

Political Science 441: International Political Economy

Northwestern University
Spring 2017
Fridays 2-4:50pm
Scott Hall 201 (Ripton Room)

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Course Overview

Political Science 441 surveys major issue areas and debates in the fields of International and Comparative Political Economy. It is targeted to Ph.D. students in political science, though graduate students from other fields and ambitious and well-prepared undergraduates are welcome. Forewarned is forearmed: the reading load is heavy, and I expect that each member of the course will be prepared to discuss each of the readings.

Broadly, the subfields of International and Comparative Political Economy involve the study of how politics, emphasizing power, material interests, institutions, and non-material factors (like ideas, norms, and social conventions), shape and are shaped by market forces (transactions involving goods and services, money and financial assets, firms and factories, and workers). Because I do not regard the disciplinary distinction between IPE and CPE as particularly important, the course includes topics and readings from both subfields.

If there are readings/topics that you would like to cover that are not on this version of the syllabus, please bring them to my attention. I also reserve the right to make changes (with the caveat that you will have plenty of warning if I choose to shuffle readings around). The syllabus is an outline, not a contract, and it is subject to change.

Course Requirements and Grading

Active and thoughtful engagement with the material is essential to success in this course. There are four ways in which I try to measure your engagement with and mastery of the course material:

- (1) *Participation* in the course discussion will account for **25%** of your final grade. The reading load is substantial and the course will be driven by discussions rather than lectures. For these reasons I strongly urge that you come regularly, on time, and well prepared – you must keep up with the readings and be ready to contribute to the conversation.
- (2) All students are required to serve as the *authors' defendant* in one course meeting. During the week in which you have been assigned the role of authors' defendant,

you will be stepping into the shoes of an author of one of the readings assigned for the seminar; you will be responsible for presenting the main arguments and evidence in the reading and will be expected to be prepared to respond to tough questions about the reading that are raised by me or the other members of the group. Your performance as authors' defendant will account for **10%** of your grade.

- (3) Each student will write two *critical memos* that outlines the main argument(s) in one or a set of readings and provides an incisive critique of the material. The critical memos should be submitted via email to me no later than **8 PM** the evening before the meeting in which the reading(s) appear. The memos should be in the range of 3-5 pages. The critical memos account for **25%** of the final course grade.
- (4) For the remaining **40%** of your course grade you have two options: (a) you may choose to submit a 15-20 page research proposal that outlines a puzzle that falls within the purview of the class, situates the puzzle in the relevant literature, develops a theoretical argument and observable implications, and sketches how you plan to conduct the research necessary to shed light on the puzzle (what kind of research design will allow you to answer the motivating question?); (b) alternatively, you may write essays based on two field exam-style questions. Like the field exam, you will get the questions and have a short time period in which to compose your responses. Unlike the field exam you will have access to your readings and notes and will not be expected to go much beyond the course readings in constructing your answers.

The due date for the final paper is **Wednesday, June 7**. I should have the paper in my hand by **7:00 PM** on that day. Papers that are submitted after the deadline will be penalized by a half grade (from a B+ to a B, for example) for each 12-hour period that passes after the announced deadline. Barring unusual and challenging personal circumstances, I expect that all students in the course will complete the requirements on time.

If you choose the exam option, we will work out a day and time during finals week in which you will be receive the questions. You will then have 36 hours to complete and submit your essays.

Recommended Readings

There is a lengthy list of "additional, recommended" readings following the assigned readings for each week's seminar meeting. The purpose of the recommendations is to help you (assuming that you are a PhD student in political science) assemble a reading list as you prepare for the qualifying exams in the comparative and IR subfields.

Course Schedule and Reading List

Week 1 (March 31): the past and future of the field

- David Lake, "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review," *Review of International Organizations* 4 (2009): 219-44.
- Jonathan Kirshner, "The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative," *World Politics* 67, 1 (Winter 2015): 155-83.
- Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, "Introduction: The Case for Constructivist Political Economy," in Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons, eds. *Constructing the International Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010): 1-19.
- Stephen C. Nelson and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Uncertainty, Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2008," *International Organization* 68, 2 (Spring 2014): 361-92.
- Kathleen McNamara, "Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE," *Review of International Political Economy* 16, 1 (February 2009): pp. 72-84.
- Penny Griffin, "Refashioning IPE: What and how gender analysis teaches international (global) political economy," *Review of International Political Economy* 14, 4 (2007): 719-36.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

- Benjamin J. Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History* (Princeton University Press, 2008).
- Susan Strange, "International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect," *International Affairs* Vol. 46, No. 2 (1970), pp. 304-15.
- Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) (esp. chapter 4, "The Study of International Political Economy").
- Mark Blyth, ed., *The Handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation* (New York: Routledge, 2009).
- Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa Martin, "International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions," in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (W.W. Norton, 2002).
- Special issue of *Review of International Political Economy* ("Not So Quiet on the Western Front: The American School of IPE") 16, 1 (February 2009): pp. 1-143.
- Adam Przeworski, *States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Joseph Stiglitz, "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (November 2000): pp. 1441-78.
- Frank Dobbin, "The Sociological View of the Economy," in Dobbin, ed. *The New Economic Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004): pp. 1-48.

Week 2 (April 7): int'l policy coordination and macroeconomic adjustment

- John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36, 2 (Spring 1982): pp. 379-416.
- Charles P. Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, 2 (June 1981): pp. 242-254.
- Michael Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy," *World Politics* 61, 1 (January 2009): pp. 121-54.
- Kathleen McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998): pp. 1-23; 43-71; 143-58.
- Henry Farrell and John Quiggin, "Consensus, Dissensus, and Economic Ideas: Economic Crisis and the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism," *International Studies Quarterly* (forthcoming).
- Frank R. Dobbin, "The Social Construction of the Great Depression: Industrial Policy during the 1930s in the United States, Britain, and France," *Theory and Society* 22, 1 (1993): 1-56.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

- Michael C. Webb, *The Political Economy of Policy Coordination: International Adjustment since 1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995)
- Stefanie Walter, *Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- Beth Simmons, *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- Kenneth A. Oye, *Economic Discrimination & Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s* (Princeton University Press, 1992).
- Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919-1939* (Oxford University Press, 1992).
- Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (University of California Press, 1986).
- Joanne Gowa, *Closing the Gold Window* (Cornell University Press, 1984).
- Harold James, *International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1996).
- Peter Temin and David Vines, *The Leaderless Economy: Why the World Economic System Fell Apart and How to Fix It* (Princeton University Press, 2013).
- Mark Blyth, *Austerity* (Oxford University Press, 2013).
- Daniel Drezner, *The System Worked: How the World Stopped another Great Depression* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Week 3 (April 14): what drives foreign economic policy openness? The case of the capital account

- Eric Helleiner, "Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back In," *Review of International Political Economy* 2, 2 (Spring 1995): pp. 315-42.
- David Andrews, "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, 2 (June 1994): pp. 193-218.
- Ilene Grabel, "The Political Economy of 'Policy Credibility': The New-Classical Macroeconomics and the Remaking of Emerging Economies," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 24, 1 (2000): pp. 1-19.
- Rawi Abdelal and Sophie Meunier, "Managed Globalization: Doctrine, Practice and Problem," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, 3 (April 2010): pp. 350-67.
- Stephen C. Nelson, David A. Steinberg, and Christoph Nguyen, "Does Democracy Promote Capital Account Liberalization?" unpublished paper (March 2017).

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

- Barry Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital* (Princeton University Press, 1996).
- Rawi Abdelal, *Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance* (Harvard University Press, 2007).
- Jeffrey Chwieroth, *Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization* (Princeton University Press, 2010).
- Geoffrey Garrett, "The Causes of Globalization," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, 6/7 (August/September 2000): pp. 941-70.
- Jeffrey Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45, 4 (September 1991): pp. 425-52.
- Jeffrey A. Winters, "Power and the Control of Capital," *World Politics* 46, 3 (April 1994): pp. 419-452.
- Richard Deeg and Mary O'Sullivan, "The Political Economy of Global Finance Capital," *World Politics* 61 (October 2009): pp. 731-63.
- Mark Blyth, "The Political Power of Financial Ideas: Transparency, Risk, and Distribution in Global Finance," in Kirshner, ed. *Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
- Sebastian Karcher and David A. Steinberg, "Assessing the Causes of Capital Account Liberalization," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 1 (2013): pp. 128-137
- Dennis P. Quinn and Carla Inclán, "The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, 3 (July 1997): pp. 771-813.
- Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz, "Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 4 (2007): pp. 703-720.

Week 4 (April 21): the puzzle of trade policy preferences

- James Alt et al., "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry," *Comparative Political Studies* 29, 6 (December 1996): 689-717.
- Edward Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety," *International Organization* 63, 3 (2009): 425-457.
- Benjamin Fordham and Katja Kleinberg, "How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?" *International Organization* 66 (2012): 311-328.
- Steven K. Vogel, "When Interests Are Not Preferences: The Cautionary Tale of Japanese Consumers," *Comparative Politics* 31, 2 (1999): 187-207.
- John S. Ahlquist, Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi, "Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle," *International Organization* 68 (Winter 2014): 33-75.
- Cornelia Woll, *Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008): pp. 1-38.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

- James Ashley Morrison, "Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization," *International Organization* 66 (Summer 2012): 395-428.
- Michael Hiscox, "Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade," *International Organization*, Vol. 55, 1 (Winter 2001): 1-46.
- Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59, 1 (Winter 2005): 107-43.
- John S. Odell, "Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis," *World Politics* 43 (October 1990): pp. 139-67.
- Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
- Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
- Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Protection for Sale," *American Economic Review* 84, 4 (September 1994): pp. 833-50.
- Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2001): pp. 267-292.
- Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade," *International Organization* 60 (Spring 2006): 469-98.
- Andy Baker, "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 4 (2006): pp. 924-938.

Week 5 (April 28): sovereign borrowing and creditworthiness

Michael Tomz, *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007): pp. 3-9; 14-28; 86-113.

Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003): pp. 1-51.

Timothy Sinclair, *The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): pp. 1-20; 50-71.

Natascha van der Zwan, "Making sense of financialization," *Socio-Economic Review* 12 (2014): 99-129.

Marieke De Goede, *Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005): pp. 1-46.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," *International Organization* 57 (Winter 2003): pp. 3-42.

Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49 (1989): pp. 803-32.

David Stasavage, *States of Credit: Size, Power, and Development of European Polities* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

Fiona McGillivray and Alistair Smith, *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change* (Princeton University Press, 2008).

Marc Flandreau and Juan Flores, "The Peaceful Conspiracy: Bond Markets and International Relations during the Pax Britannica," *International Organization* 66 (Spring 2012): 211-41.

Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann, eds., *Other People's Money: Debt Denomination and Financial Instability in Emerging Market Economies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Vinod Aggarwal, *Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Julia Gray, *The Company States Keep: International Organizations and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Andrew C. Sobel, *State Institutions, Private Incentives, Global Capital* (University of Michigan Press, 1999).

Week 6 (May 5): varieties of capitalism

- Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985): pp. 17-79.
- Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2 (2001): pp. 1-69.
- Peter Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-68.
- Ben Ross Schneider, *Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America: Business, Labor, and the Challenges of Equitable Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014): pp. 1-40; 139-59.
- Christopher A. McNally, "Sino-Capitalism: China's Reemergence and the International Political Economy," *World Politics* 64, 4 (2012): pp. 741-776.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

- Peter A. Hall, *Governing the Economy: the Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (Oxford University Press, 1986).
- Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Alexander Hicks and Lane Kenworthy, "Varieties of Welfare Capitalism," *Socio-Economic Review* 1 (January 2003): 27-62.
- Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, eds. *The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison* (Cornell University Press, 2005).
- Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds. *National Diversity and Global Capitalism* (Cornell University Press, 1996).
- Orfeo Fioretos, *Creative Reconstructions: Multilateralism and European Varieties of Capitalism after 1950* (Cornell University Press, 2011).
- Kathleen Thelen, "Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 137-59.
- Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich, "Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science* 39, 3 (July 2009): pp. 449-482.
- Mark Thatcher, "Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World," *Comparative Political Studies* 37, 7 (2004): pp. 751-780.
- Mark Zachary Taylor, "Empirical Evidence Against Varieties of Capitalism's Theory of Technological Innovation," *International Organization* 58 (Summer 2004), 601-631
- John L. Campbell, "The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons for Theories of Institutional Complementarity," *Socio-Economic Review* 9 (2011): pp. 211-34.
- Andreas Nolke and Arjan Vliegthart, "Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe," *World Politics* 61, 4 (October 2009): pp. 670-702.

Week 7 (May 12): developmental and anti-developmental states

Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the Political Basis of Agricultural Policies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981): pp. 11-29; 96-105.

Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991): pp. 1-6; 19-26; 29-41; 72-121.

Alice H. Amsden, "The Wild Ones: Industrial Policies in the Developing World," in Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds. *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 95-118.

Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater, "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective," *International Organization* 59 (Spring 2005): pp. 327-61.

David C. Kang, "Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in Korea," *International Organization* 56, 1 (Winter 2002): pp. 177-207.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Anne O. Krueger, "Government Failures in Development," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4, 3 (Summer 1990): pp. 9-23.

James A. Robinson, "Theories of 'Bad Policy'" *Journal of Policy Reform* 1 (1998): pp. 1-46.

Nicolas van de Walle, *Africa and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: the Politics of Growth in Newly Industrialized Countries* (Cornell University Press, 1990).

Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed. *The Developmental State* (Cornell University Press, 1999).

Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization* (Princeton University Press, 1990).

Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton University Press, 1995).

Vivek Chhibber, *Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialization in India* (Princeton University Press, 2003).

Week 8 (May 19): old and new perspectives on economic development

Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review* 60, 2 (May 1970): 231-36.

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, 3 (Summer 1993): pp. 51-69.

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91, 5 (2001): pp. 1369-1401.

Lant Pritchett, "The Cliff at the Border," in Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence, eds. *Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010): pp. 263-86.

John Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus,'" *World Development* 21, 8 (1993): pp. 1329-36.

Dani Rodrik, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?" *Journal of Economic Literature* XLIV (December 2006): pp. 973-87.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics* (MIT Press, 2002).

Albert O. Hirschman, "The Rise and Decline of Development Economics," in *Essays in Trespassing* (Cambridge University Press, 1981): pp. 1-24.

Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

Herman Schwartz, "Dependency or Institutions? Economic Geography, Causal Mechanisms, and Logic in the Understanding of Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 42 (2007): 115-35.

Carles Boix, "Democracy, Development, and the International System," *American Political Science Review* 105, 4 (November 2011): pp. 809-28.

Week 9 (May 26): commerce and political conflict

- Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1945 [1980]): pp. 3-40.
- Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 87, 2 (1993): 408-420.
- Jonathan Kirshner, *Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007): pp. 1-30, 154-202.
- Dale Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War* (Princeton University Press, 2014): pp. 1-51.
- Stephen G. Brooks, "Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace," *International Organization* 66, 4 (October 2013): pp. 863-88.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic

- Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security* (Princeton University Press, 2005).
- Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Gains," *International Security* 21:1 (Summer 1996): pp. 147-75.
- Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *International Security* 18, 2 (Fall 1993): pp. 125-53.
- Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War," *International Security* 20, 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41.
- Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," *International Organization* 55, 2 (Spring 2001): pp. 391-438.
- Patrick J. McDonald and Kevin Sweeney, "The Achilles' Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era," *World Politics* 59, 3 (April 2007), pp. 370-403.
- David M. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," *International Organization*, 53, 2 (Spring 1999): pp. 195-232.
- Michael Mousseau, "The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace," *International Security* 33, 4 (Spring 2009): 52-86.
- Jonathan Kirshner, *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- Kevin Narizny, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).