

Globalization and Synchronization of Innovation Cycles

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Introduction

Theoretical Motivation:

- How does globalization affect macro co-movements across countries?
- Most economists address this question by assuming that some *exogenous* processes drive productivity movements in each country.
- *But*, globalization (a trade cost reduction) can affect
 - productivity growth rates, as already shown by endogenous growth models
 - *synchronicity* of productivity fluctuations, as we show in an *endogenous cycle model*

Empirical Motivation:

- Countries that trade more with each other have more synchronized business cycles
 - Particularly among developed countries (EU, OECD, etc)
 - Not so between developed and developing countries
- Hard to explain this “*trade-comovement puzzle*” in models with exogenous shocks
 - Common shocks would cause synchronization *regardless* of the trade intensity
 - With country-specific shocks, more trade lead to *less* synchronization
 - Attempts to resolve it by global supply chains met limited success
- Easier (perhaps too easy) in models of endogenous fluctuations. No need to appeal to global supply chains.

Intuition We Want to Capture

- Two *structurally identical* countries
- Each country (in autarky) is subject to endogenous fluctuations, due to strategic complementarities in the *timing* of innovation among firms competing in the same market
- Without trade, fluctuations in the two countries are obviously *disconnected*.
- Trade integration makes firms based in different countries compete against each other and respond to an increasingly global (hence common) market environment.
- *Even with partial integration*, this causes an alignment of innovation incentives, *synchronizing* innovation activities and productivity fluctuations across countries

What We Do: To capture this intuition in a simplest possible manner,

A two-country model of endogenous innovation cycles with *two* building blocks

- **Judd (1985; sec.4)** Endogenous innovation cycles due to imitation lag
- **Helpman & Krugman (1985; ch.10)**, Home market effect/intra-industry trade between structurally identical countries with iceberg trade cost.

Conceptually, this is a study of *Synchronization of (Weakly) Coupled Oscillators*

The Two Building Blocks

Judd (1985); Dynamic Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive model; Innovators pay fixed cost to introduce a new (horizontally differentiated) variety

Judd (Sec.2); Innovators keep their monopoly power. Unique steady state globally stable.

What if competitive fringes can imitate, but only with a lag?

- Each variety sold initially at monopoly price; later at competitive price
- Impact of an innovation, initially muted, reach its full potential *with a delay*
- Past innovation discourages innovators more than contemporaneous innovation
- **Temporal clustering of innovation**, leading to aggregate fluctuations

Judd (Sec.3); *Continuous time* and monopoly lasting for $0 < T < \infty$

- *Delayed differential equation* with an infinite dimensional state space

Judd (Sec.4); *also Deneckere & Judd (1992)*: *Discrete time* and *one period monopoly*

- **1D state space** (the measure of competitive varieties inherited from past innovation determines how saturated the market is)
- Expectations do not matter!
- *Unique equilibrium path*, obtained by iterating a **1D-map**

Deneckere-Judd (DJ) in a Nutshell: A Skew-Tent Map

n_t : (Measure of) competitive varieties (per labor supply) inherited

$$n_{t+1} = f(n_t) \equiv \begin{cases} f_L(n_t) \equiv \delta(\theta + (1-\theta)n_t) & \text{if } n_t < 1 \\ f_H(n_t) \equiv \delta n_t & \text{if } n_t > 1 \end{cases}$$


$\delta \in (0,1)$, Survival rate of varieties due to obsolescence (or exogenous labor supply growth)

$$\theta \equiv \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma} \in (1, e), \text{ increasing in } \sigma \text{ (EoS)}$$

Market share of a competitive variety relative to a monopolistic variety

$\theta - 1 > 0$: the delayed impact of innovations

- Steady state (SS) globally stable for $\delta(\theta - 1) < 1$
- Unstable SS; Converging to the unique 2-cycle from a.e. for $\delta^2(\theta - 1) < 1 < \delta(\theta - 1)$
- No stable cycle; Robust chaotic attractor for $\delta^2(\theta - 1) > 1$



Helpman & Krugman (1985; Ch.10):

Trade in horizontally differentiated (Dixit-Stiglitz) goods with *iceberg trade costs* between two *structurally identical* countries; only their sizes may be different.

- **In autarky**, the number of firms based in each country is proportional to its size.
- **As trade costs fall**,
 - Differentiated goods produced in the two countries mutually penetrate each other's home markets (Two-way flows of goods).
 - Firm distribution becomes increasingly skewed toward the larger country (*Home Market Effect and its Magnification*)


Two Parameters: s_1 & ρ

$s_1 = 1 - s_2 \in [1/2, 1)$:

Bigger country's share in market size

$\rho \equiv (\tau)^{1-\sigma} \in [0, 1)$: Degree of Globalization:
inversely related to the iceberg cost, $1 < \tau \leq \infty$

s_n : Bigger country's share in firm distribution



A Two-Country Model of Endogenous Innovation Cycles

Our Main Results: By combining DJ (1992) and HK (1985):

- **2D state space:** (Measures of competitive varieties in the two countries)
 - Unique equilibrium path obtained by a **2D map** with **4 parameters**: $\theta, \delta, s_1, \rho$
 - One unit of competitive varieties = $\theta (> 1)$ units of monopolistic varieties
 - One unit of foreign varieties = $\rho (< 1)$ unit of domestic varieties
 - For $\delta^2(\theta - 1) < 1 < \delta(\theta - 1)$, either *Synchronized 2-cycle* or *Asynchronized 2-cycle*
 - **Autarky** ($\rho = 0$): Dynamics of the two countries **decoupled**. Whether synchronized or not depends entirely on how you draw the initial condition
 - **As trade costs fall** (a higher ρ), they become more **synchronized**:
 - *Basin of attraction* for Asynchronized 2-cycle *shrinks & disappears*
 - *Basin of attraction* for Synchronized 2-cycle *expands & covers the full state space*
- Fully synchronized with partial trade integration** ($\rho < 1$)
- At a smaller ρ (i.e., at larger trade cost) with more unequal country sizes
 - Even a small size difference makes a big difference
 - The larger country sets the tempo of global innovation cycles, with the smaller country adjusting its rhythm

2D Dynamical System; $n_{t+1} = F(n_t)$ with $n_t \equiv (n_{1t}, n_{2t}) \in R_+^2$;
 $(0 < \delta < 1; 1 < \theta < e; 0 \leq \rho < 1; 1/2 \leq s_1 < 1)$

$$\begin{aligned} n_{1t+1} &= \delta(\theta s_1(\rho) + (1-\theta)n_{1t}) & \text{if } n_t \in D_{LL} &\equiv \{(n_1, n_2) \in R_+^2 \mid n_j \leq s_j(\rho)\} \\ n_{2t+1} &= \delta(\theta s_2(\rho) + (1-\theta)n_{2t}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} n_{1t+1} &= \delta n_{1t} & \text{if } n_t \in D_{HH} &\equiv \{(n_1, n_2) \in R_+^2 \mid n_j \geq h_j(n_k)\} \\ n_{2t+1} &= \delta n_{2t} \end{aligned}$$


$$\begin{aligned} n_{1t+1} &= \delta n_{1t} & \text{if } n_t \in D_{HL} &\equiv \{(n_1, n_2) \in R_+^2 \mid n_1 \geq s_1(\rho); n_2 \leq h_2(n_1)\} \\ n_{2t+1} &= \delta(\theta h_2(n_{1t}) + (1-\theta)n_{2t}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} n_{1t+1} &= \delta(\theta h_1(n_{2t}) + (1-\theta)n_{1t}) & \text{if } n_t \in D_{LH} &\equiv \{(n_1, n_2) \in R_+^2 \mid n_1 \leq h_1(n_2); n_2 \geq s_2(\rho)\} \\ n_{2t+1} &= \delta n_{2t} \end{aligned}$$


where $s_1(\rho) = 1 - s_2(\rho) = \min\left\{\frac{s_1 - \rho s_2}{1 - \rho}, 1\right\}$, $0.5 \leq s_1 = 1 - s_2 < 1$;

$h_j(n_k) > 0$ defined implicitly by $\frac{s_j}{h_j(n_k) + \rho n_k} + \frac{s_k}{h_j(n_k) + n_k / \rho} = 1$.

State Space & Four Domains for the Symmetric Case: $0 < \rho < s_2 / s_1 = 1$




State Space & Four Domains for the Asymmetric Case: $0 < \rho < s_2 / s_1 < 1$





Synchronized vs. Asynchronized 2-Cycles in Autarky: $\rho = 0$; $\delta(\theta - 1) > 1 > \delta^2(\theta - 1)$,

As a 2D-map, this system has



- **An unstable steady state;** (n_1^*, n_2^*)
- **A pair of stable 2-cycles**
 - **Synchronized;** $(n_{1L}^*, n_{2L}^*) \leftrightarrow (n_{1H}^*, n_{2H}^*)$,
Basin of Attraction in red.
 - **Asynchronized;** $(n_{1L}^*, n_{2H}^*) \leftrightarrow (n_{1H}^*, n_{2L}^*)$,
Basin of Attraction in white
- **A pair of saddle 2-cycles:**
 $(n_{1L}^*, n_2^*) \leftrightarrow (n_{1H}^*, n_2^*)$; $(n_1^*, n_{2H}^*) \leftrightarrow (n_1^*, n_{2L}^*)$



Symmetric Synchronized & Asynchronized 2-Cycles: $s_1 = 0.5$; $\theta = 2.5$; $\delta = 0.75$





Red (Sync. 2-cycle) becomes dominant.





Sym. Async. 2-cycle becomes a node at $\rho = .817867$, a saddle at $\rho = .833323$.

Asymmetric Synchronized & Asynchronized 2-Cycles $s_1 = 0.7$, $\theta = 2.5$; $\delta = 0.75$



By $\rho = .165$, infinitely many Red islands appear inside White.









By $\rho = .19$, the stable asynchronized 2-cycle collides with its basin boundary and disappears, leaving **the Synchronized 2-cycle as the unique attractor.**

Three Effects of Globalization: Home Market Effect

Productivity Gains

Synchronization



Concluding Remarks

Summary:

- A hybrid of Judd's (1985; Sec.4) innovation cycles based on imitation lag and Helpman-Krugman (1985) home market effect/intra-industry trade with iceberg cost
- 1st two-country model of endogenous fluctuations
- Adding endogenous sources of fluctuations helps to understand “the trade-comovement puzzle.”

Next Steps:

- **Different Models of Endogenous Innovation Cycles:**
 - *My conjecture:* Globalization should cause synchronization as long as it causes innovators based in different countries to operate in a common market environment.
 - The assumption of structural similarity seems crucial.

What if two countries are structurally dissimilar?

- **Different Models of Trade:** For example,
 - What if the two countries become vertically specialized?; e.g., global supply chains
 - Two Industries: **Upstream & Downstream**, each produces DS composite as in DJ.
 - One country has comparative advantage in **U**; the other in **D**
 - *My conjecture:* Globalization leads to an asynchronization

Empirically consistent, as the evidence for the synchronizing effect of trade is strong among developed countries, but *not so* btw developed and developing countries