use of these terms during the week of May 11–May 17, that is, the time-period when the decision was handed down. Perhaps more importantly, there also exists in the trends data a gradual increase in use of these terms during the month of October when the wave containing the attitude strength measures was in the field; see Figure 2. In addition, while same-sex marriage was/is a polarizing issue across partisan lines, it seems plausible that this issue is an “easy” issue (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1989) and one where, in general, attitudes were undergoing a change over time. Thus, the issue may have been both ripe for discussion given its prominence (i.e., the Court decision and movement in many states to allow same-sex marriage), easy to discuss given its symbolic and nontechnical nature, and subject to varying perspectives given that it did polarize parties. However, even in this best-case scenario, the substantive effect of network disagreement on issue extremity was quite modest in nature; the adjusted marginal value for individuals at the 75th percentile on this disagreement variable is 2.93 (95% CI: 2.80, 3.06), for instance, while the expected value for respondents at the
25th percentile is 3.11 (95% CI: 2.98, 3.24). This lone significant result thus points both to the conditions under which we may expect network disagreement to matter and also the limits of disagreement’s influence.

Robustness Checks. We conducted a variety of analyses to probe the potential limits of these findings; all analyses reported below are presented in the online supplementary information.

First, we leveraged the panel structure of the ANES data to enhance the internal validity of our analyses. Importantly, attitude strength was also assessed on the first wave of the panel survey (in January, 2008) for part of the sample. We thus reran the analyses reported in Figure 1 while also controlling for Wave 1 strength, such that the coefficients for the disagreement measures now capture whether disagreement is associated with changes in strength. Our results are broadly the same. Partisan disagreement does not significantly affect attitude importance on any of the issues. Likewise, partisan disagreement is a null predictor on seven of the eight issues for attitude extremity; the exception is whether the government should pay for medical care. With regards to general disagreement, similar results again emerge, that is, a significant negative effect on extremity on the issue of same-sex marriage as well as a now significant negative coefficient for importance on this issue as well. These latter results likely reflect the special confluence of events surrounding same sex discussed earlier. Moreover, the substantive effect of disagreement remains small in these cases. Ultimately, controlling for prior attitude strength does not meaningfully change our conclusions.

Second, we tried interacting network disagreement with the respondent’s prior attitude report to examine the plausible argument that disagreement would matter more for those with weaker starting attitudes. We predominately found nonsignificant interaction terms in these analyses. Moreover, the specific nature of the interaction varied quite widely; while in some cases a positive slope emerged (i.e., a stronger negative influence of disagreement among those with weak priors than those with strong prior attitudes), in other cases the slope was flat (i.e., prior strength did not matter in the least) or even a negative (but again nonsignificant) difference wherein those with weak attitudes in W1 may have indicated stronger ones in W10 due to disagreement. Thus, it does not appear that prior attitude strength meaningfully moderated the role of network disagreement in this dataset.

Third, we also explored the potential role of discussion frequency, albeit indirectly. It may be the case that disagreement has a stronger effect when disagreeable discussions occur frequently. Unfortunately, the ANES Panel Survey does not contain measures of discussion frequency. However, we do have a measure of the perceived closeness between the respondent and his or her named discussants. We use this measure of closeness in models interacting tie strength and disagreement as a rough proxy for frequency of discussion under the assumption that there exists a positive relationship between the
two features of the discussant’s relationship. The vast majority of these interaction terms are negative as one would expect, that is, a greater effect among stronger ties, although the interaction coefficients are null in the vast majority of cases. These results again point to the robustness of our initial findings, although further work using a direct measure of discussion frequency is required to fully test this possibility.

Finally, we also explore the relationship between disagreement, age, and attitude strength. As noted earlier, Visser and Krosnick (1998) find that attitudes tend to be stronger in “middle adulthood than during early or late adulthood” (p. 1389); we find similar results in our analyses, especially for attitude importance, although there is some variation across the issues. It is thus possible that disagreement may have a stronger effect among younger respondents due to their possessing weaker attitudes in general. We thus explored whether age and age squared moderate our results, with age squared included to capture the nonlinear relationship between age and attitude strength just discussed. In general these interaction terms are insignificant. However, a plotting of the interaction terms typically reveals a greater degree of influence for disagreement among the young, and in some cases the elderly, than the middle aged. These analyses are consistent with the argument made earlier, that is, that a college-based sample, as used in Visser and Mirabile (2004), may overestimate the effects of disagreement, although we must be cautious here due to issues of statistical power.

The key point emanating from these analyses is that the findings reported in Figure 1 appear to be robust and, thus, give us confidence in the potential insignificance of network disagreement for attitude extremity and importance and, hence, strength.

**Conclusion**

Gordon Allport (1935) long ago declared “the concept of attitudes...probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology,” with “no other term [appearing] more frequently in the experimental and theoretical literature” (p. 798). Subsequent decades have shown that it is strong attitudes that ultimately matter for behavior and cognition (Krosnick, 1988; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Miller & Peterson, 2004; Wojcieszak, 2012). In this article, we have investigated a potentially crucial influence on this important concept, network disagreement, and found little evidence that individuals in disagreeable networks report substantially weaker or stronger attitudes than those in more agreeable discussion networks.

Understanding the causes of attitude strength is crucial because of the key role played by strong attitudes on behavior and cognition (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). As discussed earlier, the supposition that disagreeable networks might weaken attitudes has grounding in both theory and in some prior empirical work (Barabas, 2004; Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Levitan & Visser, 2008, 2009; Luskin et al., 2002; Mutz, 2002b; Visser & Mirabile, 2004). Alternatively, the possibility of disagreeable networks strengthening attitudes has some basis in the extant literature, as well (e.g., Wojcieszak, 2010, 2012). It is thus worth pausing to consider why we found such lackluster results for network disagreement in the present study. We suggest three possibilities. First, our findings may stem from the nature of our measures concerning network disagreement. In particular, our measures capture overall levels of disagreement, not issue-specific disagreement. While it is plausible that an individual who says they hold extremely different views on government from their discussant(s) will also disagree on more specific issues, this is not necessarily the case; general disagreement may be accompanied by issue-specific agreements. That we find no relationship here then puts a boundary condition on the general

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16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
influence of one’s discussion network and suggests future nationally representative studies of networks might consider issue-specific measures. 

A second possibility, albeit one that is difficult to assess, is that the context of our study—during a national general election—mitigated or otherwise swamped the influence of networks on attitude strength. It could be that the election context, or the specific context of a survey interview about such an election, primes distinct considerations from those that would otherwise be salient to citizens, thus suggesting no relationship when one exists at other times. For instance, an electoral context may increase the salience of citizens’ partisan loyalties, thereby leading to a stronger incentive to counter-argue contrary points of view (and this may blunt the vitiating force of disagreeable discussions). This is even more speculative than our first point but demands some attention to unravel whether the influence of discussion networks is contingent on timing and survey type.

Finally, our finding that there is no significant difference in attitude strength based on the extent of general disagreement in a person’s discussion network may be informative in its own right. Our results provide little support for the claim that a general climate of disagreement is associated with weaker issue attitudes. While this leaves open the possibility that issue-specific disagreements are so associated, it is important to remember that individuals do not appear to perceive much issue-specific disagreement with their peers (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010); thus, even if such disagreements do prompt weaker attitudes, they may be so limited in scope that the substantial impact is nevertheless small. Our results, however, are consistent with other interpretations. For instance, the lack of a clear result may highlight the potential for an unknown moderator leading to offsetting effects of disagreement, although we explored the most obvious one (age). Alternatively, our results are consistent with those of Levendusky Druckman, and McLain (2016) who find that both agreeable and disagreeable discussions prompt greater elaboration and attitude importance to an equal degree. In other words, our results are also consistent with the possibility of a true null difference between types of discussion networks. Given the important normative role accorded to political discussion, which we discuss below, investigating these possibilities is an important area for future work. In fact, perhaps the central contribution of our findings is to highlight the just discussed possibilities which warrant further investigation.

Of course, our study has important limitations that must be acknowledged. Our data are observational, which necessarily limits our ability to draw causal inferences. In addition, our results are limited by the nature of our measures as just discussed. Moreover, we do not possess a direct measure of discussion frequency and thus cannot fully test the possibility that this characteristic moderates the influence of discussion. Ultimately, we must leave these important points to future work. We do believe, however, that our study has certain advantages as well. The use of a national representative sample and the focus on multiple issues increases the external validity of our study. This research may also have a reasonable claim to internal validity despite the observational design. First, there is no evidence that attitude strength shapes discussion groups (i.e., a reverse relationship; Sinclair, 2012; Sokhey, Baker, & Djupe, 2015). In the current data set, respondents who reported more important or extreme attitudes during Wave 1 of the survey generally did not report being in more disagreeable networks later on; the few exceptions to this pattern, meanwhile, tended to point in opposite directions (i.e., to more disagreement on one measure and more agreement on the other). We thus appear to be correctly estimating a model of attitude strength as a function of discussion-group composition. Future work will be needed to replicate our findings, elaborate on the potential mechanisms linking social disagreement to strength, and further increase the robustness of results, but we believe the current study provides a sound launching-off point for these analyses.

17 That said, we do note that our results are consistent across issues; our nonfindings hold if we aggregate all issues by taking an overall average and are robust to nonlinear estimation of the effects of disagreement (see Appendix F). Even so, it is possible that issue-specific disagreement measures may matter on some issues. The main challenge to including such measures, at least on nationally representative surveys, would be the space to do so.
Understanding why networks may not affect attitude strength, or whether they do so only under certain conditions, is important both empirically and normatively. Disagreeable discussions have been linked to both positive and negative normative outcomes. On the one hand, disagreeable social networks have been linked to desirable outcomes such as increased tolerance (Mutz, 2002b; Pattie & Johnston, 2008). On the other hand, disagreeable networks seem to reduce political engagement (Mutz, 2006) and weaken partisan identities, which connects to engagement and collective responsibility of government (Fiorina, 1981; Klofstad, Sokhey, & McClurg, 2013; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012). Thus, disagreement may have a normatively mixed influence on politics. However, the normative meaning of interpersonal disagreement depends on the strength of the attitudes that emerge from disagreeable discussions. Even if disagreeable discussions shape cognition in the short term, in other words, without strength-related consequences such network effects, both positive and negative, are unlikely to impact political behavior in the long-term. There are thus few more important topics to further explore than the implications of networks on attitude formation.

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REFERENCES


**Supporting Information**

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s website:
Appendix A: Models for In-Text Figures; Replication with OLOGIT Models; Coding of Variables
Appendix B: Effects Controlling for Wave 1 Attitude Strength
Appendix C: Age as a Moderating Variable
Appendix D: Tie Strength as a Moderator
Appendix E: Does Attitude Strength Lead People to Perceive Greater Disagreement?
Appendix F: Exploring the Potential Nonlinearity of Disagreement on Attitude Strength