Financial Frictions in Macroeconomics

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## Balance Sheet, Financial System

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Frictions between financial institutions and their lenders.

Source of financial crisis, bank runs, rollover crises, etc.

Macro prudential policy
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Financial frictions between bankers and borrowers.

Perhaps the primary friction in ‘normal times’, when macro prudential is under control.
Outline

• Financial frictions for ‘normal times’
  • Asset side of bank balance sheets.

• Provides a natural interpretation of business cycles when:
  • We adopt a particular model of financial frictions (BGG)
  • Incorporate a particular shock (Risk shock).

• Financial frictions for ‘crisis times’
  • Liability side of bank balance sheets.
  • The analysis of macroprudential policy questions:
    • What leverage restrictions should be placed on banks?
    • How should those restrictions be varied over the business cycle?
    • Should you be easy in tough times and tough in easy times?
  • Some tough practical issues.
Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rate Spread

Interest rate spread strongly countercyclical!
Counter-cyclicality of Interest Rate Spread

• Consistent with the idea that rise in riskiness has something to do with recessions.

• Let’s see where this idea takes us...

• Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1999) propose of way of thinking about an economy in which the interest rate spread reflects the riskiness of individual entrepreneurs (idiosyncratic risk).
  • Of course, interest rate spreads reflect other factors too, like liquidity premia....

• Adopt a twist on the BGG Model:
  • the riskiness of entrepreneurs can vary over time.

• Put this whole mechanism in a fully specified, medium sized DSGE model, as in Christiano-Motto-Rostagno (AER2014)
  • Estimate everything using Bayesian methods.
Economic Impact of Risk Shock

lognormal distribution:
20 percent jump in standard deviation

Lenders scared of lending because of large number of entrepreneurs expected in left tail.

Entrepreneurs pay higher spread over risk free rate, and borrow less.

Entrepreneurs invest less; GDP falls; consumption falls because of job losses; stock market falls; inflation falls: RECESSION!
Is there direct evidence of greater cross-sectional risk in recessions?

- Yes

- Cross-sectional standard deviation of rate of return on equity.
  
  - Non-financial firms in Center For Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data base.
  
  - Those data do show evidence of counter-cyclicality.
Cross-sectional standard deviation, quarterly rate of return on non-financial firm equity, CRSP data

Cross-sectional standard deviation is countercyclical
How Much of US Business Cycles Can we Explain with Risk Alone?

• A surprisingly large amount.

• Estimation delivers:
  
  • Estimates of the risk shock.

• We ask:
  
  • What would the data have looked like if ONLY the risk shock had been active?
Role of the Risk Shock in Macro and Financial Variables

A. GDP growth (y-o-y %)

B. Equity (log-level)

C. Premium

D. Credit growth (y-o-y %)

E. Slope ($R^{long} - R^{short}$)

Notes: The grey solid line represents the (two-sided) fitted data. The dotted black line is the model simulations.
Why Does the Econometrics like the Risk Shock So Much?

• In part:
  • risk shock provides a straightforward interpretation of the countercyclical interest rate spread.

• Another reason:
  • The impulse response function to a contractionary risk shock looks a lot like a recession.
Figure 3: Dynamic Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Components of Risk Shock

Looks like a business cycle
What’s the model good for?

• Can think about how monetary policy should respond to an increase in interest rate spreads (should cut rates).

• Can be used to understand why including credit growth and the stock market in a Taylor rule might be a good idea (see, Christiano, et al, Jackson Hole paper, 2010).

• Open economy version can be used to think about financial dimension of exchange rate depreciation (see Mihai Copaciu and Cristian Bulete, Central Bank of Romania).

  • Depreciation makes domestic goods cheaper and stimulates output.
  • Depreciation imposes capital losses on unhedged borrowers in foreign currency, causing them to cut back spending and reducing output.
Financial frictions on liability side of bank balance sheets

• This is location of the financial problems in the US financial crisis.

• Macro prudential policy is about preventing those problems from happening again.

• But, must have a clear idea of what those problems were!

• Begin with a little background on the origins of the crisis and Great Recession.
Background

• All stories about the financial crisis and Great Recession begin with the housing boom.

• Boom was fueled by a flood of money pouring into the US via the US current account deficit.
Americans have been absorbing more goods than they produce for many years.
Current Account Deficit

• GDP (Y) accounting identity:

\[ Y = C + I + G + X - M \]

• Trade surplus (deficit, if negative) is:

\[ Y - C - I - G = X - M \]

• Negative current account is (approximately) \( X - M < 0 \).

• So, current account deficit is a situation when Americans absorb more goods \((C+I+G)\) than they produce, \( Y \).
  • What component of consumption was the culprit?
The fall in the current account is fully accounted for by a rise in C
Two Hypotheses About Cause of Capital Inflows

• Hypothesis #1: Americans went on a consumption binge.
  
  • We expect to see real interest rates rise.

• Hypothesis #2: Foreigners developed an appetite for US financial assets (Bernanke’s ‘Savings Glut Hypothesis’)
  
• Narrative for #2:
  
  • foreign buying of US financial assets leads to appreciation of dollar (hence, trade deficit).
    • This is the ‘overvalued dollar’, the Chinese ‘currency manipulation’ everyone complained so much about.
  
  • General buying of US assets leads to a stock market boom, making Americans feel richer, so consumption rises.
  
  • We expect to see real interest rates fall.
Hypothesis #2 Wins
Why did So Much Money Go Into Housing?

• Although US current account deficit with Europe nearly balanced, gross flows are huge.

• Money flowed to Europe and then flowed back again.

  • European institutions in effect part of US banking system.

Increase Supply of Funds to Housing Drove Down Mortgage rates (Consistent with Hypothesis #2.)

**Figure 1.4.** Real mortgage interest rates. 30-year conventional mortgage rate minus three measures of expected inflation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters: 10-year-ahead CPI inflation forecast (blue solid), 1-year-ahead CPI inflation forecast (red dashed), and 1-year-ahead GDP deflator forecast (green long dash).

From: Justiniano, Primiceri, Tambalotti, ‘Credit Supply and the Housing Boom’
Consistent with idea that housing purchases being funded by inflow of foreign capital corresponding to current account deficit.

Ok, So That’s the Background

• What happened next?
Trigger: house prices stopped rising in May 2006

Would not have fallen so much if there had not been a bank run.
What turned the housing price correction into a disaster?

• Initial view by many people:
Big Short View

• Low lending standards made economy a house of cards.

• When the system came under pressure, it crumbled:
  • defaults & foreclosures
  • house price drops
  • more defaults & foreclosures
  • collapse in demand due to negative wealth effect (zero lower bound kicked in).
  • Great Recession.

• View has been challenged in several detailed studies of mortgages (Albanesi, DeGiorgi and Nosal, 2016, ‘Credit Growth and the Financial Crisis: A New Narrative’)

• Credit growth during boom and defaults during the crisis concentrated at mid/top of credit score distribution for all debt categories.
Emerging Conventional View: Bank Run

• Gary Gorton:
  • *Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming*, Oxford University Press


• Nobody saw it coming because it was a run on a banking system we didn’t know was so big and so vulnerable to runs.
Why did it last so long?

- As credit to housing sector dried up (with collapse of shadow banking system), housing prices fell sharply.
  - Fall in housing prices made homeowners feel poor, and cut back spending.
  - Firms seeing fewer sales, cut back investment.
  - Economy in a tailspin.
  - Fed couldn’t save it by usual cut in $R$ because $R$ hit lower bound.

- Perfect storm:
  - Bank run occurred, when rates were already low.
  - Fed out of ammunition.
This is what a bank run looked like in the 19th century: Diamond-Dybvig run.

Bank runs in 2007 and 2008 were different and did not look like this at all (Gorton)!

It was a rollover crisis in a shadow (invisible to normal people) banking system.
Rollover crisis

- Consider the following bank:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Deposits: 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banker net worth 20</td>
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- This bank is ‘solvent’: at current market prices could pay off all liabilities.

- Suppose that the bank’s assets are long term mortgage backed securities and the liabilities are short term (six month) commercial paper.

  - The bank relies on being able to roll over its liabilities every period.
  - Normally, this is not a problem.
Rollover crisis

• Now suppose the bank cannot roll over its liabilities.

• In this case, the bank would have to sell its assets.
  • If only one bank had to do this: no problem, since the bank is solvent.

• But, suppose all banks face a roll over problem.
  • Now there may be a big problem!
  • In this case, assets must be sold to another part of the financial system, a part that may have no experience with the assets (mortgage backed securities).
The Drama of a Roll Over Crisis Brought to Life in Some Great Movies!
Rollover crisis

• A rollover crisis: when all banks in an industry (e.g., mortgage backed securities industry) are unable to roll over their liabilities.

• The only buyers of the securities have no experience with them, so they won’t buy without a price cut (firesale).

• Interestingly, the buyers of the securities will all complain at how complex they are and how non-transparent they are.

  • But, the real problem is that buyers in a fire sale are simply inexperienced.
  • The rollover crisis hypothesis contrasts with the Big Short hypothesis: assets were fundamentally bad (Mian and Sufi).
Rollover crisis

• When the whole industry has to sell, then bank balance sheets could suddenly look like this:

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Deposits: 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banker net worth -10</td>
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Fire sale value of assets:

• Multiple equilibrium: balance sheet could be the above, with run, or the following, with no run:

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• A run could happen, or not.

• This is exactly the sort of financial fragility that regulators want to avoid!

• Under rollover crisis hypothesis, this was the situation in summer 2007.
Rollover Crisis: Role of Housing Market

• What matters is the actual value of assets and their firesale value.

• If bank is solvent under (firesale value), then probability of run is zero.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-housing market correction</th>
<th>Post-housing market correction</th>
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<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>Liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 (105)</td>
<td>Deposits: 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banker net worth 20 (5)</td>
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• Rollover Crisis Hypothesis:
  • pre-2005, no crisis possible,
  • post-2005 crisis possible.
How to think about regulation when the risk is of a rollover crisis.

• One possibility: model the rollover crisis directly.

• Best model of rollover crisis at this time: Gertler-Kiyotaki (AER2015).
  
  • They adapt the rollover crisis model of sovereign debt created by Cole-Kehoe (JIE1996).

  • Cole-Kehoe related to Diamond-Dybvig.
Possible states: $s = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, T+2$. Bank run, $s = 1$. No bank run in $s > 1$. In each no-run state there is a chance of a run in the next state, unless $s = 2$. 

Run state $s = 1$. 

Steady state $s = T+2 \approx \infty$.
One Hundred Year Stochastic Simulation

Price of Capital, $Q$

Probability of a bank run in $t+1$, $p$

Bank net worth, $N$

GDP

percent deviation from steady state
Policy Use of Model

• Investigate the impact on financial stability of leverage restrictions.

• This analysis is hard!
  
  • Not clear how you introduce lots of shocks, actual investment, open economy, currency mismatch, etc.

• At a deeper level, computing equilibrium requires knowing what happens in the crisis state.
  
  • Seems unlikely other than for pedagogic purposes.

• Alternative: assume that governments will always act as lender of last resort.
  
  • Construct models that do not allow rollover crisis, but do capture moral hazard implications of bailouts.
Conclusion

• I’ve reviewed models of financial frictions that appeared interesting before and after crisis.

• Models of frictions on the asset side of financial firms seem likely to always be important and interesting.

• Discussed modeling the liability side of financial firm balance sheets.
  • Difficult tradeoffs.
  • Model things correctly, but that’s perhaps intractable.
  • Take full government bailout as exogenous (so no rollover risk), and do macro prudential policy to manage the resulting moral hazard problems.