Congressional Agenda Control and the Decline of Bipartisan Cooperation

Laurel Harbridge
Northwestern University
College Fellow, Department of Political Science
l-harbridge@northwestern.edu

Electoral incentives of members of Congress produces an equilibrium level of bipartisan cooperation in the United States Congress, but the form that bipartisanship has taken has changed over time due to changes in congressional agenda control. This paper explores how congressional agenda control – specifically the selection of bills to receive roll call votes – has affected the appearance of bipartisan cooperation in Congress. When we assess roll call records, we see a significant decline in bipartisanship over the last four decades and a subsequent decline in the electoral responsiveness of members. In contrast, when we look at bipartisan cooperation absent changes in the roll call agenda, we see bipartisanship occurring at relatively similar rates today as it did 30 years ago, and that members remain electorally responsive. Where we look for bipartisanship, and how we measure legislative behavior and preferences, determines whether we see Congress as becoming increasingly polarized and partisan.

Much has been written about the role of parties in legislatures, ranging from the strength of parties in parliamentary systems (APSA 1950; Wilson 1986) to the idea that American parties are weak and merely a collective of similar ideologies (Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 1998). Although the party system in the United States has never been as responsible a party system as that in Britain, scholars have argued that American parties have increasingly become polarized and have suggested that this polarization has come at the expense of an idealized era of bipartisanship (Eilperin 2006; Muirhead 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Rosenblum 2008). Combined with evidence that the public has not polarized, this work suggests that there is a disconnect between the mass public and the government (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006). Ultimately, this suggests that collective or aggregate electoral responsiveness has declined.

In this paper, I argue that bipartisanship has not declined as these scholars posit and that the members of Congress remain responsive to their districts. In addition, I argue that there exists an equilibrium level of bipartisan cooperation in Congress and that bipartisanship is driven by electoral incentives. However, the form that bipartisan cooperation has taken has changed over time as a result of changes in congressional agenda control. When bipartisan legislation became decreasingly likely to face roll call votes in the 1980s and 1990s, bipartisan cooperation on bill cosponsorship coalitions increased. I argue that this pattern reflects pressures on members from more competitive districts to show they are moderate and willing to work across the aisle.

By bringing an explicit focus to the congressional roll call agenda, I examine how party control over the congressional agenda, and specifically the temporal changes in the selection of bills to receive roll call votes, affects the degree of bipartisan cooperation in Congress. When we assess roll call records, there is a significant decline in bipartisanship over the last four decades

and a subsequent decline in the electoral responsiveness of members. In contrast, when we look at bipartisan cooperation absent changes in the roll call agenda, we see bipartisanship in cosponsorship coalitions occurring at relatively similar rates today as it did four decades ago, and members becoming increasingly responsive to their districts in this arena. Where we look for bipartisanship, and how we measure legislative behavior and preferences determines whether or not we see Congress as becoming increasingly polarized and partisan.

These results have a number of implications for understanding polarization in American politics and highlight the importance of carefully considering the potential biases in roll call data. This work offers three major substantive and methodological contributions. Literature on political parties has often debated when and how parties are influential, particularly in weak party systems such as the United States (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 2006). The findings in this paper are similar to the findings by Cox and McCubbins, suggesting that party influence occurs through congressional agenda control. Rather than focusing on the ultimate degree of party unity on votes, however, this paper focuses on the changing likelihood over time that bipartisan bills receive roll call votes. From this perspective, much of the party polarization observed on roll call votes is an artifact of congressional agenda control and may not necessarily reflect the underlying preferences or ideologies of individual members. Similar to Fiorina's (2004) finding of similarities in public opinion and values between citizens in red and blue states, my findings suggest that this common ground may extend to members of Congress to a greater degree than is generally recognized. When we assess legislative behavior absent agenda control, members of Congress continue to engage in bipartisanship, and the legislation that becomes law is overwhelmingly bipartisan. Members of Congress have become increasingly representative of their districts when using bill cosponsorship coalitions, despite the fact that

representation has declined when using roll call votes. Methodologically, this work highlights some of the problems in the standard results of roll call data to assess the preferences of individual members as well as trends in party polarization. By focusing exclusively on this stage of the legislative process, one that is strongly determined by the choice of which bills face roll call votes, these measures may overstate the differences of rank-and-file party members.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the argument that members' have electoral incentives to engage in bipartisanship. Section 3 focuses on ways of understanding and measuring bipartisanship over time, utilizing variation in the stage of policy formation. Section 4 examines how agenda control explains the disparate results when measuring bipartisanship with roll call votes and with cosponsorship coalitions. Section 5 returns to the electoral incentives of members and examines how representative of their districts members are when using roll call votes relative to bill cosponsorship coalitions. Section 6 concludes.

2. Overview of the Electoral Connection

Scholars have long argued that reelection is a driving, if not *the* driving, force behind the behavior of members of Congress (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974). An implication from this research is that members' desire to be reelected drives them to be responsive to and representative of their districts. Normatively, the 'electoral connection' suggests that both sides win; members of Congress get what they want (to stay in office), and the public gets what they want (representative and responsive members). Taken to the extreme, Anthony Downs (1957) argued that in a two-party system, the candidates should converge completely to the median voter in the district. The Downsian framework also predicts centrism and responsiveness in members' responses to the preferences of voters (Achen 1978).

A large body of work has grown around the question of representation and whether

members converge to the position of the district median – what would be perfect representation (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Burden 2004). Despite findings that show that candidates rarely fully converge in their positions, scholars have maintained that the median voter is important and that members can be electorally punished if they stray too far from the districts' preferences (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). The implications of electoral concerns for the legislative behavior of members may become particularly relevant if their districts are more moderate than that of the party median. In these cases, voting with the party may alienate constituents in a member's district. As noted by Lebo et al. (2007), party unity is a double-edged sword – it increases the likelihood of legislative success but can also expose members in moderate districts to electoral defeat.

Beginning with Mayhew's (1974) central premise that members of Congress are single minded seekers of reelection, I argue that the electoral incentives of members produce an equilibrium level of bipartisan cooperation in Congress. At all points in time, members of Congress have incentives to show a certain mix of bipartisan and partisan behaviors, depending on the composition of their districts. The composition of members' districts has important implications for whether a member is likely to face a strong primary election challenger from within their own party or a strong general election challenger from the opposing party.[1] Where members expect an electoral challenger, in turn, is predictive of legislative behavior and coalition formation (Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud 2004; Kanthak and Crisp 2005). The logic is that members who represent competitive districts (i.e., those that the opposing party has a chance of winning) will have the incentive to work across the aisle and engage in bipartisan collaboration. Consider, for example, Republican congressmen from competitive areas in 2008.

[1] Even if a member does not face a strong challenger in a given election, a district may still be contestable in the sense that the credible threat of a strong challenger leads the representative to be responsive to voters.

Many members focused their electoral campaigns on their records of bipartisan cooperation. An ad from a Republican Senator in Oregon took this to the extreme, stating, "I'm Gordon Smith and I approve working across party lines" (Smith 2008). In contrast, members who represent districts that are safely Democratic (or Republican), and thus where the challenge is likely to come in a primary election, are more likely to engage in partisan behavior in an attempt to shore up support from base. More generally, evidence for electorally driven bipartisanship comes from the work of Mellow and Trubowitz (2005, 662), who argue that congressional bipartisanship is more likely when the parties are nationally competitive as opposed to regionally concentrated, since regionally concentrated parties will focus on appealing to the party's base.

The ways in which members can work across the aisle, however, have changed over time. During the heyday of the Conservative Coalition between Republicans and Southern Democrats, votes often had a bipartisan makeup (Manley 1973). But since the 1970s, legislation with bipartisan support became increasingly less likely to face a roll call vote, despite the fact that it continued to become law through voice votes, a pattern that will be empirically documented in section 4. Although there were changes in congressional districts – through redistricting, demographic changes, and the replacement of members (particularly in the South) – over this period that reduced the electoral need for bipartisanship for some members (Han and Brady 2007), there remained a large number of competitive districts where, in order to be representative of the districts, members needed to have records of bipartisanship. In subsequent sections, I will show that during this period, members' use of bill cosponsorship increased and bipartisan cooperation persisted in the bill cosponsorship coalitions that members formed. It should be emphasized that the ease with which members can translate electoral incentives for bipartisanship into legislative behavior is particularly high for bill cosponsorship coalitions since

these decisions are not contingent on the selection of bills to face roll call votes.

In sum, if members of Congress represent moderate districts, the threat of a strong challenger from the opposing party is real. As a result, members have an incentive to show their constituents that they are not too extreme. Engaging in bipartisanship is one way to do this. Only members who represent ideologically homogeneous and extreme districts, and thus face a greater electoral threat from within their own party, have strong incentives to limit their use of bipartisanship.

To the extent that elite polarization is driven by redistricting, where district boundaries follow groups of strong partisans, or by an increase in the number of strong partisans relative to independents and weak partisans in the electorate, it is rational for members to engage in more partisan behavior. The extant literature suggests that both of these factors may be at work, to varying degrees. Residential segregation, combined with redistricting, means that there are fewer competitive seats today than in decades past (Cox and Katz 2002; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2002; Theriault 2005). Nonetheless, there remain a number of competitive districts, as I will document using the normal presidential vote, and we would expect members in these districts to engage consistently engage in bipartisan cooperation. After exploring aggregate trends of bipartisanship and the impact of congressional agenda control in the next section, I return to the issue of whether bipartisanship can be explained by members' electoral incentives, looking both at members' roll call records and their use of bill cosponsorship coalitions.

3. Bipartisanship in Roll Call Votes and Bill Cosponsorship Coalitions

What bipartisanship is and how it is measured is rarely specified clearly. It is often defined informally in the political realm, where anything and everything can be bipartisan. In the academic realm, it is often defined as function of the data that is easy to collect. This data is

typically roll call votes. This project extends the analysis of bipartisanship from focusing exclusively on roll call votes to including another stage of the legislative process where members can choose to work with members of their own party or with members from both parties, bill cosponsorship coalitions.[2] Of course these are not the only two forms of bipartisan cooperation that can occur in Congress. Bipartisanship may also be observed in the processes used in Congress (i.e., the use of closed versus open rules or the composition of conference committees), or even in the rhetoric of members' speeches. Nonetheless, roll call votes and bill cosponsorship coalitions are two areas that provide a unique opportunity to both systematically examine decisions by all members of Congress and to examine the influence of congressional agenda control.

The most common measure of bipartisan behavior is roll call votes. Here, it is generally assumed that behavior that is not partisan is bipartisan. Despite the prevalence of roll call votes in Congressional literature, the bills that reach roll call votes are not a random sample of the bills or issues that have been brought up in Congress. Many scholars have argued that party leaders strategically put up issues for roll call votes that divide the parties from one another but do not show divisions within their own party (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008; Heller and Mershon 2008; Loewenberg 2008; Poole 2004; Snyder 1992). If roll call votes are more likely on legislation that pit the parties against one another, this has the potential to bias analyses of roll call votes from finding high levels of bipartisanship. This is particularly true if legislation with bipartisan support passes via voice votes rather than roll call votes.

[2] The analysis focuses on the period from 1973 to 2004. This choice was driven by the visibility of voting decisions after the House reforms of the 1970s (Rohde 1991) and subsequent tracking of member's voting patterns by interest groups, and the use of cosponsorship in the House being restricted prior to the late-1960s. The House of Representatives was chosen because it is where party influence is often thought to be the greatest and where bipartisan cooperation is thought to be lowest (in comparison with the Senate, where bipartisanship is often thought to occur to a greater degree).

Second, the likelihood that legislation, and particularly bipartisan legislation, faces a roll call vote may not be constant across time. For instance, Lynch and Madonna (2008), find that the prevalence of voice votes relative to roll call votes on significant legislation varies both across time and across issues. If the underlying data generation process for roll call votes is biased against bipartisan legislation, or if the data generation process varies over time in a way that is related to whether legislation has bipartisan support, then both the level of bipartisanship and the relationship between polarization and bipartisanship may be misleading. For instance, if the use of agenda control has changed over time, with bipartisan legislation being less likely to face a roll call vote, the analysis of roll call voting may be biased toward a reduction in bipartisanship over the same period.

Because of these concerns, I explore bill cosponsorship coalitions as a second measure of bipartisanship in Congress. As noted by Krehbiel (1995) and Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), cosponsorship is less likely to be subject to agenda control. Like roll call votes, however, bill cosponsorship coalitions allow all members the opportunity to take a position and side with a coalition of other members. By looking at roll call votes in conjunction with bill cosponsorship, I am able to assess bipartisanship absent the strategic considerations of which bills face roll call votes.

Section 3.1 Bipartisanship Evidence from Roll Call Votes

Looking first at the entirety of roll call votes, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac provides one measure of bipartisanship.[3] Developed by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac in 1963, CQ defines bipartisan votes as "Roll-call votes on which a majority of voting Democrats and a majority of voting Republicans agreed" (1963, 735). Since bills on which either party

[3] Other potential measures include the Cooper and Young's (1997) definition of bipartisanship relative to the 50-50 split of the parties.

divides evenly are excluded, the percentage of bills that are bipartisan by CQ's measure is the complement of Party Unity roll calls (100 - % of Party Unity Votes), which are "votes that split the parties, a majority of voting Democrats opposing a majority of voting Republicans" (1970, 1139). Since the CQ measure classifies all votes (except those that are omitted that exactly split a party) as either party unity or bipartisan votes, partisan and bipartisan are, by assumption, definitionally opposite.

The CQ Bipartisan Measure (see Figure 1) for the House of Representatives shows a fairly steady decline in bipartisanship from the 1973 to 1995 with some recovery of bipartisanship beginning in the 105th Congress (post-1996).[4] Since conventional measures of polarization have gone up at a fairly linear rate across the period of analysis, the measurement of bipartisanship using all roll call votes suggests that there is a negative relationship between polarization and bipartisanship. However, it is important to note the increase in bipartisanship in the House since the 104th Congress, despite increasing levels of polarization, which suggests that polarization does not necessitate the decline of bipartisanship even when both are measured with roll call votes since a combination of very partisan and very bipartisan votes can produce polarized ideology estimates.

[Figure 1 about here]

Since the Congressional Quarterly measure of bipartisanship looks at what majorities of

[4] A similar pattern is found when looking just at final passage votes and omitting procedural issues. A number of scholars have noted that procedural votes have become increasingly partisan, either due to party pressure or good 'teamsmanship' among members (Lee 2009; Theriault 2006). To check whether the relationship between polarization and bipartisanship holds when procedural votes are excluded, I draw on data compiled by David Rohde (2004) for House roll call voting. Looking only at final passage votes and only those on House bills (rather than resolutions or amendments), I find that the percentage of roll call votes that are bipartisan (using the CQ definition) declined from approximately 80 percent in 1973 to 40 percent by 1994. Although there was an increase in bipartisanship under the Republicans, the overall trend of the series has been a strong decline in bipartisanship consistent with the aggregate roll call results.

the two parties are doing, it may miss additional and important variation. In particular, the CQ measure misses the extent of skew within voting (i.e., is it 90% of one party against 90% of another party or 52% of one party against 48% of another party) as well as whether Yea and Nay votes show the same patterns of bipartisanship. To parse out both of these elements in the analysis of bipartisanship, I calculate a 'Party Bipartisanship Score' for each vote, separately for the Yea and Nay Votes. For the Yea votes, the score is calculated as follows:

$$P_{ij} = \begin{cases} -1 \; if \; jth \; Yea \; vote \; on \; bill \; i \; is \; a \; Democrat \\ +1 \; if \; jth \; Yea \; vote \; on \; bill \; i \; is \; a \; Republican \end{cases}$$

$$B_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} |P_{ij}|}$$

Essentially, I subtract the number of Democrats voting Yea from the number of Republicans voting Yea and then divide by the total number of Yea votes on a bill. A similar measure is created for Nay votes. The resulting scale for Yea (Nay) votes ranges from -1 to +1, where -1 reflects votes where only Democrats voted Yea (Nay), +1 reflects votes where only Republicans voted Yea (Nay), and 0 reflects votes where the support from Democrats and Republicans was identical. Votes that are closer to 0 reflect greater bipartisanship and votes that are closer to -1 or +1 reflect greater partisanship.

Omitting unanimous and near unanimous (90% or more in favor) votes, I first plot the density of the scale by Congress for Yea votes when all House roll calls are included (Figure 2).[5] The trend over time has been an increase in density at the two poles of the distribution at the expense of the middle, or of the most bipartisan bills. A similar pattern occurs for Nay votes. In fact, Nay votes show even greater evidence of a reduction in bipartisan agreement. Restricting

[5] When unanimous and near unanimous votes are included, the vast majority of legislation is bipartisan. This further suggests that roll call vote analyses, which tend to omit unanimous and near unanimous votes because they do not provide additional information for distinguishing between the preferences of various members, are biased against finding bipartisan cooperation.

the analysis to final passage votes on House bills also shows a decline in bipartisanship. In contrast to the analysis of all votes, however, the final passage votes on the Yea side are skewed toward the majority party (the Democrats prior to the 104th Congress and the Republicans from the 104th forward) and votes on the Nay side are skewed toward the minority party. This skew is evidence of agenda control; the majority party is able to control the issues that came to votes in a way that allowed them to be the dominant group of proponents. In sum, bipartisan cooperation on roll call voting shows significant declines across the last three decades, particularly from the 1970s through the mid-1990s. This decline in bipartisanship is consistent with the rise in elite polarization.

[Figure 2 about here]

Section 3.2 Bipartisanship Evidence from Cosponsorship Coalitions

Bill sponsorship has long been understood as an effective and relatively easy way for members of Congress to become involved in the policy process. Similarly, cosponsoring legislation carries a number of possible benefits, both within Congress and among constituents. As such, cosponsorship has become a frequent activity in both the House and Senate in recent decades.

In 1967 the House passed a resolution allowing up to 25 cosponsors on a bill (Congressional Record 1967, 10708-12). Since it was first allowed in the House, cosponsorship has largely replaced the use of duplicate bills (Thomas and Grofman 1993), suggesting that members view cosponsorship in much the same way as they do sponsorship because they can make the same claims back in their constituencies. In the 95th Congress, the House passed H. Resolution 86, which allowed unlimited numbers of cosponsors and allowed cosponsorship even after the bill was in committee (Thomas and Grofman 1993). Since the 1970s, members in both

chambers have utilized cosponsorship frequently.

There are a number of reasons to believe that cosponsorship coalitions are a useful stage in the legislative process to assess bipartisanship. First, "cosponsorship provides House leaders with low-cost information about the political benefits of a bill" (Koger 2003, 227). If members who usually hold divergent positions on a bill both support a specific bill (a la Kessler and Krehbiel (1996)), then it is likely that the bill will be uncontroversial and, therefore, low cost for the leadership to move the bill to passage. As a result, the legislation may pass through a voice vote. Second, what a member cosponsors, and with whom they cosponsor, allows members to send messages to their constituents. "Even if a bill doesn't move, cosponsoring helps clarify your message. That way people know where you are... and that trickles down to constituents" (quoted in Koger 2003, 232).

To measure bipartisan cosponsorship, I utilize cosponsor data collected by James Fowler (Fowler 2006a; Fowler 2006b) that provides a matrix of all bills and cosponsors in a given Congress. I use this raw data to create bill level measures of bipartisanship for all House bills.[6] Before focusing on bipartisan cosponsorship, it is important to understand the trends in more general cosponsorship patterns. On the whole, the use of cosponsorship has increased in the House since the 93rd Congress (see Table 1). Whereas only one-quarter of House bills were cosponsored in the 93rd Congress, since the 99th Congress, more than half of all bills have been cosponsored. In the 108th Congress, over seventy percent of bills were cosponsored. The median number of cosponsors on a House bill (including those that are not cosponsored) has also risen over time. Among bills that are cosponsored, the median number of cosponsors has nearly

[6] I use only House bills throughout the analysis, omitting resolutions and amendments. Although all House bills are included in the analysis, omitting commemorative legislation, which coding is available for through 2002, does not change the results. The measures of bipartisanship with and without commemorative legislation are correlated at 0.98.

doubled in the period of analysis, from six in the 93rd Congress to eleven in the 105th through 108th Congresses. However, members are selective in their cosponsorship. No more than six percent of all cosponsored bills have more than a hundred cosponsors.

[Table 1 about here]

Since cosponsorship has not been analyzed as extensively as roll call votes, there are no standard measures of bipartisan cosponsorship. Therefore, this paper explores a number of possible specifications. I begin by creating a dichotomous measure of bipartisanship where bills are bipartisan if they are above the lower bound of bipartisanship on the scale and are partisan otherwise. Taking the simplest definition of bipartisanship – all cosponsored bills that are not unipartisan (where unipartisan refers to bills where all of the cosponsors are from the same party as the sponsor) – suggests that bills have been and continue to be overwhelmingly bipartisan. When all cosponsored bills are considered, bipartisanship occurs on more than two-thirds of cosponsored legislation. Looking at only bills with the median or more cosponsors, I find that an even higher proportion of these bills are bipartisan, and that although there is some decline over time, it is a decline from 0.94 to 0.82, a low that was reached in both the 94th and 108th Congresses under relatively low and relatively high levels of polarization, respectively.

To prevent attributing bipartisanship to bills that merely have a single rogue member cosponsoring with members of the opposite party, I restrict my definition of bipartisanship to those bills that have at least twenty percent of the cosponsors from the party other than the original sponsor (see Figure 3).[7] When all House bills are considered, the proportion of bills that

[7] Additional definitions of bipartisanship, including a raw number of cosponsors from the opposing party (5, 10, and 20) as well as different percentages of cosponsors from the opposing party (20%, 30%, and 40%) have also been used for comparison. In all cases the pattern over time is similar with the primary difference being a shift in the intercept. A potential concern about the analysis presented above is that those bills classified as bipartisan may not be that different from those bills that are classified as partisan, particularly since the inferences are often made from a small number of cosponsors. To verify that those bills classified as bipartisan are distinct from those bills classified

are bipartisan increases over time, largely due to the overall increase in cosponsorship. Nonetheless, this is suggestive that bipartisanship has become an increasingly important tool for members despite the parallel rise in polarization. Between twenty and forty percent of all House bills are bipartisan. When the analysis is restricted to only cosponsored bills, I find that although there has been some movement and a slightly downward trend in bipartisanship over time, the magnitude of the change is surprisingly small. Over the entire period of the 93rd to 108th Congresses, the range of bipartisan cosponsorship is between 47% and 61%. The low point of 47% occurs in 1975, 1993, and 2004, under disparate polarization conditions.

[Figure 3 about here]

As done in the analysis of voting, I also create a party bipartisanship score for each bill. Since cosponsorship occurs only on the positive side, this is similar to looking at the Yea votes. I first create an index of party bipartisanship by adding +1 for every Republican cosponsor and -1 for every Democratic cosponsor (any Independents add 0) and then dividing by the number of cosponsors on a bill. The resulting index ranges from -1 to +1. The absolute value of the index indicates whether a bill is highly bipartisan (values close to 0) or highly partisan (values close to +/-1).

Looking at the density of the party bipartisanship scale, which ranges from -1 (purely

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as partisan in the analysis, I focus just on those bills that receive a roll call vote and examine the probability that each type of bill – partisan and bipartisan by cosponsorship - receives an bipartisan roll call vote. That is, of all bipartisan (or partisan) cosponsored bills that face a roll call vote, what proportion end up having a bipartisan roll call vote (as defined by the CQ measure)? Using data from the Policy Agendas Project, Rohde's dataset of House roll call votes, and my bipartisan bill cosponsorship measures indicates that between one-quarter and one-half of bills with bipartisan cosponsors that reach roll call votes result in a bipartisan vote. The average for 1973 through 2000 (the last year in which all three data sources are available) is just about one-third. In contrast, between one-twentieth and one-fifth (with an average of three-twentieths) of bills with partisan cosponsors that reach roll call votes result in a bipartisan vote. Although it is not impossible for partisan cosponsored bills to result in a bipartisan roll call vote, it is rare. In all years, bills with bipartisan cosponsorship coalitions are more likely to result in a bipartisan roll call vote than bills with partisan cosponsorship coalitions. This suggests that the cosponsorship measures are capturing important variation, and that the importance of this variation extends to voting patterns of the chamber as a whole.

partisan Democratic bill) to +1 (purely partisan Republican bill), for each House of Representatives from the 93rd to the 108th Congress indicates that bipartisanship persists. As seen in Figure 4, although the distribution of cosponsor coalitions is bimodal in the sense that there are a large number of both Democratic and Republican partisan bills, the middle (i.e., the most bipartisan bills) has not vanished over time. The primary change in the distribution of bills is that it has become less lopsided toward the Democratic side, particularly once the Republicans gained majority status. Whereas partisan bills used to be predominantly Democratic, there is a relative parity of Democratic and Republican partisan bills in more recent Congresses and a growth in moderately bipartisan bills on the Republican side. More on point for this analysis, however, is the finding that the center of distribution persists across time. If there is a decline in bipartisanship, we should have seen the density of both tails grow at the expense of the center, creating a greater U-shaped pattern over time.

[Figure 4 about here]

Using a continuous measure of the percent of cosponsors from the party opposite the party of the sponsor, reiterates the persistence of bipartisanship across time. This measure is similar to the party bipartisanship scale except that it directly accounts for the party of the bill's sponsor. Across the period of analysis, the mean percentage of bipartisan cosponsors fluctuates around 30%, indicating that, on average, one third of a bill's cosponsors are from the party opposite the party of the original bill sponsor.

Regressing each of the measures of bipartisanship on time reiterates the decline of bipartisanship on roll call votes but a greater persistence of bipartisanship on bill cosponsorship. Furthermore, since the correlation between time and polarization (using the difference in party means of Americans for Democratic Actions (ADA) scores) is 0.93, this approach sheds light on

the extent to which (both voting and cosponsorship-based) bipartisanship has declined as voting-based polarization has risen. Beginning with the CQ measure of all roll call votes, the estimated beta on time is -0.45 ($p < 0.05$). The magnitude of the effect increases when only final passage votes are included, to -0.85 ($p < 0.001$). In contrast, for the 20% definition of bipartisan bill cosponsorship, the estimated beta on time is -0.25 ($p < 0.01$). Similar patterns are found when bipartisanship is measured using the party bipartisanship scales. In this case, we expect the direction of the coefficient to be positive since lower absolute values of the scale reflect greater bipartisanship. Defining bipartisanship as the mean of the absolute value of the party scale (multiplied by 100), we get an estimated coefficient on time of 1.12 ($p < 0.001$) when looking at yea roll call votes, but a coefficient of -0.02 ($p = 0.72$) when looking at bill cosponsorship coalitions. Thus, regardless of the technique for estimating bipartisanship, bipartisan cooperation shows a greater decline in roll call votes than in bill cosponsorship coalitions.

4. Agenda Control and the Decline of Bipartisanship

At all stages of the legislative process, members are interested in reelection and how their actions help them get reelected. Members from districts that are competitive between the two parties seek to insulate themselves from competition from the opposing party. Members from districts that are highly partisan seek to insulate them from competition from within their own party. Given the same goal across the legislative process, why might voting show a greater decline in bipartisanship than the decline in bipartisanship in bill cosponsorship coalitions? There are three ways this difference might occur. First, agenda control by the leadership affects which bills face roll call votes (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Second, procedural decisions may affect the partisanship of the vote (Theriault 2008). Third, the possibility of party pressure or vote buying is more likely to occur at the roll call stage than at the

bill cosponsorship stage. This paper focuses on the impact of the first – congressional agenda control.

Cox and McCubbins (2005, 5) suggest that the primary tool of the majority party is picking which bills will be voted on at all, and only secondary do they focus on garnering enough votes to get a victory. The party leadership is wary to put up issues for votes that create divisions within their own party. In contrast, the leadership often has incentives to place issues up for votes that are expected to divide the parties, with their party coming out on the winning side. A CQ staff writer notes that, "The 2004 party unity scores reflect a continuing effort by party leaders to sharpen their distinctions and to rally their troops to vote in ways that highlight those distinctions" (Poole 2004, 2906). Republicans did not want to put issues on the agenda that would not pass or that would embarrass the president (who was popular within his own party at the time). He goes on to say that:

> Republican leaders followed a model they adopted in 2000, in which they carefully orchestrated what came to a vote and managed intraparty conflict to minimize dissent on the floor. In both the House and the Senate, there were fewer total roll call votes than in 2000, but the percentage of total votes that were party unity votes were somewhat higher in 2004 than in 2000. That is a reflection of the Republican leaders' choreography (Poole 2004).

Sarah Binder goes on to say that "The rules of the game are easy enough to manipulate by a majority party to foreclose opportunities to vote on alternatives that would attract bipartisanship" (quoted in Poole 2004).

Overtime, agenda control has contributed to an increasingly partisan roll call agenda. With the decline of Southern Conservatives in leadership positions in the Democratic Party in the 1970s, and their replacement with more liberal members, the party leadership became increasingly partisan over time (Manley 1973). Across the last few decades, the party leadership has had ideal point estimates (in either DW-NOMINATE or ADA scores) that place them as

more ideologically extreme than their party's median. This is in contrast to a previous era when conservative Southern Democrats held leadership positions. A second factor that may have made the roll call agenda increasingly partisan is the increased tracking of members' voting records by interest groups, again beginning in the 1970s. When special interest groups are watching members' behavior, the parties have greater incentives to select votes that pit the parties against each other, especially on those issues that the party relies on support or funding from an interest group. The fact that votes on those bills selected as most important by these interest groups tend to closely follow party lines attests to this dynamic (Snyder 1992).

In order to explore how the incidence of bipartisanship changes across stages of the legislative process, Figure 5 looks at the percentage of cosponsored bills that are bipartisan under the 20 percent definition for all House bills, for bills that reach roll call votes, and for bills that become public law. The lines are smoothed using a loess procedure that utilizes locally weighted polynomial regression. Here, higher percentages reflect greater bipartisanship. Comparing all cosponsored bills with bills that reach roll call votes, there is a greater decline in bipartisanship in those bills that face roll call votes than there is in overall bipartisan cosponsorship of legislation. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, there is a resurgence in bipartisanship in bills that reach roll calls. Looking at bills that become public law, these bills have been and continue to be overwhelmingly bipartisan. Combined, these findings suggest that the decline in bipartisanship evident in roll call voting is largely driven by the choice of which bills receive roll call votes.

[Figure 5 about here]

A second approach to distinguishing how agenda control may influence the measurement of bipartisanship is to look at the conditional probability of reaching a specific stage in the policy

making process given that a bill is either partisan or bipartisan in its cosponsorship coalition. Using the 20% definition of bipartisan legislation, I analyze both the conditional probability of reaching a roll call vote as well as the conditional probability of becoming a public law given that a bill is bipartisan (or partisan) (Table 2). In both cases, bipartisan bills have a greater probability of reaching the legislative stage than partisan bills. Like the previous analysis, however, I find different patterns over time in the conditional probability of reaching a roll call vote versus becoming a public law for bipartisan bills. Whereas the conditional probability of a partisan bill reaching a roll call vote slightly increases over time, the conditional probability of a bipartisan bill reaching a roll call vote generally declines from the 93rd (early 1970s) to the 103rd Congresses. The conditional probability that a bipartisan bill reaches a roll call vote increases only after the Republican takeover in the 104th Congress. In contrast, the probability of becoming public law given that a bill is bipartisan has nearly tripled between the 93rd and 108th Congresses. This suggests that legislation with bipartisan support early in the legislative process (as evidenced by its cosponsorship coalition) was increasingly prevented from reaching a roll call vote from the early 1970s through the mid-1990s but that it was increasingly likely to become law (most likely through a voice vote).

[Table 2 about here]

In sum, bipartisanship persists despite polarization both in the early and late stages of policy making (bill cosponsorship coalitions and public laws), and the decline of bipartisanship in voting appears to be related to the choice of bills that receive roll call votes. For all cosponsored bills, the proportion that is bipartisan is strikingly constant across time. While bipartisan bills may not outnumber partisan bills, bipartisanship in cosponsorship coalitions is nearly as common today as it was in the early 1970s. Looking at the final stage in the policy

making process (those bills that become law) legislation has been and continues to be bipartisan. Only when looking at House bills that reach roll call votes do we see a sizeable decline in bipartisanship. This suggests that using roll call votes may artificially increase the appearance of polarization and artificially decrease the appearance of bipartisanship.

5. Implications for Electoral Responsiveness

At the outset of this paper, I argued that the electoral incentives of members produce an equilibrium level of bipartisan cooperation. In the preceding section, I showed how aggregate measures of bipartisan cooperation differ depending on whether roll call votes or bill cosponsorship coalitions are used, and that changes in agenda control help account for the discrepancies. In this section, I return to the argument that members have electoral incentives to engage in bipartisanship, and explore how the different measures of legislative behavior provide vastly different stories of electoral responsiveness over time. Specifically, I examine whether members' responsiveness to their districts' preferences has changed over time, and whether roll call votes yield differing results than bill cosponsorship coalitions.

To measure the preferences of the district, I use the *Normal Presidential Vote* in the district, measured as the mean two party presidential vote in the previous two elections by the party of the Representative (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002).[8] For instance, if the member is a Republican I use the mean Republican presidential vote in the last two presidential elections and if the member is a Democrat I use the mean Democratic presidential vote in the last

[8] I use the normal presidential vote rather than the member's own past vote share because of concerns with foresight on the part of the legislator as well as incumbency advantage. If a member foresees the importance of appearing as bipartisan or partisan, his vote share is likely to reflect that. In effect, assuming any foresight by members means that their vote share, even at time *t-1*, is endogenous to their behavior. An additional problem is the personal vote for incumbents. That is, a large margin of victory may imply a partisan district or it may imply that a member has created a strong personal brand, potentially because of their responsiveness to the district.

two presidential elections.[9] The presidential vote has been found to be an excellent proxy of district-level partisanship, particularly since the 1990s (Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008).

There are a number of ways to look at legislative behavior for evidence of electoral responsiveness. In this section I use one roll-call based measures (party unity support scores) and one cosponsorship-based measure. The *Party Unity Support Score* calculate the percent of times that a member votes with his or her party on party unity votes (defined when a majority of Democrats vote against a majority of Republicans). As mentioned in previous sections, CQ classifies votes as either party unity or bipartisan. Thus, the logic of this measure, applied to the argument that members are electorally responsive, is that members in competitive districts should have lower party unity support scores than members in safe districts.[10] The drawback of this score is that it does not capture the relative frequency of party unity votes. Focusing on bill cosponsorship patterns for the dependent variable, I define a member's propensity for *Bipartisan Cosponsorship* as the percentage of bills they cosponsored that are bipartisan. Bipartisan is defined using the definition where at least twenty percent of the cosponsors are from the party opposite the party of the sponsor.

Looking at the correlation between the normal presidential vote in the district and each of these measures yields suggestive evidence of changes in representativeness over time (see Table 3). Both measures are correlated with the normal presidential vote but the extent of this

[9] In all analyses in this paper, all districts (where data is available) are included. This includes districts that were redistricted. Ideally, instances where a district boundary was redrawn would be omitted, and the normal presidential vote in subsequent years would be omitted to drop the presidential year in the first year after redistricting. However, the author's current data on redistricting only includes an indicator for whether a district is in a state that was redistricted, meaning that removing these cases leaves minimal observations in the 93rd (1972), 98th (1982), 103rd (1992), and 108th (2002) Congresses. As a result, redistricted cases are included and are a source of measurement error.

[10] A comparison has also been made using DW-NOMINATE scores, which include all non-unanimous (or highly lopsided) votes in the calculation of idea points. With these scores, the expectation is that members in competitive districts should have more moderate ideal points. The correlation between the normal presidential vote in a member's district and his/her NOMINATE score increases from 0.37 in the 93rd House to 0.58 in the 103rd House, but has declined in magnitude since the 104th Congress.

correlation changes over time. Although initially showing a relatively strong correlation with the normal vote, party unity support scores show a weakening relationship from the 97th to 102nd Congresses. In contrast, bipartisan cosponsorship measures show little to no relationship for the first part of the series, but a growing correlation since the 102nd Congress. Since the 103rd Congress, the correlation between the normal vote and members' bill cosponsorship coalitions has generally been larger in magnitude than the correlation between the normal vote and members' party unity support scores.

[Table 3 about here]

A second approach further parses out these patterns. I use a quasi-binomial model of legislative behavior, which accounts for the likelihood that a member engages in partisan (or bipartisan) behavior relative to the number of times they do not. In the case of party unity support scores, 'successes' in the model are votes with the party. In contrast, in the case of bipartisan cosponsorship, 'successes' in the model are bipartisan cosponsorship coalitions. The primary independent variable is the *Normal Presidential Vote* in the district. I allow this effect, as well as the intercept, to vary by Congress. Finally, I include a number of individual level covariates – member of the *Majority Party*, *Female*, *Age, Tenure*, and an indicator for whether the member holds a *Leadership* post (Speaker, Majority or Minority Leader, or Whip). For each of these control variables, the effects are constrained to be constant across time. A quasi-binomial, rather than a binomial model, is used in order to allow for over-dispersion. The model is specified as follows:

$$\binom{k_{it}}{n_{it}} \sim f(\alpha_t + \beta_t \, Normal\, Vote_{it} + \gamma \boldsymbol{X}_{it})$$

To assess the degree of responsiveness to the normal presidential vote over time I

examine the predicted probability of partisan support (or bipartisan cosponsorship) over the range of the normal presidential vote for each Congress. The calculation of the predicted probability holds all variables in the model except the *Normal Presidential Vote* at either their mean or median. Figure 6 presents the predicted probability of a member voting with his party on party unity votes for selected Congresses. The 95% confidence intervals are included in the dashed lines. Over time, we see both an intercept shift toward greater party support as well as a decrease in the slope, with a low in the 101st Congress. Switching our focus to bill cosponsorship coalitions, Figure 7 presents the predicted probability of cosponsoring a bipartisan bill for the same set of Congresses. Again, 95% confidence intervals are included. As expected, the slope of the line is in the opposite direction than in the previous table since we have changed to looking at bipartisanship (rather than partisanship). More important, however, is the different pattern that we observe over time. Here, we see little movement in the intercept over time and an increase in the steepness of the slope.

[Figure 6 about here]

[Figure 7 about here]

Whereas members' responsiveness to their districts declined in the roll call-based measure, it increased over time when using the bill cosponsorship measure. This result has significant implications both for the empirical study of Congress and representation as well as the normative interests in these questions. It is also worth noting that the increase in responsiveness of the cosponsorship measure corresponds time-wise to the low point of the roll call measure. Members of Congress may have realized that their roll call behavior placed them as out of step with their districts (potentially because of the types of bills that were selected to face roll call votes) and thus turned to other forms of legislative behavior to show responsiveness. In

sum, this section demonstrates that members' legislative behavior is a function of their district preferences but that where responsiveness occurs in the legislative process has changed over time.

6. Conclusions

This research finds that we can expect an equilibrium level of bipartisan cooperation, resulting from the electoral incentives of members, but that the stage of the legislative process in which we observe bipartisanship (and thus representation) has varied over time. Bipartisanship persists in bill cosponsorship coalitions, the stage where legislators are the most independent. In contrast, bipartisanship has seen a greater decline in roll call voting. Here, the decline in bipartisanship is largely the result of the selection of bills to face roll call votes.

These findings add to the growing literature that cautions against using aggregate roll call data as the basis of all legislative behavior measures (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008; Clinton 2007; Loewenberg 2008; Roberts 2007). With respect to academic work on preferences, polarization, and party power, this research points out the importance of looking beyond roll call votes to explore these relationships. Beyond the discussion of legislative organization and legislative behavior, my findings add to the growing literature on polarization and party strength. While scholars have noted the differences between elite and mass polarization, and have focused on similarities between citizens of red states and blue states (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004), my findings suggest this may occur at the congressional level as well. Using patterns of bill cosponsorship, I find that more common ground exists between members of opposing parties than is generally acknowledged. The appearance of growing partisan cohesion and polarization reflects how political parties utilize the congressional agenda. Like Cox and McCubbins (2005), I find that the party's ability to select issues for roll call votes has important consequences. In

this case, the probability that legislation with bipartisan support faces a roll call vote has varied over time. In effect, the political parties are selecting the level of party polarization that is observed by the public by selecting which bills face roll call votes.

Although bipartisanship on roll call votes has declined, bipartisanship on bill cosponsorship coalitions largely has not. In terms of the legislation that actually becomes law, bipartisanship was and is the norm. Although partisan behavior has always been a feature of Congress, the main finding of this work is that the relative frequency of partisan relative to bipartisan behavior has not dramatically changed in bill cosponsorship. These findings cast doubt on the claims that the polarization of American politics has led to highly partisan legislation and the breakdown of bipartisan compromises. Congress has remained representative of, and relatively responsive to, the more moderate public despite being characterized as increasingly partisan.

The findings in this paper spur research in two veins. First, research should focus further on the selection of bills to receive roll call votes. If much of the level of party polarization hinges on which bills receive roll call votes, why do political parties choose bipartisan bills at one point in time and partisan bills in another? Second, research should think beyond the case of the United States Congress and look at the comparable ability of the majority party to keep issues off of the agenda. Research in this area may be able to uncover differences in how bipartisan cooperation occurs across institutions.

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Table 1: Cosponsorship Summary Statistics

Congress	Number of House Bills	Proportion of Bills Cosponsored	Median # Cosponsors (all bills)	Median # Cosponsors (> 0 cosponsors)	Proportion of bills with 0-10 Cosponsors	Proportion of bills with >100 Cosponsors
93	17,690	0.28	0.00	6.00	0.60	0.00
94	15,863	0.36	0.00	6.00	0.61	0.00
95	14,414	0.40	0.00	6.00	0.59	0.00
96	8,455	0.37	0.00	6.00	0.57	0.02
97	7,457	0.42	0.00	7.00	0.59	0.03
98	6,442	0.49	0.00	7.00	0.56	0.04
99	5,753	0.56	1.00	9.00	0.51	0.04
100	5,585	0.60	1.00	9.00	0.47	0.05
101	5,977	0.62	2.00	9.00	0.48	0.05
102	6,212	0.60	2.00	10.00	0.49	0.05
103	5,310	0.62	2.00	10.00	0.50	0.04
104	4,344	0.63	2.00	10.00	0.51	0.05
105	4,874	0.67	3.00	11.00	0.47	0.05
106	5,681	0.67	3.00	11.00	0.48	0.06
107	5,767	0.68	3.00	11.00	0.47	0.05
108	5,431	0.72	4.00	11.00	0.49	0.06

Source: Calculated by author from cosponsorship matrices provided by James Fowler.

Table 2: Conditional Probability of Reaching a Roll Call or Public Law Given Being a Partisan/Bipartisan (20% Definition) Bill

Congress	Roll Call | Partisan	Roll Call | Bipartisan	Public Law | Partisan	Public Law | Bipartisan
93	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05
94	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.05
95	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.05
96	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.08
97	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.06
98	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.08
99	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.07
100	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.09
101	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.07
102	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
103	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
104	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.08
105	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.07
106	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.11
107	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.08
108	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.12

Source: Calculated by author from cosponsorship matrices provided by James Fowler and roll call data provided by Rohde (2004) and the Policy Agenda Project (data were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. Neither NSF nor the original collectors bear responsibility for the analysis reported here.).

Table 3: Correlation of Legislative Behavior with Normal Presidential Vote

Congress	Bipartisan Cosponsorship	Party Unity Support Score
93	0.03	0.43
94	0.13	0.41
95	0.04	0.43
96	-0.12	0.38
97	-0.22	0.27
98	-0.02	0.13
99	0.03	0.13
100	0.07	0.11
101	-0.16	0.16
102	-0.16	0.29
103	-0.55	0.45
104	-0.46	0.46
105	-0.55	0.36
106	-0.65	0.39
107	-0.63	0.36
108	-0.56	0.38

Source: Calculated by author from cosponsorship matrices provided by James Fowler and roll call data from Rohde (2004).

Figure 1: CQ Roll Call Bipartisanship Measures (House of Representatives, 1973-2004)



Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Regressing the percent of bipartisan roll call votes on time produces a coefficient of -0.45 ($p < 0.05$). When only final passage votes are included this increases to -0.85 ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 2: Party Bipartisanship in Roll Call Voting (All House Votes, Yea Votes)



Source: Calculated by the author from Rohde (2004) data. Regressing the mean of the absolute value of the party scale (*100) on time produces a coefficient of 1.12 ($p < 0.001$). When only final passage votes are included this decreases to 0.45 ($p < 0.01$).

Figure 3: Bipartisan Cosponsorship (At least 20% of Cosponsors from Party Opposite the Party of Sponsor, House of Representatives, 1973-2004)



Source: Calculated by author from cosponsorship matrices provided by James Fowler. Regressing the percent of cosponsored bills that are bipartisan on time produces a coefficient of -0.25 ($p < 0.01$). As a comparison, if the measure of bipartisanship is the mean of the percent of cosponsors opposite the party of the bill sponsor, the coefficient on time is -0.17 ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 4: Party Bipartisanship in Cosponsorship Coalitions



Source: Calculated by author from cosponsorship matrices provided by James Fowler. Regressing the mean of the absolute value of the party scale (*100) on time produces a coefficient of -0.02 (p – 0.72).

Figure 5: Bipartisan Cosponsorship by Stage of Policy Making (Percentage of Cosponsored Bills That Are Bipartisan by 20% Definition, Smoothed)



Source: Calculated by author from cosponsorship matrices provided by James Fowler and roll call data provided by Rohde (2004) and the Policy Agenda Project (data were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. Neither NSF nor the original collectors bear responsibility for the analysis reported here.).

Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities from Quasi-Binomial (Party Unity Support Score, Selected Congresses)



Source: Calculated by author. Full regression model available in online appendix.

Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities from Quasi-Binomial (Bipartisan Cosponsorship, Selected Congresses)



Source: Calculated by author. Full regression model available in online appendix.

Online Appendix

Table A1: Full Model Specification of Bipartisanship by Members of Congress

	Cosponsorship	Party Unity
Intercept	1.44***	-2.05***
	(0.144)	(0.209)
Majority Party Member	-0.476***	0.764***
	(0.013)	(0.0249)
Normal Presidential Vote in District	-0.0127***	0.0551***
	(0.0025)	(0.00379)
Female	-0.217***	-0.0146
	(0.0186)	(0.0411)
Age	0.00127*	-0.00421***
	(0.000634)	(0.00108)
Number of Congresses Served	-0.00338^	-0.0149***
	(0.00192)	(0.00318)
House Leadership	-0.386***	0.9***
	(0.0725)	(0.143)
94th Congress	-1.1***	0.056
	(0.184)	(0.252)
95th Congress	-0.32^	-0.513^
	(0.191)	(0.264)
96th Congress	0.329^	-0.341
	(0.196)	(0.275)
97th Congress	0.954***	0.81*
	(0.212)	(0.375)
98th Congress	-0.343^	1.59***
	(0.185)	(0.312)
99th Congress	-0.172	1.75***
	(0.174)	(0.274)
100th Congress	-0.273	1.97***
	(0.17)	(0.278)
101st Congress	0.188	1.69***
	(0.168)	(0.277)
102nd Congress	0.0661	1.38***
	(0.168)	(0.271)
103rd Congress	0.839***	0.44
	(0.201)	(0.331)
104th Congress	0.401^	-0.00238
	(0.215)	(0.318)
105th Congress	0.938***	0.645^
	(0.184)	(0.329)
106th Congress	1.35***	0.13
	(0.177)	(0.357)
107th Congress	1.03***	0.951*
	(0.175)	(0.404)

108th Congress	0.539**	1.58***
	(0.172)	(0.348)
109th Congress	0.248	1.27***
	(0.178)	(0.346)
94th Congress x Normal Vote	0.00855*	0.00238
	(0.00335)	(0.00489)
95th Congress x Normal Vote	0.00457	0.0111*
	(0.00347)	(0.00509)
96th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.00247	0.0112*
	(0.00354)	(0.00531)
97th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.00556	-0.0122^
	(0.00374)	(0.00697)
98th Congress x Normal Vote	0.00462	-0.024***
	(0.00329)	(0.00582)
99th Congress x Normal Vote	0.00163	-0.0238***
	(0.00309)	(0.0051)
100th Congress x Normal Vote	0.00462	-0.0253***
	(0.00303)	(0.00518)
101st Congress x Normal Vote	-0.00249	-0.0225***
	(0.00298)	(0.00517)
102nd Congress x Normal Vote	-0.00433	-0.0135**
	(0.00298)	(0.00512)
103rd Congress x Normal Vote	-0.0202***	0.00928
	(0.00354)	(0.00625)
104th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.0117**	0.0167**
	(0.00377)	(0.00596)
105th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.0209***	0.00265
	(0.00317)	(0.00604)
106th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.0252***	0.0127^
	(0.00307)	(0.00656)
107th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.0214***	0.00324
	(0.003)	(0.00738)
108th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.0159***	-0.00358
	(0.00296)	(0.00644)
109th Congress x Normal Vote	-0.013***	-0.000174
	(0.00306)	(0.00634)
N	7385	7412
Log Likelihood	—	—

Standard errors in parentheses.
^$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.