The fantasy of first-person science

Daniel Dennett

Tufts University

In Consciousness Explained (1991), I described a method--long standard in cognitive science, in fact--for taking "first person" phenomena seriously within the normal methodological constraints of "third person" science: what I call "heterophenomenology". All the seriously regarded empirical research on consciousness, in every domain of cognitive science, falls crisply within the confines of heterophenomenology, and always has. The point of heterophenomenology is that any putative subjective phenomenon or property that somehow evades or transcends the reach of heterophenomenology is a subjective phenomenon that also escapes the ken of the subject! Good riddance to such phantoms. Any subjective phenomenon that any human subject has any convictions about is a candidate for heterophenomenological treatment--fair and unbiased treatment. So we needn't worry about leaving out anything that an imaginary "first person" science of consciousness would consider. There is no such thing as first person science.