**Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress:
Evidence from Survey Experiments**

Laurel Harbridge
College Fellow, Department of Political Science
Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research
Northwestern University
l-harbridge@northwestern.edu

Neil Malhotra
Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract

Does partisan conflict damage citizens' perceptions of Congress? If so, why has partisan polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the "electoral connection" by exploring the mass public's attitudes towards partisan conflict via two survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of individual members and Congress as a whole. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party identification with respect to evaluations of individual members. Independents and weak partisans are more supportive of members that espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution, and offers new insights into our understanding of "Fenno's paradox," or the tendency for voters to approve of individual members while disapproving of Congress as a whole. A paradoxical source of this heterogeneity—beyond the common explanation that members run against Washington—is that citizens' displeasure with discord in Congress as a macro-level institution is due to their support of those same behaviors performed at the micro-level by members of that institution.

The rise in partisan polarization since the 1970s has been one of the most extensively studied topics in congressional scholarship in recent years (e.g., Aldrich et al. 2002; Han and Brady 2007; McCarty et al. 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Theriault 2008a). Most of the literature on polarization in Congress has focused on the behavior of legislators themselves within the framework of the institution, hoping to identify both the causes and consequences of the increasing partisan divide (e.g. Cox and Katz 2002; McCarty et al. 2006; Roberts and Smith 2003; Stonecash et al. 2002). Less research has focused on citizens' attitudes towards party conflict and whether increasing polarization is consistent with members' electoral incentives. In this article, we seek to unpack the "the electoral connection" via an examination of the mass public's attitudes towards partisan conflict in Congress. To do so, we conducted two original survey experiments as part of the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in which we manipulated characteristics of individual members and Congress, and then measured people's attitudes towards individual members and the institution as a whole.

We build on previous research that has used aggregate and individual-level data to show that partisan conflict has decreased Americans' confidence in and approval of Congress as an institution. In a recent paper published in this journal, Ramirez (2009) found that increases in the proportion of party-line votes decreases aggregate measures of congressional approval. Similarly, analyses of individual-level survey data demonstrate that Americans' perceptions of acrimony and bickering between political parties have fostered negative attitudes towards Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Durr et al. 1997). While these findings demonstrate an important consequence of increased party conflict, they do raise an important question: Why would members of Congress behave in a partisan manner if it adversely affects how they are viewed by the public? Existing explanations rest on stories of party pressure or members being out of step with the electorate. Conversely, we suggest that electoral responsiveness may be compatible with these patterns. Via individual-level, experimental data, we show that individual members—particularly those from safe districts—do not have electoral incentives to act in a bipartisan manner and contribute to the collective good of overall congressional approval.

Our findings also re-conceptualize previous explanations of public attitudes towards Congress positing that the public's negative perception of the institution stems from members denigrating it for electoral benefit. Early work by Fenno (1975, 1978) observed that people are generally favorable toward their own member of Congress, but are much less positive in their evaluations of Congress more generally, consistent with members running *for* Congress by running *against* Congress. Subsequent work on "Fenno's paradox" suggests that people use different criteria for evaluating their own member than for evaluating Congress as a whole. For instance, Parker and Davidson (1979) and Born (1990) argue that whereas Congress is judged (poorly) on the basis of the process and output of lawmaking, individual members are judged (favorably) on the basis of constituency service and personal characteristics. Actions such as casework and position-taking can assist members in building a personal vote and increasing support among their constituents (Cain et al. 1987) but may not translate into positive evaluations of Congress as an institution. Mutz and Flemming (1999) suggest a social-psychological processes of negative perceptual biases when making evaluations in the aggregate, combined with positive perceptual biases when evaluating the local or personal, leading citizens to use different criteria when evaluating Congress versus individual Congresspersons.

In contrast, our findings offer an alternative understanding of Fenno's paradox, suggesting that even when citizens evaluate *similar* criteria, what people want from individual members is different from what they want from Congress as a whole. Although the public generally rebukes Congress in the aggregate for partisan bickering, some citizens reward individual members for eschewing bipartisan cooperation. Hence, we present a new paradox: voters' displeasure with discord in Congress as a macro-level institution is due to their support of those same behaviors performed at the micro-level by members of that institution. Simply put, citizens disapprove of Congress because it is comprised of officials with characteristics they like. This paradox is explained by some voters' inconsistent standards of evaluating similar behaviors by level of the institution.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we provide a theoretical basis for our hypotheses concerning how different segments of the public respond to partisan activity in Congress. Additionally, we present some empirical regularities on district preferences and the degree of partisan behavior to motivate the analyses. We then present the designs of the two experimental studies, the results, and their implications for the study of polarization and party conflict in Congress.

Partisan Conflict and the Electoral Connection

Challenging Downs' (1957) prediction that politicians should converge to the position of the median voter, scholars have recently asked, "Whatever happened to the median voter? Rather than attempt to move her 'off the fence' or 'swing' her from one party to another, today's campaigners seem to be ignoring her" (Fiorina 1999). Although it is unlikely that complete convergence occurs between candidates (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Miller and Stokes 1963), many scholars have nonetheless suggested that members seek to be representative of their constituents lest they face electoral defeat (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Erikson 1978; Erikson and

Wright 1980).

In contrast to solely focusing on electoral competition in a Downsian space, recent work on legislative behavior has taken an alternative approach to understanding representation and non-convergence to the median by examining the tensions members can face between their party and constituency, particularly for cross-pressured members in competitive districts. This research suggests that some members find it easier to converge to the median than others. Many studies of political parties focus on the positive electoral benefits of the party brand and the need for collective action in order to enact a legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Parties provide a number of tangible resources to members including campaign funding, valuable committee assignments, and deal-making to shepherd legislation introduced by the member (Smith 2007). Members who are loyal to the party and vote the party line are much more likely to receive these benefits than are disloyal members. Much of this research suggests that there are benefits to voting with the party even if a member's district preferences lean away from the party position on a particular bill (Aldrich 1995; Rohde 1991). Thus, partisan conflict in Congress may reflect party influence on members (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006).

In many cases, members' partisan and constituent interests are reinforcing. However, some members are pulled in opposite directions by party and constituency interests (Bond and Fleisher 1990). These cross-pressured members may have the most to lose from engaging in partisan behavior. Many party theorists find that members who are cross-pressured by their party and constituency may be able to break party discipline on certain votes. As noted by Lebo et al. (2007), party unity is a double-edged sword—it increases the likelihood of legislative success but can also expose members in moderate districts to electoral defeat. Similarly, Patty (2008) notes that a “fundamental tension occurs when [a] member’s individual and collective interests are in conflict” (640).

The rise of polarization in Congress since the 1970s has led scholars to question whether members are following the party rather than their constituents, leading to a decline in responsiveness to constituent interests and thus to the median voter (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006). Our analysis suggests that party polarization is not incompatible with responsiveness to a member’s constituents, as members may focus their actions on winning support in a narrower constituency than the geographic constituency (Fenno 1978). In particular, we focus on the differential preferences of strong partisans and other individuals (including weak partisans and independents), whose electoral influence may vary by district type.

In addition to party pressure, primary competition may cause members not to adopt the preferences of the median constituent in their districts. A member may face a competitive primary election challenge from within his or her own party (Brady et al. 2007) and/or a strong general election challenge from the opposing party (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002). Previous research has found that the electoral stage at which members expect an electoral challenger affects legislative behavior and coalition formation (Kanthak and Crisp 2005; Crisp et al. 2004). The logic is that members who represent competitive districts (i.e., those that the opposing party has a chance of winning), and where the challenge is likely to come in a general election, will have the incentive to work across the aisle and engage in bipartisan collaboration. In contrast, members who represent districts that are safely Democratic (or Republican), and thus where the challenge is more likely to come in a primary election, may engage in partisan behavior in an attempt to shore up support from strong partisans, who make up a larger portion of the primary electorate (Norrander 1989; Geer 1988; Grofman 1993). While competitive primary and general elections are not mutually exclusive, we can think of members as focusing on gaining support from specific reelection constituencies, which will be related to where they anticipate challengers. Further, even in the general election, strong partisans are more likely to turn out to vote (e.g. Wattenberg and Brians 1999),[1] and the median voter in these districts is more likely to be a strong partisan, thereby incentivizing the member to engage in partisan legislative discord (consistent with electorally-responsive behavior).

Hence, building on Mayhew's (1974) central premise that members of Congress are "single-minded reelection seekers," we argue that the electoral incentives of members influence the level of partisan conflict in Congress.[2] Following Ramirez (2009), we use the term "partisan conflict" loosely to refer to any outcome or scenario where Democrats and Republicans do not appear to be working together to achieve common goals.[3] This includes party-line voting on roll calls, partisan composition of cosponsorship coalitions, acrimonious floor speeches and rhetoric, and the use of procedural tactics against the opposing party.[4] For instance, studies of partisan polarization in Congress consider partisan homogeneity in roll-call voting as a sign of conflict and a lack of bipartisan cooperation. In conceptualizing party conflict, we purposely adopt a broad definition since citizens may have differing interpretations and reactions to various forms of congressional behavior. We hypothesize that voters who are Independents and weak partisans prefer that their member engage in bipartisan activities whereas strong partisans prefer partisan

[1] For instance, in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, strong partisans exhibited a turnout rate eleven percentage points higher than weak partisans and Independents (p<.001). An even larger difference of twenty-one percentage points was observed in the 2008 American National Election Study (p<.001).

[2] Although the survey experiments in this paper focus on the observable aspects of legislative behavior, it is important to note that in the real world legislative behavior may reflect both preferences and strategies. That is, when a member of Congress chooses a certain mix of partisan and bipartisan behaviors that reflect the preferences of the district median, this may reflect the member's own preferences (in which case the voters were able to select a member whose own positions reflect the median voter) or it may reflect a strategic choice by the member.

[3] Ramirez (2009) specifically operationalizes partisan conflict as the percentage of roll call votes in which 75% of Democrats vote against 75% of Republicans.

[4] We will not be examining all of these sources of partisan conflict, but rather only those which are most empirically tractable to test comparative statics in an experimental setting.

behavior as a result of their greater likelihood of agreement with, and attachment to, their political party. Accordingly, members of Congress have incentives to exhibit a certain mix of bipartisan and partisan behavior depending on the composition of their districts and which electoral stage they expect competition.

Aggregate-level data show that members from competitive (general election) districts are less likely to engage in partisan conflict and more likely behave in a manner that might be classified as bipartisan. These behaviors include: (1) voting with opposing partisans on roll calls with greater frequency; and (2) joining cosponsorship coalitions with members of the opposing party. With respect to roll call voting, Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) analyze congressional elections from 1956-1996 and find that, when controlling for district preferences (measured by the normal presidential vote) and a range of other factors, members with more extreme voting records (i.e., more liberal or conservative than the district median voter) are less likely to be reelected as compared to their colleagues whose voting behavior better represents their districts. In every election year between 1956 and 1996, roll call extremity has a negative effect on members' general election vote share, even when controlling for factors such as challenger quality and spending. Substantively, a 25-point shift in a member's Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score away from the median voter (an approximately one standard deviation shift) decreases a member's vote share by 1 to 3 percentage points (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, 133). They find that this pattern is true across types of districts. For members in both marginal and safe seats, the extremity of a member's ADA score relative to his or her district's preferences adversely affects the probability of reelection. Since competitive districts have more moderate median voters, members who represent these districts will have more moderate voting records than members of more liberal (or conservative) districts where the median voter pulls the member toward the ideological poles.

We find similar results using bill cosponsorship coalitions—members from more centrist districts are more likely to engage in bipartisan cosponsorship. In some ways, cosponsorship is an even better metric than roll call votes in assessing strategic decision making on the part of congresspersons because bill cosponsorship is in the purview of individual members and is less likely to be subject to agenda control (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Krehbiel 1995). Whereas previous work on cosponsorship tends to focus on the frequency of cosponsoring (Campbell 1982) or on the dyadic patterns of cosponsorship (Fowler 2006), we focus on the relative incidence of partisan and bipartisan cosponsorship, similar to roll call analyses that examine the extremity of a member's voting position.[5] In Figure 1, we plot district[6] preferences (proxied by the normal presidential vote[7] in the district) against the percentage of the member's cosponsorships that are bipartisan for the 103rd-109th Congresses. Lower values of the normal vote indicate districts that are more competitive for the incumbent party. A member is coded as engaging in a bipartisan cosponsorship if he or she cosponsors a bill on which at least 20% of the bill's cosponsors are from the party opposite the party of the bill's original sponsor.[8] All other

[5] There is a smaller body of work that has looked more directly at the bipartisan nature of cosponsorship coalitions, including the signaling explanation posited by Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), as well as working papers on bipartisan cooperation and polarization (Theriault 2008b; Harbridge 2009). The latter work examines differences in patterns of bipartisanship between cosponsorship and roll call votes. Our analysis uniquely explores the effects of district characteristics on bipartisan cosponsorship.

[6] Cosponsorship data from Fowler (2006). All districts (where data are available) are included. This includes districts that were redistricted. Ideally, instances where a district boundary was redrawn would be omitted. However, our data only include an indicator for whether a district is in a state that was redistricted, meaning that removing these cases leaves minimal observations in the 103rd (1992), and 108th (2002) Congresses. As a result, redistricted cases are a source of measurement error.

[7] Following Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) and Levendusky et al. (2008), we operationalize the normal presidential vote as the mean two-party presidential vote in the previous two elections by the party of the incumbent representative. For instance, if the member is a Republican we use the mean Republican presidential vote in the last two presidential elections and if the member is a Democrat we use the mean Democratic presidential vote in the last two presidential elections. Hence, higher values of this variable indicate more extreme districts whereas lower values represent more moderate, competitive districts.

[8] Results are consistent when using alternate definitions of bipartisanship, including a 30%, 40%, and 50% cutoff. Online Appendix Table A1 replicates the OLS results in Table 1 using these alternate specifications. In each case,

cosponsorships are considered partisan cosponsorships. As is clear from the figure, members from moderate districts (i.e. normal votes near 50% or less) are more likely to cosponsor legislation with members of the opposite party.

This relationship is robust to the inclusion of several member-level control variables (majority party status, gender, age, tenure, leadership position) and Congress-level controls—divided government, majority seat share, and presidential election years.[9] As shown in the first two columns of Table 1, there exists an inverse relationship between the normal vote and bipartisan cosponsorship activity, either estimating an OLS model or a quasi-binomial model[10] to predict the frequency of bipartisan cosponsorship. Moving from a competitive district where the normal presidential vote is 50% to a moderately-safe district where the normal vote is 60% corresponds to a 6.1-percent decrease in the percent of bills cosponsored by the member that are bipartisan. Over the period of analysis, the median member cosponsored 91 bipartisan bills (out of a total of 163 cosponsorship) so a 6.1% effect is equivalent to changing the number of bipartisan bills by 9. Alternatively, we can consider the percentage of bills that a member

---

the normal presidential vote has a significant and negative effect on the frequency of bipartisan cosponsorship. Additionally, to verify that those bills classified as bipartisan are distinct from those bills classified as partisan in the analysis (using the 20% threshold), we focused on just those bills that receive a roll call vote and examined the probability that each type of bill—partisan and bipartisan by cosponsorship—receives a bipartisan roll call vote. That is, of all bipartisan (or partisan) cosponsored bills that face a roll call vote, what proportion end up having a bipartisan roll call vote (as defined by the CQ measure)? Data from the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones 2000), Rohde's dataset of House roll call votes (2004), and the bill cosponsorship measures indicate that between one-quarter and one-half of bills with bipartisan cosponsors that reach roll call votes result in a bipartisan vote. The average for 1993 through 2000 (the last year in which all three data sources are available) is one-third. In contrast, between one-twentieth and one-fifth (with an average of three-twentieths) of bills with partisan cosponsors that reach roll call votes result in a bipartisan vote. Although it is not impossible for partisan cosponsored bills to result in a bipartisan roll call vote, it is rare. In all years, bills with bipartisan cosponsorship coalitions are more likely to result in a bipartisan roll call vote than bills with partisan cosponsorship coalitions. This suggests that the cosponsorship measure is capturing important variation, and that the importance of this variation extends to voting patterns in the chamber as a whole.

[9] Data from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2008), the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (1997), Volden and Wiseman (2009), and updated by the authors.

[10] The quasi-binomial model examines the number of successes that occur in a specific number of trials. Applied to the question at hand, "successes" are bipartisan cosponsorship coalitions and the number of trials is the number of bills that a member cosponsors. A quasi-binomial, rather than a binomial, model is used to allow for over-dispersion in the dependent variable.

cosponsors and its range in the data. For the period of analysis, the interquartile range is bounded by 47% and 65% bipartisan cosponsorships, with a median of 56%. Thus, the magnitude of the effect of the normal vote is quite substantial when considering where in the distribution it would move a member. Looking at a few examples from California illustrates this pattern. The normal presidential vote in Representative Jim Costa's (CA-20, Dem) Fresno district is 51% Democratic and in the 109th Congress 59% of the bills that he cosponsored were bipartisan. In contrast, the normal presidential vote is 87% Democratic in the nearby Berkeley and Oakland areas and only 24% of the bills that Representative Barbara Lee (CA-9, Dem) cosponsored were bipartisan.

District preferences not only explain between-member variation in bipartisan activity but also within-member variation across time. In the third and fourth columns of Table 1, we include fixed effects for members.[11] In both the OLS and quasi-binomial models, even when controlling for member fixed effects and Congress-level variables, the normal presidential vote exerts a significant negative effect on bipartisan cooperation. Drawing on the third model, a 10 percent increase in the normal vote is associated with nearly a 2% decrease in bipartisan cooperation. While significantly smaller than the effects that examine variation between members, this effect still shows the pull of a member's constituency. That is, when a member's district becomes more partisan, the member's bipartisan cooperation declines. Indeed, there have been some notable cases of members becoming more frequent bipartisan cosponsors as their district becomes more moderate. Consider the example of Steve Chabot (OH-1), a Republican who represented southwestern Ohio from 1995 to 2008. Between the 104th and 107th Congresses[12] the normal Republican presidential vote in this district declined from 57% to 47%. Over this period, the percent of his cosponsorship coalitions that were bipartisan increased from 41% to 55%.

[11] Due to the inclusion of member fixed effects, time-invariant variables drop out of the model specifications.
[12] The 108th and 109th Congresses are omitted from this illustration because of redistricting.

Certainly, district preferences are not the only factors that explain legislative bipartisanship.[13] However, these patterns suggest that bipartisan cooperation, like patterns of legislative extremism more generally, are strongly related to district preferences. Further, the propensity to reach across the aisle is not simply a fixed characteristic of a member. Rather, it endogenously changes in response to electoral and strategic incentives. The implication of this fact is that district-level changes in the composition of voters—either through redistricting, mobility, or political and demographic shifts—can significantly alter the legislative dynamics in Congress even if the composition of the legislature remains the same.

These empirical patterns suggest that there may be a differential desire for bipartisanship within the public. Whereas voters who are strong partisans may not want their co-partisan representative to compromise his or her beliefs in order to reach agreement with the other party, people less attached to or aligned with a political party may believe that compromise and collaboration is the basis of effective government. Hence, underlying district preferences should lead some members to engage in behavior contributing to party conflict and others to engage in bipartisan behavior. The experiments presented in this paper explore the individual-level dynamics that underlie this electoral connection.

Experimental Studies

To empirically evaluate whether partisan polarization affects mass perceptions of Congress as an institution and support for individual members, we conducted two survey experiments over the Internet as part of the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

[13] Bipartisan cooperation could occur through shared features of members that are unrelated to district preferences. A full dyadic member-to-member model specification with controls for region/state and veterans status, among other things, is beyond the scope of the analysis (which looks at each member across all bills). However, even when we condition on region and veterans status, the effect of the normal presidential vote on bipartisan cosponsorship frequency is statistically significant in all specifications (see Online Appendix Tables A2 and A3).

(CCES) administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. Political behavior and attitude research suggests that how voters respond to the institution versus individual members is not clear-cut. Whereas theories of partisan cue-taking and partisan rationalization (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Rahn 1993) would predict that strong partisans will prefer conflict as a feature of both members and the institution, previous findings from Congressional scholarship (as well as recent observational survey data) suggest that the public should broadly be opposed to acrimony in all cases (e.g. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Ramirez 2009; Pew 2010).

The CCES pre-election wave was conducted during October 2008 and the post-election wave was conducted two weeks following Election Day (November 4, 2008). In addition to common content questions administered to 32,800 respondents, 1,000 respondents participated in our experimental module.[14] All experiments were conducted in the pre-election wave, and were placed after the comment content on the questionnaire.

The CCES uses YouGov/Polimetrix's matched random sample methodology (Ansolabehere 2008). This procedure uses matching to select representative samples from non-randomly selected pools of respondents. After a target sample, or random sample from the target population, is drawn, each member of the target sample is matched to an individual in the pool of opt-in survey respondents. Matching is based on demographics, voter, and consumer characteristics. The matched cases are then weighted using propensity scores. The resulting sample is a nationally representative panel of U.S. adults. Differences between this method and random digit dialing methods administered during the 2008 election were slight (Ansolabehere 2008). As shown in Online Appendix A4, distributions of gender, age, race, education, and partisanship were generally similar to those in the 2008 American National Election Study,

[14] Respondents participated in both experiments, thereby creating a 2x2 design. Using Transue et al.'s (2009) procedures, we find no spillover effects between the different experiments.

which was administered face-to-face to a probability sample. All of the experiments presented actual data to respondents and required no deception, thereby enhancing the ecological validity of the findings. Randomization was successful. As shown in Online Appendix A5, experimental conditions were balanced on observables.

Study 1: Evaluations of Congress

Although the dominant view has been that "members are not held individually responsible for their collective performance in governing" (Jacobson 2004, 227) and Fenno (1978) suggests that members of Congress can make up for negative evaluations of Congress by running against Washington, there are a number of recent studies that indicate that aggregate approval or confidence of Congress is politically important. First, approval of individual members and approval of Congress track closely over time even if they have very different intercepts (Kimball 2005; Born 1990; Ramirez 2009). Thus, "an unpopular Congress may harm the reelection chances of incumbents and members of the majority party" (Kimball 2005, 64). Recent work by Jones (2010) finds that party polarization has increased the magnitude of the relationship between congressional approval and incumbent vote shares. Second, negative evaluations of Congress may discourage prospective politicians from serving (Hibbing and Theiss-More 2001, 145; Kimball 2005). Third, negative evaluations may disincentivize current politicians from tackling difficult, but important policy issues (Hibbing and Theiss-More 2001, 145). Finally, low levels of trust in government may lead the public to be less supportive of policies that incur real costs but yield little direct benefits to some citizens, including race-conscious and social welfare policies (Hetherington and Globetti 2002).

Design

To examine how perceptions of party conflict affect opinions of Congress as an institution, we conducted a survey experiment in which we manipulated the extent to which Congress was portrayed as being a place where members of opposite parties cooperated and worked together. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first "partisan" condition, respondents were provided the following information:

> In a recent session of the United States House, about 30% of legislation that was introduced had bipartisan support – that is, it had support from significant numbers of both Democrats and Republicans.

In the second "bipartisan" condition, respondents were shown the following blurb:

> In a recent session of the United States House, about 80% of legislation that became law had bipartisan support – that is, it had support from significant numbers of both Democrats and Republicans.

The information in both blurbs is accurate. Note that we are able to manipulate the level of party conflict and still remain truthful by distinguishing between bill introductions and bill passage. Although this distinction may be substantively meaningful to some respondents, we believe that is unlikely, especially since respondents saw only one of the two blurbs. More important, although that technical distinction might affect their view of specific pieces of legislation, it should not affect how they view the institution as a whole. Hence, our manipulation is able to present respondents with two different levels of party conflict while holding other features of Congress constant.

Measures

After the blurb about the extent of partisan conflict was presented, respondents were asked: "Based on this information, how much confidence do you have in the U.S. Congress?"[15] with the following five response options: "a great deal," "a lot," "a moderate amount," "a little,"

[15] The question wording of "confidence in Congress" was adapted from an item used in Harris surveys. The polychoric correlation between confidence in Congress and approval of Congress (which was asked as part of the common content questionnaire) is $r = .70$.

and "none." The main independent variable was a dummy indicating whether respondents were assigned to the condition presenting Congress as bipartisan, with the partisan presentation as the baseline. Although we did not explicitly provide a control condition,[16] the common content did include an item asking respondents about their overall approval of Congress on a four-point scale ranging from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve" (question CC335con) which can be used as a baseline.

Methods

In order to estimate the overall treatment effect, we estimated the following regression model via ordinary least squares:[17]

$$C_i = \alpha + \beta_1 B_i + \beta_2 SR_i + \beta_3 WR_i + \beta_4 WD_i + \beta_5 SD_i + \boldsymbol{\gamma}\mathbf{x_i} + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where i indexes respondent, C_i represents confidence in Congress, B_i represents the bipartisanship treatment dummy, SR_i, WR_i, WD_i, and SD_i are dummy variables representing strong Republicans, weak Republicans, weak Democrats, and strong Democrats, respectively (with Independents as the omitted group),[18] $\mathbf{x_i}$ represents a vector of demographic controls, and ε_i represents stochastic error. The coefficient estimate of β_1 represents the treatment effect of the bipartisan information.

To assess the moderating effect of partisanship, we estimated the following model:

---

[16] As Gaines et al. (2007) argue, a control condition is not necessary in this study because we are not concerned with whether the 30% figure or the 80% figure is driving the effect. Rather, we are only interested in testing the comparative static that increasing the perception of bipartisan activity increases confidence in Congress as an institution.

[17] For simplicity of interpretation, we estimated all regressions via ordinary least squares. However, we re-estimated all models using ordered logistic regression and the results were statistically and substantively similar (see Online Appendix Tables A6 and A7). Freedman (2008b, 2008a) argues that including pre-treatment control variables in a regression framework when analyzing experimental data can produce bias in finite samples. However, Freedman's concerns only apply to analyses with $N < 500$. Moreover, Green (2009) shows that Freedman employs non-standard modeling assumptions to achieve his unbiasedness results and that for all practical purposes a sample size of 20 is sufficient to estimate unbiased treatment effects and correct standard errors.

[18] We used the standard question used by the ANES to assess partisanship: "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" We considered the follow-up question which assessed whether individuals were "strong" or "not strong" Republicans and Democrats to separate strong and weak partisans. We treated those who did not answer "Republican" or "Democrat" as Independents.

$$C_i = \alpha + \beta_1 B_i + \beta_2 SR_i + \beta_3 WR_i + \beta_4 WD_i + \beta_5 SD_i + \beta_6(SR_i \times B_i) + \beta_7(WR_i \times B_i) + \beta_8(WD_i \times B_i) + \beta_9(SD_i \times B_i) + \boldsymbol{\gamma}\mathbf{x_i} + \varepsilon_i. \quad (2)$$

β_1 represents the treatment effect among Independents. The interpretation of the interaction terms is as follows. $\beta_1 + \beta_6$ represents the treatment effect among strong Republicans whereas β_6 represents the *difference* in the treatment effect between strong Republicans and Independents.

We included control variables for age, gender, race, education, and media use.[19] Although the treatment was randomly assigned and we can obtain an unbiased estimate of the causal effect in the absence of these controls, we included them to increase the efficiency of the estimates. Additionally, they provide baselines with which to assess the substantive significance of the treatment effects. All variables were coded to lie between zero and one, meaning that we can interpret a one-unit change in an independent variable (i.e., going from the lowest value to the highest value) as inducing a 100β percentage-point change in the dependent variable.[20]

Results

When the legislative activity of Congress is framed as being characterized by partisan conflict, people have less confidence in the legislative branch as an institution. As illustrated in Figure 2, confidence in Congress is higher among *all* partisan groups in the "bipartisan" condition compared to the "partisan" condition. Regression results confirm this pattern. As shown in the first column of Table 2, the treatment information showing that 80% of passed legislation has bipartisan support significantly increases confidence in Congress as compared to information showing a much lower rate of bipartisanship on introduced legislation (β_1 = .031,

[19] We also estimation specifications controlling for a consumer confidence index and obtained similar results (see Online Appendix Tables A8 and A9). We do not report these results here because of missing data on the consumer confidence measures.

[20] Age was coded to lie between 0 (youngest person in dataset) and 1 (oldest person in dataset). For gender and race, males and non-whites were the excluded categories, respectively. Education was linearly coded to lie on a four-point scale between 0 (less than a high school education) and 1 (college graduates). Media use was linearly coded to lie on a five-point scale between 0 (used zero media sources) and 1 (used four media sources).

p=.021, two-tailed). We can use the estimates of the effects of party identification on the dependent variable to put this treatment effect into context. Given that the survey was conducted when Democrats controlled both chambers, it is unsurprising that Democrats have more confidence in Congress than Republicans. Strong Republicans' level of confidence was .09 units less than Independents, and strong Democrats' level of confidence was .16 units more than Independents. The effect of the bipartisan framing is about 12% of the effect of party identification. This is quite large given that party identification is considered to be one of the most important explanatory variables in the study of political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960).

To calibrate these results against a baseline, we can compare them to respondents' overall approval of Congress. Prior to receiving any treatment information, 47% of respondents strongly disapproved of Congress' job performance. 46% of respondents reported having little or no confidence in Congress in the "bipartisan" condition; this figure was 55% in the "partisan" condition. Although we did not include an explicit manipulation check,[21] these results suggest that the treatments achieved their desired objectives.

This treatment effect was not moderated by partisanship per theoretical expectations. Bipartisanship is universally considered a positive trait of Congress as an institution, regardless of one's partisan leanings. As shown in the second column of Table 2, none of the interaction terms between partisanship and the treatment dummy are statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that β_6, β_7, β_8, and β_9 are jointly equal to zero (p = .61). Also, none of the coefficients associated with the interaction term are significantly

[21] We did not include an explicit manipulation check for two reasons. First, the treatment information is sufficiently unambiguous to demonstrate the proposed theoretical mechanism. Second, including a manipulation check question after the dependent variable of interest may have induced consistency bias. After reporting their level of confidence in Congress, respondents may have then rationalized their response to the manipulation check to be line with their initial report. Nonetheless, our estimated treatment effects can be interpreted as "intent-to-treat" effects, which may have been even larger if we isolated our analyses to respondents for whom the manipulation was successful.

different from one another, meaning that the treatment effects were constant across partisan subgroups. We also estimated a model pooling Republican and Democratic respondents and including dummy variables for "strong partisans," "weak partisans," and interactions between these two dummies and the "bipartisan" treatment. As shown in the third column of Table 2, we find that there are no significant differences between Independents, weak partisans, and strong partisans with respect to the treatment effect. Hence, Americans of all partisan leanings are more confident in Congress when informed that it has engaged in more bipartisan activity.

This study suggests that partisan conflict lowers the standing of Congress in the public's eyes. This is true not only for Independents, but for Americans across the partisan spectrum. Thus, when evaluating bipartisan cooperation in the abstract, the public is generally supportive of members of Congress working with members of the opposite party. These experimental findings are consistent with previous observational (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) and aggregate-level (Ramirez 2009) studies showing that partisan conflict decreases congressional approval. However, it is important to note that the public votes for individual members, not for a party or for Congress as a whole. Although the public may not prefer high levels of partisanship in Congress, individual citizens have no vote over aggregate Congressional behavior as the electoral pressures fall on individual members rather than on the institution as a whole. Therefore, in the second experimental study, we assess whether mass preferences for bipartisanship in the abstract apply to the behavior of individual members.

Study 2: Approval of Members

Design

In Study 2, we explored how partisan conflict affects the public's view of members of

Congress. There are a number of ways we could portray members as engaging in partisan or bipartisan behavior, including presenting their voting records and their cosponsorship coalitions. As the most direct test of partisan behavior, we decided to examine roll call voting behavior, which may be more intuitively understandable than cosponsorship coalitions, which requires respondents to have some knowledge of legislative procedure. Our interest in this experimental design is not to capture the actual information that members communicate to voters in campaigns, but rather to quantify the more qualitative information that members deliver. For example, former Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR), a moderate from a Democratic-leaning state, said in a 2008 campaign advertisement, "I'm Gordon Smith and I approve working across party lines" (Smith 2008). The narrator of the ad mentioned Smith's bipartisan work with Democrats such as Senator Barack Obama and Governor Ted Kulongoski on environmental legislation.

We asked respondents to evaluate a member of Congress based on his voting behavior. Democrats were asked to evaluate Bud Cramer (D-AL), Republicans were asked to evaluate Steve LaTourette (R-OH), and Independents were randomly assigned to one of the two members.[22] We did not present respondents with their actual member of Congress because most legislators' voting behaviors do not vary dramatically from year to year, requiring deceptive information (that a clearly conservative/liberal member was moderate, or vice versa) that would decrease the ecological validity of the findings.[23] Both Cramer and LaTourette were unique among their parties in actually having a dramatic change in their voting records in the two-year

[22] We based this assignment upon the first question used by the ANES to assess partisanship: "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" We treated those who did not answer "Republican" or "Democrat" as Independents.

[23] Asking respondents about their own member of Congress may have decreased treatment effects because respondents would have greater pre-treatment information about the legislators and therefore may have been immune to deceptive information. Our design attempts to capture how constituents react to information about bipartisan activity undertaken by their own member by creating the counterfactual of interest—how a particular member is perceived when they appear to be working solely with co-partisans compared to when they attempt to reach across the aisle. Thus, our design is intended to minimize pre-treatment bias while still keeping our study in the context of the real world.

period before the administration of the survey.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition, we assigned respondents to view the member's voting history in 2007, which almost always toed the party line:

> Some members of Congress work with members of their own party almost all of the time. Other members work with members of both parties.[24] On key issues identified by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) [American Conservative Union (ACU)] in 2007, Representative Bud Cramer (AL-5) [Steve LaTourette (OH-14)] almost always voted the Democratic [Republican] position.

In the second condition, respondents viewed the member's 2006 record, which was more bipartisan:

> Some members of Congress work with members of their own party almost all of the time. Other members work with members of both parties. On key issues identified by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) [American Conservative Union (ACU)] in 2006, Representative Bud Cramer (AL-5) [Steve LaTourette (OH-14)] took the Democratic [Republican] position on about half the votes and the Republican [Democratic] position on about half the votes.

The first sentence of the blurb is intended to focus the respondent's attention on the member's level of intraparty collaboration. Hence, we communicate various aspects of partisan conflict that citizens might find distasteful: ideological extremity, lack of accommodation and cooperation, and incivility.

Comparing approval ratings between conditions allows us to assess whether citizens had more favorable opinions of members who engage in partisan activity, contributing to congressional polarization. By simply changing the year of the voting record—which should be immaterial to respondents—we are simultaneously able to manipulate bipartisan legislative behavior, hold the member constant, and remain truthful to respondents.

Measures

[24] Which one of the first two sentences of the paragraph came first was randomized.

After the blurb about voting behavior was presented, respondents were asked: “Based on this information, do you approve or disapprove of the job Representative Cramer [LaTourette] is doing in Congress?” with the following five response options: “strongly approve,” “somewhat approve,” “neither approve nor disapprove,” “somewhat disapprove,” and “strongly disapprove.” This five-point measure served as the principal dependent variable of interest. The main independent variable was a dummy indicating whether respondents were assigned to the condition showing bipartisan voting behavior, with the party line voting blurb as the baseline. While we did not explicitly provide a control condition, the common content did include an item asking respondents about their overall approval of their member of Congress on a four-point scale ranging from “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve” (question CC335rep) which can be used as a baseline.

Although we are ultimately interested in how perceptions of bipartisanship affect voting decisions, asking respondents about their vote intentions for a member that would never appear on their ballot may have been confusing. Consequently, we use job approval as the dependent variable of interest. Nonetheless, our findings do speak to vote choice as approval strongly predicts voting intentions. Among respondents who reported voting for the incumbent House member, 51% strongly approved of the member’s job performance and an additional 40% approved somewhat. In contrast, among respondents who reported voting for the challenger, only 14% strongly approved of the incumbent and 27% somewhat approved ($\chi^2(3) = 207.6$, $p<.001$).

Methods

In order to estimate the overall treatment effect, we estimated the following regression model:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 B_i + \beta_2 SP_i + \beta_3 WP_i + \boldsymbol{\gamma}\mathbf{x_i} + \varepsilon_i \qquad (3)$$

where i indexes respondent, A_i represents approval of the member, B_i represents the bipartisanship treatment dummy, SP_i, and WP_i, represent strong and weak partisans, respectively (with Independents as the omitted group), $\mathbf{x_i}$ represents a vector of demographic controls, and ε_i represents stochastic error. Since respondents are evaluating co-partisans, we have no *a priori* expectation that Democrats or Republicans will approve of the member more (or less). This is in contrast to Study 1, where Democratic control of Congress suggested that Democratic respondents would have more confidence in Congress than Republican respondents. As a result, we pool Democratic and Republican respondents together. Nonetheless, we also analyzed the data separately for Democrats and Republicans as described below.

To assess the moderating effect of strength of partisanship, we estimated the following model:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 B_i + \beta_2 SP_i + \beta_3 WP_i + \beta_4(SP_i \times B_i) + \beta_5(WP_i \times B_i) + \boldsymbol{\gamma}\mathbf{x_i} + \varepsilon_i \qquad (4)$$

β_1 represents the treatment effect among Independents. Similar to equation (2), $\beta_1 + \beta_4$ represents the treatment effect among strong partisans whereas β_4 represents the *difference* in the treatment effect between strong partisans and Independents. Again, because we do not expect baseline differences between Democrats and Republicans in their approval of co-partisans, we examine the moderating effect of strength of partisanship rather than both the strength and direction of partisanship (as we did in Study 1).

Results

Overall, Americans were not more favorable to members who exhibited a less polarized voting record, but there was significant heterogeneity by strength of partisanship. As illustrated in Figure 3, strong identifiers negatively respond to the member when told that he is engaging in bipartisan behavior whereas weak identifiers and Independents are positively disposed to bipartisanship, which nets to an overall null effect. Returning to the statistical models in equations (3) and (4), we first show the results pooling Democrats, Republicans, and Independents (and accordingly evaluations of both Cramer and LaTourette) together. The first column of Table 3 presents coefficient estimates from equation (3). The bipartisan information relative to the partisan information did not significantly increase approval of the member.[25] However, the effects vary significantly by partisan attachment. Whereas Independents and weak partisans were supportive of bipartisan behavior, strong Democrats and Republicans actually approved of the members *less* when told they voted with the opposing party. The second column of Table 3 presents coefficient estimates from equation (4). Among Independents, the treatment effect is positive and statistically significant ($\beta_1 = .108$, $p<.001$), indicating that Independents in the bipartisan treatment condition approved of the member nearly .11 units more than Independents in the partisan condition. Compared to Independents, the treatment effect was significantly weaker among strong partisans ($\beta_4 = -.183$, $p<.001$). Moreover, strong partisans approved of the member significantly *less* when told he voted with members of the opposite party ($\beta_2 + \beta_4 = -.075$, $p<.001$).

Finally, weak Democrats and Republicans were also positively disposed to bipartisanship and behaved much more like Independents than strong partisans. The interaction term between the treatment dummy and the weak partisan dummy (β_5) was statistically insignificant, meaning that weak partisans and Independents were statistically indistinguishable with respect to their response to the treatment information. Analyzing the treatment effect within the subgroup, weak

[25] We used the member approval question and the Congressional approval question in the common content as baselines with which to compare the treatment effects. Constituents will, of course, on average exhibit higher support for their own member than from another district. 45% of respondents either strongly or somewhat approved of their own member of Congress, and 21% either strongly or somewhat approved of Congress as a whole. In the "bipartisan" condition, 32% of respondents either strongly or somewhat approved of the target member; this figure was 27% in the "partisan" condition.

partisans were more approving of the member when he was portrayed as bipartisan ($\beta_3 + \beta_5 =$ .116, p<.001). Despite their partisan affiliations, weak partisans have preferences for bipartisanship that are more similar to Independents than to strong partisans, as the treatment effect was significantly different between strong and weak partisans ($\beta_4 - \beta_5 = -.191$, p<.001). We also replicated our analyses examining the Cramer and LaTourette blurbs separately. As shown in columns (3)-(6) of Table 3, the estimates are similar to the pooled results. Hence, whereas strong partisans were actually negatively affected by bipartisan legislative behavior, this effect was offset by approval of bipartisanship among Independents and weak partisans.

Discussion

The findings from Study 1 provide micro-level evidence consistent with extant aggregate-level findings, and demonstrate little heterogeneity within the public by strength of partisanship. When combined with the findings from Study 2, the results offer a new way to think about party conflict, representation, and mass preferences. A priori, we could have expected a number of potential positive findings, including preferences for partisanship among members and partisanship in the institution; preferences for bipartisanship among members and bipartisanship in the institution; preferences for partisanship among members and bipartisanship in the institution; or preferences for bipartisanship among members and partisanship in the institution. As mentioned previously, theories of party cues and partisan rationalization would predict the first outcome. In contrast, previous findings of general unhappiness with discord in Congress would predict the second outcome. Yet, we find the third outcome, which is both consistent with our theoretical expectations, and helps resolves some existing questions in the literature, such as why we have observed persistent polarization and discord in Congress despite the damage it provides collectively to the institution as a whole.

What are the implications of these findings for our understanding of polarization in Congress? First, since the median voter may differ in partisan strength across districts, these results may help explain why bipartisan voting and cosponsorship behavior is most prevalent among members from marginal districts and less prevalent among members from safe districts. Second, strong partisans may support abstract conceptions of bipartisanship, but not when specifically applied to the voting behavior of a co-partisan member of Congress. This is similar to the commonly-found pattern in the literature on political tolerance (e.g., Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964), which finds that Americans support civil liberties as abstract principles, but not when applied in specific circumstances or when applied to unpopular groups such as communists and atheists. Thus, our understanding of representation and the extent to which researchers judge members as responsive may need to be conditioned on what segments of the electorate members are responding to. Whereas a partisan Congress is not representative of the preferences of the public as a whole, individual members may be representative even when they engage in partisan behavior.

Finally, these results re-conceptualize our understanding of "Fenno's paradox." Not only do people use different criteria to evaluate members of Congress versus Congress as an institution, but even when using similar criteria, what the public wants from the two groups differs. One potential source of the aggregate disparity in people's perception of Congress and their congressperson is the willingness of strong identifiers to tolerate (and even desire) members' partisan behavior but to disavow acrimony and party conflict in Congress at large.

Hence, this study addresses the question raised by previous studies (e.g. Ramirez 2009) that voters are less approving of Congress when it engages in partisan conflict but that members continue to engage in discord. Although citizens (including strong partisans) approve of Congress more when it effuses an image of bipartisanship, individual members—particularly those from safe districts characterized by primary election competition—are *individually* incentivized to behave in a partisan matter, thereby harming the *collective* image of the institution. While Cox and McCubbins (1993) observed that parties in legislatures can wield selective benefits to solve collective action problems and compel members to behave in the interest of the party brand, no similar institution exists for Congress as a whole to protect its reputation.

In addition to addressing an important problem, our studies also raise additional questions that can be explored by subsequent research. For instance, how do voters respond to polarization on other forms of legislative behavior such as the formation of bill cosponsorship coalitions? Due to agenda-setting power, members have less flexibility in demonstrating bipartisanship on roll call votes. Can bipartisan cosponsorship by members offset the perception of increased rancor and partisanship on roll call voting? An experiment in which members' activities in both of these areas is manipulated can help address these questions. In addition to exploring the impact of bipartisanship on evaluations of Congress and individual members, future studies can also include evaluations of specific pieces of legislation, examining those with bipartisan versus partisan support. Subsequent research can vary both the substantive content of legislation and its bipartisan nature to see how much the policy substance of a bill matters in voters' minds, compared to the cue of bipartisan support. Examining public opinion related to Congress and its actions can potentially shed light on important theoretical debates, particularly those which posit the presence of an electoral connection.

In addition, future work ought to explore why bipartisanship is preferred by strong partisans in general, but not for individual members of Congress. One possibility is that strong partisans prefer that co-partisan members engage in partisan behavior because the member is seen as protecting their interests. However, if these individuals view bipartisanship in Congress as a whole as occurring when the opposing party compromises its position (but when their own party does not), this seemingly paradoxical set of positions makes sense. That is, bipartisanship occurs when the other party moves from their preferred position. Leveraging differences in expectations for how likely “your side” prevails when they are in the majority versus minority may help uncover whether people see bipartisanship as leading to more “wins” or ”losses” for their side than would have occurred in the absence of bipartisanship.

Beyond the specific topic of inquiry in this paper, our results speak to a number of important questions in the broader study of Congress and electoral accountability in political institutions. For example, this research suggests that even in a period of anti-incumbent sentiment and proclaimed desires among the public for greater interparty cooperation, many members of Congress may end up better off engaging in partisan conflict. Additionally, from a comparative perspective, our results suggest that confidence in political institutions may be lower in single-member district electoral systems when citizen preferences over who is representing their districts conflicts with preferences for legislative behavior in the institution at large. Since the public votes for members of Congress, rather than for parties as in parliamentary systems, the incentives for partisanship by individual members may trump the collective incentives for bipartisanship.

References

Adler, E. Scott, and John Wilkerson. 2008. "Congressional Bills Project: 1973-2002." NSF 00880066 and 00880061.

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Aldrich, John H., Mark M. Berger, and David W. Rohde. 2002. "The Historical Variability in Conditional Party Government, 1877-1994." In *Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress*, ed. D. W. Brady and M. D. McCubbins. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2009. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008: Common Content* (Data Release 1) [Computer File]. M.I.T. 2008 [cited February 2 2009]. Available from http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/teamcontent.html.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles III Stewart. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1):136-59.

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2000. "Congressional Roll Call Votes." Policy Agendas Project with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922.

Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. 1990. *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Born, Richard. 1990. "The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressment: Members May Run from Congress, but They Can't Hide." *Journal of Politics* 52 (4):1223-41.

Brady, David W., Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2007. "Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out-of-Step with the Primary Electorate?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32 (1):79-105.

Cain, Bruce E., John Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Campbell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Campbell, James E. 1982. "Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7 (3):415-22.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting." *American Political Science Review* 96 (1):127-40.

Cox, Gary, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Crisp, Brian F., Kristin Kanthak, and Jenny Leijonhufvud. 2004. "The Reputations Legislators Build: With Whom Should Representatives Collaborate?" *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):703-16.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Boston: Addison-Wesley.

Durr, Robert H., Andrew D. Martin, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. "Explaining Congressional Approval." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1):175-207.

Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (3):511-35.

Erikson, Robert S., and Gerald C. Jr. Wright. 1980. "Policy Representation of Constituency Interests." *Political Behavior* 2 (1):91-106.

Fenno, Richard F. Jr. 1975. "If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is 'The Broken Branch,' How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?" In *Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform*, ed. N. J. Ornstein. New York: Praeger.

———. 1978. *Home Style: Home Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1999. "Whatever Happened to the Median Voter?" In *MIT Conference on Parties and Congress*. Cambridge: Stanford University.

Fiorina, Morris P., and Matthew S. Levendusky. 2006. "Disconnected: The Political Class versus the People." In *Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America's Polarized Politics*, ed. P. S. Nivola and D. W. Brady. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Fowler, James. 2006. "Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks." *Political Analysis* 14:456-87.

Freedman, David A. 2008a. "On Regression Adjustments in Experiments with Several Treatments." *Annals of Applied Statistics* 2:176-96.

———. 2008b. "On Regression Adjustments to Experimental Data." *Advances in Applied Mathematics* 40:180-93.

Gaines, Brian J., James H. Kuklinski, and Paul J. Quirk. 2007. "The Logic of the Survey Experiment Reexamined." *Political Analysis* 15:1-20.

Geer, John. 1988. "Assessing the Representativeness of Electorates in Presidential Primaries." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (4):929-45.

Green, Donald P. 2009. "Regression Adjustments to Experimental Data: Do David Freedman's Concerns Apply to Political Science?" In *SSRN Working Paper No. 1466886*.

Grofman, Bernard N. 1993. *Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective*. New York: University of Michigan Press.

Han, Hahrie, and David W. Brady. 2007. "A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party Polarization after the Second World War." *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (3):505-31.

Harbridge, Laurel. 2009. "Bipartisanship in a Polarized Congress." Stanford University.

Hetherington, Marc J., and Suzanne Globetti. 2002. "Political Trust and Racial Policy Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2):253-75.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-More. 2001. "Process Preferences and American Politics: What the People Want Government to Be." *American Political Science Review* 95 (1):145-53.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. *Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward American Political Institutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jacobson, Gary. 2004. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Sixth Edition ed. New York: Longman.

Jones, David R. 2010. "Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (2):323-37.

Kanthak, Kristin, and Brian F. Crisp. 2005. Partisans, Collaborators, Loners and Compromisers: Cosponsorship Patterns as a Means of Challenger Deterrence. Paper read at Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, at Chicago, IL.

Kessler, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. "Dynamics of Cosponsorship." *American Political Science Review* 90 (3):555-66.

Kimball, David C. 2005. "Priming Partisan Evaluations of Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* XXX (1):63-84.

Kimball, David C., and Samuel C. Patterson. 1997. "Living Up to Expectations: Public Attitudes Toward Congress." *Journal of Politics* 59 (3):701-28.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. "Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (4):906-23.

Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. 2007. "Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (3):464-81.

Levendusky, Matthew S., Jeremy C. Pope, and Simon D. Jackman. 2008. "Measuring District-Level Partisanship with Implications for the Analysis of U.S. Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 70 (3):736-53.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

McClosky, Herbert. 1964. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 58 (2):361-82.

Miller, Warren R., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57 (1):45-56.

Mutz, Diana, and Gregory M. Flemming. 1999. "How Good People Make Bad Collectives." In *Congress and the Decline of Public Trust*, ed. J. Cooper. Boulder: Westview Press.

Norrander, Barbara. 1989. "Ideological Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters." *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (3):570-87.

Parker, Glenn R., and Roger H. Davidson. 1979. "Why Do American Love Their Congressmen so Much More than Their Congress?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4 (1):53-61.

Patty, John W. 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (3):636-55.

Pew. 2010. *Willingness to Compromise a Plus in Midterms*. The Pew Research Center for People and the Press 2010 [cited May 24 2010]. Available from http://people-press.org/report/617/.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Prothro, James W., and Charles M. Grigg. 1960. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement." *The Journal of Politics* 22 (2):276-94.

Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (2):472-96.

Ramirez, Mark D. 2009. "The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional Approval." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (3):681-94.

Research, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social, and Carroll McKibbin. 1997. "Roster of United States Congressional Officeholders and Biographical Characteristics of Members of the United States Congress, 1789-1996: Merged Data [Computer File] (Study #7803)." 10th ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI.

Roberts, Jason, and Steven Smith. 2003. "Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2):305-17.

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 2004. "Roll Call Data for the United States House of Representatives, 1953-2004." East Lansing, MI: Compiled by the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program, Michigan State University.

Smith, Gordon. 2008. *Truth* 2008 [cited June 30 2008]. Available from http://www.gordonsmith.com/.

Smith, Steven S. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. 2002. *Diverging Parties: Realignment, Social Change, and Political Polarization*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Theriault, Sean M. 2008a. *Party Polarization in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2008b. The Procedurally Polarized Congress. Paper read at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, at Boston, MA.

Transue, John E., Daniel J. Lee, and John H. Aldrich. 2009. "Treatment Spillover Effects across Survey Experiments." *Political Analysis* 17 (2):143-61.

Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2009. "Legislative Effectiveness in Congress." Ohio State University. Manuscript.

Wattenberg, Martin P., and Craig Leonard Brians. 1999. "Negative Campaign Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer?" *American Political Science Review* 93 (4):891-9.

Figure 1: Regression of Bipartisanship on Normal Vote



Table 1: Regressions Predicting Percent of Cosponsored Bills that are Bipartisan by Member (103rd-109th Congresses)

	OLS	Quasi-Binomial	OLS	Quasi-Binomial
Normal Presidential Vote	-.61***	-.02***	-.18***	-.01***
	(.02)	(.001)	(.03)	(.001)
Majority Party Member	.26	.07***	-3.30***	-.13***
	(.38)	(.02)	(.37)	(.02)
Female	-3.44***	-.14***	——	——
	(.56)	(.02)		
Age	.01	.00	——	——
	(.02)	(.001)		
Tenure	.24***	.01**	——	——
	(.05)	(.002)		
House Leadership	-12.40***	-.54***	-2.05	-.12
	(1.72)	(.08)	(1.86)	(.08)
Divided Government	3.86***	.19***	3.13***	.17***
	(.47)	(.02)	(.33)	(.01)
Majority Seat Share	.01	.00	-.13	-.002
	(.09)	(.003)	(.07)	(.003)
Presidential Election Year	2.45**	.12***	2.58***	.13***
	(.78)	(.03)	(.47)	(.02)
Constant	87.00***	1.43***	88.60***	1.36*
	(5.36)	(.21)	(7.42)	(.60)
Member Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	3033	3033	3033	3033
R^2	.34	——	.83	——

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed)

Figure 2: Impact of Bipartisanship on Confidence in Congress by Partisanship (Study One)



Note: Y-axis represents difference in percentage of respondents having at least “a moderate amount” of confidence in Congress between “bipartisan” condition and “partisan” condition.

Table 2: OLS Regressions Predicting Confidence in Congress (Study One)

β_1: Bipartisan Version	.03* (.01)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.02)
β_2: Strong Republican	-.09*** (.02)	-.10*** (.03)	——
β_3: Weak Republican	.02 (.03)	-.01 (.04)	——
β_4: Weak Democrat	.09*** (.02)	.07 (.04)	——
β_5: Strong Democrat	.16*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	——
β_6: Bipartisan Version x Strong Republican	——	.01 (.04)	——
β_7: Bipartisan Version x Weak Republican	——	.05 (.05)	——
β_8: Bipartisan Version x Weak Democrat	——	.05 (.05)	——
β_9: Bipartisan Version x Strong Democrat	——	.05 (.03)	——
Strong Partisans	——	——	.02 (.02)
Weak Partisans	——	——	.03 (.03)
Bipartisan Version x Strong Partisans	——	——	.04 (.03)
Bipartisan Version x Weak Partisans	——	——	.05 (.04)
γ_1: Age	-.08* (.03)	-.08* (.03)	-.09* (.04)
γ_2: Male	-.06*** (.01)	-.06*** (.01)	-.07*** (.02)
γ_3: White	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.04* (.02)
γ_4: Education	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.05* (.03)
γ_5: Media Use	-.06* (.03)	-.06* (.03)	-.08** (.03)
Constant	.40*** (.03)	.41*** (.03)	.45*** (.03)
N	987	987	987
R^2	.20	.21	.08

****p*<.001; ***p*<.01; **p*<.05 (two-tailed)

Figure 3: Impact of Bipartisanship on Approval of Members by Partisanship (Study Two)



Note: Y-axis represents difference in percentage of respondents either "somewhat" or "strongly" approving of Cramer [LaTourette] between "bipartisan" condition and "partisan" condition.

Table 3: OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Members of Congress (Study Two)

	All Respondents		Democrats		Republicans	
β_1: Bipartisan Version	.02	.11***	.04*	.13***	.00	.08*
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
β_2: Strong Partisans	.07***	.17***	.08***	.17***	.06**	.16***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
β_3: Weak Partisans	.01	.00	.02	.04	-.01	-.04
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)
β_6: Bipartisan Version x Strong Partisans	——	-.18***	——	-.18***	——	-.19***
		(.03)		(.04)		(.04)
β_7: Bipartisan Version x Weak Partisans	——	.01	——	-.05	——	.08
		(.04)		(.05)		(.06)
γ_1: Age	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.06	-.01	-.01
	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
γ_2: Male	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.03	-.03
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
γ_3: White	.01	.01	.02	.02	-.01	.00
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
γ_4: Education	-.01	-.02	.00	-.02	-.02	-.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
γ_5: Media Use	.05	.05	.02	.02	.08*	.07
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Constant	.51***	.47***	.50***	.46***	.53***	.49***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
N	965	965	528	528	437	437
R^2	.04	.09	.05	.08	.04	.11

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed)

Online Appendix

Table A1: OLS Regressions Predicting Percent of Cosponsored Bills that are Bipartisan by Member (103rd-109th Congresses)

	(20%)	(30%)	(40%)	(50%)	(20%)	(30%)	(40%)	(50%)
Normal Presidential Vote	-.61***	-.50***	-.36***	-.23***	-.18***	-.15***	-.13***	-.10***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)
Majority Party Member	.26	-2.22***	-5.09***	-6.72***	-3.30***	-4.88***	-6.41***	-6.29***
	(.38)	(.35)	(.29)	(.24)	(.37)	(.40)	(.33)	(.28)
Female	-3.44***	-2.49***	-1.58***	-.17	——	——	——	——
	(.56)	(.52)	(.43)	(.34)				
Age	.01	.01	.01	.00	——	——	——	——
	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)				
Tenure	.24***	.30***	.20***	.24***	——	——	——	——
	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.03)				
House Leadership	-12.40***	-10.26***	-9.12***	-6.55***	-2.05	-1.24	-2.16	-1.21
	(1.72)	(1.59)	(1.30)	(1.05)	(1.86)	(1.98)	(1.66)	(1.39)
Divided Government	3.86***	.92*	.14	-2.92***	3.13***	.10	-.43	-3.63***
	(.47)	(.44)	(.36)	(.29)	(.33)	(.35)	(.29)	(.24)
Majority Seat Share	.01	-.37***	-.76***	-1.02***	-.13	-0.57***	-.89***	-1.19***
	(.09)	(.08)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.05)
Presidential Election Year	2.45**	-.02	-.77	-.73	2.58***	.08	-.73	-.89*
	(.78)	(.72)	(.59)	(.48)	(.47)	(.50)	(.42)	(.35)
Constant	87.00***	93.05***	96.07***	95.35***	88.60***	101.47***	101.74***	108.83***
	(5.36)	(4.97)	(4.08)	(3.30)	(7.42)	(7.89)	(6.61)	(5.54)
Member Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3033	3033	3033	3033	3033	3033	3033	3033
R^2	.34	.27	.27	.33	.83	.76	.75	.75

****p*<.001; ***p*<.01; **p*<.05 (two-tailed)

Table A2: OLS Regressions Predicting Percent of Cosponsored Bills that are Bipartisan by Member (103rd-109th Congresses) – Conditioning on Region of Member

	New England	Midwest	South	West	Pacific
Normal Presidential Vote in District	-.62***	-.56***	-.61***	-.33***	-.55***
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.10)	(.05)
Majority Party Member	3.77***	1.20	-.70	-5.47**	-.32
	(.83)	(.85)	(.61)	(1.69)	(.94)
Female	-3.54**	-2.57	-3.35**	-1.71	-3.36**
	(1.11)	(1.36)	(1.06)	(1.90)	(1.13)
Age	.08	.10*	-.01	-.07	-.10
	(.05)	(.05)	(.02)	(.12)	(.05)
Tenure	.22	-.04	.54***	.56	.06
	(.12)	(.12)	(.09)	(.36)	(.14)
House Leadership	—	-12.58***	-15.89***	—	2.49
		(2.58)	(2.61)		(5.43)
Divided Government	3.76***	3.44***	5.77***	2.93	1.00
	(.91)	(1.03)	(.77)	(1.88)	(1.07)
House Majority Seat Share	-.28	.12	.61***	.21	-1.23***
	(.18)	(.20)	(.15)	(.37)	(.21)
Presidential Election	1.57	2.27	3.97**	.69	1.13
	(1.50)	(1.69)	(1.28)	(3.13)	(1.77)
Constant	100.14***	75.15***	55.74***	65.96**	153.90***
	(10.50)	(11.77)	(8.84)	(22.63)	(12.38)
N	603	726	1022	171	490
R^2	.54	.27	.38	.16	.39

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed)

Table A3: OLS Regressions Predicting Percent of Cosponsored Bills that are Bipartisan by Member (103rd-104th Congresses) – Conditioning on Veteran Status of Member

	Veterans (103-104)	Not Veterans (103-104)
Normal Presidential Vote in District	-.77***	-.85***
	(.01)	(.07)
Majority Party Member	-6.69***	-7.94***
	(1.70)	(1.48)
Female	—	-.62
		(2.04)
Age	.06	-.03
	(.13)	(.10)
Tenure	-.21	-.02
	(.28)	(.27)
House Leadership	-21.83***	5.45
	(5.57)	(6.72)
Divided Government	-.08	2.13
	(1.71)	(1.49)
Constant	104.54***	110.76***
	(8.23)	(5.42)
N	197	192
R^2	.32	.50

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed)

Table A4: Comparison of Sample with 2008 ANES

	2008 CCES	2008 ANES
Gender		
Female	50.8%	54.9%
Male	49.2	45.1
Age		
18-24	5.7	11.3
25-34	13.0	18.5
35-44	17.4	16.0
45-54	26.5	21.7
55-64	20.2	15.6
65+	17.2	17.0
Race		
White	76.4	79.4
Black	9.8	12.1
Other	13.8	8.5
Education		
High School and Below	64.0	65.1
Associates Degree	6.8	9.6
Bachelors Degree	20.4	16.6
Graduate Degree	8.8	8.8
Party Identification		
Republican	28.5	25.7
Democrat	35.5	34.0
Independent/Other	36.0	40.3
N	1000	2322

Appendix A5: Randomization Checks

	Study 1		Study 2	
Gender	Partisan	Bipartisan	Partisan	Bipartisan
Female	51.2%	50.4%	50.9%	50.7%
Male	48.8	49.6	49.1	49.3
	$\chi^2(1) = .06$, p=.81		$\chi^2(1) = .01$, p=.94	
Race				
Nonwhite	24.7	22.5	22.5	24.7
White	75.3	77.6	77.5	75.3
	$\chi^2(1) = .71$, p=.40		$\chi^2(1) = .66$, p=.42	
Education				
Less HS	4.5	4.1	3.7	4.9
High School	37.7	37.6	39.0	36.3
Some College	23.5	20.6	21.9	22.3
Associates	7.3	6.3	7.8	5.8
Bachelors	18.2	22.7	19.4	21.4
Post-Graduate	8.8	8.8	8.3	9.3
	$\chi^2(5) = 3.78$, p=.58		$\chi^2(5) = 3.54$, p=.62	
Party Identification				
Strong Democrat	26.1	25.7	22.5	29.1
Weak Democrat	7.8	11.4	9.1	10.1
Independent	36.5	15.5	38.8	33.4
Weak Republican	7.3	9.0	8.7	7.6
Strong Republican	22.4	18.4	21.0	19.8
	$\chi^2(4) = 6.29$, p=.18		$\chi^2(4) = 7.09$, p=.13	
Age	48.9	50.1	49.2	49.7
	p=.22		p=.61	
N	510	490	485	515

Table A6: Ordered Logistic Regressions Predicting Confidence in Congress (Study One)

β_1: Bipartisan Version	.27* (.12)	.01 (.20)	.01 (.20)
β_2: Strong Republican	-.78*** (.17)	-.88*** (.22)	——
β_3: Weak Republican	.13 (.24)	-.12 (.34)	——
β_4: Weak Democrat	.83*** (.23)	.54 (.34)	——
β_5: Strong Democrat	1.52*** (.17)	1.30*** (.22)	——
β_6: Bipartisan Version x Strong Republican	——	.22 (.33)	——
β_7: Bipartisan Version x Weak Republican	——	.52 (.47)	——
β_8: Bipartisan Version x Weak Democrat	——	.56 (.45)	——
β_9: Bipartisan Version x Strong Democrat	——	.48 (.32)	——
Strong Partisans	——	——	.20 (.18)
Weak Partisans	——	——	.19 (.25)
Bipartisan Version x Strong Partisans	——	——	.39 (.26)
Bipartisan Version x Weak Partisans	——	——	.52 (.34)
γ_1: Age	-.63* (.31)	-.64* (.31)	-.77* (.31)
γ_2: Male	-.55*** (.12)	-.57*** (.12)	-.64*** (.12)
γ_3: White	.02 (.15)	.02 (.15)	-.27 (.15)
γ_4: Education	.20 (.22)	.18 (.22)	.45* (.21)
γ_5: Media Use	-.62** (.23)	-.59* (.24)	-.69** (.23)
N	987	987	987
Pseudo R^2	.09	.09	.03

****p*<.001; ***p*<.01; **p*<.05 (two-tailed). Cutpoints available from authors upon request.

Table A7: Ordered Logistic Regressions Predicting Approval of Members of Congress (Study Two)

	All Respondents		Democrats		Republicans	
β_1: Bipartisan Version	.25	1.11^{***}	$.42^{*}$	1.34^{***}	.02	$.80^{*}$
	(.13)	(.22)	(.18)	(.30)	(.19)	(.33)
β_2: Strong Partisans	$.67^{***}$	1.64^{***}	$.69^{**}$	1.65^{***}	$.60^{**}$	1.59^{***}
	(.15)	(.21)	(.20)	(.30)	(.22)	(.32)
β_3: Weak Partisans	-.01	-.07	.05	.25	-.10	-.41
	(.19)	(.27)	(.26)	(.39)	(.28)	(.38)
β_6: Bipartisan Version x Strong Partisans	——	-1.80^{***}	——	-1.72^{***}	——	-1.90^{***}
		(.29)		(.40)		(.44)
β_7: Bipartisan Version x Weak Partisans	——	.09	——	-.50	——	.77
		(.37)		(.52)		(.55)
γ_1: Age	-.29	-.41	-.49	-.62	.03	.01
	(.33)	(.33)	(.45)	(.46)	(.49)	(.50)
γ_2: Male	-.18	-.15	-.12	-.08	-.28	-.26
	(.13)	(.13)	(.18)	(.18)	(.20)	(.20)
γ_3: White	.06	.06	.23	.24	-.21	-.18
	(.16)	(.16)	(.20)	(.20)	(.27)	(.27)
γ_4: Education	-.10	-.16	.13	-.04	-.29	-.26
	(.23)	(.23)	(.32)	(.32)	(.35)	(.36)
γ_5: Media Use	.47	.45	.12	.18	$.84^{*}$	.72
	(.25)	(.25)	(.34)	(.34)	(.37)	(.38)
N	965	965	528	528	437	437
Pseudo R^2	.02	.04	.02	.04	.02	.05

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed). Cupoints available from authors upon request.

Table A8: OLS Regressions Predicting Confidence in Congress (Study One)

β_1: Bipartisan Version	.03* (.01)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.02)
β_2: Strong Republican	-.10*** (.02)	-.11*** (.03)	——
β_3: Weak Republican	.01 (.03)	-.02 (.04)	——
β_4: Weak Democrat	.10*** (.02)	.07 (.04)	——
β_5: Strong Democrat	.16*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	——
β_6: Bipartisan Version x Strong Republican	——	.02 (.04)	——
β_7: Bipartisan Version x Weak Republican	——	.05 (.05)	——
β_8: Bipartisan Version x Weak Democrat	——	.05 (.05)	——
β_9: Bipartisan Version x Strong Democrat	——	.05 (.03)	——
Strong Partisans	——	——	.03 (.02)
Weak Partisans	——	——	.03 (.03)
Bipartisan Version x Strong Partisans	——	——	.04 (.03)
Bipartisan Version x Weak Partisans	——	——	.05 (.04)
γ_1: Age	-.06 (.03)	-.06 (.03)	-.08* (.04)
γ_2: Male	-.06*** (.01)	-.06*** (.01)	-.07*** (.01)
γ_3: White	.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)	-.04* (.02)
γ_4: Education	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.05* (.03)
γ_5: Media Use	-.07* (.03)	-.06* (.03)	-.09** (.03)
γ_6: Consumer Confidence	.04 (.03)	.04 (.03)	-.08* (.03)
Constant	.38*** (.03)	.39*** (.03)	.48*** (.03)
N	970	970	970
R^2	.21	.21	.08

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (two-tailed)

Table A9: OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Members of Congress (Study Two)

	All Respondents		Democrats		Republicans	
β_1: Bipartisan Version	.02	.11***	.04*	.13***	.00	.08*
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
β_2: Strong Partisans	.07***	.17***	.08***	.17***	.06**	.16***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
β_3: Weak Partisans	.01	.00	.01	.04	-.01	-.03
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)
β_6: Bipartisan Version x Strong Partisans	——	-.18***	——	-.17***	——	-.19***
		(.03)		(.04)		(.04)
β_7: Bipartisan Version x Weak Partisans	——	.00	——	-.06	——	.08
		(.04)		(.05)		(.06)
γ_1: Age	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.04	-.01	-.02
	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
γ_2: Male	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.04	-.03
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
γ_3: White	.01	.01	.02	.03	-.01	.00
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
γ_4: Education	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.02	-.02
	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
γ_5: Media Use	.05	.04	.02	.02	.08	.07
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
γ_6: Consumer Confidence	.05	.06	.02	.04	.07	.07
	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Constant	.49***	.45***	.49***	.44***	.50***	.46***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
N	948	948	518	518	430	430
R^2	.04	.09	.04	.08	.05	.12

****p*<.001; ***p*<.01; **p*<.05 (two-tailed)