Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications

Matthias Doepke  Fabian Kindermann
Northwestern University  Universität Regensburg

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Abstract

It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers.

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1 Introduction

A basic fact about babies is that it takes both a woman and a man to make one. Implied in this fact is that some form of agreement between mother and father is required before a birth can take place.1 In this paper, we introduce this need for agreement into the economic theory of fertility choice. In particular, we provide empirical evidence that agreement (or lack thereof) between potential parents is a crucial determinant of fertility; we develop a bargaining model of fertility that can account for the empirical facts; and we argue that the need for agreement between parents has important consequences for how policy interventions affect childbearing.

Even if one accepts that agreement between the parents is important for fertility in principle, it may still be the case that most couples happen to agree on fertility in practice (i.e., either both want a child, or neither wants one). Hence, the first step in our analysis is to document empirically the extent of disagreement on childbearing within couples. We draw on evidence from the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP), a longitudinal data set covering 19 countries2 that includes detailed information on fertility preferences and fertility outcomes. For each couple in the data set, there are separate questions on whether each partner would like to have “a/another baby now.” Thus, we observe agreement or disagreement on having a first/next child for each couple.3 The data reveal that there is much disagreement about having babies. Moreover, disagreement increases with the existing number of children. For couples who have at least two children already, in all countries in our data set we observe more couples who disagree (i.e., one partner wants to have another baby, and the other does not) than couples who both want another child. Moreover, women are generally more likely to be opposed to having another child than are men, particularly so in countries with a very low fertility rate.

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1Exceptions from this rule are possible (such as cases of rape, deception, and accidental pregnancy), but they do not account for a large fraction of births and will not be considered here. Also, while all babies start with an egg and a sperm, not all start from a mutual decision of a mother and father, for example in the case of same-sex couples and more generally whenever sperm donation or surrogacy are involved. Data limitations make it difficult to study these issues, but they raise interesting questions which we will discuss at the end of the paper.

2The countries covered are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Sweden.

3Data on fertility intentions have not previously been available at this level of detail; existing data generally have been limited to the desired total number of children, which is less informative for the bargaining process for having another child.
The second step in our analysis is to show that reported preferences for having babies actually matter for fertility outcomes. The GGP survey has a panel structure, so that stated fertility preferences can be linked to subsequent births. The data confirm the intuition that agreement between the potential parents is essential for having a child. We compare the fertility of couples where at least one partner desires a child to that of couples who agree not to want a baby (some of whom end up with a baby anyway). Relative to this baseline, the male partner alone wishing to have a child, with the female partner being opposed, has a very low impact on the probability of a baby’s arrival (indistinguishable from zero once we condition on the existing number of children). If the female partner wants a child but the male partner does not, subsequent fertility is significantly higher compared to the baseline, but the effect on the probability of a birth is quantitatively small. Only couples who agree and both want a baby have a high probability of actually getting one. Overall, while women turn out to have some independent control over their fertility, the main finding is most of the time each partner has veto power, so that agreement between parents on wanting a baby is essential for babies to be born.

Our ultimate interest is what this need for agreement between parents implies for the economics of fertility more broadly. Specifically, we would like to know how the possibility of disagreement between mothers and fathers affects the economywide fertility rate, and how it matters for the impact of policy interventions (such as child subsidies or publicly provided child care) on fertility. To this end, we develop a bargaining model of fertility decisions. The woman and the man in a given relationship have separate preferences and bargain over household decisions, including fertility and the allocation of consumption. For a birth to take place, agreement is essential: both partners have to prefer an additional child over the status quo. Disagreement over having babies is possible in equilibrium, because the partners have a limited ability to compensate each other for having a baby. In particular, our household bargaining model features lack of commitment. While bargaining is efficient within the period, the partners cannot commit to specific transfers or other actions in the future. Instead, the allocation of resources within the household is determined period-by-period through cooperative Nash bargaining with period-specific outside options, which are given by a state of non-cooperation in a continuing relationship along the lines of the separate-spheres bargain-

4We also consider an extension in which partial commitment is possible, and allow for partial commitment in the model used for quantitative analysis. See Gobbi (2018) for a related analysis of the role of lack of commitment for investments in child quality.
ing model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). This matters for fertility, because having a child affects future outside options. In particular, if in the non-cooperative allocation one partner would be stuck with most of the burden of child care, this partner would lose future bargaining power if a birth were to take place, and thus may be less willing to agree to having a child.

The key novel implication of this setup is that not just the overall costs and benefits of children matter for fertility (which is the focus of models that abstract from bargaining), but also the distribution of costs and benefits within the household. Specifically, in a society where the burden of raising children is borne primarily by mothers, women will be more likely than men to disagree with having another child, and *ceteris paribus* the fertility rate will be lower compared to a society with a more equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of having children. This prediction can be verified directly in the GGP data. The data set includes questions on the allocation of child care tasks within the household, i.e., whether it is the mother or the father who usually puts the children to bed, dresses them, helps them with homework, and so on. Based on the answers we construct an index of fathers’ and mothers’ shares in raising children. In all countries in our data set women do the majority of the child rearing work, but there is also substantial variation across countries. As predicted by the theory, it is precisely in the countries where men do the least amount of work where the fertility rate is the lowest, and where women are especially likely to be opposed to having another child.

In the final part of our analysis, we examine the efficacy of policies that aim to increase the fertility rate. We focus on such policies because recently many industrialized countries have experienced historically unprecedented low fertility rates. In Japan, Germany, Spain, Austria, and many Eastern European countries, the total fertility rate has remained below 1.5 for more than two decades.\(^5\) Such fertility rates, if sustained, imply rapid population aging and declining population levels in the future, creating big challenges for economic and social policy. The population of Germany, for instance, is projected to decrease by about 13 million from the current level of 80 million by 2060.\(^6\) Hence, even though the optimal level of fertility is not obvious from a theoretical perspective,\(^7\) the current fertility rate in these countries is widely perceived to constitute

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\(^5\)The replacement level of the total fertility rate (at which the population would remain constant in the long run) is about 2.1.

\(^6\)Source: “Bevölkerung Deutschlands bis 2060,” German Statistical Office, April 2015. Decline of 13 million is for forecast assuming relatively low net migration; for high net migration the projected population decrease is 7 million.

\(^7\)Decisions on optimal population size involve judgements on the value of children that are never born;
a demographic crisis, one that has so far proved resistant to many attempted interventions.

With the focus on the European fertility crisis in mind, we parameterize a dynamic, quantitative extension of our model to match fertility intentions and outcomes in the GGP data for countries with a total fertility rate of below 1.5. This model features time and goods costs of children, a market for child care services, a labor-market participation decision for mothers, and the possibility of partial commitment. A crucial aspect of the procedure for estimating model parameters is to match the evolution of couples’ fertility intentions over time. Doing so is important to capture whether disagreement within couples is predominantly about the timing of births, or also about the total number of children a couple will have. We use the estimated model to compare the effectiveness of alternative policies aimed at increasing fertility. We show that policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers (e.g., by providing public child care that substitutes time costs that were previously borne mostly by mothers) can be more than twice as effective than policies that provide general subsidies for childbearing. This is primarily because mothers are much more likely to be opposed to having another child than are fathers. Notably, the countries in our sample that have relatively high fertility rates close to the replacement level (France, Belgium, and Norway) already have such policies in place. Other countries that highly subsidize childbearing, but in a less targeted manner (such as Germany), have much lower fertility rates.

Our work builds on different strands of the literature. Existing empirical evidence on fertility preferences has usually relied on surveys in which participants are asked about their desired total number of children. In many surveys this information is only available for women. Data sets that record responses for both women and men show that disagreement about fertility is commonplace. For example, Westoff (2010) reports that in 17 out of 18 surveyed African countries men desire more children than women do, with an average gap in desired family size of 1.5 and a maximum of 5.6 in Chad.8

There are a few studies in the demography literature that document how disagreement over desired future fertility correlates with actual fertility. Studies using recent data from industrialized countries find results broadly consistent with ours, namely, couples who disagree on fertility are relatively unlikely to have a birth. This is consistent with

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8One reason why gaps in desired fertility are especially large in developing countries may be maternal mortality risk; see Ashraf et al. (2018).
the notion of veto power for each partner. \(^9\) Studies that use data from developing countries display different patterns. There is generally little evidence of veto power, that is, couples where only one partner reports a wish for an additional child have substantially higher fertility rates than couples where both don’t want a child (Coombs and Chang 1981; Tan and Tey 1994; Gipson and Hindin 2009). Moreover, whereas in industrialized countries women usually have at least as much say over fertility as men do, in some developing-country studies men’s preferences matter more. \(^10\) Compared to these studies, one advantage of the data used here is that we have information on the specific intention of having a/another baby at the time of the survey, which can be matched more directly into a bargaining model of fertility than a general question on future fertility intentions. Moreover, unlike in most existing studies our sample is not restricted to married couples, which is important given currently high rates of nonmarital childbearing. Finally, we are able to use comparable data for a number of countries, which makes it possible to assess county-level determinants of disagreement and its impact on realized fertility.

In terms of the application of our theory to the European fertility crisis, there is existing empirical work that has already pointed to a link between low fertility and a high child care burden on women (Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern 2008, de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz 2011). Relative to this literature, the contribution of our paper is to show explicitly how the large child care burden on women is reflected in high rates of women being opposed to having another child, and to develop a bargaining model of fertility that can account for the data and is useful for policy analysis. Relative to the existing literature on the response of fertility to financial incentives (e.g., Cohen, Dehejia, and Romanov 2013, Laroque and Salanié 2014, and Raute 2018), our contribution is to consider the differential impact of policies targeted at mothers versus fathers. \(^11\)

The existing theoretical literature on fertility choice has relied mostly on unitary models of household decision making. \(^12\) In a unitary model a common objective function for the

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\(^9\) Testa, Cavalli, and Rosina (2014) use recent Italian data and find that disagreement has a particularly strong negative effect on fertility at higher parities, i.e., decisions on additional children after the first child is already born. Thomson (1997) (US data), Thomson and Hoem (1998) (Swedish data) and Hener (2014) (German data) find similar results, although in these studies the survey questions on fertility preferences are less informative. In studies using US data for earlier time periods (between the 1950s and 1970s) disagreement has a smaller effect on fertility (Beckman 1984; Thomson, McDonald, and Bumpass 1990).

\(^10\) See for example Bankole (1995) using data from Nigeria. See also Doepke and Tertilt (2018) for a recent discussion that links the developing-country evidence to the mechanism developed here.

\(^11\) We relate our policy findings to the empirical literature in more detail in Section 6.

\(^12\) See, for example, Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989).
entire household is assumed to exist, and hence there is no conflict of interest between partners and no scope for disagreement. Such models do not speak to the issues discussed in this paper. Within the small existing literature that does take bargaining over fertility into account, our paper builds most directly on Rasul (2008). Rasul develops a two-period model in which there is a possibility of lack of commitment, and where the threat point is characterized by mothers bearing the entire cost of child rearing. Using household data from the Malaysian Family Life Survey, he finds evidence in favor of the limited commitment model. In terms of emphasizing the importance of bargaining and lack of commitment, our overall approach is similar to Rasul (2008). However, there are also key differences. Most importantly, in Rasul’s setting the mother decides unilaterally on fertility (while taking the impact on future bargaining into account), whereas our point of departure is that both parents have to agree for a child to be born. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first in the fertility literature to take this perspective. Moreover, we consider a dynamic model with multiple periods of childbearing, which allows us to distinguish disagreement over the timing of fertility from disagreement over the total number of children, and we match a rich quantitative model to data from low-fertility countries to allow for policy evaluation.

In the next section, we start our analysis by documenting the prevalence of disagreement over fertility among couples surveyed by the Generations and Gender Programme. We also show that agreement between partners is important for a birth to take place, and that across countries disagreement over fertility is closely related to the distribution of the burden of child care. In Section 3, we introduce our bargaining approach to fertility in a static setting, and in Section 4 the full quantitative model is developed. In Section 5

\[13\] A similar, more recent contribution is Kemnitz and Thum (2014). Dynamic models of fertility that also consider the marriage market have been developed by Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003), Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002), and Guner and Knowles (2009). Endogenous bargaining also arises in Basu (2006) and Iyigun and Walsh (2007), although not in the context of fertility. The potential inefficiency of household decision making due to the impact of current decisions on future bargaining power was pointed out by Lundberg and Pollak (2003), and the extent of commitment within households is analyzed more generally by Mazzocco (2007). Empirical studies of the link between female bargaining power and fertility include Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014), who suggest that more female bargaining power leads to lower fertility rates in a developing-country context.

\[14\] Brown, Flinn, and Mullins (2015) develop a model of marriage where both partners have to contribute for a child to be born, but the analysis is not focused on fertility and does not consider fertility intentions. The need for agreement also distinguishes our work from bargaining models where household decisions can be expressed as the maximization of a weighted sum of the utility of the partners, such as Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2012). Eswaran (2002) considers a model where different fertility preferences between mothers and fathers (which in other studies are taken as primitives) arise endogenously.
we match the model to the GGP data. Policy simulations are described in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. Proofs for propositions and additional theoretical and empirical findings are contained in the online appendix.

2 Evidence from the Generations and Gender Programme

We use data from the “Generations and Gender Programme” (GGP) to evaluate the importance of agreement on fertility decisions.\textsuperscript{15} The GGP is a longitudinal survey of adults in 19 mostly European countries that focuses on relationships within households, in particular between partners and between parents and children. Topics that are covered include fertility, partnership, labor force participation, and child care duties.

In this section, we use the GGP data to document a set of facts regarding agreement and disagreement over having babies. The GGP provides more detailed information on fertility intentions than do earlier data sets. The questions we use to determine fertility preferences and agreement or disagreement among partners are:

Q1: “Do you yourself want to have a/another baby now?”

for the respondent, and:

Q2: “Couples do not always have the same feelings about the number or timing of children. Does your partner/spouse want to have a/another baby now?”

for the respondent’s partner or spouse.\textsuperscript{16} Our sample includes all respondents who answer these two questions in Wave 1 of the survey (at most two waves are available to date) and where the female partner is of childbearing age. Given that these questions are asked of all respondents who indicate that they are in a relationship, the sample includes married and non-married couples, and both cohabitating couples and those who have separate residences. Data for these questions are available for 11 countries in Wave 1 of the survey (which was carried out between 2003 and 2009), with a total of

\textsuperscript{15}The data are available for research use at https://www.ggp-i.org/.

\textsuperscript{16}There is only one respondent per couple. This raises the question how reliable the answer regarding the fertility intention of the non-responding partner is. While there may be some misreporting, we find that the patterns of disagreement reported by female and male respondents (which each account for about half of the sample) are essentially identical, which speaks against a substantial bias.
33,479 responses from couples where the woman is between the ages of 20 and 45 (i.e., childbearing age). The included countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Russia. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the Wave 1 sample. The average age of the respondents is in the mid thirties, about 70 percent of couples are married, and close to 90 percent are cohabitating. The table provides a first glimpse of disagreement over having children: In more than 27 percent of couples at least one partner desires a baby, but in less than 17 percent of couples both partners do.

Table 1: Summary statistics of the Wave 1 sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of female partner</td>
<td>33.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of male partner</td>
<td>36.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent female (in %)</td>
<td>49.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married couple (in %)</td>
<td>68.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting (in %)</td>
<td>87.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of existing children</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women wanting a baby (in %)</td>
<td>22.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men wanting a baby (in %)</td>
<td>22.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples where at least one partner wants a baby (in %)</td>
<td>27.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples who both partners want a baby (in %)</td>
<td>16.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 33,479 observations. Included countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Russia.

The participants in the study are surveyed again in Wave 2, which takes place three years after the initial interview. So far, Wave 2 data on fertility outcomes are available for seven countries (Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, and Germany, Lithuania and Russia), with more to become available in the coming years. The availability of data on fertility outcomes makes it possible to study the link between gender-specific fertility intentions and outcomes. The sample size for each country in each wave is given in Tables 9 and 11 in Appendix E. This appendix also provides a detailed description of the data set.

Here we focus on basic facts regarding fertility intentions, fertility outcomes, and the division of child care tasks between the partners within the household. These are the
key variables with which to evaluate the predictions of our theory. We document three facts that inform our economic model, namely:

1. Many couples disagree on whether to have a (or another) baby.
2. Without agreement, few births take place.
3. In countries where men do little child care work, women are more likely to be opposed to having more children.

The data set contains a great deal of other information. In Appendix E we provide some additional empirical analysis to show how other characteristics of individuals and couples relate to fertility intentions, agreement on fertility, and fertility outcomes. We now turn to the three main facts to be documented.

2.1 Many Couples Disagree on Whether to Have a Baby

To document the extent of disagreement over having babies, we focus on the number of couples who disagree as a fraction of all couples where at least one of the partners wants to have a baby. We condition on at least one partner wishing to have a child, because in the entire sample most couples either haven’t yet started to have children or have already completed their fertility. Hence, both partners not wanting a/another baby at the present time is the most common state. In contrast, we are interested in disagreement over having babies as an obstacle to fertility among couples where there is at least some desire for having a child.

Based on the answers to questions Q1 and Q2, a couple can be in one of four states. Let AGREE denote a couple where both partners desire a baby; SHE YES/HE NO denotes the case where the woman desires a baby, but the man does not; and SHE NO/HE YES means that he desires a baby, but she does not. The remaining possibility is that neither partner wants to have a baby. Let \( \nu(\cdot) \) denote the fraction of couples in a given country in one of these states. We now compute the following disagreement shares:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DISAGREE MALE} &= \frac{\nu(\text{SHE YES/HE NO})}{\nu(\text{AGREE}) + \nu(\text{SHE YES/HE NO}) + \nu(\text{SHE NO/HE YES})}, \\
\text{DISAGREE FEMALE} &= \frac{\nu(\text{SHE NO/HE YES})}{\nu(\text{AGREE}) + \nu(\text{SHE NO/HE NO}) + \nu(\text{SHE NO/HE YES})}.
\end{align*}
\]
Figure 1 displays the extent of disagreement over fertility across countries, where the total fertility rate for each country is shown in parentheses.\textsuperscript{17} In this graph, if all couples in a country were in agreement on fertility (either both want one or both do not), we would get a point at the origin. In a country that is on the 45-degree line, women and men are equally likely to be opposed to having a baby.

Figure 1: Disagreement over having a baby across countries

Notes: Data from Generations and Gender Programme. Each dot is a country, total fertility rate displayed in parentheses. “Disagree Female” is the number of couples where the woman does not want a child but the man does, as a fraction of all couples where at least one partner wants a child. “Disagree Male” is the analogous fraction of couples where the man does not want a child but the woman does.

The main facts displayed in the first panel of Figure 1 (which shows results for all couples) can be summarized as follows. First, there is a lot of disagreement; in 25 to 50 percent of couples where at least one partner desires a baby, one of the partners does not

\textsuperscript{17}We obtained the total fertility rates for each country from the 2014 World Bank Development Indicators and use a simple average between the years 2000 and 2010.
(the total disagreement is the sum of the values on the x and y axes). Second, women are more often in disagreement with their partner’s desire for a baby than the other way around (i.e., most countries lie to the right of the 45 degree line). Third, the tilt towards more female disagreement is especially pronounced in countries with low total fertility rates, whereas disagreement is nearly balanced by gender in the countries with a relatively high fertility rate (France, Norway, and Belgium).

The picture as such does not allow conclusions about whether disagreement affects the total number of children a couple ends up with. It is possible that the disagreement is about the timing of fertility, rather than about how many children to have overall. This issue will be addressed in the quantitative analysis below by exploiting repeated information on child preferences for couples who took part in both waves of the survey. As a first pass, it is indicative to consider disagreement as a function of the existing number of children. The total fertility rate of a country is more likely to be affected by disagreement over higher-order children; e.g., if a couple has at least two children already, it is more likely that the potential baby to be born is the marginal child (so that the total number of children would be affected). The remaining panels of Figure 1 break down the data by the number of children already in the family. The main observations here are that among couples who have at least two children, the extent of disagreement is even larger (50 to 70 percent), and the tilt towards female disagreement in low-fertility countries is even more pronounced.

2.2 Without Agreement, Few Births Take Place

Next, we document that disagreement is an important obstacle to fertility. The basic facts can be established through simple regressions of fertility outcomes on intentions of the following form:

\[ \text{BIRTH}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_f \cdot \text{SHE YES/HE NO}_i + \beta_m \cdot \text{SHE NO/HE YES}_i + \beta_a \cdot \text{AGREE}_i + \epsilon_i. \]

Here BIRTH\(_i\) is a binary indicator which takes a value of one if couple \(i\) has a baby in the three years after stating fertility intentions (as observed in Wave 2 of the survey). The right-hand side variables denote the fertility intentions of couple \(i\) in Wave 1. The constant \(\beta_0\) captures the baseline fertility rate of couples in which both partners state not to want a baby. The parameters \(\beta_f, \beta_m, \) and \(\beta_a\) measure the increase in the probability of having a baby compared to the baseline for couples in each of the three other states. In a world where women decide on fertility on their own, we would expect to find
\( \beta_f = \beta_a > 0 \) and \( \beta_m = 0 \). If each partner’s intention had an independent influence on the probability of having a baby, we would observe \( \beta_f > 0, \beta_m > 0, \) and \( \beta_a = \beta_f + \beta_m \). Finally, if a birth can take place only if the partners agree on having a baby (i.e., each partner has veto power), we expect to find \( \beta_f = \beta_m = 0 \) and \( \beta_a > 0 \). Least squares estimates for this regression, using pooled data for all available countries as well as samples split by the number of existing children, are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Impact of fertility intentions on probability of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whole sample</th>
<th>By number of children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( n = 0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHE YES/HE NO</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHE NO/HE YES</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGREE</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>10,974</td>
<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column is a linear regression of a binary variable indicating whether a child was born between Wave 1 and Wave 2 (i.e., within three years after Wave 1) on stated fertility intentions in Wave 1. Countries included (i.e., all countries where data from both waves are available) are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, and Russia. Sample restricted to couples where the woman is between 20 and 45 years old (i.e., of childbearing age) and the man is between 20 and 55 years old during the Wave 1 interview (when intentions are recorded).

We find that all coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level for the pooled sample, but the agreement term \( \beta_a \) is the largest in size, and more than twice as large as the sum of \( \beta_f \) and \( \beta_m \). A couple that agrees has a more than three times higher incremental likelihood of having a baby than does a couple where the man disagrees, and a more than seven times higher likelihood than does a couple where the woman

\( \beta_a \) is statistically different from \( \beta_m + \beta_f \) at the 1 percent level in all regressions.
disagrees.

Next, we break down the regressions by parity, i.e., the number of children the couple already has. The need for agreement is most pronounced for couples with no children. For these couples, the probability of having a child when only one partner desires one is not significantly different from the probability of couples that agree not to want a child. Perhaps not surprisingly, for higher-order children, the woman’s intention turns out to be more important than the man’s. In fact, if the woman disagrees, the man’s desire for a child has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a birth (at the five percent level). But even for a woman, having her partner agree greatly increases the probability of having a child.

In summary, the data show that agreement between the potential parents is essential for babies to be born. While women have some independent control over their fertility, only couples who agree on the plan to have a baby are likely to end up with one.

2.3 When Men Do Little Child Care Work, Women Are More Likely to Be Opposed to Having More Children

In the theory articulated below, disagreement between partners regarding fertility can arise because couples cannot commit to a specific allocation of child care duties in advance. To show that the distribution of child care between mothers and fathers matters in the GGP data, here we calculate the average share of men in caring for children at a national level by coding the answers to the following questions:

“I am going to read out various tasks that have to be done when one lives together with children. Please tell me, who in your household does these tasks?

1. Dressing the children or seeing that the children are properly dressed;
2. Putting the children to bed and/or seeing that they go to bed;
3. Staying at home with the children when they are ill;
4. Playing with the children and/or taking part in leisure activities with them;
5. Helping the children with homework;
6. Taking the children to/from school, day care centre, babysitter or leisure activities.”
The possible answers to these questions are “always the respondent,” “usually the respondent,” “about equal shares,” “usually the partner,” and “always the partner.” We code these answers as 0, 0.15, 0.5, 0.95, and 1 if the respondent is female and 1, 0.85, 0.5, 0.15, and 0 if the respondent is male. We aggregate the answers by forming a simple mean per couple (on the sample of couples with at least one child under the age of 15) and calculating the average for every country. This gives us a proxy for the share of men in child care for every country. In all countries in the data set, women carry out the majority of these tasks, but there is also considerable variation across countries. The countries with the highest fertility rates (Belgium, France, and Norway) also have the highest participation of men in child care. Men do the most child care work in Norway with a share of just above 40 percent, whereas Russian men do the least with a share of less than 25 percent.

Figure 2: Disagreement over fertility and men’s share in caring for children

Notes: Data from Generations and Gender Programme. Each dot is a country, total fertility rate displayed in parentheses. Sample restricted to couples who have at least one child under age 15.

To examine how the allocation of child care duties is related to fertility intentions, we plot the male share in child care against the difference between female disagreement and

\[ \text{Share of men caring for children} \]

\[ \text{Disagree Female} - \text{Disagree Male} \]

Correlation = −0.733

19In Appendix E.6, we show that our measure of the distribution of the burden of child care lines up well with time use data from other sources.
male disagreement with having another child (the difference between the DISAGREE FEMALE and DISAGREE MALE variable computed on couples with at least one child under the age of 15). This yields Figure 2 (which also includes a regression line). The figure shows that in countries where women do most of the work in raising children, women are more likely to be opposed to having more children, and fertility is low.

Figure 3: Disagreement over fertility and mother’s labor market behavior

Notes: Data from Generations and Gender Programme. Each dot is a country, total fertility rate displayed in parentheses. Horizontal axis of left panel displays gap in labor force participation rate between mothers with a child up to age 3 and all other women in the sample (which is restricted to women of ages 20 to 45). Horizontal axis of right panel displays gap in weekly hours of labor supply between the same groups.

One important factor that determines the distribution of the burden of child care is the labor market impact of child birth. In some countries, many mothers drop out of the labor force for an extended period to care for young children, while in others most families use market-based child care and career interruptions are short. Figure 3 relates the labor market impact of having a young child to disagreement over fertility. On the vertical axis we display the difference between female and male disagreement with having another child, as in Figure 2. On the horizontal axes, we display two measures of the labor market impact of having a young child. For the left panel, we use the difference in the labor force participation rate between mothers with a young child (up to 3 years) and all other women in our sample (which is restricted to women of childbearing age). For the right panel, we use the difference in weekly hours worked between the same groups. The figure shows that in countries where women reduce their labor supply a lot and are likely to drop out of the labor force when having a child, women are also relatively more likely to disagree with having another child. This observation suggests
that differences in the ease of combining children and careers for mothers may be an important driver of variation across countries in both the distribution of the burden of child care and in disagreement over having children.

While the empirical connections between the burden of child care, mothers’ labor supply decisions, disagreement over fertility, and fertility outcomes described in this section make intuitive sense, they are not suggestive of a simple causal interpretation where variation in a single exogenous variable is responsible for the variation in all the others. Instead, economic reasoning would suggest that these variables are all mutually connected, as they all emerge from the same household decision process. We therefore would like to develop a model of household decision making that can account for all the empirical findings. For this task, a baseline model of fertility choice based on the unitary model of the family is not going to work, because in such models there is no scope for disagreement between partners. Instead, a bargaining model is required where disagreement may arise. In addition, the empirical link between disagreement and realized fertility suggests that individuals with a high fertility preference are not always able to compensate their partners for their child care duties in order to get them to agree to having a baby. We take the perspective that this is due to lack of commitment within the household. Next, we describe the theoretical framework that spells out this mechanism and that can account for all the facts documented above.

3 A Bargaining Model of Fertility

In this section, we develop a bargaining model of fertility choice. We consider the decision problem of a household composed of a woman and a man. Initially the couple does not have children. To have a child, the two have to act jointly, and hence a child is created only if both partners find it in their interest to participate. Without agreement, the status quo prevails. In this section, we outline the main mechanism for the case of a one-time choice of a single child. We contrast the cases of commitment and lack of commitment, and argue that the distribution of the child care burden between the partners is an important determinant of the total fertility rate. The model analyzed here is deliberately stylized to bring out the implications of lack of commitment in a sharp way. In Section 4, we expand the analysis by introducing dynamics, a richer structure for the cost of children, and the possibility of partial commitment in order to develop a quantitative model that can be matched to the data and used for policy analysis.
3.1 Setup and Solution under Commitment

Consider an initially childless couple consisting of a woman \( f \) and a man \( m \). The couple has to decide on whether to have a child. The market wages for the woman and the man are \( w_f \) and \( w_m \). The total cost of a child in terms of consumption is given by \( \phi \) (time costs are introduced in the quantitative model in Section 4). Utility \( u_g(c_g, b) \) of partner \( g \in \{f, m\} \) is given by:

\[
u_g(c_g, b) = c_g + bv_g,
\]

where \( c_g \geq 0 \) is consumption, \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) indicates whether a child is born, and \( v_g \) is the additional utility partner \( g \) receives from having a child compared to the childless status quo.\(^{20}\)

In addition to the opportunity to have children, an added benefit of being in a relationship is returns to scale in consumption, for example through the joint use of an apartment, cooking together, and so on. Specifically, if a couple cooperates, their effective income increases by a factor of \( \alpha > 0 \) (or, equivalently, the effective cost of consumption decreases by a factor of \( 1/(1 + \alpha) \)). For a cooperating couple, the budget constraint is then given by:

\[
c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) \left( w_f + w_m - \phi b \right).
\]

The household reaches decisions through Nash bargaining. The timing is such that the household first needs to decide on whether to have a child, and then consumption takes place after the birth outcome \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) has been realized. The timing implies that bargaining will depend on the extent of commitment. Consider first the case of full commitment, in which the partners can commit to a future consumption allocation before having a child. This case amounts to choosing consumption and fertility simultaneously subject to a single outside option. The outside option is not to cooperate, in which case the couple does not have a child and forgoes the returns to scale from joint consumption. Utilities \( \bar{u}_g(0) \) in the outside option are therefore given by:

\[
\bar{u}_f(0) = w_f \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{u}_m(0) = w_m.
\]

We denote the ex-post utility of woman and man (i.e., taking wages, costs of children, and the bargaining outcome into account) as \( u_g(0) \) when no child is born and \( u_g(1) \) when

\(^{20}\)Linear utility in consumption has the advantage that utility is transferable between the partners, which facilitates bargaining. Non-transferable utility would introduce additional frictions and amplify the commitment problem that we introduce explicitly below.
a child is born, where \( g \in \{f, m\} \). We assume equal bargaining weights throughout.\(^{21}\) The following proposition characterizes the bargaining outcome under commitment.

**Proposition 1** (Fertility Choice under Commitment). Under commitment, the couple decides to have a child if the condition:

\[
v_f + v_m \geq \phi(1 + \alpha)
\]

is met. Moreover, when (4) holds, we also have:

\[
u_f(1) \geq u_f(0) \quad \text{and} \quad u_m(1) \geq u_m(0).
\]

That is, each partner is individually better off when the child is born. Conversely,

\[
v_f + v_m < \phi(1 + \alpha)
\]

implies

\[
u_f(1) < u_f(0) \quad \text{and} \quad u_m(1) < u_m(0),
\]

i.e., if the couple decides not to have a child, each partner individually is better off without the child. Taking together, the conditions imply that under commitment the couple always agrees about the fertility choice, and this choice is efficient.

The proof for the proposition is contained in Appendix A.

The implication of perfect agreement on fertility among the partners conflicts with our empirical observation of many couples who disagree on having a child. The main reason for why the model is at odds with the data is the assumption of full commitment. To see why this assumption might be problematic, consider a case where the benefits of having a baby are distributed unequally between the partners, say, the man derives high utility \( v_m > \phi(1 + \alpha) \) from a child (i.e., his utility alone exceeds the cost of having a child), whereas the woman does not, \( v_f = 0 \). Under commitment, this couple will decide to have the child, and the bargaining outcome is such that the total utility benefit is equally shared. But given that only the man derives direct utility from the child, the way utility is shared is by the woman getting a much larger share of consumption than the man, so that the woman’s extra utility from consumption balances the man’s extra utility from the baby. In other words, when deciding on whether to have a child, the man is implicitly promising a large future transfer to the woman if she agrees to have the child.

\(^{21}\)All results can be generalized to arbitrary weights.
The problem is that the woman may not find this promise of a future transfer credible. What stops the man from reneging on the promise and renegotiating the consumption allocation after the baby is born? This possibility suggests an alternative setup with a lack of commitment. As we will see, this setting can account for disagreement between partners on fertility.

3.2 Setup and Solution under Lack of Commitment

Under lack of commitment, partners are not able to commit to future transfers when deciding on whether to have a baby. Hence, bargaining proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the partners decide whether to have a child. In the second stage, resources are allocated to consumption, given the outside option after the fertility decision is sunk. Hence, for each partner there are two different outside options, one for the case where the couple has a child and one for the case where it doesn’t. This setup captures lack of commitment, in the sense that the partners are not able to make binding commitments for transfers in the second stage during the first-stage bargaining over fertility.

The outside options conditional on not having a child are still given by (3). To formulate the outside options when there is a child, we have to take a stand on who bears the cost of raising the child in the non-cooperation state. We assume that the cost shares of woman and man are given by fixed parameters $\chi_f$ and $\chi_m$ with $\chi_f + \chi_m = 1$. The new outside options therefore are:

\begin{align}
\bar{u}_f(1) &= w_f + v_f - \chi_f \phi, \\
\bar{u}_m(1) &= w_m + v_m - \chi_m \phi.
\end{align}

Notice that in the outside option, the partners still derive utility from the presence of the child. We interpret the outside option as non-cooperation within a continuing relationship, as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993). That is, the couple is still together and both partners still derive utility from the child, but bargaining regarding the allocation of consumption breaks down, the division of child care duties reverts to the defaults given by $\chi_f$ and $\chi_m$, and the couple no longer benefits from returns to scale in joint consumption. We do not take an explicit stand on how the default cost shares $\chi_f$ and $\chi_m$ are determined. We can imagine that traditional gender roles within a country are relevant (as emphasized by Lundberg and Pollak 1993), but government policies determining the availability of market-based child care should also matter.\footnote{The role of country-specific social norms regarding the division of labor in the household for outcomes...} Another possibility is...
that the defaults for cost shares are in part controlled by the couple. For example, cost
shares may depend on the couple’s decision of where to live (say, close to grandparents
who would be willing to help with child care) and on whether one of the parents drops
out of the labor force to care for the child. Endogenous cost shares result in a model
with partial commitment, which we consider as an extension in Appendix D and which
forms the basis of the quantitative model in Section 4.

We now characterize the fertility choice under lack of commitment.

**Proposition 2 (Fertility Choice under Lack of Commitment).** Under lack of commitment,
we have $u_f(1) \geq u_f(0)$ (the woman would like to have a child) if and only if the condition

$$v_f \geq \left( \chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi$$

is satisfied. We have $u_m(1) \geq u_m(0)$ (the man would like to have a child) if and only if the
condition

$$v_m \geq \left( \chi_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi$$

is satisfied. The right-hand sides of (7) and (8) are constants. Hence, depending on $v_f$ and $v_m$, it
is possible that neither condition, both conditions, or just one condition is satisfied. Since child
birth requires agreement, a child is born only if (7) and (8) are both met simultaneously.

The proof for the proposition is contained in Appendix A.

The reason why disagreement is possible is that after the child is born, the outside op-
tions of the two partners shift away from the outside options in the full commitment
model. Figure 4 illustrates this issue for the case in which the woman bears a larger
share of the burden of child care than the man does.

The figure displays the utility of the woman on the horizontal axis and the utility of the
man on the vertical axis. Under commitment, the outside option is given by $(w_f, w_m)$. The
line $b = 0$ shows the utility possibility frontier for the case in which the couple
does not have a baby, and the line $b = 1$ shows the frontier for the case of having one. In the depicted situation, having a baby yields a higher sum of utilities for the couple. Under commitment, the utility allocation between the woman and the man is given
by the intersection between the utility possibility frontier and a 45-degree line starting
from the initial outside option (the 45-degree slope arises because of equal bargaining
such as marriage and fertility have been empirically documented by Fernández and Fogli (2009) and
Sevilla-Sanz (2010), among others.)
weights). Note that under commitment, for each partner the utility level of having a child is higher than the utility level of not having a child, so that the partners agree and will act jointly to have a child. More generally, under commitment the partners will agree to have a child if and only if the utility possibility frontier for $b = 1$ is higher than the frontier for $b = 0$, and they will agree not to have a child otherwise. Since along the 45-degree line from the outside option (or, more generally, any line with positive slope corresponding to a set of bargaining weights) the woman’s and the man’s utility move in the same direction, there cannot be disagreement, i.e., a situation where only one of the partners wishes to have a child.

In the case of lack of commitment, there are two outside options, the one without a child and the one with a child. The outside option without a child is identical to the outside option under commitment. Because she bears a large fraction of the burden of child care, the woman’s outside option if a child is born $w_f + v_f - \phi \chi_f$ is lower than the initial outside option, whereas the man’s outside option when a child is born $w_m + v_m - \phi \chi_m$ is higher. Again, the solution to the bargaining problem is the intersection of the
utility possibility frontier and the 45-degree line starting at the relevant outside option. However, because the outside option now depends on the fertility decision, there is a possibility of disagreement over fertility, which is the case drawn here. Because she bears a large share of the child cost and hence loses bargaining power if a child is born, the woman will have a lower utility level with a child compared to without. Hence, she will not agree to a birth and the couple will remain childless, even though they could both be better off with a child if they were able to commit.

3.3 Towards a Quantitative Model

We would like to explore the ability of the lack of commitment mechanism to quantitatively account for the evidence discussed in Section 2, and then go on to examine the implications of this mechanism for how various policy interventions affect fertility. Doing this requires us to extend the simple one-shot model discussed here in a number of directions. First, to account for the distribution in fertility and fertility intentions in the data, we introduce heterogeneity across couples in terms of preferences and wages. Second, there is an important distinction between partners’ disagreement about the total number of children they want to have, and disagreement about when to have them. In the extreme, one can envision a setting in which all couples agree on how many children they ultimately want to have, and the only source of conflict is whether to have them early or late. In this case, an intervention that reshuffles the child care burden between the partners may affect when people have children, but it would not affect the ultimate outcome in terms of the total number of children per couple. To allow us to separate disagreement over the timing of fertility versus over the total number of children, we extend the model to a dynamic setting where child preferences evolve over time. Third, the one period model assumes a complete lack of commitment regarding the burden of child care, and the distribution of the burden of child care in the outside option is a reduced form parameter. In reality, there are ways for couples to achieve at least some commitment, and the burden of child care is linked at least in part to factors such as the cost of market-based child care and female labor supply. In the full model, we therefore introduce labor supply and child care decisions and an element of partial commitment.

To clarify how these extensions affect the basic mechanics of the model, in the appendix we work out the implications of each of these extensions in isolation in the context of the one period model described above. In particular, in Appendix B we introduce a distribution of fertility preferences into the model, and show how the total fertility rate
depends on the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers. The key insight here (which carries over to the full model) is that the impact of a policy that changes the distribution of the burden of child care depends on disagreement shares and on the density of the distribution of fertility preferences. The density matters because the fertility decision is at the extensive margin: in a given period, a couple either has a child or not. If there is, say, a decrease in the burden of child care for mothers, the number of of women who now switch from not wanting a child to wanting one depends on the density of the distribution of fertility preferences at the threshold of indifference. Second, disagreement shares also matter: if a potential mother switches towards wanting a child, this increases fertility only if her partner already wants a child, i.e., if the mother’s intention is pivotal for the decision. We will describe below in the full model how these factors underlie our main findings about the effects of policies designed to increase fertility rates.

In Appendix C, we focus on the role of timing of fertility by considering a two-period setting, and show that depending on the persistence of fertility preferences, disagreement in fertility intentions may or may not affect overall fertility. We describe below how we use evidence on the persistence of fertility intentions to pin down this aspect in the full model.

In Appendix D, we introduce partial commitment by allowing the couple to bargain over the distribution of the burden of child care in an initial stage, before deciding on fertility. We show that as long as there are limits to how much commitment is possible, this model yields qualitatively the same results as the simpler model described above. However, the degree of commitment matters for quantitative results, which is why we include an element of partial commitment in the full model below.

4 A Quantitative Model of Bargaining over Fertility under Partial Commitment

We now describe the quantitative model that we match to the evidence from the GGP data. The main additional elements compared to the simple setup described above are dynamic decision making with fertility preferences that evolve over time; a richer structure of child rearing costs including time and goods components; heterogeneity in wages; endogenous labor supply that is linked to child care decisions; and the possibility of partial commitment.
We model couples that are fertile from period 1 to period $T = 8$. Each model period corresponds to three years of calendar time. The first period corresponds to ages 20–22, the second to 23–25, and so on up to period 8 (ages 41–43). Parents raise their children for $H = 6$ periods (corresponding to 18 years). Hence, after completing fertility, the couple continues to raise its children until all children have reached adulthood by period $T + H$. Couples start out with zero children and can have up to three children. We denote by $b$ the fertility outcome in a given period, where $b = 1$ if child is born in the period and $b = 0$ otherwise. Also, $n$ denotes the total number of children of a couple, where $0 \leq n \leq 3$.

There is heterogeneity across couples in the woman’s wage $w_f$. We abstract from heterogeneity in the man’s wage $w_m$, because it does not affect the fertility decision in our setting. To generate wage heterogeneity, we distinguish between women who have college education $co$ and those with less-than-college education $nc$. Education is denoted by $e \in \{nc, co\}$. College-educated women have higher average wages, but there is also wage heterogeneity conditional on education. Specifically, wages are distributed according to log-normal distributions with education specific means and variances. A woman’s wage is constant over the life cycle. There is also a fixed cost of participation $p_c$ that has to be paid if a woman is in the labor force, which allows us to match the observation that some women do not work even before having children. To simplify the exposition below, we write the model in terms of the wage net of the participation cost. Specifically, women draw a potential wage $\tilde{w}_f$ from the log normal distribution, and then work if $\tilde{w}_f > p_c$, with the net wage given by $w_f = \max\{0, \tilde{w}_f - p_c\}$.

In a given period, a person of gender $g \in \{f, m\}$ derives utility from consumption $c_g$ and fertility $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and there is also a disutility of child care $d_g$. The utility $v_g$ that a person derives from the arrival of a child is stochastic and evolves over time (to be described below). The individual utility of a household member of gender $g \in \{m, f\}$ at age $t$ is given by the value function:

$$V^t_g(e, w_f, a_1, a_2, a_3, v_f, v_m) = E \left[ u(c_g, d_g, v_g, b) + \beta V^{t+1}_g(e, w_f, a_1', a_2', a_3', v_f', v_m') \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

---

23. There are only few couples with more than three children in our data for low-fertility countries.

24. This is because in the model fathers do not reduce labor supply to care for children and because utility is linear in consumption.

25. Allowing for wage dynamics would generate additional predictions for the timing of fertility, but here the role of wage heterogeneity is simply to allow us to match broad differences across women with different labor market opportunities in terms of fertility intentions and outcomes.
Here $w_f$ is the woman’s wage, $a_1$, $a_2$ and $a_3$ denote the ages of the children at the beginning of the period, $v_f$ and $v_m$ are the child preferences of the two partners, and $\beta$ is a discount factor that satisfies $0 < \beta < 1$. In writing the value function this way, it is understood that $c_g$ and $b$ are potentially stochastic functions of the state variables that are determined through bargaining between the partners. We have $a_i = 0$ for a potential child that has not yet been born. The $a_i$ evolve according to:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
    a'_1 \\
    a'_2 \\
    a'_3 \\
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
    I(a_1 > 0)(a_1 + 1) + I(a_1 = 0)b \\
    I(a_2 > 0)(a_2 + 1) + I(a_1 > 0)I(a_2 = 0)b \\
    I(a_3 > 0)(a_3 + 1) + I(a_2 > 0)I(a_3 = 0)b \\
\end{pmatrix},
$$

where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function. Since in the model no decisions affecting fertility are made after all children are grown, we assume that parents die at that point and hence $V^{T+H+1}_g = 0$.

As in Section 3 above, utility is linear in consumption and additively separable in felicity derived from the presence of children, and the disutility of child care $d_g$ enters linearly also. Instantaneous utility is given by:

$$
uc_g, d_g, v_g, b) = c_g - d_g + v_g \cdot b.
$$

Notice that the couple derives utility from a child only in the period when the child is born. However, this is without loss of generality, since only the present value of the added utility of a child matters for the fertility decision.

Children are costly as long as they live with their parents. For each child, there is a fixed monetary cost $\phi_c$ and a fixed utility cost $\phi_u$. We think of the utility cost as a time cost that accrues outside of typical work hours, such as the time spent caring for school-age children on nights or weekends.\footnote{See Schoonbroodt (2018) for an analysis that points out the importance of distinguishing between child care that competes with work hours versus child care that does not.} Hence, this cost is not denominated by the market wage, but directly enters utility through the term $d_g$.

There is an additional time cost of taking care of children during work hours, which accrues until the child is three years old (i.e., for one model period). There are two options for how this cost can be covered. One option is for the mother of the young child to stay at home instead of working. This choice is denoted by $h = 1$. In this case,
the opportunity cost of caring for the young child is given by the woman’s wage $w_f$. The alternative is for the woman to keep working, $h = 0$, and buy child care on the market (e.g., use a daycare center) at price $w_y$. The child care decision is discrete, $h \in \{0, 1\}$, i.e., we abstract from the possibility of working part time, and also from the option of the father staying at home with the child.\footnote{Allowing for this possibility would be straightforward and would not change the main results. However, it would also complicate notation, and given that in the GGP data very few men stay at home as primary care givers for children, we abstract from this option here.}

Given the age distribution of children $a_i$, we can calculate the total number of children living in the household as:

$$n_h = \sum_i \mathbb{1}(0 < a_i < H) + b,$$

where $H$ is the duration of childhood. The total monetary cost of raising children is $n_h \phi_c + b(1 - h)w_y$, the forgone wage if the mother cares for a young child is $bh w_f$, and the total utility cost is $n_h \phi_u$.

Couples bargain over fertility, child care, and consumption under partial commitment. The sense in which there is partial commitment is that the distribution of the burden of child care between mother and father is not entirely exogenous (as in the model in Section 3), but instead depends in part on earlier decisions by the couple. Specifically, we assume that the couple can decide ahead of time whether, if a baby arrives, the mother will stay home to take care of the child for the first period ($h = 1$), or whether they will use market child care instead ($h = 0$). The couple can commit to this decision. In contrast, it is not possible to pre-commit to a specific distribution of the other child costs $\phi_c$ and $\phi_u$. Given that commitment is possible for only a part of the child rearing cost, the lack of commitment mechanism outlined in Section 3 is still operative, which is essential for the model to be able to match disagreement between partners on having children.

The motivation for allowing commitment with regards to the child care arrangement $h \in \{0, 1\}$ is twofold. First, how to arrange child care is a major decision that is subject to switching costs and requires advance planning; it is not unheard of to apply for daycare slots long before a child is born. Moreover, the child care decision interacts with other major choices that also have the characteristics of being lumpy and persistent, such as in which city or neighborhood to live (which may differ in the availability of child care).
Arguably, it should be easier to commit to such decisions compared to other aspects of child care that can be easily changed on an everyday basis. Second, because the child care decision for young children interacts with the mother’s labor market opportunities, allowing for partial commitment in this particular dimension generates empirical implications that we can take to the data.

Building on the partial commitment framework outlined in Appendix D, the bargaining process between the partners in every period proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, the couple decides on the child care arrangement $h \in \{0, 1\}$ conditional on a child being born in that period. The default choice is the one that minimizes the total cost of child care, that is, $h = 1$ if $w_f < w_y$ and $h = 0$ otherwise. However, the partners can change the default if both of them agree. This may be attractive because of the repercussions of the choice of $h$ on the decision to have a baby.

As an example, consider a couple where the woman’s wage $w_f$ is slightly lower than the cost of market based child care $w_y$, so that the default is for the woman to stay home if a child is born, $h = 1$. However, staying at home lowers the woman’s outside option, so that if $h = 1$ she may not agree to have the child. If the husband wants to have a child, the partners may agree that they would both be better off by committing to $h = 0$, i.e., the woman keeps working and the couple uses market child care. Relative to the default of $h = 1$, the woman would gain through a better outside option and hence more bargaining power, and the man would gain through a higher probability of getting a child. The reverse scenario is also possible: a woman with a relatively high wage may offer to stay home with the child if she really wants one and her partner is opposed, because the woman staying home increases the man’s relative bargaining power and, hence, his incentive to agree to having a child.

The second stage of bargaining concerns the fertility choice $b \in \{0, 1\}$. However, it is useful to first consider the third stage of bargaining over the allocation of consumption, where the outside options come into play. As in the model of Section 3, the outside option is a temporary state of non-cooperation in which each partner consumes her or his own earnings (if any) and provides her or his share of the burden of child care for one period. Future utility is the same in the outside option as on the equilibrium path, and given that the consumption allocation within a period does not affect state variables, we can treat the consumption decision as a static bargaining problem. In terms of the distribution of the burden of child care in the outside option, we aim to capture the intuition that the man (who often has higher earnings) is relatively more likely to
contribute to monetary costs compared to non-monetary costs. Hence, we assume that in the outside option monetary expenses (the child cost \( \phi_c \) and, potentially, the cost of market child care \( w_y \)) are paid in equal shares by woman and man. In contrast, the utility cost \( \phi_u \) (which captures child care outside of market hours) is divided according to the cost shares \( \chi_f \) and \( \chi_m \), where \( \chi_f + \chi_m = 1 \). The utility cost of raising children for gender \( g \in \{ f, m \} \) is then given by \( d_f = \chi_g n h \phi_u \). The cost shares \( \chi_f \) and \( \chi_m \), which may reflect comparative advantage but which we interpret as primarily being due to social norms, will later be matched to data on the actual distribution of child care between parents.

The within-period outside option for the wife, analogous to (5), is then given by:

\[
\bar{u}_f(w_f, v_f, h, n_h, b) = (1 - bh)w_f - \frac{1}{2} (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h)w_y b) - \chi_f \phi_u n_h + v_f \cdot b, \tag{10}
\]

and for the husband we have, analogous to (6):

\[
\bar{u}_m(w_m, v_m, h, n_h, b) = w_m - \frac{1}{2} (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h)w_y b) - \chi_m \phi_u n_h + v_m \cdot b. \tag{11}
\]

Given these outside options, the couple negotiates how to divide consumption given the budget constraint. The couple’s budget constraint in the case of cooperation reads:

\[
c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) [(1 - bh)w_f + w_m - \phi_c n_h - (1 - h)w_y b], \tag{12}
\]

that is, total consumption is equal to total income minus the goods cost of raising children, scaled up by the increasing returns from cooperation \( \alpha \). With equal bargaining weights, the Nash bargaining outcome is the solution of the maximization problem:

\[
\max_{c_f, c_m} \left[ c_f - \left( (1 - bh)w_f - \frac{1}{2} (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h)w_y b) \right)^{0.5} \right]^2
\]

subject to the above budget constraint. Notice that the utility derived from children and the direct utility cost of children drop out here, because they enter equilibrium utility and the outside option equally.\(^{29}\) Similarly, future utility does not enter because the

\(^{28}\)Notice that we do no impose a non-negativity constraint on consumption, which does not cause problems because utility is linear in consumption. Alternatively, one could add additional endowments to ensure that consumption is possible even in the outside option. For our analysis, the only feature that is crucial is that the outside option depends on whether the couple decides to have a child.

\(^{29}\)We assume that the allocation of the utility costs \( d_g \) is the same in equilibrium and outside option.
The evolution of the state variables is unaffected by the current consumption allocation: the bargaining problem regarding consumption is static. Analogous to (15) and (16) in the proof of Proposition 2, the solution to the maximization problem is:

\[ c_f(n_h) = \left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right) (1 - bh) w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} w_m - \frac{1}{2} (1 + \alpha) (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h) w_y b), \]

\[ c_m(n_h) = \frac{\alpha}{2} (1 - bh) w_f + \left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right) w_m - \frac{1}{2} (1 + \alpha) (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h) w_y b). \]

As before, each partner receives its outside option plus a fixed share of the surplus generated by cooperation.

We now go back to the second stage of bargaining, when fertility is decided on. In this stage, the partners form their intentions for having a child during the period, taking as given the child care decision \( h \in \{0, 1\} \) taken at the beginning of the period, and anticipating how having a child \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) would affect the bargaining outcome over consumption at the end of the period and the continuation utility in future periods. Let \( i_g \in \{0, 1\} \) denote the intention of partner \( g \), where \( i_g = 1 \) denotes that the partner would like to have a baby. Formally, \( i_g \) is determined as follows:

\[ i_g = I\left\{ u(c_g, d_g, v_g, 1) + \beta E [V_{t+1}^g(e, w_f, a_1', a_2', a_3', v_f', v_m') | b = 1] \geq u(c_g, d_g, v_g, 0) + \beta E [V_{t+1}^g(e, w_f, a_1', a_2', a_3', v_f', v_m') | b = 0] \right\}, \quad (13) \]

where \( I(\cdot) \) is the indicator function and it is understood that consumption and child care costs depend on \( b \). Equation (13) expresses that a partner intends to have a child if having a child increases expected utility. In Section 3, we assumed that having a baby requires agreement, i.e., a child was born \( (b = 1) \) if and only if \( i_f = 1 \) and \( i_m = 1 \). In the GGP data explored in Section 2, we found that although agreement between the partners greatly increases the likelihood of having a baby, some births occur nevertheless without perfect agreement. We therefore allow for a general mapping of fertility intentions to outcomes that also depend on the existing number of children. Given fertility intentions and the existing number of children \( n \), the probability of having a baby in a given period is given by a function \( \gamma(i_f, i_m, e, n) \). Later on, we will choose this function to match the observed birth probability for each combination of intention and existing number of children.

This is without loss of generality, since utility only depends on the sum \( c_g + d_g \). A different allocation of the utility cost in equilibrium would result in an exactly offsetting change in consumption and leave overall utility and fertility decisions unchanged.
children in the GGP data, separately for women with college education and less-than-college education. We take this function as exogenous; some factors that are likely to play a role in reality are natural fecundity (births are not guaranteed even if the partners agree), imperfect birth control, and change over time in fertility intentions.

Regarding child preferences, we show in Appendix C that the persistence of child preferences over time determines the extent to which disagreement over having babies matters for the timing of fertility versus total lifetime fertility. Specifically, transitory disagreement (i.e., couples who disagree today are likely to agree in the future) primarily delays fertility, whereas persistent disagreement lowers the total number of children a couple will have. To be able to match the degree of persistence to the data, we model child preferences as follows. In every period, a couple draws potential fertility preferences \( \tilde{v}_f, \tilde{v}_m \) from a joint uniform distribution\(^{30}\) that depends on the existing number of children \( n \):

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{v}_f \\
\tilde{v}_m
\end{bmatrix}
\sim U
\left(
\begin{bmatrix}
\mu_{f,e,n} \\
\mu_{m,e,n}
\end{bmatrix},
\begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_f^2 & \rho \sigma_f \sigma_m \\
\rho \sigma_f \sigma_m & \sigma_m^2
\end{bmatrix}
\right).
\]

The means \( \mu_{g,e,n} \) of the distribution are gender-specific and also depend on the woman’s education \( e \) and the existing number of children \( n \). The dependence of fertility preferences on the number of existing children captures the possibility of declining marginal utility from additional children. The variances \( \sigma_g^2 \) are also gender specific, and the correlation between the partners’ preference draws is given by a parameter \( \rho \). In the first period, actual preferences \( v_f, v_m \) are equal to potential preferences, \( v_g = \tilde{v}_g \) for \( g \in \{f, m\} \).

In subsequent periods, if no child is born \( (b = 0) \), with probability \( \pi \) the couple’s fertility preferences are unchanged in the next period. With probability \( 1 - \pi \), the couple draws new fertility preferences from the same distribution. When a birth takes place \( (b = 1) \), the couple always draws new fertility preferences. Formally, this implies that the couple retains the existing preference draw with probability \( \pi (1 - b) \), and adopts a new draw.

\(^{30}\)Empirically, we do not have information on the global shape of child preferences away from the thresholds of indifference, because we observe only a binary variable on child preferences. We therefore use uniform distributions in the quantitative implementation of our model, while noting that the measured policy effects should be considered to be locally valid.
with probability $1 - \pi(1 - b)$:

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
v_f' \\
v_m'
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{cases} 
\begin{bmatrix}
v_f \\
v_m
\end{bmatrix} & \text{with probability } \pi(1 - b) \\
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{v}_f \\
\tilde{v}_m
\end{bmatrix} & \text{with probability } 1 - \pi(1 - b).
\end{cases}
$$

Here $v_g'$ denotes fertility preferences in the following period. By matching the evolution of fertility preferences to the GGP data (where fertility preferences for the same couple are observed in repeated waves), we can ensure that the model reproduces the proper mapping from current fertility preferences to long-run fertility outcomes.

5 Matching the Model to Data from the Generations and Gender Programme

We now describe the procedure for matching the dynamic model to the GGP data. Our quantitative exercise has two objectives: to show that the partial commitment framework is able to account for the evidence described in Section 2, and to use the model to compare the performance of alternative policies intended to raise fertility in low-fertility countries. We interpret the data from the various countries in our data set as driven by the same structural model, with differences across countries in the distribution of the child care burden and the cost of market child care. We use all available data to estimate model parameters that are assumed identical across countries (such as the mapping of fertility intentions into outcomes). The remaining parameters are chosen to match evidence from the countries in our data set with a total fertility rate below 1.5 (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Russia). Accordingly, our policy experiments in the following section should be interpreted as being valid for the initial conditions of a low-fertility country.

We choose the model parameters in two steps. First, we pin down a number of parameters individually, either by setting them to standard values or by estimating them directly from the data. Second, we jointly estimate the remaining parameters, concerning the distribution of child preferences, the evolution of preferences over time, the female labor market, and the cost of child care, to match data from the low fertility countries.
5.1 Preset and Individually Estimated Parameters

Two parameters that are less central to our analysis are set to standard values: we set the discount factor to $\beta = 0.95$, which corresponds to an annual interest rate of about two percent, and we set the economies of scale in the family to $\alpha = 0.4$, as in Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003).

Next, we turn to parameters that we estimate directly from the data. The parameter $\chi_m$ determines the distribution of the non-monetary burden of child care between mother and father. We pin down this parameter using our data on the distribution of the burden of child care in the GGP data (see Section 2, Figure 2). However, note that the parameter is specifically about the distribution of child care outside of working hours, and hence we do not want to capture that women do a larger share of the work simply because they are more likely to be stay-at-home parents. Accordingly, we pin down $\chi_m$ using the distribution of child care in the GGP data among those couples in the low-fertility countries where the woman is in the labor force. The resulting estimate is $\chi_m = 0.307$, that is, the male share in child care outside working hours is about 30 percent, leaving the remaining 70 percent to the mothers.

A number of parameters are estimated separately for two groups of couples, namely those where the woman has a college education (or above), and those where she does not. The fraction of college-educated women in the low-fertility countries in our GGP sample is 25.3 percent, and hence we impose the same percentage in the model. We normalize the mean wage of women with less-than-college education to 1.0, and then set the mean of the wage distribution for college-educated women to 1.5, i.e., the college wage premium is 50 percent, which is the average premium for European countries documented by Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2009).

We also use the GGP data to estimate the probabilities of having a child within three years conditional on the intentions of the male and the female partner, the woman’s education, and the existing number of children. We assume that these parameters do not vary across countries, and hence we construct them from the whole sample of countries for which we have two waves of data (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Ger-

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31In addition to the woman being in the labor force, we also require that the couple has at least one child under the age of 14 and that we observe the fertility intention for both partners.

32Given that only women bear a time cost of children during working hours, in our setting the man’s wage does not affect decisions, and hence we do not consider variation in men’s education or wages. However, the male wage does matter when we introduce taxation policies below.

33See Table 2 in Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2009), column “Multi-period average.”
many, Lithuania, and Russia), allowing us to link intentions and outcomes.\textsuperscript{34} We choose \( \gamma(i_f, i_m, e, n) \) to match regression results as reported in Table 2, but separately by education. From these regression results, we derive the numbers shown in Table 3. We use a value of zero where the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Using the point estimates instead does not substantially alter our findings.

Table 3: Fertility rates in GGP data by fertility intention (percent of couples with each combination of female intent, male intent, and existing number of children that will have a baby within three years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing children</th>
<th>( n = 0 )</th>
<th>( n = 1 )</th>
<th>( n = 2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She no</td>
<td>17.89 17.89</td>
<td>13.06 13.06</td>
<td>4.28 4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She yes</td>
<td>17.89 40.21</td>
<td>23.60 39.84</td>
<td>12.21 36.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing children</th>
<th>( n = 0 )</th>
<th>( n = 1 )</th>
<th>( n = 2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She no</td>
<td>17.03 17.03</td>
<td>11.42 11.42</td>
<td>2.48 2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She yes</td>
<td>17.03 43.78</td>
<td>26.67 42.48</td>
<td>2.48 30.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To calibrate the monetary cost of children \( \phi_c \), we focus on data from Germany, the largest of the low-fertility countries. The statistical office of Germany estimates the consumption expenditure of couples with children to average at €38,000 in 2011. The OECD consumption equivalence scale quantifies the consumption cost of a child to be around 0.3 times the consumption of an adult, and Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) estimate this equivalence scale to be 0.4. Using the OECD equivalence scale for a couple with two children together with the average expenditures of German couples with children, we arrive at an annual expenditure of around €5,000 per year. Given that we normalize the mean wage of women without college education to one, we scale this estimate by the average annual earnings of women without college education in Germany, which

\textsuperscript{34}We use all available data because the number of data in each cell would become too small if we estimated the regressions separately by country.
we estimate to be €30,000.\textsuperscript{35} Hence, we set $\phi_c = 5,000/30,000 = \frac{1}{6}$.

There are also two time costs for children. The time cost of caring for young children (if no market-based child care is used) is equivalent to full-time labor supply, which we normalize to one (i.e., time is measured relative to full-time labor supply). In addition, there is the utility cost $\phi_u$ that is interpreted as child care outside of typical work hours, i.e., child care during mornings, nights, and weekends. If there are 16 non-sleep hours per day and full-time work corresponds to 40 hours per week, in principle there are almost twice as many hours of child care needed outside work hours compared to during work hours. However, children (especially older ones) do not need to be monitored all the time and it is also possible to combine watching children with other activities. We therefore assume that the two types of time costs are of the same magnitude and set $\phi_u = 1$.\textsuperscript{36}

### 5.2 Jointly Estimated Parameters

The remaining parameters to be determined concern the distribution of female and male child preferences, the persistence of child preferences over time, the dispersion of wages, the cost of market-based child care, and participation costs in the labor market. We calibrate these parameters jointly by matching a set of target moments. While all parameters affect all target moments to some extent, for each set of parameters there is a set of directly related moments. For the distribution of female and male child preferences, these moments are the reported fertility intentions conditional on the number of existing children and on the education of the female partner. Given that fertility can be at most three in the model, for fertility intentions given $n = 2$ we group all couples with two or more children. We generate this data from a pooled sample of the low fertility countries in the GGP data. To pool the sample, we calculate the country-specific cross tables of fertility intentions of men and women, using the sample weights. We then take the non-weighted average across countries to derive the pooled intention tables. The results are shown in the first part of Table 4. These 24 data moments are the primary drivers of 13 model parameters, namely 12 mean parameters for child preferences and the correlation parameter.

\textsuperscript{35}Finke (2010) puts the average hourly wage of German women with high school education at €15, which corresponds to €30,000 annually for a full-time worker with 2,000 hours of labor supply per year. \textsuperscript{36}In practice, making different choices for the basic costs of children $\phi_c$ and $\phi_u$ has little impact on our overall results. If we choose higher costs, the estimation procedure for child preferences delivers a proportionally higher utility derived from children, so as to match target moments on fertility intentions.
Table 4: Distribution of fertility intentions in GGP data and model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High school</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>College</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 0</td>
<td>n = 1</td>
<td>n = 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>n = 0</td>
<td>n = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
<td>He no He yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>She no</td>
<td>56.36 6.92</td>
<td>66.05 7.55</td>
<td>90.25 4.39</td>
<td>56.56 7.04</td>
<td>59.76 8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>She yes</td>
<td>5.55 31.16</td>
<td>4.29 22.10</td>
<td>2.31 3.05</td>
<td>6.37 37.50</td>
<td>5.08 28.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>She no</td>
<td>55.67 5.51</td>
<td>68.37 7.25</td>
<td>85.62 6.35</td>
<td>50.20 5.55</td>
<td>59.76 8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>She yes</td>
<td>4.74 34.08</td>
<td>3.14 21.23</td>
<td>3.40 4.64</td>
<td>4.84 39.40</td>
<td>2.41 29.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to calibrate the preference persistence parameter $\pi$, we use data from all low fertility countries for which we have two waves, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, and Russia. In these countries we select couples that didn’t have a baby in between Waves 1 and 2. We drop couples in which the female partner is beyond the age of 35 in the first wave. We look at these couples’ combinations of fertility preferences in Wave 1 and calculate the share that reports to have the same preferences in Wave 2. These statistics should tell us how persistent certain combinations of child preferences are over time. The result is shown in Table 5. The four data moments in the table pin down the persistence parameter $\pi$.

Next, we turn to female labor force participation. Table 6 displays the labor force participation rates of women in our sample broken down by education and by the presence of young children (under age 3). Participation is lower for women with young children, consistent with the assumption of a larger time cost for raising young children in the model. We also observe that labor force participation is higher for women with
Table 5: Share of couples with same fertility intentions in both waves in GGP data (population 35 and under) and in the model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>He no</td>
<td>He yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She no</td>
<td>79.89</td>
<td>25.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She yes</td>
<td>22.63</td>
<td>65.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more education, consistent with the notion of a higher opportunity cost of time for these women. These four target moments help pin down the dispersion of women’s wages $\sigma_{w,e}$, the labor market participation cost $p_c$, and the cost of market based child care $w_y$.

Table 6: Women’s labor force participation in GGP data and model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child under 3:</td>
<td>Child under 3:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>62.60</td>
<td>22.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>80.50</td>
<td>43.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last two parameters to set are the standard deviations of child preferences $\sigma_f$ and $\sigma_m$. These standard deviations determine how strongly men and women react to changes in the cost of children. Intuitively, if the standard deviation is small, the density of preferences around the cutoff between wanting and not wanting a child is high. A small change in child costs will then change the fertility intentions of many individuals, leading to a large change in the fertility rate. The standard deviations therefore are important determinants of the effectiveness of policies aimed at raising fertility. We cannot identify the standard deviations from the distribution of child preferences in Table 4 alone; intuitively, the table provides information on the total number of people with child preferences above and below a certain threshold, but not on the density close to the threshold (this is analogous to the reason why standard deviations are fixed in a probit model). Instead, we make use of the cross country variation in disagreement shares in our sample of low-fertility countries. We interpret this variation as being driven by variation in
the share of men in caring for children, as captured by Figure 2, and by variation in the availability of market child care. Intuitively speaking, if across countries the female disagreement share varies a lot but the male disagreement share varies little, this indicates that women’s preferences react more strongly to changes in the relative child care burden, and hence suggests that women’s fertility preferences are more concentrated than men’s ($\sigma_f < \sigma_m$).

Figure 5: Fertility intentions across countries, GGP data and model

(a) Couples with one child

(b) Couples with two or more children

Formally, we measure the relative variation of female and male disagreement by running cross-country regressions of the form:

$$\text{DISAGREE MALE}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{DISAGREE FEMALE}_i + \epsilon_i,$$

with $i$ denoting the country index, separately for couples with one child and couples with two or more children.\textsuperscript{37} Figure 5 displays the data and the resulting regression lines. The target moments used to pin down the standard deviations $\sigma_f$ and $\sigma_m$ are the left and right endpoints of the regression lines (i.e., evaluated at the lowest and highest value for the “Disagree Female” variable in the sample). To compute the corresponding regressions in the model, we need to take a stand on what drives the variation in male and female disagreement across countries. The male cost share $\chi_m$ is one candidate, but

\textsuperscript{37}We focus on couples who already have children because preferences for the marginal (last) child are what matters for predictions for overall fertility rates.
the cost of market-based child care \( w_y \) also matters. To capture the relationship between these variables, we regress the female labor force participation rate of women with small children on \( \chi_m \) among the low-fertility countries. Then, we take the extremes of the distribution of \( \chi_m \) among the low fertility countries, which are 0.28 and 0.34 (recall that \( \chi_m \) is measured by the average male share in child care among couples who are both working full time). We choose corresponding child care costs \( w_y \) for these two extremes to exactly match the predicted female labor force participation rates for mothers with small children from the regression, which are 21.5 and 34.7 percent, respectively. This gives us two parameter combinations of \( \chi_m \) and \( w_y \). We then compute the model-generated disagreement shares in the two hypothetical countries, and use these to compute the model-generated regression line. The relationships generated by the estimated model are displayed in Figure 5 as solid lines. By matching the target moments, we ensure that the estimated model generates an empirically plausible response in male and female fertility intentions to variations in cost shares and child care costs.

5.3 Parameter Choices and Model Fit

Let \( Y \) denote the 32 target moments we describe above, i.e. the 24 values for the distribution of fertility intentions, the four values for the persistence of child preferences, the four values for labor force participation, and the four end points of the regression lines in Figure 5. Let \( \theta \) denote the vector of the 20 parameter choices, namely the mean child preferences \( \mu_{g,e,n} \) depending on gender, education, and the existing number of children (12 parameters), the dispersions \( \sigma_g \) of child preferences by gender (2 parameters), the correlation \( \rho \) and persistence \( \pi \) of child preferences (2 parameters), the child care cost \( w_y \) and participation cost \( p_c \) (2 parameters), and the dispersions of women’s wages \( \sigma_{w,e} \) by education (2 parameters). Let \( \hat{Y}(\theta) \) denote the model simulated counterparts for a set of parameters \( \theta \). To pin down the parameters, we numerically solve the problem

\[
\min_{\theta} \left[ \hat{Y}(\theta) - Y \right]' \cdot \left[ \hat{Y}(\theta) - Y \right],
\]

i.e., we minimize a simple residual sum of squares. The solution is computed using a parallelized simulated annealing method. The resulting set of parameters is shown in Table 7. The model-predicted distributions of fertility intentions, the predictions about the persistence of child preferences, and the predictions for female labor force participation are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The cross-country predictions for fertility intentions are shown as solid lines in Figure 5.
The calibrated model provides a good fit for the data on fertility intentions and the persistence of child preferences over time, especially for couples in which at least one of the partners wants to have a baby. For us these couples are the most important ones, since they will be most prone to changing their fertility intentions in reaction to policy. The model also does well at fitting the slope of the relationship between male and female disagreement across countries in Figure 5, and particularly so for couples that have two or more children.

The estimated parameters suggest steeply declining marginal utility from having children, especially for men. From the second child onwards, women are estimated to have stronger child preferences than men. Intuitively, this arises because the estimated cost share implies that women carry most of the child care burden, yet there are still at least some women who desire a second or third child. The estimation rationalizes this pat-
tern by assigning a stronger child preference to women. In fact, from the second child onwards, mean child preferences for men are estimated to be negative. This occurs because most couples agree on not currently wanting a child, so that the couples desiring one are in the upper tail of the distribution of child preferences. Moreover, men benefit from having children not just in terms of direct utility, but also through an improved bargaining position.

Child preferences turn out not to be highly persistent but strongly correlated within couples. As argued above, the persistence of preferences is important for shaping how disagreement versus agreement on children translates into lifetime fertility rates. The high correlation may appear surprising, given that we document substantial disagreement among couples about having children. However, at all parities the majority of couples agree that they don’t want to have a child, which the model accounts for with highly correlated preferences. The less-than-perfect correlation leaves enough room for disagreement to arise for a substantial portion of couples.

Table 8: Demographic statistics generated by estimated model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total fertility rate</th>
<th>1.56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of couples without children</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of couples with one child</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of couples with two children</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of couples with more than two children</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the quantitative exercise shows that the partial commitment model does an excellent job at accounting for the facts described in Section 2. We can further evaluate the performance of the model by considering non-targeted moments. Table 8 reports some basic demographic statistics for the model. The model predicts a total fertility rate of the low fertility countries of 1.56, which is a little higher than the average in these countries of 1.36. Some of the gap is due to the fact that our calibration is to a data set consisting of couples, whereas the actual fertility rate is pulled down to some extent by women who are not in a relationship and do not have children. With this adjustment in mind and given that the fertility rate was not targeted, the close fit suggests that the

38This is the average total fertility rate for our low-fertility countries for the years 2000–2010, from World Development Indicators.
measured fertility intentions translate into overall outcomes in an accurate manner. The model also predicts that after having completed the fertile period, i.e. at the age of 45, most couples have one or two children, which is also true in the data. Only a small fraction has three children, and 12 percent of couples are childless.\textsuperscript{39} For comparison, the German Statistical Office reports that in 2008, about 19 percent of women between the ages 40 and 49 had no children. Some of these women presumably will go on to have children later, and the group also contains single women and women unable to have children who are not part of our analysis.

6  Policy Experiments: The Effectiveness of Targeted Child Subsidies

We now turn to the policy implications of our analysis. In many countries, historically low fertility rates are considered a major challenge for future economic prospects, because it is difficult to sustain economic growth with a shrinking population and to maintain social insurance systems with an aging population. Already, child bearing is subsidized and publicly supported in various ways in many countries, but there are doubts about how effective such policies are. Here, we study the effect of policies that aim to promote fertility within our quantitative model.

Our analysis suggests that the effectiveness of policy interventions will depend on their separate effect on women’s and men’s incentives for having children. It therefore matters how effectively a policy can lower the burden of child care specifically for, say, mothers as opposed to fathers. We consider two scenarios. We start with the polar case in which interventions can be precisely targeted. Specifically, we consider child subsidies that are paid to either the mother or the father and increase the outside option of this parent one-for-one, without an effect on the outside option of the other parent (similar to the interpretation of Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997). This scenario gives sharp results on the desirability of subsidizing either mothers’ or fathers’ desire for children. However, it is not obvious whether such polar policies are feasible, because how a given subsidy is used ultimately depends on how this subsidy enters intra-household bargaining. Hence, we also consider “real world” policies modeled to be comparable to specific policies that we can observe in the data, such as parental leave policies or subsidized daycare.

We evaluate the effectiveness of policies by measuring the cost of increasing the total

\textsuperscript{39}See Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015) for a discussion of the economics of childlessness and related empirical evidence.
fertility rate by 0.1, i.e., from 1.56 to 1.66. This is a sizeable increase, although still well short of moving fertility to the replacement level. We first consider the case of child subsidies targeted at either mothers or fathers. Formally, let $s_g(n_h)$ denote the total subsidy paid to the partner $g$ for the $n_h$ children currently living in the household. The joint budget constraint (12) then becomes:

$$c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) \left[ (1 - bh)w_f + w_m - \phi_c n_h - (1 - h)w_y b + s_f(n_h) + s_m(n_h) \right],$$

and the outside options (10) and (11) are changed to:

$$\bar{u}_f(w_f, h, n_h, b, v_f) = (1 - bh)w_f - \frac{1}{2} (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h)w_y b) - \chi_f \phi_u n_h + v_f \cdot b + s_f(n_h),$$

$$\bar{u}_m(w_m, h, n_h, b, v_f) = w_m - \frac{1}{2} (\phi_c n_h + (1 - h)w_y b) - \chi_m \phi_u n_h + v_m \cdot b + s_m(n_h).$$

In addition to targeting subsidies to either mothers or fathers, we also consider the possibility of subsidies that are only paid for higher-order children, i.e., from the second or the third child onwards. We focus on the steady-state cost of policies that are in place over the entire life course of couples.

Figure 6: Relative cost of targeted subsidies needed to raise the total fertility rate by 0.1

Notes: Bars display the cost of child subsidies paid to either mothers and fathers needed to raise the total fertility rate by 0.1, relative to a subsidy paid to mothers for all children.

Figure 6 shows the relative cost of these subsidies (each of which raise fertility by 0.1),
both in terms of the cost per subsidized child and the total cost per couple (over their whole life course). When comparing along the margin of paying subsidies for all or only higher-order children, the subsidy amount necessarily increases when fewer children are eligible for the subsidy (left panel). However, the total cost of the subsidies declines when only higher-order births are subsidized, especially so when the subsidy is only paid for third children. This is because most couples would have had one or two children even without the subsidy (see the distribution of completed fertility in Table 8). When all births are subsidized, this results in high sunk costs for inframarginal births that make the policy costly in the aggregate. Targeting subsidies to higher-order children is more cost effective, since the program is better targeted towards marginal children.

Next, consider the margin of paying the subsidy either to mothers or fathers. Here, the key finding is that it is much more effective to target subsidies towards women than towards men. Specifically, the subsidy needs to be 2.2 to 3.1 times larger when targeted towards men than towards women. This finding is novel to our analysis and would not arise in a model that abstracts from bargaining. There are three features of our analysis that can create a gap between the effectiveness of child subsidies paid to women versus men, and it turns out that all three push in the direction of favoring subsidies to women. First, as displayed in Figure 1, in the low fertility countries that we calibrate to, many more women than men are opposed to having another child. Thus, women are more likely to be pivotal in the household decision (see Proposition 3 in the appendix), which means that subsidies directed to women are more effective. The second reason for our finding is related to the distribution of fertility preferences. Looking at the estimation results in Table 7, we can see that the women’s child preferences are less dispersed than those of men, indicating that there are relatively more women close to the preference threshold at which they switch to wanting a baby. Consequently, a given subsidy can incentivize more women than men to switch their opinion towards having another baby. Third, even with symmetric fertility intentions and child preferences, women’s and men’s preferences may also have a differential direct effect on fertility. Indeed, we can see in the fertility regressions in Table 2 that women have a larger impact on the fertility decision in the household than men. These three reasons combined imply that subsidies that are targeted towards women are much more likely to succeed in raising the total fertility rate.

In absolute terms, the present value of the per-couple subsidy needed to increase fertil-
Figure 7: Relative cost of real-life policies raising the total fertility rate by 0.1

Notes: “Tax credit” is a per-child subsidy that is proportional to each partner’s labor income. “Child care” is a subsidy to the cost of market-based child care. “Parental leave” is a subsidy paid to mothers who take care of a young child at home. Cost is displayed relative to a tax credit for all children.

The fertility by 0.1 ranges from about 15,000 euros in the best-case scenario (subsidizing mothers from the third child onwards) to more than 130,000 euros in the worst case (subsidizing fathers from the first child onwards).\textsuperscript{40} As a comparison, estimates based on a recent reform of child benefits in Germany by Raute (2018) imply a cost of about 25,000 euros per couple for achieving the same increase in fertility. The reform provides benefits from the first child onward and is targeted primarily to women. In the model, for the same scenario the cost would be about 45,000 euros. Hence, while fertility is somewhat less responsive to financial incentives in the model compared to the estimate by Raute (2018), the required subsidies have the same order of magnitude. Moreover, our experiment measures the long-run impact whereas Raute (2018) focuses on the first five years.

\textsuperscript{40}The mean unskilled wage for women is normalized to one in the calibration. To compute the absolute subsidy, we assume that this wage corresponds to 30,000 euros per year, which approximates the annual earnings of women with a high school degree in Germany.
after the reform, and other empirical findings suggest that the long-run impact on fertility is usually smaller than the short-run impact (e.g. Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens 2017). Hence, the impact of financial incentives in our model is broadly consistent with independent empirical estimates.

The results in Figure 6 rely on the notion that subsidies paid to either mother or father affect the outside option of this partner one-for-one. However, it is not obvious how outside options will respond. At the other extreme, we can envision a case where partners consider a subsidy, no matter to whom it is paid, as joint income that enters their outside options in a parallel way, so that it does not make a difference to whom the subsidy is paid. Even then, it is possible to design policies that affect mothers and fathers in different ways, because of mothers’ specific role in child care. To evaluate this possibility, we next consider policies under the alternative assumption that cash subsidies cannot be arbitrarily targeted, and instead the impact on outside options depends on the details of the policy design. We compare the cost of three policies. The first is a “tax credit,” that is, a per-child subsidy that is proportional to each parent’s labor income. Given that men have higher average wages, this policy benefits fathers relatively more. The second policy is a child care subsidy that subsidizes the use of market-based child care. The benefit itself shifts up both parents’ outside options in a parallel way. However, the policy also incentives women to work rather than stay at home to care for young children (so that they are eligible for the subsidy), and working increases mothers’ outside option. The third policy is a parental leave benefit that pays a subsidy to women who do not work while home with a young child. In this policy scenario, the benefit increases the outside option of mothers who stay at home, but it also provides incentives for dropping out of the labor force for mothers who without the policy would be working, which lowers the outside option.

Figure 7 compares the cost of these policies, again broken down by whether the policy applies to all or only higher-order children. The costs are expressed relative to the cost of increasing fertility by 0.1 through a tax credit paid for all children. As before, costs are lower when only higher-order births are incentivized. Comparing across policies, the most effective way to raise fertility is to provide child care benefits. The intuition follows from Figure 6: ideally the government would like to subsidize mothers, and by subsidizing child care (a component of the burden of children that otherwise would be

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41We assume an average gender wage gap of 25 percent. In addition, partners of college-educated women are assumed to have proportionally higher wages, but there is no additional variation in male wages conditional on the woman’s education.
primarily borne by mothers) the policy can be targeted more effectively compared to the other policies. More precisely, for couples who otherwise would not have used market-based child care but switch to using child care because of the policy, the higher earnings of the mother directly improve her outside option (10), whereas the cost of child care is borne by both partners. Endogenous labor supply is crucial for the ranking of the policies. This is apparent from the fact that parental leave benefits are less effective than the child care subsidy: under the parental leave policy mothers are directly subsidized, but they are also given incentives not to work, which lowers the outside option and increases bargaining frictions.

The cost differences in Figure 7 are smaller compared to Figure 6 because targeting is less precise, but the results still suggest that the design of real-life policies matters. In absolute terms, the present value of the per-couple cost of the policies varies from about 18,000 to about 95,000 euros. The cheapest policy, namely child care benefits from the third child onwards, is only 3,000 euros more expensive than the (potentially infeasible) policy of targeting subsidies entirely to mothers, suggesting that this policy does rather well at incentivizing mothers. Overall, accounting for the pattern of agreement and disagreement on having babies makes a big difference for policy effectiveness.

In summary, our results suggest that, in a low fertility environment, policies that focus on making childbearing and working compatible for mothers of young children (such as subsidies for market-based child care) are likely to be the most effective. It is interesting to compare these predictions to empirical studies of the effect of different types of policy interventions on fertility. Our findings are consistent with the observation that across countries, there is a close empirical link between low fertility and a high child care burden on women (Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern 2008, de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz 2011). At the micro level, while there is a sizeable literature on the role of financial incentives for fertility (e.g., Cohen, Dehejia, and Romanov 2013, Laroque and Salanié 2014, and Raute 2018), most papers do not compare alternative policies, and the estimated effects vary too much across settings to yield a straightforward meta-analysis for comparing different types of policies. One exception is Goldstein et al. (2018), who compare the cost effectiveness of child allowances and daycare subsidies for raising fertility, and find, consistent with our results, that daycare subsidies are more effective. However, one limitation of the study is that it is based on vignette-survey experiments that provide information on desired rather than actual fertility. Regarding the specific role of access to child care, D’Albis, Gobbi, and Greulich (2017) provide cross-country evidence showing
that differences in fertility across Europe result from fewer women having two children in low-fertility countries, and that child care services are crucial for the transition to a second child to occur. For the case of Germany, Bauernschuster, Hener, and Rainer (2016) find that a large expansion of public child care for young children in Germany substantially increased fertility. A historical example of a transformation that specifically lowered the cost of childbearing for mothers is the introduction of infant formula, which reduced mother’s need to breastfeed and hence greatly enhanced their flexibility in dealing with the needs of young children. Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) argue that the introduction of infant formula contributed to the simultaneous rise in female employment and fertility observed in the United States between the 1930s and 1960s. Regarding parental leave benefits, Dahl et al. (2016) find that expansions of paid maternity leave in Norway increased mothers’ time out of the labor market after a birth, but did not increase fertility. All these findings are consistent with our results.

Perhaps the strongest indication that policy design matters comes from the study by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) of the effects of various family policies (such as the length of parental leave for mothers and fathers, the pay rate during parental leave, and public spending on early childhood care and education) on household decisions and outcomes across high-income countries. They find that public support for early childhood care is the only policy that has a positive and significant association with fertility. These results are confirmed by a regression analysis with time and country fixed effects, where once again public spending on early childhood education and care is the only policy having a positive and substantial impact on fertility. While these results are not sufficient to establish causality, they line up well with our finding that policies that specifically support mothers (such as public daycare for young children) are the most effective at raising fertility.

7 Conclusions

In this paper, we have examined the demographic and economic implications of the simple fact that it takes agreement between a woman and a man to make a baby. Using newly available data from the Generations and Gender Programme, we have shown that

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42 A 10 percentage point increase in child care coverage is estimated to increase the incidence of second and third births by 4 and 7 percent. However, Bick (2016) comes to a different conclusion and argues (based on a quantitative model that abstracts from bargaining) that providing more subsidized child care would do little to raise fertility in Germany, as it would mostly crowd out private child care arrangements within the extended family.
disagreement between partners about having babies is not just a theoretical possibility, but a commonplace occurrence: for higher-parity births, there are more couples who disagree about having a baby than couples who agree on wanting one. We have also shown that disagreement matters for outcomes, in the sense that a baby is unlikely to be born unless both parents desire one. We interpret the data using a model of marital bargaining under partial commitment, and show that our calibrated model provides a close match for the data on fertility intentions and outcomes.

Our findings have both positive and normative implications for the economics of fertility choice. On the positive side, our theory suggests a novel determinant of a country’s average fertility rate, namely the distribution of the child care burden between mothers and fathers. If one gender carries most of the burden, we would expect to observe a lopsided distribution of fertility intentions, and the fertility rate can be low even if childbearing is highly subsidized overall. Indeed, in the sample of European countries in the GGP data, we find that all low fertility countries are characterized by many more women than men being opposed to having another child.

In terms of normative implications, the analysis suggests that policies that aim at raising the fertility rate will be more effective if they specifically target the gender more likely to disagree with having another child. In our quantitative model calibrated to the European low fertility countries, we find that a child subsidy that specifically lowers women’s child care burden is, dollar for dollar, up to three times as effective at raising fertility than is a subsidy targeted at fathers. In many industrialized countries, today’s extremely low fertility rates are projected to cause major problems for the sustainability of social insurance systems in the future. Examining policies from the perspective of their effect on agreement and disagreement within couples on fertility will play an important role in designing an effective response to this policy challenge. One immediate implication is that optimal policy will be country specific, because patterns of disagreement over fertility vary widely across countries. In the GGP sample, it is notable that the high fertility countries (Belgium, France, and Norway) already have broadly balanced fertility intentions between women and men, so that there is less need for targeted policies.

Our analysis suggests a number of promising directions for future research. First, the paper points to a close link between mothers’ labor market opportunities and disagreement over child care and fertility between parents. In our model, women’s labor market opportunities are modeled in a simple way through a fixed wage that provides earning
opportunities that are not directly affected by having children. It would be interesting to combine our analysis with a richer model of the accumulation of work experience and career choices, where having children may have more profound repercussions (see for example Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens 2017 and Gallen 2018). Such a model would also yield richer implications for the effects of the distribution of the burden of child care on the timing and spacing of births, which would make it possible to address the difference between high- and low-fertility countries in more dimensions.

Second, our analysis has focused on contemporary fertility choices in high-income countries. A natural next step is to consider how the mechanisms explored here also contributed to the historical changes throughout the fertility transition and its aftermath. Given that the opportunity cost of mothers’ time plays a central role in our analysis, it is interesting to ask what the model predicts if there is a secular change in women’s labor market opportunities over time. The novel feature of our model is that a rise in women’s wages affects both the total cost of children and the how the burden of this cost is distributed between the parents. As an example, consider a version of our model in which the only cost of children is the time cost of caring for young children during work hours. In this setting, a rise in women’s wages will gradually increase the opportunity cost of children, until the level is reached where market-based child care is used, after which the cost of children is constant. In terms of the distribution of the burden of child care, at low wages the entire burden falls on women, who experience a decrease in their outside option as they drop out of the labor force to care for children. However, once the female wage is sufficiently high for market-based child care to be used, the time cost is transformed into a monetary cost, and the burden of child care is shared between mother and father. This feature implies that close to the threshold where market child care is used, women’s utility from having children is actually increasing in the female wage, and hence fertility will be increasing in the wage also if women are pivotal in the fertility decision. Combining these features, the model can generate a U-shaped evolution of fertility as women’s wages and female labor-force participation rise. This rhymes well with the empirical observation that during the early phase of the demographic transition, there is a negative relationship between fertility and female labor force participation, whereas the relationship is positive across countries in recent data.\(^{43}\)

\(^{43}\)See Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008) and Doepke and Tertilt (2016) on the empirical pattern, and Da Rocha and Fuster (2006), de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz (2011), Hazan and Zoabi (2015), Siegel (2017) and Bar et al. (2018) on potential channels that can account for some of the changing relationships between women’s education, labor supply, and fertility.
Third, the analysis could be applied to understand fertility choices in low-income countries. As documented in Doepke and Tertilt (2018), there is evidence that in developing countries there is even more disagreement over fertility compared to high-income countries. There is only little research to date on how this disagreement affects fertility outcomes. A key question when applying a bargaining model of fertility to developing countries is how much power women and men have within the family. Our results for rich countries point to a veto model, where each partner has enough power to block the decision to have an additional child. If the distribution of power within the household is more lopsided, outcomes may be quite different. In addition, if there is a shift in relative power within households over time (specifically, through improvements in women’s rights), this may have substantial effects on fertility outcomes even if gender-specific fertility preferences are unchanged.

Fourth and last, while our analysis goes beyond the unitary model of the household, it is still based on the “standard” case of a baby born as the result of a mutual decision of a mother and father. This is a limitation, because it excludes same-sex couples having babies using sperm donors or surrogacy, single women using a sperm donor, or any type of family using an adoption agency. At this time, these family types still account for a relatively small fraction of children and are difficult to study with survey data. Nevertheless, other family types in general and same-sex parenting more specifically are phenomena that grow in importance over time. While much of our analysis should extend to same-sex couples (as the burden of child care still needs to be shared in some way, leading to the same commitment issues as in our analysis), there are also important differences, for example concerning the impact of traditional role models. Another increasingly important trend is the development of technologies such as egg freezing and in vitro fertilization that give women a lot more control on when to have babies and who to have them with. As these trends grow in importance and more data becomes available, it will be interesting to study how the bargaining perspective on fertility choice can be applied more widely.

References


A Proofs for Propositions in Main Text

Proof of Proposition 1: The bargaining problem can be solved via backward induction, i.e., we first solve for the ex-post allocation for a given fertility choice, and then consider the optimal fertility choice in the first stage.

If the couple decides not to have a child \((b = 0)\), then resource allocation is determined by the maximization problem:

\[
\max_{c_f, c_m} \left[ (c_f - w_f)^{0.5} (c_m - w_m)^{0.5} \right] \quad \text{s.t. } c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) [w_f + w_m].
\]

Here \(\alpha\) is an efficiency scale factor that defines the surplus of a joint household. Individual consumption in this case is given by:

\[
c_f(0) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m] \quad \text{and} \quad c_m(0) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m],
\]

and utilities are:

\[
u_f(0) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m] \quad \text{and} \quad u_m(0) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m].
\]

If the partners do decide to have a child \((b = 1)\), the resource allocation solves the maximization problem:

\[
\max_{c_f, c_m} \left[ (c_f + v_f - w_f)^{0.5} (c_m + v_m - w_m)^{0.5} \right] \quad \text{s.t. } c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) [w_f + w_m - \phi]
\]

The first-order conditions give:

\[
c_f + v_f - w_f = c_m + v_m - w_m,
\]
and plugging this into the budget constraint yields:

\[ c_f(1) = w_f - \nu_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + \frac{1}{2} [v_m + \nu_f - \phi] \]

\[ c_m(1) = w_m - \nu_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + \frac{1}{2} [v_m + \nu_f - \phi] . \]

Utilities are then:

\[ u_f(1) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + \frac{1}{2} [v_m + \nu_f - \phi] , \]

\[ u_m(1) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + \frac{1}{2} [v_m + \nu_f - \phi] . \]

Consequently, the partners equally share the monetary surplus from cooperation as well as the surplus from having children. Given the utilities for a given fertility choice, we can now consider whether the couple will choose to have a child. The female partner prefers to have a child if:

\[ u_f(1) \geq u_f(0) \iff \nu_f + \nu_m \geq \phi (1 + \alpha) \]

The same condition applies to the male partner. Consequently, there is no disagreement, i.e. either both partners want to have a child, or both prefer to remain childless. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2:** We once again characterize the outcome by backward induction. In the case without children, the resource allocation of the couple solves the maximization problem:

\[
\max_{c_f,c_m} \left[ c_f - w_f \right]^{0.5} \left[ c_m - w_m \right]^{0.5} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) [w_f + w_m],
\]

which is the same as under the commitment case. Consequently,

\[ c_f(0) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m] \quad \text{and} \quad c_m(0) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m], \]

and utilities are:

\[ u_f(0) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m] \quad \text{and} \quad u_m(0) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m]. \quad (14) \]

In the case with children, the maximization problem to determine the resource allocation is now different, because bargaining takes place ex post, with the new outside options given the presence of a child:

\[
\max_{c_f,c_m} \left[ c_f - (w_f - \chi_f \phi) \right]^{0.5} \left[ c_m - (w_m - \chi_m \phi) \right]^{0.5} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad c_f + c_m = (1 + \alpha) [w_f + w_m - \phi].
\]
First-order conditions now give us:

\[ c_f - (w_f - \chi_f \phi) = c_m - (w_m - \chi_m \phi), \]

and plugging this into the budget constraint yields:

\[ c_f(1) = w_f - v_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + [v_f - \chi_f \phi], \]
\[ c_m(1) = w_m - v_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + [v_m - \chi_m \phi]. \] (15) (16)

Utilities then are:

\[ u_f(1) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + [v_f - \chi_f \phi] \quad \text{and} \]
\[ u_m(1) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + [v_m - \chi_m \phi]. \] (17) (18)

Couples again share the monetary surplus from cooperation, but now the utility surplus from fertility is purely private. We can now move to the first stage and characterize the fertility preferences of the two partners. The woman wants to have a child if:

\[ u_f(1) \geq u_f(0) \iff v_f \geq (\chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi, \]

and the male partner would like to have a child if:

\[ u_m(1) \geq u_m(0) \iff v_m \geq (\chi_m + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi. \]

In these inequalities, the term \( \chi_g \phi \) represents the direct cost of having the child to partner \( g \). Since bargaining is ex post, having a child lowers the outside option, so that (unlike in the commitment solution) the partner bearing the greater child care burden is not compensated. The second term \( (\alpha/2)\phi \) represents the loss in marital surplus due to the cost of a child. This part of the cost of childbirth is shared equally between the partners.

Depending on \( v_f \) and \( v_m \), it is possible that neither, both, or just one of the partners would like to have a child. Hence, in the case of lack of commitment disagreement between the two partners about fertility is possible.

\[ \Box \]

**B The Distribution of the Burden of Child Care and the Fertility Rate**

In this section, we examine how in an economy with many couples who are heterogeneous in child preferences the average fertility rate depends on the distribution of the child care burden.

Consider an economy with a continuum of couples. The cost shares \( \chi_f \) and \( \chi_m = 1 - \chi_f \) are
identical across couples. In contrast, child preferences are heterogeneous in the population, with a joint cumulative distribution function of $F(v_f, v_m)$. For a child to be born, both (7) and (8) have to be satisfied. For ease of notation, we denote the threshold values for the woman’s and man’s child preference above which they would like to have a child by $\tilde{v}_f$ and $\tilde{v}_m$:

$$\tilde{v}_f = (\chi_f + \alpha/2) \phi, \quad (19)$$

$$\tilde{v}_m = (\chi_m + \alpha/2) \phi = (1 - \chi_f + \alpha/2) \phi. \quad (20)$$

The expected number of children $E(b)$ (i.e., the fraction of couples who decide to have a child) is given by:

$$E(b) = 1 - F(\tilde{v}_f, \infty) - F(\infty, \tilde{v}_m) + F(\tilde{v}_f, \tilde{v}_m). \quad (21)$$

That is, the couples who don’t have a child are those where either the woman’s or the man’s fertility preference is below the threshold; the last term is to prevent double-counting couples where both partners are opposed to having a child.

We interpret the cost parameters $\chi_f$ and $\chi_m$ as driven partly by government policy, and partly by social norms. For example, there may be a social norm that women do most of the work in raising children, especially in the case of non-cooperation between the couples (which is where the distribution of the burden matters). The extent to which this norm will affect bargaining will depend also on the availability of public child care. If public child care is available, the man will be more likely to bear a substantial share of the cost of raising children (i.e., by contributing to the cost of daycare) compared to the case where the default is that children are cared for at home by the mother. In Section 4, we explicitly consider the interaction of market-based child care with the parents’ cost shares in raising children, and consider policies that can shift the cost shares. Here, we simply take the breakdown of the cost as given, and consider how fertility intentions and outcomes depend on this breakdown.

To gain intuition for how fertility depends on the distribution of child costs, it is useful to consider the case of independent distributions $F_f(v_f)$ and $F_m(v_m)$ for female and male child preferences, so that $F(v_f, v_m) = F_f(v_f)F_m(v_m)$. Expected fertility can then be written as:

$$E(b) = 1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f) - F_m(\tilde{v}_m) + F_f(\tilde{v}_f)F_m(\tilde{v}_m). \quad (22)$$

Now consider, for a constant total cost of children $\phi$, the effect of a marginal increase in the female cost share $\chi_f$ and a corresponding decrease in the male share $\chi_m = 1 - \chi_f$. If the distribution functions are differentiable at $\tilde{v}_f$ and $\tilde{v}_m$, the marginal impact of a such a shift in the distribution of the burden of child care is:

$$\frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} = \phi F'_m(\tilde{v}_m) [1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f)] - \phi F'_f(\tilde{v}_f) [1 - F_m(\tilde{v}_m)]. \quad (23)$$
The first (positive) term represents the increase in the number of men who agree to have a child if the female cost share $\chi_f$ increases (and hence the male cost share declines), and the second (negative) term is the decline in agreement on the part of women. The first term has two components: $F'_m(\tilde{v}_m)$ is the density of the distribution of male child preferences at the cutoff, which tells us how many men switch from disagreeing to agreeing with having a child as $\chi_f$ rises. The second component $1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f)$ is the fraction of women who agree to have children. This term appears because the man switching from disagreeing to agreeing only results in a birth if the woman also agrees. If most women are opposed to having a child, an increase in male agreement has only a small effect on fertility. In the same way, the negative impact of a decline in female agreement on fertility, measured by $F'_f(\tilde{v}_f)$, is weighted by the share of men agreeing to have a child $[1 - F_m(\tilde{v}_m)]$.

The terms for the existing fractions of women and men agreeing to have a child in (23) introduce a force that leads to high fertility if agreement on having children is balanced between the genders. In the extreme, if all women were opposed to having a baby but at least some men wanted one, the only way to raise fertility would be to lower the female cost share (and vice versa if all men were opposed). Given that we observe that in low-fertility countries women are more likely to be opposed to having another child compared to men, this suggests that fertility could be raised by lowering women’s cost share. However, the overall distribution of child preferences is also important, because fertility reacts strongly only if many women are close to the threshold of wanting to have children.

The overall relationships between cost shares, agreement rates, and fertility can be fully characterized when child preferences are uniform, so that the densities $F'_f(\tilde{v}_f)$ and $F'_m(\tilde{v}_m)$ are constant. In particular, if female and male fertility preferences have the same uniform densities (but potentially different means), fertility is maximized when equal fractions of women and men agree to having a child. If one gender has more concentrated fertility preferences (higher density), fertility is maximized at a point where the rate of agreement in this gender is proportionately higher also. To formally establish this result, we first focus on the case of independent uniform distributions.

**Proposition 3 (Effect of Distribution of Child Cost on Fertility Rate).** Assume that the female and male child preferences follow independent uniform distributions with means $\mu_g$ and densities $d_g$ for $g \in \{f, m\}$. Then expected fertility $E(b)$ is a concave function of the female cost share $\chi_f$, and fertility is maximized at:

$$\hat{\chi}_f = \min \left\{ 1, \max \left\{ 0, \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\phi} \left[ \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \frac{d_m - d_f}{d_f d_m} \right] \right\} \right\}. \quad (24)$$

Hence, if women and men have the same preferences ($\mu_f = \mu_m$, $d_f = d_m$), fertility is maximized when the child care burden is shared equally. Moreover, if the distributions of female and male preferences have the same density ($d_f = d_m$), equal shares of men and women agree to having a child at the maximum
fertility rate, even if \( \mu_f \neq \mu_m \) (provided that \( \chi_f \) is interior). If \( d_f \neq d_m \), at \( \chi_f \) more individuals of the gender with the more concentrated distribution of preferences (higher \( d_g \)) agree to having a child than individuals of the gender with more dispersed preferences. Specifically, fertility is maximized when the ratio of agreement shares \((1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f))/(1 - F_m(\tilde{v}_m))\) is equal to the ratio of densities \( d_f/d_g \).

**Proof of Proposition 3:** Fertility preferences for gender \( g \in \{f, m\} \) have independent uniform density on \( \mu_g - (d_g)^{-1}/2, \mu_g + (d_g)^{-1}/2 \). The distribution function is given by (in the relevant range):

\[
F(v_f, v_m) = (v_f - (\mu_f - 1/2d_f))d_f(v_m - (\mu_m - 1/2d_m))d_m,
\]

and the fraction of couples who have a child is given by:

\[
E(b) = 1 - \left(\tilde{v}_f - \left(\mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f}\right)\right)d_f - \left(\tilde{v}_m - \left(\mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m}\right)\right)d_m
+ \left(\tilde{v}_f - \left(\mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f}\right)\right)d_f\left(\tilde{v}_m - \left(\mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m}\right)\right)d_m. \tag{25}
\]

Given (19) and (20), the average fertility rate is a quadratic and concave function of the female cost share \( \chi_f \) (i.e., the quadratic term has a negative sign). The derivative of average fertility with respect to \( \chi_f \) is:

\[
\frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} = \phi d_m \left[1 - \left(\chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi - \left(\mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f}\right)\right]d_f
- \phi d_f \left[1 - \left(1 - \chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi - \left(\mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m}\right)\right]d_m, \tag{26}
\]

which simplifies to:

\[
\frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} = \phi(d_m - d_f) + \phi d_f d_m \left[(1 - 2\chi_f)\phi + \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{d_m} - \frac{1}{d_f}\right)\right].
\]

Equating the right-hand side to zero gives the cost share \( \hat{\chi}_f \) at which fertility is maximized (assuming that the solution is interior):

\[
\hat{\chi}_f = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\phi} \left[\mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \frac{d_m - d_f}{d_f d_m}\right]. \tag{27}
\]

Taking corner solutions into account, the fertility maximizing cost share is given by expression (24) in the statement of the proposition. Moreover, starting with (26), if there is an interior maxi-
mum we have:

\[
\phi d_m \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\hat{\chi}_f + \alpha/2}{\phi} - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f \right] = \phi f_f \left[ 1 - \left( 1 - \frac{\hat{\chi}_f + \alpha/2}{\phi} - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m \right],
\]

and hence:

\[
\frac{d_f}{d_m} = \frac{1 - \left( \frac{\hat{\chi}_f + \alpha/2}{\phi} - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f}{1 - \left( 1 - \frac{\hat{\chi}_f + \alpha/2}{\phi} - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m} = \frac{1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f)}{1 - F_m(\tilde{v}_m)}.
\]

Thus, as stated in the last part of the proposition, if the distributions of female and male child preferences have different densities, fertility is maximized if the ratio of densities is equal to the fraction of individuals agreeing to have a child for each gender.

The result suggests that if the distribution of the child care burden is not at the fertility-maximizing level, the fertility rate could be raised by policies that shift these responsibilities in a particular direction. Likewise, subsidies for childbearing would be more or less effective depending on whether they specifically target one of the partners (say, by providing publicly financed alternatives for tasks that previously fell predominantly on one partner). For a concrete policy analysis, we need to add more structure to the analysis. We do this in Section 4 in a more elaborate quantitative version of our theory. When matched to the GGP data, that model indeed predicts that the effectiveness of policies designed to promote childbearing crucially depends on how the policies are targeted.

For non-uniform distributions of child preferences, the same intuitions regarding the effects of a change in cost shares that arise from Proposition 3 still apply locally. In particular, given (23), the local effect of a change in cost shares is driven by the density of the child preferences of each gender and by the existing shares of agreement and disagreement by gender. Global results can be obtained only by placing at least some restrictions on the overall shape of preferences.\(^4^4\)

Empirically, we do not have information on the global shape of child preferences away from the cutoffs, because we observe only a binary variable on child preferences. We therefore use uniform distributions in the quantitative implementation of the dynamic model, while noting that the measured effects should be considered to be locally valid.

In the quantitative model, we also allow for correlation in child preferences within households.

\(^{44}\)One can even construct cases (albeit unrealistic ones) where fertility is maximized when one gender bears the entire child care burden. For example, consider a preference distribution (identical between men and women) where 50 percent of each gender want to have a child even if they have to bear the entire child cost, whereas the other 50 percent agree to having a child only if they bear none of the cost. In this case, 50 percent of couples have a child if one partner bears all the cost, whereas only 25 percent of couples have a child if both partners make a contribution.
We now show that results similar to those in Proposition 3 (which was established for the case of independent child preferences) also go through when we allow for correlation in child preferences between the partners.

**Proposition 4** (Effect of Distribution of Child Cost with Correlated Preferences). Assume that the female and male child preferences follow uniform distributions with means $\mu_g$ and densities $d_g$ for $g \in \{f, m\}$. With probability $\eta > 0$, the draw of a given woman and man are perfectly correlated in the sense that:

$$v_f = \frac{d_m}{d_f} (v_m - \mu_m) + \mu_f.$$  

With probability $1 - \eta$, woman and man have independent draws from their distributions. This implies that $\eta$ is the correlation between the woman’s and the man’s child preference. Then expected fertility $E(b)$ is a concave function of the female cost share $\chi_f$, and fertility is maximized at:

$$\hat{\chi}_f = \min \{1, \hat{\chi}_{f1}, \max \{0, \hat{\chi}_f, \hat{\chi}_{f2}\}\},$$

where

$$\hat{\chi}_f = \frac{(d_m + \frac{1}{2}(d_m - d_f)) \phi + \mu_f d_f - \mu_m d_m}{\phi d_f + d_m},$$

$$\hat{\chi}_{f1} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\phi} \left[ \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1+\eta}{1-\eta} d_m - d_f \right) \right],$$

$$\hat{\chi}_{f2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\phi} \left[ \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{d_m - \frac{1+\eta}{1-\eta} d_f}{d_f d_m} \right) \right].$$

Hence, if women and men have the same preferences ($\mu_f = \mu_m$, $d_f = d_m$), fertility is maximized when the child care burden is equally shared, $\hat{\chi}_f = 0.5$. Moreover, if the distributions of female and male preferences have the same density ($d_f = d_m$), equal shares of men and women agree to having a child at the maximum fertility rate, even if $\mu_f \neq \mu_m$ (provided that $\hat{\chi}_f$ is interior). If $d_f \neq d_m$ and $\hat{\chi}_f \neq \hat{\chi}_f$, at $\hat{\chi}_f$ more individuals of the gender with the more concentrated distribution of preferences (higher $d_g$) agree to having a child than individuals of the gender with more dispersed preferences.

**Proof of Proposition 4:** Fertility preferences for gender $g \in \{f, m\}$ have uniform density on $\mu_g - (d_g)^{-1}/2, \mu_g + (d_g)^{-1}/2$. With probability $\eta$, the draws are perfectly correlated in the sense that we have:

$$v_f = \frac{d_m}{d_f} (v_m - \mu_m) + \mu_f,$$

and with probability $1 - \eta$ the draws are independent. The distribution function is given by (in
the relevant range):

\[
F(v_f, v_m) = \eta \min \left\{ \left( v_f - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f, \left( v_m - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m \right\} + (1 - \eta) \left( v_f - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f \left( v_m - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m.
\]

The fraction of couples who have a child is given by:

\[
E(b) = 1 - \eta \max \left\{ \left( \tilde{v}_f - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f, \left( \tilde{v}_m - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m \right\} - (1 - \eta) \left( \left( \tilde{v}_f - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f + \left( \tilde{v}_m - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m \right) + (1 - \eta) \left( \tilde{v}_f - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f \left( \tilde{v}_m - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m.
\]

Given (19) and (20), the average fertility rate as a function of the female cost share \( \chi_f \) has a kink at the point where the two elements inside the max operator are equal, and is a quadratic and concave function of \( \chi_f \) away from the kink. The kink is at the cost share that equates disagreement between men and women, given by:

\[
\bar{\chi}_f = \frac{(d_m + \alpha/2(d_m - d_f)) \phi + \mu_f d_f - \mu_m d_m}{\phi(d_f + d_m)}
\]

For \( \chi_f < \bar{\chi}_f \), the derivative of fertility with respect to \( \chi_f \) is given by:

\[
\left. \frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} \right|_{\chi_f < \bar{\chi}_f} = \eta \phi d_m + (1 - \eta) \phi d_m \left[ 1 - \left( \chi_f + \alpha/2 \right) \phi - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) d_f \right] - (1 - \eta) \phi d_f \left[ 1 - \left( 1 - \chi_f + \alpha/2 \right) \phi - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) d_m \right],
\]

which simplifies to:

\[
\left. \frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} \right|_{\chi_f < \bar{\chi}_f} = \phi(d_m - (1 - \eta)d_f) + (1 - \eta) \phi d_f d_m \left[ (1 - 2\chi_f) \phi + \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{d_m} - \frac{1}{d_f} \right) \right].
\]

Equating the right-hand side to zero gives the cost share \( \hat{\chi}_f \) would be maximized fertility is maximized if the solution is interior and if we have \( \hat{\chi}_f < \bar{\chi}_f \):

\[
\hat{\chi}_f = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\phi} \left[ \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1 + \eta}{1 - \eta} d_m - d_f \right) \right].
\]
In the alternative case of $\chi_f > \tilde{x}_f$, the derivative of fertility with respect to $\chi_f$ is given by:

$$
\frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} \bigg|_{\chi_f > \tilde{x}_f} = -\eta \phi d_f + (1 - \eta) \phi d_m \left[ 1 - \left( (\chi_f + \alpha/2) \phi - \left( \mu_f - \frac{1}{2d_f} \right) \right) d_f \right] - (1 - \eta) \phi d_f \left[ 1 - \left( (1 - \chi_f + \alpha/2) \phi - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2d_m} \right) \right) d_m \right],
$$

which simplifies to:

$$
\frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} \bigg|_{\chi_f > \tilde{x}_f} = \phi((1 - \eta)d_m - d_f) + (1 - \eta) \phi d_f d_m \left[ (1 - 2\chi_f)\phi + \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{d_m} - \frac{1}{d_f} \right) \right].
$$

Equating the right-hand side to zero gives the cost share $\hat{x}_{f2}$ would be maximized fertility is maximized if the solution is interior and if we have $\hat{x}_{f2} > \chi_f$:

$$
\hat{x}_{f2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\phi} \left[ \mu_f - \mu_m + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{d_m - \frac{1 + \eta}{\eta} d_f}{d_f d_m} \right) \right].
$$

We have $\hat{x}_{f1} > \hat{x}_{f2}$. Three cases are possible. If $\hat{x}_{f2} \leq \hat{x}_f \leq \hat{x}_{f1}$, fertility is maximized at the kink $\hat{x}_f$, and equal numbers of men and women agree to have a child. If $\hat{x}_{f1} < \hat{x}_f$, fertility is maximized at $\hat{x}_{f1}$, and if $\hat{x}_{f2} > \hat{x}_f$, fertility is maximized at $\hat{x}_{f2}$. Taking also the possible corners at 0 and 1 into account, the fertility maximizing cost share $\hat{x}_f$ can be written as:

$$
\hat{x}_f = \min \{1, \hat{x}_{f1}, \max \{0, \hat{x}_f, \hat{x}_{f2}\} \},
$$

as stated in expression (28) in the proposition.

With identical preferences, we have $\hat{x}_{f2} < \hat{x}_f = 0.5 < \hat{x}_{f1}$, so that $\hat{x}_f = 0.5$. When $d_f = d_m$, we still have $\hat{x}_{f2} < \hat{x}_f < \hat{x}_{f1}$, so that in an interior solution $\hat{x}_f = \hat{x}_f$ implying (by the construction of $\hat{x}_f$) that equal frictions of men and women agree to have a child. As the final case, consider the situation when $d_m > d_f$ (the case $d_m < d_f$ is parallel and omitted). We want to show that at the fertility maximizing cost share $\hat{x}_f$, at least as many men agree to having a child as women do. Because equal fractions agree at $\chi_f = \hat{x}_f$, we need to show that $\hat{x}_f \geq \hat{x}$. To construct a contradiction argument, assume to the contrary that $\hat{x}_f < \hat{x}$. If there is an interior maximum in this region it is given by $\hat{x}_{f1}$. The first order condition corresponding to this case gives:

$$
(1 - \eta) \phi d_f [1 - F(\tilde{v}_m)] = \eta \phi d_m + (1 - \eta) \phi d_m [1 - F(\tilde{v}_f)],
$$

which implies:

$$
1 > \frac{d_f}{d_m} > \frac{1 - F(\tilde{v}_f)}{1 - F(\tilde{v}_m)}.
$$

65
Thus, fewer women than men would agree to having a child; however, this is a contradiction because $\bar{\chi}_f < \bar{\chi}$ implies that more women than men agree to have a child. Hence, when $d_m > d_f$ we must have $\bar{\chi}_f \geq \bar{\chi}_f$, which establishes the last claim in the proposition. \hfill \square

C The Timing of Births

In this appendix we illustrate the role of the persistence of fertility preferences for determining the overall fertility rate. A limitation of the static model used in the theoretical part of the paper is that it does not distinguish between the timing of births and the total number of births. In a dynamic setting, there is an important distinction between partners’ disagreement about the total number of children they want to have, and disagreement about when to have them. In the extreme, one can envision a setting in which all couples agree on how many children they ultimately want to have, and the only source of conflict is whether to have them early or late. In this case, an intervention that reshuffles the child care burden between the partners may affect when people have children, but it would not affect the ultimate outcome in terms of the total number of children per couple. If the policy aim is to raise fertility rates, understanding whether policy affects total fertility or only the timing of fertility is clearly important.

We now extend the theoretical analysis to a two-period setting in order to clarify how this issue relates to the persistence of child preferences between periods. In the quantitative model introduced in Section 4 in the main text, we use repeated observations of the child preferences of a given couple from multiple waves of the GGP survey to pin down this critical aspect of the analysis.

In the setting considered here, there is a continuum of couples, and the wages $w_f$ and $w_m$, the child cost $\phi$, and the cost shares $\chi_f$ and $\chi_m = 1 - \chi_f$ are identical across couples and over the two periods $t = 1, 2$. The child cost accrues only in the period when a child is born (to be relaxed in Section 4). Preferences are as in (1), but extending over two periods with discount factor $\beta$, where $0 < \beta \leq 1$. Child preferences in the second period may depend on the fertility outcome in the first period. First-period child preferences are denoted as $v_{f,1}$, $v_{m,1}$, and second-period preferences are given by $v_{f,2}$ and $v_{m,2}$. Hence, the expected utility function is:

$$E[u_g(c_{g,1}, b_1, c_{g,2}, b_2)] = c_{g,1} + b_1 v_{g,1} + \beta E[c_{g,2} + b_2 v_{g,2} | b_1].$$

The expectations operator appears because we allow for the possibility that child preferences in the second period are realized only after decisions are made in the first period. As before, we focus on the case of lack of commitment. In each period, the partners bargain ex post over consumption after the fertility decision has been made; in addition, the partners are unable to commit to a specific second-period consumption allocation during the first period. There is no
savings technology, so that (in the case of cooperation) the per-period budget constraints are as in (2) above. In addition, the outside option of non-cooperation affects only a single period. That is, a non-cooperating couple in the first period returns to cooperation in the second period.

The second period of the two-period model is formally identical to the static model, and Propositions 2 and 3 apply. For a given couple with a given preference draw, let \( EV_{f,2}(0) \) and \( EV_{m,2}(0) \) denote equilibrium second-period expected utilities conditional on no child being born in the first period, and \( EV_{f,2}(1) \) and \( EV_{m,2}(1) \) denote expected utilities if there is a first-period birth. Here the dependence of second-period utility on first-period fertility is solely due to preferences in the second period being allowed to depend on the fertility outcome in the first period. We start by characterizing the conditions for births to take place.

**Proposition 5 (Conditions for Child Birth in Two-Period Model).** In the second period, a birth takes place \( (b_2 = 1) \) if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:

\[
\begin{align*}
    v_{f,2} &\geq (\chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi \equiv \bar{v}_{f,2}, \\
    v_{m,2} &\geq (\chi_m + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi \equiv \bar{v}_{m,2}.
\end{align*}
\]

(32) and (33)

In the first period, a birth takes place \( (b_1 = 1) \) if and only if the following conditions are met:

\[
\begin{align*}
    v_{f,1} &\geq (\chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi + \beta (EV_{f,2}(0) - EV_{f,2}(1)) \equiv \bar{v}_{f,1}, \\
    v_{m,1} &\geq (\chi_m + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi + \beta (EV_{m,2}(0) - EV_{m,2}(1)) \equiv \bar{v}_{m,1}.
\end{align*}
\]

(34) and (35)

**Proof of Proposition 5:** The second period of the two-period model is formally identical to the static model analyzed in Proposition 2, and hence conditions (7) and (8) are applicable, which gives (32) and (33). The expected utilities in period 2 as a function of first-period utility are then given by:

\[
V_g(b_1) = \int_{v_{f,2}} \int_{v_{m,2}} \left[ w_g + \frac{\alpha}{2} (w_f + w_m) \right. \\
+ I(v_{f,2} \geq \bar{v}_{f,2}, v_{m,2} \geq \bar{v}_{m,2}) \left( v_{g,2} - \left( \chi_g + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi \right) \Bigg] f(v_{f,2}, v_{m,2}|b_1) dv_{f,2} dv_{m,2},
\]

(36)

where \( f(v_{f,2}, v_{m,2}|b_1) \) is the joint density of fertility preferences in the second period given \( b_1 \). Given these utilities, the terms \( EV_g(1) - EV_g(0) \) then represent the change in second period expected utility as a function of the initial fertility choice. From the perspective of deciding on fertility in the first period, these terms act like a constant that adds to (or subtract from) the benefit of children. Applying Proposition 2, the conditions for having a baby in the first period
are then:

\[ v_{f,1} + \beta (EV_f(1) - EV_f(0)) \geq \left( \chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi, \]

\[ v_{m,1} + \beta (EV_m(1) - EV_m(0)) \geq \left( \chi_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi, \]

which gives (34) and (35).

Hence, the main change compared to the static case is that when deciding on fertility in the first period, the partners also take into account how having a child affects their utility in the second period. Depending on how preferences evolve, this effect could go in either direction. If future preferences are uncertain, there can be an option value of waiting, i.e., a couple may delay having a child in the hope of a more favorable future preference realization.

We now illustrate how the evolution of child preferences determines whether shifts in the distribution of the child care burden (say, induced by targeted policies) affect the total number of children (denoted by \( n = b_1 + b_2 \)) or just the timing of fertility. We do so by considering two polar cases. The first one is where first-period fertility does not affect preferences in the second period; instead, fertility preferences are drawn repeatedly from the same distribution. In this scenario, shifts in the cost share affect only total fertility, but not the timing of fertility.

**Proposition 6 (Level and Timing of Fertility with Independent Draws).** Assume that in both periods, the female and male child preferences follow independent uniform distributions with identical means \( \mu_g \) and densities \( d_g \) for \( g \in \{f, m\} \). Then expected fertility \( E(b_1) \) and \( E(b_2) \) in the two periods depends on the female cost share \( \chi_f \) as described in Proposition 3. For any \( \chi_f \), we also have \( E(b_1) = E(b_2) \), so that total expected lifetime fertility \( E(n) = E(b_1) + E(b_2) \) satisfies:

\[ E(n) = 2E(b_1) = 2E(b_2). \]

The timing of fertility, as measured by the ratio \( E(b_1)/E(b_2) \), is independent of \( \chi_f \).

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Given that fertility preferences in the second period do not depend on the fertility realization in the first period, we have \( EV_f(0) = EV_f(1) \) and \( EV_m(0) = EV_m(1) \). Hence, given Proposition 5 the conditions for fertility in each period are the same as those for the single period model characterized in Proposition 2. We therefore obtain the same fertility rate in both periods, \( E(b_1) = E(b_2) \), and Proposition 3 applies to each period separately.

Next, we consider an opposite polar case where having a child in the first period removes the desire for additional children.

**Proposition 7 (Level and Timing of Fertility with Fixed Desire for Children).** Assume that in the first period, the female and male child preferences follow independent uniform distributions with means
$\mu_g$ and densities $d_g$ for $g \in \{f,m\}$. In the second period, preferences depend on first-period fertility: if $b_1 = 1$, we have $v_{f,2} = v_{m,2} = 0$, and if $b_1 = 0$, we have $v_{g,2} = (\chi_g + \alpha) \phi$. Then the total fertility rate is constant for all $\chi_f \in [0, 1]$: 

$$E(n) = E(b_1) + E(b_2) = 1.$$ \hfill (37)

Fertility in the first period depends on $\chi_f$ as described in Proposition 3 for the transformed parameter $\tilde{\alpha} = (1 + \beta) \alpha$. Given that $E(n)$ is constant and:

$$E(b_1) = \frac{E(b_1)}{1 - E(b_1)},$$ \hfill (38)

the cost share $\chi_f$ affects only the timing, but not the level of fertility.

**Proof of Proposition 7:** We proceed by backward induction. If $b_1 = 1$, we have $v_{f,2} = v_{m,2} = 0$. Given (32) and (33), this guarantees that no additional child will be born in the second period, and second-period utilities are (given Nash bargaining):

$$EV_f(1) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}(w_f + w_m),$$

$$EV_m(1) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2}(w_f + w_m).$$

Conversely, if we have $b_1 = 0$, the preference realizations $v_{g,2} = (\chi_g + \alpha) \phi$ guarantees that the conditions (32) and (33) are satisfied, so that $b_2 = 1$ for sure. We therefore have $b_2 = 1 - b_1$ and, in expectation:

$$E(b_2) = 1 - E(b_1),$$

which gives (37) and (38). Continuing, the resulting second-period utilities conditional on $b_1 = 0$ are:

$$EV_f(0) = w_f - \chi_f \phi + \frac{\alpha}{2}(w_f + w_m - \phi) + (\chi_f + \alpha) \phi,$$

$$EV_m(0) = w_m - \chi_m \phi + \frac{\alpha}{2}(w_f + w_m - \phi) + (\chi_m + \alpha) \phi,$$

which can be simplified to:

$$EV_f(0) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}(w_f + w_m + \phi),$$

$$EV_m(0) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2}(w_f + w_m + \phi).$$
Given these utilities, the impact of having a child in the first period on continuation utility is:

\[ EV_f(0) - EV_f(1) = \frac{\alpha}{2} \phi, \]
\[ EV_m(0) - EV_f(1) = \frac{\alpha}{2} \phi. \]

We now move to the fertility decision in the first period. The conditions (34) and (35) are:

\[ v_{f,1} \geq \left( \chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi + \beta \frac{\alpha}{2} \phi, \]
\[ v_{m,1} \geq \left( 1 - \chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi + \beta \frac{\alpha}{2} \phi. \]

which can be rewritten as

\[ v_{f,1} \geq \left( \chi_f + \frac{1 + \beta}{2} \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi, \]
\[ v_{m,1} \geq \left( 1 - \chi_f + \frac{1 + \beta}{2} \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \phi. \]

With the change of variables

\[ \tilde{\alpha} = (1 + \beta) \alpha, \]

the conditions can be written as:

\[ v_{f,1} \geq \left( \chi_f + \frac{\tilde{\alpha}}{2} \right) \phi, \]
\[ v_{m,1} \geq \left( 1 - \chi_f + \frac{\tilde{\alpha}}{2} \right) \phi. \]

The conditions therefore are of the form (7) and (8), so that the results in Proposition 3 apply with the transformed parameter \( \tilde{\alpha} \).

The proposition captures an extreme case where all individuals eventually want to end up with exactly one child, and the only disagreement is over when that child should be born. But the intuition from this example carries over to the general case where a birth leads to at least some downward shift in future fertility preferences. This is a plausible scenario, because as long as the marginal utility derived from children is diminishing, some such downward shift will be present. If this effect is strong, policies that aim to shift the distribution of the child care burden may have little impact on the overall fertility rate, even when the data in a given cross section suggest a lot of disagreement over fertility.

To deal with this issue and to allow for a meaningful policy analysis, we need to capture how a given couple’s child preferences shift over time, and how this depends on child birth. Doing
this in a quantitatively plausible manner requires a more elaborate model, which we develop in Section 4 in the main text.

D Fertility Choice with Partial Commitment

In this appendix, we consider an extension of the basic setup that allows for partial commitment. The partial-commitment setup also forms the basis for the quantitative model developed in Section 4 in the main text. In this version of the model, the cost shares $\chi_f$ and $\chi_m$ are not parameters, but choice variables. Before deciding on fertility, but after learning about their child preferences, the partners can take an action that changes the ex-post distribution of the child care burden. Formally, the cost share $\chi_f$ is selected from a given feasible interval $[\chi_{f,\text{min}}, \chi_{f,\text{max}}]$, with $\chi_m = 1 - \chi_f$. There is also a default cost share $\chi_{f,0} \in [\chi_{f,\text{min}}, \chi_{f,\text{max}}]$. Intuitively, what we have in mind is that couples can commit to some long-term decisions that affect the ex-post child care burden. Examples include a choice of location that affects the availability of child care (i.e., close to grandparents or a daycare facility), and buying durable goods (such as household appliances or minivans) that facilitate taking care of children. Such decisions would lower the expected time cost of having children and turn those into monetary expenses, which implicitly lowers the child care burden on the partner who ex post will be responsible for the majority of the time costs of raising children. We show that as long as the ex-post cost shares can be moved only within a limited range, the partial commitment model has the same qualitative implications as the setup with fixed cost shares considered above.

The time line of events and decisions is as follows.

1. The potential utilities from having a child $v_f$ and $v_m$ are realized.
2. The woman can offer to increase her child care burden $\chi_f$ above the default within the feasible range, $\chi_{f,0} < \chi_f \leq \chi_{f,\text{max}}$.
3. The man can offer to increase his child care burden $1 - \chi_f$ above the default within the feasible range, $\chi_{f,\text{min}} \leq \chi_f < \chi_{f,0}$.
4. Given the final $\chi_f$ arising from the previous stage, the couple decides on whether to have a child as before.
5. Given the decisions in the previous rounds, the couple decides on the consumption allocation as before.

Consistent with our treatment of fertility choice, we assume that agreement is necessary to move cost shares; the partners can make voluntary offers to do more work, but they cannot unilaterally force the other partner to do more. We can solve for the equilibrium by backward induction. Stages 4 and 5 are identical to the existing model; hence, we only need to characterize the
decisions in Stages 2 and 3 of potentially altering ex-post child care arrangements, and hence
bargaining power.

**Proposition 8** (Fertility Choice under Partial Commitment). _Under partial of commitment, a birth
takes place if and only if the conditions:

\[ v_f + v_m \geq (1 + \alpha)\phi, \]
\[ v_f \geq \left(\chi_{f,\text{min}} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi, \]  
\[ v_m \geq \left(1 - \chi_{f,\text{max}} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi. \]  

are all satisfied. The first condition states that having a baby extends the utility possibility frontier for the
couple, and the remaining conditions state that there is a \(\chi_f\) in the feasible range such that both partners
benefit from having the baby. In terms of predictions for fertility, partial commitment nests the cases of
lack of commitment when \(\chi_{f,\text{min}} = \chi_{f,\text{max}}\), and full commitment when the conditions:

\[ \chi_{f,\text{min}} \leq \frac{\min(v_f)}{\phi} - \frac{\alpha}{2}, \]  
\[ \chi_{f,\text{max}} \geq 1 - \frac{\min(v_m)}{\phi} + \frac{\alpha}{2} \]

are satisfied.

**Proof of Proposition 8:** For a given \(\chi_f \in [\chi_{f,\text{min}}, \chi_{f,\text{max}}]\) that is negotiated in Stages 1–3, the
outcome of the last two stages is as in the lack of commitment model analyzed in Proposition 2. Hence, the utilities \(u_g(b, \chi_f)\) that each partner attains are given by (14), (17), and (18):

\[ u_f(0, \chi_f) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m], \]
\[ u_m(0, \chi_f) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m], \]
\[ u_f(1, \chi_f) = w_f + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + [v_f - \chi_f \phi] \]
\[ u_m(1, \chi_f) = w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + [v_m - \chi_m \phi]. \]

A child is born whenever both partners agree, i.e. as soon as

\[ v_f \geq \left(\chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi \quad \text{and} \quad v_m \geq \left(1 - \chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi. \]

We first show that (39) to (41) are necessary for a birth to take place. Summing the two inequali-
ties in (48) yields (39); hence, (39) is necessary for a child to be born. Intuitively, (39) states that a
baby can be born only if having a baby expands the couple’s utility possibility frontier. Next, if
(40) is violated, we have \(u_f(1, \chi_{f,\text{min}}) < u_f(0, \chi_{f,\text{min}})\). Hence, the woman will be opposed to hav-
ing a child even at her lowest possible cost share, and a fortiori for all other feasible cost shares as well. Hence, (40) is necessary for the woman to agree to having a child. The same argument implies that (41) is necessary for the man to agree to having a child.

Next, we want to show that (39) to (41) are sufficient for a birth to take place. Consider first the case where (39) is satisfied and we also have:

\[ v_f \geq (\chi_{f,0} + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi \]  
\[ v_m \geq (1 - \chi_{f,0} + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi, \]  

i.e., (7) and (8) are satisfied at the default cost share \( \chi_{f,0} \) (this implies that (40) and (41) are also satisfied). Then, given Proposition 2, if neither partner offers to bear higher cost, the couple will have the child, and both partners will be better off compared to not having a child. Moreover, given (46) and (47), a partner offering to bear higher cost could only lower her or his utility. Thus, the equilibrium outcome is that neither partner offers to bear higher cost, and a birth takes place.

Now consider the case where (39) to (41) are satisfied, but we have:

\[ v_f < (\chi_{f,0} + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi. \]  

Subtracting both sides of this equation from (39) gives:

\[ v_m > (1 - \chi_{f,0} + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi, \]

that is, (39) and (51) imply that (50) holds with strict inequality. If neither partner offers to bear a higher than the default cost share, the couple will not have a baby because of (51) (i.e., the woman will not agree). Also, the woman has no incentive to offer to bear higher cost share, because then she would want a baby even less, hence the outcome would be unchanged. Hence, to prove that in this situation a baby will be born as claimed in the proposition, we have to show that the man will offer to bear a sufficiently high cost for the woman to agree to having the baby. Hence, consider the decision of the man to bear a higher than the default cost share. Conditional on having the child, given (47) the man’s utility is strictly decreasing in his cost share. Hence, the only possibilities are that the man does not make an offer, in which case no birth takes place and the man gets utility (45), or the man offers to bear just enough cost to make the woman indifferent between having the baby and not having the baby. The required cost share satisfies

\[ v_f = (\chi_f + \frac{\alpha}{2}) \phi \]
and is therefore given by:

\[ \chi_f = \frac{v_f}{\phi} - \frac{\alpha}{2}. \]

Given that (40) holds, this is a feasible offer, i.e., \( \chi_f \geq \chi_{f,\text{min}} \). We still need to show that offering this cost share and having the baby makes the man weakly better off compared to not making an offer. The man’s utility with cost share \( \chi_f \) and a baby being born is:

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_m(1, \chi_f) &= w_m - (1 - \chi_f)\phi + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + v_m \\
    &= w_m - \left(1 - \frac{v_f}{\phi} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m - \phi] + v_m \\
    &= w_m - (1 + \alpha)\phi + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m] + v_f + v_m.
\end{align*}
\]

We therefore have \( u_m(1, \chi_f) \geq u_m(0, \chi_f) \) if the following condition is met:

\[
w_m - (1 + \alpha)\phi + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m] + v_f + v_m \geq w_m + \frac{\alpha}{2} [w_f + w_m]
\]
or:

\[
v_f + v_m \geq (1 + \alpha)\phi,
\]

which is (39) and therefore satisfied. Hence, it is in the interest of the man to make the offer, and a birth will take place. The outcome for the remaining case where (39) to (41) are satisfied, but we have:

\[
v_m < \left(1 - \chi_{f,0} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi
\]

(the man does not want the child given the default cost share) is parallel: the woman will offer to bear just enough cost for the birth to take place. Hence, (39) to (41) are also sufficient for a birth to take place, which completes the proof.

Regarding the last part of the proposition, if (42) and (43) are satisfied, (40) and (41) are never binding. Hence, (39) is the only condition for a birth to take place, which is also the condition that characterizes fertility under commitment in Proposition 1.

Let us now consider, parallel to the analysis in Section B, how the distribution of the child care burden affects fertility under partial commitment. We consider an economy with a continuum of couples, with wages and cost shares identical across couples. Child preferences are heterogeneous in the population. We focus on the case of independent distributions \( F_f(v_f) \) and \( F_m(v_m) \) for female and male child preferences. Define \( \tilde{v}_f \) and \( \tilde{v}_m \) in the partial commitment case as:

\[
\begin{align*}
    \tilde{v}_f &= \left(\chi_{f,\text{min}} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi, \\
    \tilde{v}_m &= \left(1 - \chi_{f,\text{max}} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\phi.
\end{align*}
\]
Given Proposition 8, the fertility rate for the economy will be given by:

\[ E(b) = \text{Prob}(v_f \geq \tilde{v}_f \land v_m \geq \tilde{v}_m \land v_f + v_m \geq (1 + \alpha)\phi) \]
\[ = \text{Prob}(v_f \geq \tilde{v}_f \land v_m \geq \tilde{v}_m) - \text{Prob}(v_f \geq \tilde{v}_f \land v_m \geq \tilde{v}_m \land v_f + v_m < (1 + \alpha)\phi). \]

Writing this out in terms of the distribution functions gives:

\[ E(b) = 1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f) - F_m(\tilde{v}_m) + F_f(\tilde{v}_f)F_m(\tilde{v}_m) \]
\[ - \int_{v_m=\tilde{v}_m}^{\infty} \max\{F_f((1 + \alpha)\phi - v_m) - F_f(\tilde{v}_f), 0\} \, dF_m(v_m). \]

Here the first line is analogous to (22) in the case without commitment, and the second line subtracts the probability that having a baby lowers the utility possibility frontier, i.e., (39) is violated, even though both individual conditions (40) and (41) are satisfied.

We now would like to assess how a change in the distribution of the child care burden affects fertility under partial commitment. Consider the case where parents are able to move away from the default cost share \( \chi_{f,0} \) up to a maximum change of \( \xi > 0 \), so that \( \chi_{f,\text{min}} = \chi_{f,0} - \xi \), \( \chi_{f,\text{min}} = \chi_{f,0} + \xi \). If the distribution functions are differentiable at \( \tilde{v}_f \) and \( \tilde{v}_m \), the marginal effect of a change in the default female cost share \( \chi_{f,0} \) on fertility in the case of partial commitment is:

\[ \frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} = \phi F'_m(\tilde{v}_m) [1 - F_f(\tilde{v}_f)] - \phi F'_f(\tilde{v}_f) [1 - F_m(\tilde{v}_m)] \]
\[ - \phi F'_m(\tilde{v}_m) (F_f((1 + \alpha)\phi - \tilde{v}_m) - F_f(\tilde{v}_f)) + \phi F'_f(\tilde{v}_f) (F_m((1 + \alpha)\phi - \tilde{v}_f) - F_m(\tilde{v}_m)). \]

or:

\[ \frac{\partial E(b)}{\partial \chi_f} = \phi F'_m(\tilde{v}_m) [1 - F_f((1 + \alpha)\phi - \tilde{v}_m)] - \phi F'_f(\tilde{v}_f) [1 - F_m((1 + \alpha)\phi - \tilde{v}_f)]. \quad (52) \]

The first (positive) term represents the increase in the number of men who agree to have a child if the default female cost share \( \chi_f \) increases (and hence the male cost share declines), and the second (negative) term is the decline in agreement on the part of women. The first term has two components: \( F'_m(\tilde{v}_m) \) is the density of the distribution of male child preferences at the cutoff, which tells us how many men switch from disagreeing to agreeing with having a child as \( \chi_f \) rises. The second component \( 1 - F_f((1 + \alpha)\phi - \tilde{v}_m) \) is the probability that the woman will also agree, conditional on the man being just at the cutoff. In the same way, the negative impact of a decline in female agreement on fertility, measured by \( F'_f(\tilde{v}_f) \), is weighted by the share of men agreeing to have a child conditional on the woman being at the cutoff, \( 1 - F_m((1 + \alpha)\phi - \tilde{v}_f) \).

Comparing the expression under partial commitment (52) with the corresponding condition under no commitment (23), we see that the impact of shifts in the burden of child care on fertility
has the same form, except that under partial commitment the relevant agreement shares are conditional on the other partner being just at the indifference threshold. As long the gender that is more likely to be opposed to having a baby in general is also more likely to be opposed on the margin (which is not guaranteed for arbitrary distributions of child preferences, but is true under intuitive regularity conditions), the general intuition from the no commitment case (namely, that fertility can be raised by favoring the gender more likely to be opposed to a baby and with a more dense distribution of fertility preferences) carries over to the partial commitment case.

E Data Description and Further Analysis

The “Generations and Gender Programme” is a panel survey conducted in 19 countries (Wave 1), namely Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, and Sweden. The survey can be connected to an associated survey conducted in Japan. As already mentioned above, we are interested in the answers to question a611 that asks

“Do you yourself want to have a/another baby now?”

and question a615 that asks

“Couples do not always have the same feelings about the number or timing of children. Does your partner/spouse want to have a/another baby now?”

For those respondents who didn’t give an answer to question a611, we recover their intention towards having a baby from question a622, which asks the respondents about their plans to have a child within the next three years.\footnote{This time span corresponds to the interval between two waves of the survey.} We only use the answer to this question if the female household member is not currently pregnant.

E.1 Sample Selection for Intention Data

We select Wave 1 of our sample as follows. We use only those respondents who gave a clear answer to both questions a611\footnote{Including those with recovered answers.} and a615, meaning that they responded either yes or no, and we also exclude couples who report that it is physically impossible for them to have a baby. In addition, we select couples in which the female partner is between the ages of 20 and 45 and the male partner between the ages of 20 and 55. These selection criteria naturally rule out single households. However, we do not restrict the sample to married couples, i.e. we include
couples that are in any form of relationship.\textsuperscript{47} We also do not require partners to live in the same household. As we will see below, being married and living in the same household can impact our variables of interest. These selection criteria give us the sample sizes reported in Table 9.

Table 9: Wave 1 sample with questions about fertility preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>female</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>2,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>4,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>2,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>2,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>2,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>2,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>4,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>3,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>3,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>2,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,115</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,364</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,479</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 reports additional descriptive statistics for the Wave 1 sample (see also Table 1). We define individual skill levels using the ISCED classification standard and assume that a person is high-skilled if her highest education level is of type 5 or 6, meaning that she has completed some tertiary education. According to this definition, almost 30 percent of the female partners in the sample are high skilled, whereas for men it is only 26 percent. 67 percent of the female partners are working, where working is defined as either being officially employed, self-employed, or helping a family member in a family business or a farm. On the other hand, 87 percent of the male partners are working. 37 percent of couples in which the respondent has at least one biological child report to regularly use some institutional or paid child care arrangement. 42 percent regularly get help with child care from someone for whom caring for children is not a job. We interpret this as family based child care arrangements.

\textsuperscript{47}There are no same sex couples in our sample.
Table 10: Additional descriptive statistics of the sample (Wave 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female partner high skilled (in %)</td>
<td>29.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male partner high skilled (in %)</td>
<td>26.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female partner working (in %)</td>
<td>67.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male partner working (in %)</td>
<td>87.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use institutional child care (in %)</td>
<td>37.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use family child care (in %)</td>
<td>42.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 34,479 observations. Included countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Russia. Child care questions only asked of couples with at least one child.

E.2 Sample Selection for Birth Data

When combining the first wave with data from Wave 2, we apply one additional selection criterion, namely that respondents are present in both waves. This selection gives us the sample size reported in Table 11. Note that the second wave is only available for a smaller number of countries. However, we find that the composition of the sample with respect to the variables reported in Table 10 is remarkably similar.

Table 11: Wave 2 sample with questions about fertility preferences and observed fertility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When a respondent is present in both waves, we can compute whether they had (at least one) child in the time span between Waves 1 and 2. We do this using the difference in the number of biological children of the respondent, where biological children can be either with the current or a former partner. We therefore abstract from both adoption and fostering. We find that in roughly 15 percent of couples in our sample at least one child is born between Waves 1 and 2. We can also check how stable partnerships are in our sample. In fact, 89 percent of couples are still in a relationship with the same partner in Wave 2. Only 4 percent of respondents have changed the partner and about 7 percent have split up and live on their own.

To check how important child birth to single women is in the data, we construct a comparison group of female respondents who in Wave 1 report not to have a partner. For this group, we find that around 8 percent of respondents are having a child in between the two waves. This number may suggest that being in a partnership is not a prerequisite for having a baby. However, a further investigation of the partnership status of the respondents in Wave 2 reveals that the vast majority of children in this sample is born to women who have found a partner in the three years between the two waves. The number of children born to women who are single in both waves is very small.

### E.3 Determinants of Fertility Intentions

Next, we provide some further investigation of the variables we are using to pin down parameters of our quantitative model. Specifically, we want to study what are covariates of fertility intentions, the degree of agreement, as well as the male share in child care activities in the sample. We therefore use our fertility intention data from Wave 1 and run a OLS regressions of intentions on regressors that may be related to our variables of interest. For all the regressions we use country fixed effects to account for different social and institutional environments. In Tables 12 and 13, we regress the female and the male fertility intention on all the variables reported in the descriptive statistics Tables 1 and 10, including a squared term for the age of the female partner and a variable for the age difference between the man and the woman. We use dummy variables for marriage, cohabitation, high skills (education), and so on. We run these regressions separately for couples with no children, one child, and two or more children. Note that we can only include dummies for the use of child care for couples that already have at least one child. In addition, we include a dummy variable for the gender of the first child. We also run two separate regressions with either marriage or cohabitation as a regressor, since the two tend to be highly collinear.

We find that the coefficients for both female and male fertility intentions are very similar in terms

---

48For 74.40 percent of our sample the time span was at most 40 months, and for 97.94 the time span was at most 50 months.
Table 12: What covaries with women’s intention to have a baby?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>without children</th>
<th>with 1 child</th>
<th>with 2+ children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age woman</td>
<td>0.1528***</td>
<td>0.1490***</td>
<td>0.0744***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0091)</td>
<td>(0.0091)</td>
<td>(0.0102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared/100</td>
<td>-0.2508***</td>
<td>-0.2405***</td>
<td>-0.1476***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0143)</td>
<td>(0.0143)</td>
<td>(0.0154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0027*</td>
<td>-0.0060***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0016)</td>
<td>(0.0016)</td>
<td>(0.0015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.2215***</td>
<td>0.0709***</td>
<td>-0.0377***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0160)</td>
<td>(0.0099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitng</td>
<td>0.1483***</td>
<td>0.0880**</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0150)</td>
<td>(0.0446)</td>
<td>(0.0076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. woman</td>
<td>-0.0191</td>
<td>-0.0176</td>
<td>0.0500***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0158)</td>
<td>(0.0160)</td>
<td>(0.0155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. man</td>
<td>-0.0512***</td>
<td>-0.0499***</td>
<td>0.0637***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0149)</td>
<td>(0.0152)</td>
<td>(0.0159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working woman</td>
<td>0.0545***</td>
<td>0.0488***</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0147)</td>
<td>(0.0149)</td>
<td>(0.0145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working man</td>
<td>0.0414**</td>
<td>0.0391**</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0172)</td>
<td>(0.0175)</td>
<td>(0.0222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. child care</td>
<td>0.0540***</td>
<td>0.0534***</td>
<td>0.0147***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0146)</td>
<td>(0.0146)</td>
<td>(0.0146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family child care</td>
<td>-0.0020</td>
<td>-0.0034</td>
<td>-0.0077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0133)</td>
<td>(0.0133)</td>
<td>(0.0064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First kid male</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0123)</td>
<td>(0.0124)</td>
<td>(0.0054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent female</td>
<td>-0.0126</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
<td>0.0204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0128)</td>
<td>(0.0129)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>5744</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>6239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Table 13: What covaries with men’s intention to have a baby?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>without children</th>
<th>with 1 child</th>
<th>with 2+ children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age woman</td>
<td>0.1355***</td>
<td>0.1320***</td>
<td>0.0472***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0093)</td>
<td>(0.0094)</td>
<td>(0.0107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared/100</td>
<td>-0.2270***</td>
<td>-0.2171***</td>
<td>-0.1067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0146)</td>
<td>(0.0147)</td>
<td>(0.0161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>-0.0061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0016)</td>
<td>(0.0017)</td>
<td>(0.0016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.2250***</td>
<td>0.0846***</td>
<td>-0.0367***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0162)</td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitng</td>
<td>0.1494***</td>
<td>0.1025**</td>
<td>-0.0937**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0155)</td>
<td>(0.0420)</td>
<td>(0.0393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. woman</td>
<td>-0.0199</td>
<td>-0.0178</td>
<td>0.0414***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0161)</td>
<td>(0.0163)</td>
<td>(0.0161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. man</td>
<td>-0.0306**</td>
<td>-0.0287*</td>
<td>0.0731***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0152)</td>
<td>(0.0154)</td>
<td>(0.0162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working woman</td>
<td>0.0495***</td>
<td>0.0444***</td>
<td>0.0223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0151)</td>
<td>(0.0153)</td>
<td>(0.0147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working man</td>
<td>0.0779***</td>
<td>0.0759***</td>
<td>0.0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0173)</td>
<td>(0.0175)</td>
<td>(0.0227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. child care</td>
<td>0.0668***</td>
<td>0.0656***</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0148)</td>
<td>(0.0148)</td>
<td>(0.0068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family child care</td>
<td>0.0092</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0135)</td>
<td>(0.0136)</td>
<td>(0.0068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First kid male</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
<td>-0.0124**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
<td>(0.0058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent female</td>
<td>0.0644***</td>
<td>0.0604***</td>
<td>0.0383***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0131)</td>
<td>(0.0132)</td>
<td>(0.0130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>5744</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>6239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
of signs, magnitude, and significance. The results show a clear hump-shaped pattern of fertility intentions by age for both men and women. Figure 8 visualizes this pattern for couples without children and those with one child, where we evaluate all other variables at their sample means. We find that men would agree on having a child a little earlier than women. The age difference between partners, although statistically significant, plays a quantitatively small role.

Figure 8: Life cycle profiles of fertility intentions and agreement

The security of living in a marriage or cohabitation with a partner are major determinants for wanting children at all. For couples without children, the coefficients of the respective dummies are positive, large, and highly significant. For second or higher-order children the effects are much less pronounced, and even turn negative for couples with two or more children. Tertiary education (especially that of men) seems to have adverse effects fertility intentions. This suggests that there is a lot of dispersion in the desire for children of the highly educated workforce. While there are more couples with high skills who want no children at all, those who do get children want more of them than their less educated counterparts. Finally, having a job and therefore a secure source of income is an important covariate for the decision whether to have children at all. The coefficients are positive and significant for employment of both partners on fertility intentions of both men and women. For couples that already have one child, the use (and therefore the availability) of institutional or paid child care comes with a larger intention to have another child. The use of family child care arrangements, on the other hand, hardly covaries with fertility intentions. A reason for this may be that institutional child care usually takes care of children throughout the day so that parents can go to work. Help with child care from the family can also include bringing the children to the grandparents one day on the weekend. The gender of the first child has hardly any impact on fertility intentions. If anything, women’s intention to have a
second child are slightly larger when the first child is a boy. Finally, the gender of the respondent plays almost no role in the reported fertility intention of women. In contrast, women tend to slightly overestimate the desire for fertility of their male partners.

E.4 Determinants of Agreement

In Table 14 we regress our dummy for agreement of the partners (AGREE) on the same covariates as in the previous tables. We find a hump shaped pattern of agreement with regards to the age of the woman. This suggests that at least part of the conflict between men and women on whether to have a baby is due to differences in desired timing. Marriage and cohabitation come along with a significantly higher level of agreement, where cohabitation tends to play a larger role at least for the second child. This observation suggests, as emphasized by our theoretical analysis, that the ability to commit is a major determinant of agreement and disagreement. With respect to education and having a job, we find similar patterns as in the previous two regressions. Again, for both men and women having a job comes along with a significantly higher degree of agreement on having children at all. Interestingly, the use or availability of institutional child care doesn’t impact agreement much, while the use of family child care comes along with a significantly lower level of agreement. Finally, there is a discrepancy between reported agreement between men and women who already have two or more children.

E.5 Determinants of Men’s Participation in Child Care

In Table 15 we study covariates of the man’s share in caring for the child/children. We exclude age variables from this table, as none of our age covariates turned out significant. Being married is not a strong predictor of men’s share in child care, but cohabitation is. When partners have a child and live in one household, not surprisingly, the male partner will take a larger share in child rearing. Men who are educated or whose partners are educated tend to spend more time with the children. Regarding employment, we find that when the mother works, the father has to take a larger share in caring for the children, and vice versa. The use of institutional child care also leads the father to look after the children more. This is consistent with the interpretation underlying our policy analysis, namely that institutional child care tends to substitute child care that is (usually) provided by the mother. Last but not least, men tend to overestimate (or women underestimate) how much time they spend on child rearing.

E.6 Computing Men’s Share in Caring for Children with Time Use Data

In our analysis, we measure the distribution of the burden of child care within the household using a number of questions in the GGP data set on which parent usually performs a number of specific child care activities. A limitation of this data is that it is qualitative and does not allow
Table 14: What covaries with agreement on wanting a baby?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>without children</th>
<th>with 1 child</th>
<th>with 2+ children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age woman</td>
<td>0.0976***</td>
<td>0.0880***</td>
<td>0.0719***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0160)</td>
<td>(0.0162)</td>
<td>(0.0197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared/100</td>
<td>-0.1496***</td>
<td>-0.1321***</td>
<td>-0.1401***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0260)</td>
<td>(0.0263)</td>
<td>(0.0316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>-0.0049**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0023)</td>
<td>(0.0025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.1993***</td>
<td>0.1242***</td>
<td>-0.0182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0192)</td>
<td>(0.0238)</td>
<td>(0.0238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting</td>
<td>0.2191***</td>
<td>0.3551***</td>
<td>-0.1232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0249)</td>
<td>(0.0620)</td>
<td>(0.0855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. woman</td>
<td>-0.0370*</td>
<td>-0.0300</td>
<td>0.0282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0218)</td>
<td>(0.0217)</td>
<td>(0.0225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. man</td>
<td>-0.0287</td>
<td>-0.0219</td>
<td>0.0480**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0214)</td>
<td>(0.0214)</td>
<td>(0.0221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working woman</td>
<td>0.0825***</td>
<td>0.0690***</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
<td>(0.0228)</td>
<td>(0.0215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working man</td>
<td>0.0895***</td>
<td>0.0740**</td>
<td>-0.0078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0291)</td>
<td>(0.0292)</td>
<td>(0.0314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. child care</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
<td>-0.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0202)</td>
<td>(0.0201)</td>
<td>(0.0279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family child care</td>
<td>-0.0469**</td>
<td>-0.0525***</td>
<td>-0.0770***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0188)</td>
<td>(0.0188)</td>
<td>(0.0278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First kid male</td>
<td>-0.0099</td>
<td>-0.0107</td>
<td>-0.0272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0178)</td>
<td>(0.0178)</td>
<td>(0.0255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent female</td>
<td>0.0238</td>
<td>0.0179</td>
<td>0.0137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0185)</td>
<td>(0.0184)</td>
<td>(0.0186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>2948</td>
<td>2963</td>
<td>2887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$
Table 15: What covaries with male participation in child care?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>with 1 child</th>
<th>with 2+ children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.0113*</td>
<td>0.0067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0058)</td>
<td>(0.0046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting</td>
<td>0.1506***</td>
<td>0.1618***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0202)</td>
<td>(0.0207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. woman</td>
<td>0.0172***</td>
<td>0.0178***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0055)</td>
<td>(0.0040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. man</td>
<td>0.0180***</td>
<td>0.0198***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0054)</td>
<td>(0.0039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working woman</td>
<td>0.0833***</td>
<td>0.0786***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0051)</td>
<td>(0.0034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working man</td>
<td>−0.0714***</td>
<td>−0.0667***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0091)</td>
<td>(0.0062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. child care</td>
<td>0.0204***</td>
<td>0.0127***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0050)</td>
<td>(0.0033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family child care</td>
<td>0.0079*</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0046)</td>
<td>(0.0033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First kid male</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
<td>−0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0043)</td>
<td>(0.0030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent female</td>
<td>−0.0738***</td>
<td>−0.0655***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0044)</td>
<td>(0.0030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>6172</td>
<td>6178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12208</td>
<td>12228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
us to pin down exactly how much time mothers versus fathers spend on child care. To address this limitation, here we compare our results on the distribution of the burden of child care to a similar computation based on international time use data.

Figure 9: Disagreement over fertility and men’s share in caring for children, measured with time use data

Notes: Time use data from International Social Survey Program. The data set used is “Family and Changing Gender Roles IV 2012.” Distribution of child care computed based on self-reported child care by women and men in households with both partners present at least one child under the age of 5.

We use time use data from the most recent available Family and Changing Roles (2012) module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP provides representative survey data from almost 50 member countries, including ten of the eleven countries in our GGP sample (no data is available for Russia). The Family and Changing Roles module contains detailed information on attitudes towards gender roles within the family, and, importantly, time use information for the respondent and their partner. The ISSP interviews one adult in each household. Each respondent reports for how many hours she or he spends looking after family members and how many hours the partners spends. We utilize this measure as a proxy for child care time. We restrict the sample to individuals living with a partner and at least one child up to the age of 5. We compute the female and male share in child care using only self-reported time

\[ \text{Correlation} = -0.810 \]
use (i.e., we do not use the report for the partner’s time use), although using both reports yields similar patterns.

Figure 9 uses this data to display a version of Figure 2 based on the time use data instead of the GGP data. We see that despite the different data source, the basic pattern is essentially the same. The level and distribution of the implied male share of time cost is very similar in the GGP data and in the time use data, and the male contribution to child care contributes to be highly correlated with disagreement between women and men about fertility. The result suggest that our measure of the distribution of the burden of child care provides a good approximation to measures based on time use.