Lecture #16: Currency Crisis

The focus of this class is on currency crisis. This happens when the government says it is committed to maintaining a particular value for the exchange rate, but private markets don’t believe the central bank will succeed. They believe that for one reason or another, there will be a devaluation soon. A central bank that acts to preserve its target value of the exchange rate under these circumstances is said to be ‘defending’ the exchange rate. The UIP relation indicates that a defense requires raising the domestic nominal rate of interest. Otherwise, market participants who believe the exchange rate will devalue soon, will sell the domestic currency with the objective of acquiring the foreign currency necessary to purchase higher-yielding foreign financial assets. Even a relatively small expected devaluation could produce a huge ‘run for the exits’ as traders attempt to sell domestic currency. Such a ‘run for the exits’ is sometimes referred to as an ‘attack’ on the currency.

Defending against an attack can be quite costly, since it can require raising the interest rate a lot. For example, if people expect a 10 percent depreciation with 50 percent probability in the next month, domestic interest rates will have to be higher by 5 percentage points, at a monthly rate (i.e., 60 percentage points, annual rate!). Interest rate increases of this magnitude can do significant damage to the economy, both by reducing investment via the usual channels, and by doing damage to bank balance sheets, inhibiting them from doing their business of transmitting funds from savers to entrepreneurs who borrow to fund investment. These large interest rate changes needed to defend against a currency attack are based on the UIP relation. The outcome of these calculations are so unpleasant, that it doesn’t seem unreasonable to refer to this as the Curse of the UIP. Market participants who think that the Curse of the UIP will inhibit a central banker from putting up a strong defense, may be encouraged to press the attack even more vigorously.

The purpose of this lecture is to explore these ideas in our AA-DD curve framework.

1. Defending the fixed exchange rate when $E^*$ jumps.

Recall, under a fixed exchange rate system, the central bank has to move the money supply so that the $AA$ curve intersects the $DD$ curve at the targeted value of the exchange rate.

(a) The standard model.

To defend the fixed exchange rate, $E_0$, the monetary authority must decrease the money supply and raise the interest rate. We first consider the economic effects of this in the context of the
‘standard model’, the one in which aggregate demand is not a function of the interest rate. The monetary authority has to raise the domestic interest rate by enough so that traders are compensated for the depreciation of the currency that they expect. That is, the interest rate must be
\[ R = R^* + \frac{(E_e - E_0)}{E_0}, \]
where \( E_e \) is the exchange rate that traders expect to prevail in the future (\( E_e > E_0 \)). The interest rate must jump in the amount, \( (E_e - E_0)/E_0 \). Otherwise, traders will ‘attack’ the domestic currency by attempting to sell it in exchange for some other currency, in the hopes of benefitting from higher expected interest rates in other countries. The central bank that is committed to \( E_0 \) must defend against the attack by raising \( R \) enough (they do this by reducing \( M \), of course.) In the standard model, a defense against attack is basically costless to the central bank, because a high interest rate has no bad effects on the domestic economy.

(b) The model in which aggregate demand is a decreasing function of \( R \).

There are several important real-world features that are left out of the standard model. The key one is that in practice, aggregate demand is a decreasing function of the rate of interest. When we take this into account, we begin to get a glimpse into why it is that currency crises strike fear into the hearts of central bankers.

To see what happens when \( E_e \) jumps in the model where aggregate demand is a decreasing function of \( R \), consider the \( AA-DD \) curve diagram in Figure 1. The effect of the jump in \( E_e \), as explained in Figure 17-5, is to raise the \( AA \) curve up to \( AA' \). In the standard model, the monetary authority who wants to defend the exchange rate, \( E_0 \), has to shift the \( AA \) curve back down to where it was before, by reducing \( M \). In the model where aggregate demand is a decreasing function of the interest rate, the rise in \( R \) occurring with the fall in \( M \) has the effect of shifting the \( DD \) curve to the left.\(^1\) As a result, the economy settles at an equilibrium to the left of the point where it started out. The economy moves from point 1 to point 2. The way to think about how this happens is like this.

To defend the interest rate, \( E_0 \), the monetary authority must raise the domestic interest rate by moving the \( AA \) curve from \( AA' \) back to \( AA2 \). This higher interest rate makes the \( DD \) curve shift left and hurts output and employment. Now, we begin to see why a rise in \( E_e \) is a worry to central bankers.

2. Reasons Why Central Bankers Don’t Like to Raise Rates.

\(^1\)Make sure you understand why this is so. Remember the definition of the \( DD \) curve and then work out carefully, why a rise in \( R \) would shift it left.
The previous discussion brings out why defending a currency against a rise in $E^e$ might be painful: by requiring a rise in $R$, it can hurt output and employment. But, a really sharp rise in the interest rate can hurt for other reasons too. By increasing the cost of doing business, it may drive companies into bankruptcy. That could hurt the banking system which is now stuck with bad loans. If enough of the banking system’s assets go bad, the banks themselves could go bad. Since banks are a key institution connecting borrowers and lenders, when they are damaged this could further reduce the amount of investing, beyond what we would normally expect from a rise in $R$.

The best way to understand the ‘bad loan’ problem is to look at the assets and liabilities table for a typical bank:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans 1200</td>
<td>Demand Deposits 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vault Cash and Deposits</td>
<td>Certificates of Deposit 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Central Bank 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net Worth 400

In the example, the bank has issued 900 units of currency in demand deposits and has borrowed 100 in the form of CD’s. The bank’s assets include 1200 in loans and 200 in cash and deposits with the central bank (which is also like cash). The bank’s net worth is 400. This is the difference between assets and the other things on the liability side of the balance sheet. When this is positive, this is the piece of the bank that belongs to the bank’s owners. With a healthy bank, net worth is large. A is bankrupt if its net worth is negative. Note that one component of the bank’s assets is risky, namely loans. If the economy slows down (say due to a rise in interest rates), then some of the firms to whom loans have been made may themselves go bankrupt. In this case, the loans to them in effect become worthless. They literally vanish from the bank’s balance sheet. As loans go bad and the 1200 number shrinks, the net worth of the bank’s owners shrinks an equal amount. If enough loans go bad, net worth goes negative, the bank goes bankrupt, and must be shut down.2

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2In practice, there are things that can be done to keep banks with negative net worth operating. To do this they have to, in effect, run a kind of Ponzi scheme, paying off the liabilities they issued to finance the now-bad assets by issuing new liabilities. Ordinary businesses have a hard time doing this sort of thing, but banks can get away with it because bank depositors typically enjoy government guarantees of their deposits. They are not putting their money at risk if they put it in a negative net worth bank.

Incidentally, one can see how it might be that if a lot of banks have negative net worth
3. Why does $E^e$ go up? There are three types of answers. They are closely related.

(a) One (‘First generation models’) lays responsibility with bad government policy. This says that $E^e$ goes up because the market correctly perceives that the government has been, or is about to, pursue policies that are inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate regime. Examples:

i. Unemployment is high (i.e., $Y$ is low), and the government just raises $M$ and hopes that by some miracle the exchange rate does not devalue (we’ll see later how the theory of imperfect asset substitutability can place a - false, unfortunately - veneer of respectability on this hope).

ii. The market may come to expect that $M$ must rise in the future. This is thought to have played a role in the Asian currency crisis. The argument is that inadequate government regulation of the banking system over a period of years led the banks to make a lot of very bad loans. People began to realize the extent of the bad loan problem and expected that to pay for this, the government would eventually resort to the printing press. In our model, this manifests itself in the short

and are running Ponzi schemes, they would not have the funds necessary to finance loans for new investment activities. In this way, a banking system with really bad balance sheets can act as a drag on investment and, hence, aggregate economic activity. This type of argument has been used by the Economist magazine to explain the poor performance of the Japanese economy in the past decade. The idea is pursued in a PhD thesis about Japan by Levon Barseghyan.

3 Good government regulation of the banking industry is very important. This is necessary to mitigate the bad (‘moral hazard’) effects of government guarantees of deposits in banks. The problem regulation must help solve arises because government guarantees remove an incentive from depositors to monitor the asset side of the bank balance sheet. For example, depositors don’t really have to worry if their bank is making extremely risky loans because even if those loans go bad deposits are insured. In the absence of guarantees, of course, depositors would ‘discipline’ bankers who take excessive risk or are incompetent by withdrawing their funds. Because deposit guarantees eliminate this market discipline mechanism, guarantees have a tendency to give rise to excessive risk-taking in banks, and this is called ‘moral hazard’. Government regulation of banks is designed to mitigate the moral hazard effects of deposit guarantees. (The story of why there are government deposit guarantees in the first place is a separate one. It has to do with a belief that in the absence of guarantees the banking system is ‘fragile’ and vulnerable to bank runs. But, this is another story...)

4 What I mean by ‘to pay for this’ is the following. If a bank’s net worth goes so
run by a rise in $E^e$. Notice that this story does not require that $E^e$ jump in response to actual high money growth. In fact, high money growth was not observed prior to the crises in the Asian crisis countries. (Trouble is, high money growth was also not observed after these crises either.)

(b) The second reason (‘Second generation models’) lays responsibility with private expectations. Under this view, absent speculators’ expectations of a devaluation, the government could and would pursue policies consistent with the exchange rate target. Speculators’ expectations of a depreciation make a defense so costly, that the government has to give in to a depreciation.

i. An example is the 1995 French presidential election, when people came to believe that the government would devalue to help with the election. To defend the exchange rate required raising the interest rate above those in Germany by 3 percentage points. Although the government survived the attack in this case, it is easy to imagine (as the speculators imagined) that the government might have chosen to go with a devaluation rather than defend.

ii. A bad shock to aggregate demand produces the realization that the government will be in a situation where the conflict between domestic goals and the fixed exchange rate goal is be particularly sharp. Although the government could maintain the fixed exchange rate if market participants did not raise $E^e$, if $E^e$ does go up the cost of a defense would be more than the government could bear. Knowing this, speculators might raise $E^e$ at this time. If they do this, their expectations of a devaluation would be self-fulfilling. In this example, if market participants expected the government to stick to the fixed exchange rate and so they did not raise $E^e$, then this would be self-fulfilling too. The point is that in this scenario a currency crisis occurs as a result of private market expectations and not as a result of bad government policies.

There are several examples of this. One is the Asian crisis far negative that the assets aren’t enough to cover a bank’s deposit liabilities, then the government must step in with its own money to make up the difference. If the government resorts to the printing press to come up with the money (as opposed to taxes), this means that $M$ rises.

5 This argument is laid out very carefully in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, ‘Understanding the Korean and Thai Currency Crises’, 2000, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives. It can be found on the course web site.

6 Perhaps at a deeper level, one could still lay the blame on bad government policies. For example, suppose the conflict between domestic and exchange rate objectives is acute
countries. In the years before the crisis in 1997, several things had happened to reduce aggregate demand in these countries. China devalued its currency, which reduced world demand for Asian crisis country goods, which had fixed the exchange rates to the dollar. The NAFTA agreement made Mexico a stronger competitor with the Asian countries for US markets. Also, the US dollar appreciated vis a vis the Yen, putting the Asian crisis countries at a disadvantage relative to Japan.

iii. A rise in foreign interest rates. If the central bank is to defend the exchange rate under these circumstances, then they must raise the interest rate. Markets may figure that the government does not have the stomach for this, and they raise $E_e$. This may have effects which force the government to devalue in the end, even though, if markets had not raised $E_e$, the government would have had the resolve to raise the interest rate.

A possible example of this is Mexico in 1994. The US raised interest rates in that year and this put the Mexican central bank, which had a fixed exchange rate relative to the dollar, in a bind. The year 1994 was a presidential election year. So, markets expected the government to devalue. To try and convince the markets that it was serious about the exchange rate, the Mexican government took out loans in dollars. The idea was that, by making it expensive for the government if a devaluation occurred, this action would convince markets of the government’s seriousness.

A second example is Europe in 1992. As a result of reunification in Germany, German interest rates rose. The rest of the countries in the EMS (‘European Monetary System’) had to raise their interest rates too, to preserve the exchange rate system in the EMS. Private markets decided in 1992 that a number of countries in the EMS just wouldn’t have the stomach to do this, and raised $E_e$ for these countries. Throughout 1992 these countries had to keep interest rates even higher than Germany’s interest rates to defend the exchange rate. This was painful because unemployment was already high at this time. Markets understood how painful this was, and this is one reason they raised $E_e$ in the first place. They figured that the pain would ultimately result in a devaluation. They were right in the case of Britain and Italy.

The attack went like this. On September 5-6, government

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because the banking system’s balance sheets are in poor condition. In this case, one might want to blame the risk of a currency crisis on bad policy after all if the poor condition of bank balance sheets is a result of inadequate regulation.
officials solemnly proclaimed that the countries in the EMS were committed to the fixed exchange rates. September 8 - first attack, against Scandinavian countries. Finland gives up quickly and abandons the fixed exchange rate. Sweden defends, and raises rates first to 24 percent, then to 75 percent (at an annual rate). September 10-11 another attack. The Bank of Italy gives up, after sustaining huge foreign exchange losses. The lira is devalued 7% on September 13. September 16-17: the British pound comes under attack. The Bank of England gives up. Sweden increases interest rates to 500 percent! Ireland goes to 300 percent. France successfully defends. By the end of September, the crisis was over.

The Swedish crisis was particularly severe, and it is interesting to look at Sweden more closely. It’s unemployment rate in the summer of 1992 was high, it had jumped from a 1982-91 average of 2.4 percent to 5.3 percent in 1992. The government deficit was in bad shape. Further recession would have made it a lot worse. The banking system was also thought to be in a troubled state. The market perceived that to defend the exchange rate would be quite costly, and this was one reason they raised $E$. One of the reasons that Sweden wanted to defend the exchange rate was that it wanted to prove to the other Europeans that it was ready for membership in the European Community (EC). When things happened that the market thought would make Swedish devaluation ‘excusable’ in the eyes of EC members, then the market’s probability of a devaluation went up. So, when a vote occurred in Denmark that seemed to make European unification seem less likely in the near term, the idea was that the cost of abandoning the fixed exchange rate went down. The attack on Sweden became stronger. Sweden survived the September crisis. But, later, on November 19, they surrendered. (These observations are taken from Obstfeld’s paper, cited in the footnote.) Obstfeld (see the footnote for the reference) summarizes the situation nicely:

“For a discussion of the European currency crisis of 1992, see Obstfeld, The Logic of Currency Crises (on his web site at Berkeley Econ department) or Blanchard, Macroeconomics, chapter 14. Obstfeld argued that the 1992 European crisis could not be explained by ‘first generation models’.
a successful parity defense, can trigger a speculative attack....If governments determine the extent of their resistance through cost-benefit analysis, however, self-fulfilling crises become likely in situations where economic distress already places the government under pressure. ... If markets expect a devaluation, for example, interest rates will rise, thus creating an incentive to devalue. Similarly, expectations of devaluation may be incorporated in wage demands, raising authorities’ incentive to accommodate. These processes are circular: thus their timing is basically arbitrary and they can be brought into play by seemingly minor events.”

(c) The third reason (‘third generation models’) is a combination of the first two. The idea is that economies become vulnerable to second generation crises if something happens that makes an interest rate defense of the currency costly. For example, if the banking system and/or output are weak. The idea is that bad government policies have something to do with the crisis, but that they are not so bad that the crisis is absolutely inevitable.

The fact that expectations are so important is one reason central bankers are advised to be humorless and to not give any impression that they have human concerns. To see this, imagine a financial market participant wondering if the exchange rate will drop in the future. They will think about the central banker weighing the pain of raising the interest rate (high unemployment, disruptions) against the gain (staying in the fixed exchange rate regime) and they will believe that the ‘pain’ side will receive little weight. If they imagine the central banker cares only about the fixed exchange rate and is less moved by the plight of unemployed people, then such a financial market participant will not imagine the central banker caving in to a currency attack (i.e., rise in $E^c$). This will reduce the likelihood of the attack occurring in the first place.
Figure 1: The Output Consequences of Defending the Fixed Exchange Rate, $E_0$, when the Market Expects a Devaluation and Aggregate Demand is a Decreasing Function of $H$. 

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The graph illustrates the output consequences of defending a fixed exchange rate, $E_0$, under the assumption that the market expects a devaluation and aggregate demand is a decreasing function of $H$. The graph shows the interaction between the exchange rate, demand, and output, highlighting the points where the market expectations intersect with the aggregate demand curve.