When the Second Dimension Comes First:
Culture-First Forces and the Politics of Social Provision

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Abstract: The recent ascendance of xenophobic parties has been labeled a global “populist” wave by scholarly and popular treatments. This label, however, allows few analytical insights about the policy ideas these groups bring to national political systems. We introduce the alternative concept of culture-first forces: political groups that prioritize “second-dimension” (cultural) preferences over “first-dimension” (economic) issues. What types of governance positions are adopted by such forces? The answer, we argue, is contingent on the sequencing of key factors in a model of culture-first statism that we illustrate through a comparative historical analysis of two cases in leading western democracies: white southern Democrats in the U.S. and the Front National in France. Each dramatically shifted its first-dimension positions to pursue its second-dimension priorities and eventually championed different social provision regimes. This paper identifies the sequence of welfare statebuilding and social diversification as important to explaining divergent economic position-taking by culture-first forces.

Keywords: culture-first forces, populism, social diversity, racial threat, group rivalry, party politics, social provision, diminished welfare state, culture-first statism, sequencing, political development.
Recent high-profile electoral surprises have rocked some of the world’s most stable democracies: among them, the nomination and election of Donald Trump, the success of the Brexit referendum, and the failure of either mainstream party to advance to the most recent French presidential run-off. When coupled with victories by norm- and constitution-violating candidates elsewhere, these results have been interpreted by political scientists and popular audiences alike as a global “populist” wave.

Accordingly, scholarly attention to the concept of populism is on the rise. As one review essay recently observed, “populism is sexy” (Rooduijn 2019), with the label being applied to a variety of emerging groups, parties, and candidates that “range across the political spectrum from extreme left to extreme right” (Lee n.d.:2, citing Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2018). Often described as a “thin” ideology (Freeden 1998; Mansbridge and Macedo, 2019; Mudde 2004), the term can be so inclusive as to be “easy to confuse with related concepts,” and most treatments show significant “reluctance in giving the concept any precise meaning” (Rooduijn 2019: 365; Laclau 2005:3). Some scholars go so far as to call populism “a form of claim-making, a style of political communication rather than an ideology” (Mickey 2017), while others argue that its emergent transnational patterns are better explained as epiphenomena of the urban-rural divide and as primarily sociological or interest-driven rather than ideological (Maxwell 2019; Ogorzalek 2018; Rodden 2018).

As a result, this inclusive but fuzzy category can present more analytical confusion than insights into what policy and political ideas these groups introduce to the political systems they touch. This is likely one reason why many contemporary analyses of populism focus on its potential existential threats to liberal democratic procedures and constitutional stability: rather
than examine what these parties bring to the table, such assessments focus on the (admittedly real) danger that they will flip the table right over (Lee n.d.; Lieberman et al. 2019). But short of a reconstitution or revolution, studying these groups only for their potential anti-democratic effects restricts our assessments of the types of economic or cultural ideas these groups are likely to champion, how they might shape important areas of policy under current party systems, and what consequences they have for our discipline’s existing theories of partisan, policy, and ideological politics.

In this article, we suggest an alternative conceptual approach: one that takes seriously the ideological priorities held by many groups placed under the populist mantle. To some extent, the scholarship on populism already does this, though it does not follow this thread to the end. Many recent treatments by leading scholars narrow their scope to a subset of groups identified as “right-wing populists” reminiscent of pre-World War II fascist parties (see e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2017). However, continually settling for the inherited, ideologically “thin” concept of populism to describe actors like Trump, Le Pen, and UKIP does not capture the intuitively thick

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2 We believe these illiberal, antidemocratic impulses are serious and urgent. But if this populist wave persists as a long swell, it is important to analyze these groups’ likely roles within democratic systems and governing institutions (see e.g. Bimes and Mulroy 2004). One of our cases, the American South, illustrates how one such group has persisted for decades within a durable constitutional framework and radically transformed its nation’s politics. In any case, we are reluctant to theorize much about these (or any) groups’ role in putative post-democratic constitutional orders; party politics in such contexts is often either trivial or fully deterministic of political outcomes.
ideology of nationalism, xenophobia, and chauvinism that drives many of their public appeals. In this article, we also deliberately focus on groups like these, but build on this work by developing theory about how these groups link their ideological priorities to their policy proposals, and what role they are likely to play in current party systems. In doing so, we seek to advance three main points.

First, we draw a distinction between populists and an overlapping but conceptually distinct category of groups we call *culture-first forces* (CFFs). These are political coalitions that prioritize cultural issues located on what political science typically calls the “second” dimension of politics, rather than those on the economic “first” dimension. Culture-first forces need not be populist, though most of the populist victories of recent years to attract scholarly interest are, fundamentally, culture-first forces. Until recently, political science has largely neglected these forces, in part because they are often seen as marginal players in national politics. Indeed, it is their prioritization of cultural politics, which does not fit the materialist and economic concerns that figured centrally in so much of 20th Century political conflict and political analysis, that often relegates them to the political periphery. These cultural positions—maintained even at the risk of broad social condemnation and electoral inviability—have kept some of these forces in the political wilderness for decades, yet they have not compromised much on them.  

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3 Culture-first forces need not be culturally conservative, though most electorally-organized CFFs appear to be devoted to culturally conservative positions. While most accounts of party behavior focus on the tendency toward vagueness on potentially divisive cultural issues (Bräuninger and Giger 2018; Rakove 1975; Rovny 2013), we want to explain these perplexing instances of clarity and emphasis.
prioritizing the second dimension, these culture-first forces present puzzling new objects for scholars accustomed to prioritizing the first.

Second, we argue that by analyzing these groups from a culture-first perspective, we can begin to assess their likely policy effects on not only second-dimension issues, but first-dimension, as well. Like many scholars, we agree that the first-dimension politics of resource distribution are important. But we also agree with the growing body of literature suggesting that economic and cultural ideologies are not as orthogonal as their “dimensional” construction implies. We therefore draw on existing research on the political economy of diversity and the politics of social provision to model the likely economic position-taking of culture-first forces in light of their cultural priorities (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2009). We demonstrate that when culture comes first causally, as well as rhetorically, it also shapes position-taking on the economic dimension.

Finally, in contrast to much of the literature on the political economy of diversity, we argue that this “interdimensional” relationship between cultural and economic politics is contingent on the political setting in which it unfolds. We adopt a developmental approach and propose a model of culture-first statism that emphasizes the policy context in which culture-first forces formulate their first-dimension politics. We find that these forces’ positions on economic issues depend on the sequencing of key factors: chiefly, social diversification and the institutionalization of a welfare state. We illustrate this model with brief case studies of long-lived culture-first forces in two leading western democracies: white southern Democrats in
the U.S. from the 1920s-60s, and France’s Front National since its founding in the 1970s.⁴ We find that in order to prioritize their second-dimension concerns, these forces learned to be flexible on the first, and continuously adapted their economic positions to serve their cultural agenda in their national political systems over time.

**Why Culture First?**

Assessing the ideological content of populism has been an insoluble puzzle -- Mansbridge and Macedo (2019) chronicle conceptual confusion dating back at least five decades. Empirically, identifying a group as populist provides little information about what policy ideas it is likely to embrace, and the clearest theory of populists’ economic policy effects is based on cases that are not comparable to the current European-American wave (Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin 2013). Figure 1a, which displays European parties’ estimated ideological positions in two-dimensional space, illustrates this point: populists are as ideologically heterogenous as non-populists, maybe more so.⁵

Why, then, are contemporary analysts so dedicated to a concept that is evidently of so little conventional analytical utility? A closer read of the recent scholarship on populism suggests that it is not populists *per se* that animate most of the discussion, but a subset of parties that are

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⁴ The Front National is now “Rassemblement National.” We use “Front National,” as the events we analyze took place before the name change.

⁵ In this paper we employ a convention that estimates actors’ positions on ostensibly orthogonal economic (first-dimension) and cultural (second-dimension) issues in two-dimensional ideological space.
often identified as right-wing or authoritarian, appear likely to undermine democratic procedures (Lee n.d.), and attract support from culturally conservative, economically precarious, socially alienated, or xenophobic segments of the electorate (Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Mayer 2018). Far from ideologically “thin,” these groups typically articulate a viscous, often vicious, brand of cultural politics rooted in xenophobic nationalism and illiberal policies. In common parlance, many groups are identified as right-wing populists mainly because of their conservative cultural positions, not their economic positions, which span the first dimension. We adopt the alternative concept of a culture-first force to clarify this distinction.

6 These traits are neither universal among nor unique to populist movements. Mansbridge and Macedo (2019) carefully differentiate between 19th century U.S. Populists and Spain’s Podemos on one hand, and contemporary nationalist-populist parties on the other. Similarly, Inglehart and Norris (2017) restrict their analysis to the contemporary “right-wing” populist wave in Europe.
**Figure 1a (left):** Estimated Cultural and Economic Conservatism of European Party Platforms. **1b (right):** Estimated Importance of Cultural and Economic Positions in European Party Platforms. Higher values indicate more importance on that dimension.

The ideological thickness and emphases of this culture-first politics can be observed empirically in Figure 1b, which plots experts’ assessments of the importance that each European party places on its cultural and economic platforms. If populists were thinly ideological, we would expect them to be concentrated in the lower-left quadrant, with few clearly articulated or dearly held ideological positions. The Italian 5-Star Movement, led by a comedian who mocks elites but espouses few policy specifics, fits the bill. But as we can see, most parties, including those called populist, articulate clear ideas on at least one dimension. Furthermore, the pattern of populist parties’ ideological clarity is not dissimilar to that of non-populist parties, though more are clustered at the top-left.

Parties classified under the populist label, in other words, do not lack ideologies; they simply do not share one pattern of ideological views or priorities as a cohesive group. Some, including Spain’s Podemos and the personalist-communist splinter group, La France Insoumise, clearly define and emphasize their positions on both cultural and economic issues. Yet, while scholars of populism implicitly include all the highlighted parties dispersed across Figure 1b in their analyses, the bulk of the alarmed analytical attention focuses on those clustered in the top-left hand quadrant. The Front National, Alternative for Germany, and UKIP are in this group; were the U.S. included in the CHES, Donald Trump likely would be, as well. These

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7 See Online Appendix A for details on the databases and the variables employed here.
forces’ messages are consistent and coherent on their actual priorities--cultural issues--while remaining inconstant or inscrutable on the economic dimension. This pattern of ideological consistency (on the second dimension) and flexibility (on the first dimension) is what makes these groups culture-first forces, and if we call them by their name, we can better theorize about their effects on the national political systems in which they operate, and examine what happens when the second dimension comes first.

Diversity, Culture-First Forces, and Social Provision: A Model of Culture-First Statism

Shifting our analysis from the “thin ideology” of populism allows us to observe the thick ideology of cultural issue prioritization shared by many of these groups. Most importantly, we can investigate the ways ostensibly independently-formulated positions in the conventional two-dimensional political space relate to one another, and what factors structure culture-first forces’ positions on their less-prioritized economic platforms. In this section, we present a model of how two salient factors--social diversity and existing social provision policy regimes--are likely to affect the economic policy positions taken by culture-first forces.

Group Rivalry and the Diminished State

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8 A concept that does not limit itself to a subset of populist groups allows comparisons with other non-populist groups who also prioritize second-dimension politics over the first, like U.S. southern Democrats.
Cultural issues are often treated as secondary to the “central” modern governance concerns of political economy. As modern democracies become more diverse in their social bases and multicultural in their internal politics, however, scholars are paying increased attention to how social diversification (both in terms of levels of diversity, and how rapidly that diversity changes over time) interacts with other elements of political systems to shape individual attitudes, political opportunities, and policy outcomes. The prevailing evidence suggests, for instance, that social diversity causes outgroup antipathy among members of the dominant group and inhibits public decision-making (see Enos 2017; Habyarimana et al. 2009).

These responses to increased social diversity can shape policy preferences on both dimensions of politics. The well-known “group threat hypothesis” argues that individual-level intragroup homophily and intergroup antipathy are each made more intense by the proximity and salience of an “other” (Blalock 1967; Enos 2017). At the system level, this intergroup tension can increase incentives for political elites to make anti-egalitarian appeals (Hajnal and Abrajano 2016; Kaufmann 2004; Key 1949), as evidenced by the culturally anxious, anti-immigrant, and white supremacist contemporary political rhetoric expressed by many culture-first forces.

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9 The received wisdom emphasizes the first dimension as rhetorically, developmentally, or mathematically prior to the second. Frank (2004) and others offer Marxian arguments that economic interests are truer than cultural values; Inglehart (1977) characterizes cultural politics as largely a conflict over post-material values; and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) infer that race and regional issues within American political economy are part of an intermittent “secondary” dimension.
While it may be intuitive that cultural transformation drives changes in cultural politics, the relationship between diversity and the ostensibly orthogonal economic dimension of politics is less obvious. One extensively theorized version of (what we term) the diminished state hypothesis contends that social diversification undermines the provision of public spending and public decision-making (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Putnam 2007; Sombart 1976). This might result from coordination problems between different groups, or preference divergence on economic issues (Habyarimana et al. 2009). But the most intractable challenge, from a governance perspective, is the group rivalry politics that can stem from feelings of group threat. 10 Group rivalry politics can affect first-dimension policies of social provision in (at least) two important ways. First, it can undermine the amount or character of public goods provision. Under conditions when group rivalry is activated by diversity, groups are less likely to want to share public goods with others or trust the other group to participate in its provision (Alesina et al. 1999; An, Levy, and Hero 2018; Putnam 2007). Especially when group identities are salient, the dominant (i.e., most numerous, politically powerful, or economically advantaged) group may opt to provide fewer public goods, or provide them to themselves as exclusionary private goods and use policy to reinforce these boundaries (Huber and Stanig 2011; Jones-Correa 2000; Trounstine 2018).

10 Group rivalry is the most difficult of these challenges to overcome because it derives from at least one group’s aversion to collaborating with the other group. Alternatively, coordination challenges can be ameliorated by elite-level power brokers who develop trust across cultural divides (Burns et al. 2009; Ogorzalek 2018), and preference-divergence challenges by an inclusive logroll across groups (Trounstine and Rugh 2011).
Second, group rivalries can inhibit the development of redistributive policy. When group identities are salient and between-group inequality is high, the party system itself is more likely to organize around group identities that reinforce class divides (Huber 2012). Under these conditions, even when public support for redistributive policies in principle is strong among the dominant group, class-based redistribution through welfare state-type interventions can be framed and understood as intergroup redistribution from the dominant to subaltern group (Gilens 2000; Mendelberg 2001; Piston 2018). Indeed, diverse societies tend to redistribute less and provide fewer public goods, especially when between-group inequality is high (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Baldwin and Huber 2010).

Despite these findings, many studies of the diminished state are not specific about the agents that drive diminished social provision policy as diversity or between-group inequality rises. For the most part, they estimate average relationships across comparable polities with different levels of diversity and social provision. But connecting the cultural to the economic is not an automatic process; rather, it must be done by political actors. Culture-first forces can play this role, linking reactions to diversity with potential changes to public policy by articulating what a politics of group rivalry looks like, and advocating for economic policy that limits cross-group sharing and maintains intergroup hierarchies. In other words, if the central thread of the diminished state literature is correct, we should expect to see culture-first forces reliably oppose statist social provision programs.

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11 This relationship between the politicization of group identities and between-group inequality appears to vary across electoral systems (Huber 2012).
However, while the purported challenges that diversity presents to governance and social provision are compelling, this relationship is also not inevitable or empirically invariant. Research has found that the relationship between diversity and a diminished state may be: weaker on average than initially estimated; moderated by the effects of political organizations capable of overcoming diversity challenges; trivial when considered alongside other factors that promote statist interventions; or variable across policymaking venues (Boustan et al. 2013; Hopkins 2011; Ogorzalek 2018; Trounstine and Rugh 2011). With these insights in mind, we argue that the process by which second-dimension politics get connected to first-dimension politics -- work that is performed by political actors like culture-first forces operating within concrete strategic contexts -- demands examination.

**Sequencing and Social Provision**

We argue that there are under-appreciated yet very important factors that systematically moderate the connections made between social transformation, second-dimension cultural politics, and first-dimension economic politics. Most analyses supporting the diminished state hypothesis, for instance, are cross-sectional or experimental in nature, and focused on ultimate policy outcomes rather than the political paths that lead to them. Likewise, most comparative-historical treatments of the development of first-dimension policy, especially outside the U.S. context, do not examine the role played by second-dimension politics (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Kenworthy 2003). These two parallel areas of inquiry have

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12 Diversity and culture-first forces are not the only factors that shape economic policies. Overall levels of social wealth, inequality, business power, globalization, constitutional form, and many other factors are also important (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Stepan and Linz 2011).
remained largely disconnected from one another, and yet, there is much to be gained from a developmental approach that centers how cultural priorities are translated into economic positions in different national contexts.

How, then, do the politics of social provision develop in rapidly changing societies? We complicate the diminished state hypothesis using tools distinctive to the study of political development: *timing* and *sequence*. While “time-sensitive” perspectives are useful in many areas of policy study, comparative sequencing approaches are *especially* crucial for understanding the first-dimension politics of social provision policies in democracies. As studies of policy feedback argue, social provision policies are likely to generate new constituencies of support that make them particularly sticky and resilient to efforts to undo or even modestly reform them (Palier 2004; Pierson 1994). Even culture-first forces navigating the effects of group rivalry politics may be loathe to eliminate such policies if potential supporters are unwilling to surrender public benefits that they already enjoy -- a species of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

Thus we theorize that the *sequencing* of the emergence of politically-salient increases in social diversification and the establishment of a robust social provision policy regime will affect how culture-first forces engage with their political system’s first-dimension politics.

Figure 2 illustrates our *model of culture-first statism* and highlights the importance of taking not only the presence, but the comparative sequencing, of key factors of interest into account. In the figure, the horizontal axis depicts the operation of the group rivalry mechanism: increased diversity prompts enhanced group consciousness, which in turn increases the salience of the second-dimension priorities of culture-first forces for members of the majority group. The key interaction occurs at the second arrow in the culture-first statism model, where CFFs develop
a set of political economy positions. According to the diminished state model, we would expect culture-first forces to oppose intergroup sharing and cross-group redistribution, and advocate for limited social provision. However, the vertical axis moderates this step by allowing a nation’s existing political economy politics to shape a CFF’s economic positions. If the group rivalry mechanism is initiated (by a salient rise in diversity) after the entrenchment of a national system of social provision, culture-first forces will be less likely to take anti-provision economic positions. Instead, culture-first forces in such contexts will strategically adjust their first-dimension positions in order to advance their core cultural goals. Our model and case analyses focus on the three central boxes with dashed borders in Figure 2. These important stages connect the key associated inputs (diversity) and outputs (social provision) that feature prominently in the diminished-state literature (e.g. Alesina et al. 1999) and captures how intentional political actors and the organizations (including CFFs) that support them provide a mechanism driving the politics of the diminished state.

13 Importantly, the economic positions of culture-first forces are ultimately integrated into the wider interparty political system and contribute to the discussion and development of national social provision policy.
Driven by the perceived peril of racial threat and an enduring interest in maintaining the racial order, culture-first forces prioritize a clear policy agenda on second-dimension issues, subsequently choosing first-dimension policies that support those priorities. These CFF economic positions may appear arbitrary because they vary across different political contexts, but we argue that they are far from it. Rather, these economic positions are structurally contingent on the political systems in which they operate and are therefore analytically tractable. Below, we examine two important cases to consider how the sequencing of key factors in the culture-first statism model -- increased diversity, existing social provision policy regime, and culture-first forces motivated by group identities and second-dimension social politics -- can lead to divergent outcomes across national political contexts.

**Figure 2:** Model of Culture-First Statism, with the Diminished State Model for comparison.
**Culture-First Forces in Action: Two Cases, Profonde Differences**

The following cases illustrate the social provision politics of two culture-first forces: white southerners in the U.S. and the Front National (FN) in France. These culture-first forces merit comparison because they are longstanding groups that have existed within established democracies for decades, both shaping and being shaped by those party systems. As such, they can shed light on the likely trajectories of more recently emergent parties and groups activated by social change in other nations. In these two cases, the cultural “threat” generated by salient diversity has affected first-dimension politics in different ways. In the U.S., white southerners, preoccupied with racial supremacy since the nation’s founding, were primarily a marginal force in national politics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, while more “primary” first-dimension conflicts played out in rapidly modernizing areas elsewhere.14 During the New Deal era, however, white southern representatives played a pivotal role in national first-dimension policymaking, siding with economically liberal non-southern Democrats on some issues and with conservative Republicans on others. Prompted by second-dimension opposition to the mid-20th century civil rights agenda, white southerners ultimately switched parties and adopted first-dimension policy positions at the extreme Right of the nation’s political spectrum,

14 Despite a folksy twang, southern white political elites were not generally considered populists. While more politically heterogeneous than often inferred from their “Solid South” reputation, most southern leaders are more aptly described as bourbon elite than rabble-rousing populists, and as de-mobilizers rather than mobilizers of popular political action. Successful exceptions, like Louisiana’s Huey Long, demonstrate this contrast.
while maintaining their conservative cultural priorities, especially on racial issues. As a result, the American political system as a whole has responded to this shift and remains a conservative outlier among its peers on labor policy, welfare provision, and state planning policy.

In France, the Front National traced a different path. Similar to white southerners, the FN originated in extreme-right cultural grievances linked to the end of French colonialism and modestly increased immigration from non-European former French colonies. While the FN initially took anti-statist positions on the first dimension, their position shifted left over time. The FN came to articulate this combination of cultural conservatism and welfare chauvinism as a republican defense of *la France Profonde* (the mythic, unchanging “true” French character found mainly in the countryside), and their gains in rural areas over recent electoral cycles suggest this message resonates. The FN’s prioritization of second-dimension politics allowed flexibility for a rearticulation of the party’s ideology that coincided with a strategic shift on the first dimension -- but in the opposite direction than that taken by the American South. In each case, the culture-first force shifted its first-dimension position while maintaining its cultural priorities. Though they shifted in opposite directions on first-dimension policy, these shifts were not arbitrary -- they served political goals that would advance each CFF’s cultural priorities. We discuss each case briefly in turn, with attention to the development of key elements of the culture-first statism model: diversity, culture-first force articulation of group rivalry politics, and an existing social provision regime.

**White Southerners and the Diminished American State**
The U.S. provides an archetypal case for observing culture-first statism in action; after all, many of the theories of diversity and state provision were developed and tested in American contexts. It will come as no surprise that the U.S., especially relative to its western-democratic peer group, has always been characterized by salient social diversity, and the intensity of its racial conflict has ranged from “clear and problematic” to “existentially urgent.” We focus on a long-lived culture-first force based among white southerners. During the New Deal, when faced with Democratic co-partisans whose policy positions threatened the white supremacist racial order, this faction changed not only its partisan alliances but also its position on first-dimension economic issues, playing a pivotal role in reshaping the party system and shifting the nation’s political economy to the Right. Today one should not try to explain the relatively enfeebled American welfare state, and its lack of attention to reducing economic inequality, without an account of this culture-first force in U.S. politics.15

Race and other forms of diversity have always been important elements of American political development, and southern whites in particular have prioritized their regional racial hierarchy (Bateman, Katzenelson, and Lapinski 2018; Frymer 2017; Graber 2006; King and Smith 2005, 2011; Lieberman 2001). At times this meant efforts to nationalize that hierarchy, and at

15 Throughout our analysis, we refer to statism primarily in terms of welfare state provision and the size of the common weal. Scholars of American politics note that the U.S. state is not “diminished” in all respects--in particular, the security, policing, and carceral dimensions of American state activity are overdeveloped in racialized ways (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Gottschalk 2016; Soss and Weaver 2017). These observations are consistent with our narrative of social provision politics.
others it meant establishing, insulating, and preserving the South’s distinctive social order.\textsuperscript{16} For our analysis, the crucial insight is that second-dimension political issues were salient in the U.S. well before the New Deal era and could therefore inform 20th-century efforts to expand the welfare state and social provision.

While federal and subnational institutions made fledgling, irregular efforts at social provision in earlier decades, the largest-scale interventions in the economy by the federal government began in the New Deal era. Most notably and durably, the 1935 Social Security Act created a range of quasi-European style welfare programs; policies like the 1935 Wagner Act and the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act restructured the playing field between capital and labor; and the income tax was dramatically expanded, providing the resources necessary for expanded public provision. Likewise, the expansion of the regulatory state during this period brought a wider range of economic activities under the purview of federal officials. The subsidization of the private housing market, the creation of public housing programs, massive urban infrastructure and countercyclical employment projects, and huge national programs to modernize (and expand to all regions) transportation, energy, communications, and military infrastructure developed under New Deal programs.

At every turn, however, this expansion of state activity was subject to the scrutiny, amendment, or veto of a bloc of southern representatives whose priority remained the defense of

\textsuperscript{16} This observation is not meant to trivialize the oppressive force of racial politics in other areas of the country (see e.g. Sugrue 1996), nor to assert that southern whites were only white supremacists and that racial politics played out uniformly throughout the South (Key 1949).
white supremacy and the maintenance of status quo second-dimension politics. The “solid”
American South had long pursued this goal through clear policy positions on cultural issues, but
also via position-taking on economic issues important to achieving their cultural priorities. Even
before the New Deal, the region’s segregated accommodations regime was ideologically opposed
to intergroup sharing, but not necessarily social provision itself. This malign model of
separate-and-unequal national public provision was subtly incorporated into the structures of
many New Deal policies.

The New Deal social policy regime was thus contained by a “southern cage” of
second-dimension priorities: one in which southern Democrats, as senior members of the new
majority party, leveraged their new positions of institutional authority to achieve their
preferences and threatened to undermine the whole project if white supremacy was not given
precedence (Katznelson 2013). To retain southern support, New Deal policymakers built
ostensibly race-neutral, but foreseeably exclusionary measures into many of their programs.
Among the most consequential were carve-outs excluding labor sectors often reserved for
African Americans from worker protections, access to unemployment, and old-age insurance;
and delegating benefits administration to local officials prepared to carry out discriminatory
objectives (Katznelson 2005; Lieberman 2001; Weir 1988). When granted these concessions,
southern Democrats welcomed federal largesse. The nation’s least developed region, after all,
stood to benefit from the New Deal programs’ massive interventions. Unlike Republicans, who

17 Southerners consistently defied attempts at racial egalitarianism and by the wartime period of
the 1940s began to vote distinctly enough on these issues that a mathematically-derived “second
dimension” emerges from an analysis of roll call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1997).
remained well to the right of center on the first-dimension continuum, the white South did not ideologically oppose interventionist economic policy, at least at first, as long as that policy was compatible with their second-dimension priorities.

Over time, this exclusionary model of public provision was replaced with a different approach. Over the latter half of the New Deal period, southerners began to “defect” from the Democratic leadership’s positions and established a recurring, formidable conservative coalition with Republicans that blocked or amended legislation on facially-unrelated first-dimension policies that posed a threat to the maintenance of the white-supremacist racial order (Katznelson and Mulroy 2012). The policy breadth of this coalition expanded over time from the beginning of the New Deal period through the 1940s: on issue after issue, southern Democrats became more likely to side with Republicans and block or hamstring significant policy priorities of the economic Left. Perhaps the most powerful of these coalitional “defections” were the late-1940s revisions of New Deal labor law, which dismantled labor protections to workers’ detriment (Farhang and Katznelson 2005).

Over time, this coalition recurred enough to reveal a clear shift to the Right among white southerners on economic issues. These trends are reflected in Figure 3, which displays average estimates of legislator ideology (i.e. DW-NOMINATE first-dimension scores) in three congressional voting blocs over time: southern Democrats, non-southern Democrats, and non-southern Republican representatives. While southern representatives began quite close to their Democratic co-partisans on the economic dimension, they gradually drifted to a position

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18 There were no nonwhite southerners in Congress during this period (and few in the electorate), and white southerners were overwhelmingly Democratic.
about equidistant from the other two voting blocs. In fact, even as non-southern Democrats and Republicans both shifted to the economic Left over time, southern representatives shifted rightward on economic issues.¹⁹

**Figure 3:** First-dimension (“economic”) DW-NOMINATE scores, 1933-1964, bloc averages by congress. Positive values interpreted as conservative.

¹⁹ These trends should be interpreted as illustrative rather than precisely descriptive.

DW-NOMINATE scores are widely-used and provide an analytically conservative illustration of our point. More refined analyses that focus on political economy votes and/or relax the measures’ linear-change assumption to estimate ideology from roll calls suggest NOMINATE scores likely underestimate an abrupt rightward shift by southern Democrats on economic issues during the 1940s (Bateman, Katznelson, and Lapinski 2018; Caughey and Schickler 2016; Katznelson and Mulroy 2012). The white South was consistently far to the Right of the other blocs on the “race-region” DW-NOMINATE second dimension during the extended New Deal era.
Over time, southern whites, in an effort to preserve their region’s racial hierarchy, adopted more conservative positions on first-dimension politics. As civil rights activists developed and carried out campaigns to overturn institutional discrimination and achieve full recognition of civil rights under the law, this culture-first force abandoned public social provision. Most dramatically, in response to landmark court decisions and legislation outlawing *de jure* segregation, some southern jurisdictions responded by simply eliminating (rather than integrating) public goods. Virginia closed its public schools, and communities created quasi-private segregation academies. Nashville closed its public pools for three years. In the face of strong intergroup antipathy and a new political and social system that was no longer likely to accommodate their demands for racial exclusion, the American South changed and solidified its position on first-dimension economic issues, adopted a working model of diminished goods provision, and worked to dismantle (what was left) of the American welfare state.

Southern whites, as a culture-first presence during this era, were initially a peripheral, sectional force, a Lost Cause remnant far removed from the center of political conflict on the national stage. Over time, however, this group’s second dimension racial appeals grew in national popular appeal, spreading to other quarters of the nation. For instance, when Strom Thurmond broke from the Democratic Party to run for president in 1948, he won several southern states outright, but few votes anywhere else in the nation; his oversteered defiance of the Democratic civil rights platform was of limited appeal outside the old confederacy. In 1968, however, after the successful passage of national civil rights and voting rights bills, George Wallace carried a similar ideological cultural profile and message into his own third-party
campaign. Like Thurmond, he ran first in the Deep South. But unlike Thurmond, he averaged a “respectable” eight percent in counties outside the South, even as Nixon himself began to experiment with the Republican party’s new “Southern Strategy.”

The presence and power of this culture-first force was not only a precursor to the New Deal era policy considerations of social provision, but continued to influence the politics of social provision through the rest of the century. As the Republican Party increasingly partnered with the South, Republicans’ prioritization of economic liberalism was combined with the South’s prioritization of the maintenance of the racial hierarchy to craft a set of ostensibly race-blind assaults on racial equality and redistributive social policy (Chen 2009; King and Smith 2005, 2011). These appeals, along with party-building on the ground in the region’s rapidly growing suburbs, helped make inroads into the white southern electorate over time (Black and Black 2003). Civil rights protections were rebranded as onerous regulations or limits on individual liberty, and taxes and social programs were marked as means to finance the lifestyles of indolent, undeserving strangers very different from the modal taxpayer. We know from research on political communication and psychology that these appeals effectively make a double connection--they activate racial antipathy, racially code social provision programs, and thereby reduce support for such programs among the dominant white majority (Gilens 2000; Mendelberg 2001). These race-inflected anti-state appeals are of a piece with the efforts of southern Democrats to undermine these programs at their very creation, and the fragmented original design has continued to make attacks on them politically attractive. The ultimate policy change looks like a first-dimension shift, but it is driven and shaped by second-dimension concerns through a model of culture-first statism.
Over time, the cultural dimension of American political conflict fused with or even supplanted the economic dimension. White southern voters are now likely to support Republican candidates in national elections, and social context and attitudes on race are strongly predictive of party and vote choice across the nation (Hajnal and Abrajano 2016; Tesler 2016). This evidence suggests that views on economic issues are not primarily a question of divergent preferences, or benignly ill communication. Public opinion and lived patterns of residential choice continue to suggest that resource hoarding and aversion to intergroup sharing among white persons drives the dominance of culture-first statism in American politics (Enos 2017; Trounstine 2018). The American system of social provision is now largely organized around principles that include skepticism of statism, subnational control over public programs, and deference to a private sector with a penchant for discriminatory practices. This bears more than passing similarity to the principles articulated and strategies pursued by the white South decades ago under a different partisan banner.

**Resilient Republicanism in France**

The Front National (FN) was born in the 1970s as a minor protest party endorsing immigration restrictions and authoritarian law-and-order positions. Over time, it grew to be among the most successful culture-first forces in Europe (see e.g. Bréchon and Mitra 1992; Edo et al. 2019). Especially in recent election cycles, the FN’s strengthening presence in the waning industrial heartland of France’s northeast and its consistent national electoral support (of about 20 percent) have been notable. In this section we briefly discuss the party’s development as a culture-first force in French politics. By emphasizing second-dimension issues and explicitly denigrating first-dimension politics, the FN has broadened its electoral appeal without sacrificing
its actual core principles. In contrast to the U.S. case, however, this culture-first force has learned, over time, to respond to growing diversity in France not with proposals for the diminishment of social spending, but its maintenance.

The FN fit uncomfortably within the late 20th-century French political landscape. The constitutional disruptions and World Wars that hit France engendered a 20th century politics that was far less stable than the U.S. two-party system. The postwar Fourth Republic was particularly unstable, with 22 prime ministers in 12 years. De Gaulle’s dominant presence in the early Fifth Republic produced a politics difficult to assess in conventional left-right ideological terms. Gaullism paired the business-friendly boom of the *trente glorieuses* with significant elements of statist *dirigisme* and substantial welfare state provision. Culturally, the (almost) end of French colonialism and a wave of new immigration was coupled with a conservative emphasis on republican social stability and national self-assertion in both European and global affairs. Eventually, however, a more recognizable Left-Right dimension solidified, with socialists and center-right parties rotating in office or cohabitating since the late 1970s, and a range of de Gaulle-era policies enduring as part of a broad consensus.

Among these consensus elements is a belief in the strong role of the state in French life and in the importance of social protection to insure individuals against the forces of modern life. The framework for this welfare provision was established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (Smith 2003). Today, the French welfare state’s universality and connection to republican membership make it an “intrinsic part of French democracy” and an “integral part of...national identity” (Childers 2006:136; Dutton 2002:11). Once firmly established, the social
rights associated with the welfare state became part of a political consensus and are considered politically unassailable and a fundamental source of social solidarity.

Diversity came later. Like most European nations, France was overwhelmingly white and Christian through the early 20th century. The mass immigration policies begun as part of a postwar *populationniste* agenda encouraged arrivals from other predominantly Catholic European nations that were thought to be “more ethnically and culturally compatible” with the French way of life (Freeman 1979:55). As Dancygier (2007) notes, as recently as 1968, about 70 percent of immigrants to France arrived from elsewhere in Europe. Over time, non-Europeans came to constitute an ever-greater share of the new arrivals, introducing a modest but real degree of more intense and visible cultural difference into French republican life. Immigration from the former colonies of North Africa was particularly numerous, and by the early 1990s nearly one in ten persons in hexagonal France was either born in North Africa or the child of someone born there. Increased immigration from other former French colonies accelerated later but made a significant contribution to the total immigrant and French population as well. Today, immigration rates remain high. About 11 percent of French residents are either foreign-born or non-French citizens born in France (INSEE 2019). Because the EU has eased intra-European movement, Europeans are back up to 50 percent of new arrivals; however, immigration from outside Europe continues apace and there are now substantial numbers of first- and second-generation French citizens of North African, Sub-Saharan, and Southeast Asian descent (Lê 2019).^{20}

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^{20} The French government famously does not collect explicit racial statistics, but estimates affirm the quotidian impression that racial diversity has indeed arrived. Groups that might draw
As immigration has reshaped the visage of France, it has been politicized in ways consistent with culture-first politics. While mainstream parties have been uneasy with social transformation, they have not made immigration or the preservation of a nostalgic French identity central to their platforms (Dancygier 2007). The Front National, on the other hand, spent the 1970s and 80s at the political periphery taking extreme stands on these issues:

“Campaigning on fiercely nationalistic, anti-immigrant programs, the FN called for the forcible repatriation of all non-European immigrants, for a ban on all further immigration, and for a wholesale reform of France’s nationality laws. It warned of immigration’s role in eroding French values, identity, and unity…” (Dancygier 2007:246).

The FN’s founder and long-time leading candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, initially drew little support. He won less than one percent in the 1972 Presidential election, and even a decade later the FN did not field a candidate for the Assemblée Nationale in most areas, but was limited mainly to the Mediterranean Coast and the exurban departments near Île-de-France. By the mid-1980s, however, substantial gains in national percentages and wins in some local races made it apparent that the FN had tapped a vein among conservatives (Dancygier 2007).

This was an early turning point for the FN, as it nationalized its party base and established a real foothold as its core issue rose on the national agenda. Brechon and Mitra (1992:68), for instance, cite a 1984 poll finding that nearly 70 percent of French respondents favored “the prohibition of the entry of new immigrants into France.” However, this progress became a plateau. Its extreme, culture-first platform, coupled with the bad behavior, wartime xenophobic attention are particularly concentrated in the greater Paris region and Mediterranean coastal departments (INSEE 2019).
misdeeds, and habitually offensive rhetoric of Le Pen himself, made the FN anathema in mainstream circles until at least 2000. Even after Le Pen’s surprise success in the 2002 Presidential election, in which he ran second and advanced to the run-off, the rest of the public sphere quickly united to repudiate him, forming a *cordon sanitaire* around his candidacy and returning Jacques Chirac to office.

While the FN’s economic platform typically receives less attention, it was also an outlier during the party’s first years of growth. Figure 4 displays ideological estimates of the economic (first-dimension) and cultural (second-dimension) platforms of major French parties of the Fifth Republic.

**Figure 4:** Economic (first-dimension) and cultural (second-dimension) platforms of major French parties of the Fifth Republic. Conservative positions are more positive and each line represents a party’s estimated position on that dimension over time. The FN is tracked by the bold line. *Source: Manifestos Project.*

The French party system has not been terribly stable—in particular, conservative parties have come and gone and splintered in the wake of de Gaulle. Perhaps the *biggest* change in the
parties’ positions, however, is the economic shift of the FN. Initially, the party’s economic positions were vague “beyond a few broad corporatist references,” but by the late 1970s, the FN moved “decisively toward a free-market economic stance” that Le Pen characterized as a form of market-centric “Reaganomics,” calling for tax cuts, reductions in the welfare state, and even the abolition of the minimum wage, all while characterizing the unemployed as “parasites” (Shields 2007:189–9, 272). The party’s founders thus articulated an ideology to the extreme right on both cultural and economic issues (Ivaldi 2015; Lorimer 2018).

Over time, however, FN party leaders adjusted their positions to solidify their foothold among working-class voters. These shifts included calls to increase support for students and job training, industrial protectionism, housing subsidies for families, and a raise in the minimum wage. As shown in Figure 4, the FN’s economic positions have shifted steadily to the left since the mid-1990s and today are close to the mainstream Left parties (and to the left of President Emanuel Macron’s new En Marche (LREM) party by these estimates). This economic shift came at a time during which the FN was trying to shed its objectionable, peripheral past. Among other claims, FN leaders began to intimate that their ideology was new -- not part of the 20th Century first-dimension cleavage, but a kind of “third way” politics (Ivaldi 2012:109). FN youth director Samuel Marechal wrote the 1996 tract Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, Francais! (“Neither Left, Nor Right--French!”), arguing that first-dimension politics was outdated and the FN was a unifying force for France. Lorimer interprets that text as rooted in the “party’s monist understanding of politics and the rejection of political conflict as intrinsic to modern democracy” (2018:4). While a strong ideological position, it literally defied categorization on the conventional left-right economic continuum. Downplaying first-dimension conflicts gave the FN flexibility to engage in
strategic politics on its less-prioritized dimension while maintaining its extreme cultural positions.

The FN’s economic shift came in the 1990s as western governments took a distinct neoliberal turn. Across the industrialized world, governments attempted to reform the welfare state, with varying degrees of success. Even the French statist consensus was negotiated; all the mainstream parties’ platforms shifted rightward in the 1990s (see Figure 5, left panel). Most of these reforms were not generally popular, and in France the welfare state’s design and institutions generated a politics that was particularly resistant to retrenchment and reform, even relative to other nations (Palier 2004). These neoliberal goals generated new political conflict that raged between “governing parties in favor of reforms that would give them back some degree of system control and employee representatives [and] welfare ‘defenders’” (Palier 2004:103; Palier and Bonoli 1994).

Here is where the importance of sequencing plays an important role. This new terrain of economic conflict created a political opportunity for the savvy second generation of FN leaders (Shields 2007). As a culture-first force considered anathema even to the likeliest coalition partners on the Right -- and therefore possessing only a remote potential to engage in governance and policymaking on economic issues -- the party had a wide latitude to take new positions. Given the defining priority of their cultural vision for France, FN flux and ambiguity on the first dimension was not only understandable, it was a potential tool for broadening its appeal in the party’s increasingly proletarian base (Ivaldi 2015). While its economic positions formerly renounced statism as a way of freeing popular energies, Marine Le Pen now argues that in efforts to serve the people and rein in capitalism’s excesses, “the key is the State” (Ivaldi 2012:110).
Tacking to more popular positions, the FN economic platform shifted consistently to the Left, from neoliberalism to welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt 1995), and is now articulated in republican terms. Indeed, rather than simply observe that the FN is *ni droite, ni gauche* on the economic dimension, Marine Le Pen has explicitly located the FN’s apparent reversal on an alternative political dimension, “globalization vs. patriotism” (Lorimer 2018).

Prioritizing second-dimension politics has meant the FN can be more vague than other parties with respect to their commitments on the first dimension. To observe this, consider again the 2017 Chapel Hill Experts Survey, which asks experts to assess the clarity and salience of European parties’ positions on the two dimensions.

![Expert assessments of the clarity and salience of the economic and cultural French party platforms. FN positions circled for ease of visualization. Source: 2017 CHES.](image)

**Figure 5:** Expert assessments of the clarity and salience of the economic and cultural French party platforms. FN positions circled for ease of visualization. *Source: 2017 CHES.*

As Figure 5 demonstrates, the FN appears to place far less importance on its economic positions than other French parties; they are less clear and mostly less salient, with “economic
questions...long occup[ying] a secondary place in the ideology and communications of the party” (Ivaldi 2012:109). The FN’s first-dimension platform has become a heterodox mix of statist and free-market positions that provides the party wiggle room to pursue a more diverse range of voters for whom the party’s second-dimension positions are attractive, or at least not anathema (Afonso 2015; Ivaldi 2015; Rovny 2013; Shields 2007). Conversely, the right-hand panel of Figure 5 shows that the FN’s positions on cultural issues are both clear and salient (and consistently conservative, per Figure 4).

The FN’s economic shift coincided with a dramatic secular improvement of its overall public image, a broadening of its electoral base into new regions, and increased support in its original footholds (Gombin 2016; Ivaldi and Dutozia 2018; Stockemer and Barisone 2016). Marine Le Pen’s dediabolisation of the FN is often described as a softening of the party’s cultural stances to present a more “affable” face to the public (Ivaldi 2015). To some extent this is true; the party’s standard bearer is no longer a man who tortured Algerians, was convicted of hate speech violations, infamously minimized the Holocaust, and physically assaulted a female political opponent. But an examination of the FN’s platform also demonstrates that the party’s substantive changes have been not on its cultural politics, but its economic position-taking. Though the FN has not gained national leadership power, it now appears to be the most electorally stable party in a heavily fractured party system. In stark contrast to the U.S. account, politicized diversity did not lead to the abandonment of statism by culture-first forces. Linking their patriotic appeals to a well-entrenched system of universal welfare provision, the FN changed its position to advocate for the strengthening of the welfare state as diversity increased.
and its second-dimension concerns became most salient. How should we think about these different outcomes? In the discussion section, we contrast these cases directly.

**Discussion: Lessons for When the Second Dimension Comes First**

We draw several parallels and one major contrast between the FN and white southerners in the U.S. In each case, a political coalition preoccupied with group-based cultural politics was relegated to the periphery of a national conversation focused largely on the first-dimension politics of material distribution. In France, the FN was irrelevant at the polls, until it was not. In the U.S., southern leaders wary of “external” federal interference in their regional racial order only intermittently connected with national party politics until the shock of the economic depression brought southerners to a pivotal position in national policymaking. Context and sequencing are pivotal to this story: while the FN has learned that it must bend to first-dimension French politics to achieve its cultural goals, it is first-dimension American politics that has been bent to meet the cultural priorities of the American South.

These parties have pursued their culture-first goals within distinct institutional contexts. The diminished state outcome predicted by the extant literature on the political economy of diversity suggests increased racial diversity is likely to drive group rivalries and thereby undermine social provision. But in fact, the patterns observed in these cases are quite different. We argue that the sequence of welfare state establishment and group rivalry politics is key to explaining how these divergent political changes played out. In France, xenophobic appeals

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21 There are of course many factors that influence which positions a political party stakes out in its pursuit of office. However, structural explanations for state retrenchment common across
plateaued when they were coupled with proposals against a venerated welfare state. This happened even in the context of rapidly rising diversity--exactly the context in which racial threat and group rivalry mechanisms driving antipathy towards public provision are theoretically most likely to play out. But it was the FN’s leftward move on the first dimension that helped them break new ground outside their initial base and enter the top tier of politics. Despite an avowed effort to soften their political image via dediabolisation, the party only softened on the dimension they were less concerned about in the first place: the politics of economic redistribution. Regardless of why the party made this move, the fact that they did suggests that major welfare retrenchment is unlikely in France--or if it occurs, it will not be driven by the xenophobes. Their approach to this sector appears more likely to entail exclusion than reduction.

The U.S. story is quite different: culturally-preoccupied white southern political elites shaped and limited statism from the beginning, and eventually came to be its staunchest critics. The statist efforts of their northern co-partisans created a strange-bedfellows coalition until the South’s second-dimension priorities were dramatically threatened by civil rights legislation and social change. They foreswore interventionist economic policy and shifted hard to the economic Right (while remaining largely unchanged in their cultural positions) in order to defend racial hierarchy. Today it is very difficult to tell the difference between sincerely anti-statist and veiled racist appeals or reasoning in American political life. Tax rates have fallen, the common weal is running dry, public investment is stagnant, and even core welfare state programs (those that have nations, like neoliberalism or globalization, cannot explain instances when different culture-first forces move in opposite directions on the first dimension.
not been effectively racialized) are perennially on the chopping block. If those cuts occur, the cleaver will likely be held by this culture-first force.

What does this pattern -- one that suggests that culture-first forces will variably change their economic positioning in different political and policy contexts -- mean for our understanding of the “dimensionality” of political conflict?

First, in the U.S., the two dimensions eventually folded into one, with doubly liberal and doubly conservative poles. Racialized partisan polarization has come to color nearly all aspects of the American political system. This means that despite the fact that welfare retrenchment itself is quite unpopular in the broad public, it has become a priority not only of traditional small-state Republicans but also of CFF southern whites--and closely contested, polarized two-party competition keeps it perennially on the agenda. In France, the FN’s shift may be altering the dimensionality of party conflict (even if one declines Le Pen’s suggested globalist-patriot redefinition). As the popularity of the mainstream parties ebbs, every election is an adventure, and it is not clear how or if the FN’s shift may ultimately shape welfare state policies. These differences (sclerotic polarization in one case and chaos in the other), may of course be related to the countries’ different electoral institutions, but they also likely reflect the distinct ways in which culture-first forces shape and are shaped by the context provided by the larger political system around them.

Second, our developmental approach allows us to retain the use of dimensional analysis while using it in a new way. Because populists are so ideologically heterogeneous on cultural and economic issues, using populism to explain contemporary political events effectively introduces a third dimension that inhibits analysis of how these groups are likely to impact these
important policy areas in their respective political systems and unnecessarily limits the class of potential comparison groups. But by directing attention, instead, to assessing the ideological development of culture-first forces, this can help clarify the relationships between these ostensibly orthogonal ideological dimensions. For instance, we can avoid imposing false dimensional symmetry onto parties’ positions by assessing the way actors actually prioritize or make strategic trade-offs across those dimensions. A cross-sectional view of the FN in 2019 might lead one to believe that their hostility to immigration is a reluctant compromise to their dedication to solidaristic French republicanism and a ‘responsible if unfortunate’ approach to generous social provision. Only by examining their historic platforms can we see that xenophobia has been an enduring organizing principle and that they are willing to “adapt” their first-dimension program because it is a secondary political concern. Similarly with southern Democrats, who tolerated the “communistic” statism of the New Deal until the CIO started organizing black workers in Dixie.

Finally, in common parlance, many groups are identified as right-wing populists mainly because of their conservative cultural positions, not their economic positions. This is why we prefer the alternative language of a culture-first movement. Shifting our conceptual lens from populism to culture-first forces enables a clearer theorization of these groups not (or not only) in light of global trends in economic inequality, but as a response to a concurrent major social change underway in many western democracies: increased ethnoracial diversity. Such movements are likely to continue to be salient as western democracies become more diverse, with potential effects for many policy areas. Scholarly emphasis on these groups’ anti-elite appeals related to their (real) populist tendencies steers analyses toward rising inequality as their
cause, and toward first-dimension solutions as a potential remedy for those concerned about their anti-democratic tendencies. However, listening to these groups’ actual messages suggests that (xenophobic, ethno-traditionalist, racist) cultural views about changing demography are more central to their beliefs and goals, so clearly accounting for that reality will lead to different theories of their likely effects. Today, at least some culture-first forces express support for the welfare state and programs of workers’ rights against the most powerful elements of the capitalist class, while others oppose social provision, and still others are vague or obscure on such issues. Their cultural priorities do not appear to be as flexible. By clearly conceptualizing the politics of such groups, we can begin to observe the ways in which “new” ideology fits into or abraids against “old” policy and institutions, and reconsider how yesterday’s political systems shape tomorrow’s political conflict.

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\(^{22}\) In most cases, CFF conservative cultural positions appear to be more consistent than the selective attacks on elites or representation of the (narrowly-defined) common person that mark them as populists.
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Online Appendix A: Methodological Supplement

These materials are intended as a supplement to “When the Second Dimension Comes First: Culture-First Forces and the Politics of Social Provision.”

Identifying populist parties


CHES data

Figure 1a uses data from the CHES to illustrate parties’ positions and platform emphases in two dimensional ideological space. Those dimensions are “economic” and “cultural” positions. For economic issues, we used the measure of Left/Right economic positions:

\[ \text{LRECON} = \text{position of the party in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues.} \]

Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.

0 = Extreme left

: 

5 = Center

: 

10 = Extreme right

For cultural issues, we used the measure of “GAL/TAN” (Green-Alternative-Libertarian and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist), on a 0-10 scale:

\[ \text{GALTAN} = \text{position of the party in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often} \]
reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

0 = Libertarian/Postmaterialist

: 

5 = Center

: 

10 = Traditional/Authoritarian

We also used measures of respondents’ assessments of the clarity and salience of the parties on each dimension. For each of these variables, high clarity (high salience) is coded 10, low clarity (low salience) coded 0. These variables are:

LRECON_CLEAR
LRECON_SALIENCE
GALTAN_CLEAR
GALTAN_SALIENCE

Figure 1b shows the estimated “importance” of economic and cultural platforms for all European parties, with importance estimated as an average of “clarity” and “salience” as assessed by the 2017 CHES. These figures show the disaggregated aspects of importance, with clarity at left and salience at right. Because salience and clarity are highly correlated on each dimension (r=.70 on economic positions and r=.72 on cultural positions), the figures resemble each other and Figure 1b.
Manifestos Project Data

Figure 5 uses data from the Manifestos Project to illustrate platform changes by the Front National in France over time. The Manifestos Project goes further back in history and includes a broader range of nations (i.e., non-European nations) than the CHES to assess the positions of party platforms directly from their texts rather than based on expert opinion.

As a robustness check for Figure 1a, which shows the two-dimensional ideological heterogeneity of “populist” parties using the CHES dataset, this section replicates the analysis using analogous measures drawn from the Manifestos Project (see https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/). As in Figure 1a, non-populists are represented in grey, and populists in darker grey with accompanying party labels. For reference, the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. (both categorized as non-populists, and available in the Manifestos Project database but not in the CHES) are labeled in the figures as well. For parties that appear in
both the CHES and Manifestos datasets (all European, because CHES asks only about European parties), cultural and economic positions are correlated at \( r = 0.74 \) and \( r = 0.75 \), respectively. At right, the same figure is presented, but with only selected nations (U.S., France, U.K, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain -- all nations with recent culture-first or electoral populist victories) for visual clarity (note the altered scales in the two graphs).

These measures of platform ideology combine many related positions taken by the parties in a given year. Coders at the Manifestos Project assess these platforms qualitatively using statements and positions made by the parties, and quantitatively in terms of the amount of attention or emphasis devoted to the issue by each party. The economic and social measures used here and in Figure 5 employ the additive indexes suggested on the Manifestos Project website:

https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents/visualizations

Economy (State <-> Market):
\[(\text{per}401 + \text{per}402 + \text{per}407 + \text{per}414 + \text{per}505) - (\text{per}403 + \text{per}404 + \text{per}405 + \text{per}406 + \text{per}409 + \text{per}412 + \text{per}413 + \text{per}415 + \text{per}416 + \text{per}504)\]

Society (Progressive <-> Conservative): \[(\text{per}104 + \text{per}109 + \text{per}601 + \text{per}603 + \text{per}605 + \text{per}608) - (\text{per}105 + \text{per}106 + \text{per}107 + \text{per}501 + \text{per}503 + \text{per}602 + \text{per}604 + \text{per}607 + \text{per}705)\]

**NOMINATE Data**

In Section 4, we draw on DW-NOMINATE data from voteview.org to illustrate the first-dimensional rightward shift of southern white congressmembers. We also note that southern white congressmembers are now the most conservative members of each major party in the U.S. The following figures demonstrate that development over time, again using DW-NOMINATE scores over roughly two-decade intervals from 1933-2009.
Each figure represents the distribution of first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores by race-region and party of members of Congress: southern whites in either party (only present in significant numbers as Republicans after the Democratic party’s civil rights legislation of the 1960s) are represented with thicker lines.

Note the relative congruence of southern and non-southern Democrats at the outset of the New Deal, and the later rightward shift of the southern bloc. As more southern whites converted
to the Republican Party, they quickly became relatively conservative (on average), even before the largest party conversion, in 1994. Over time, southerners have remained as the right wing of that party, and possibly “pulled” their Republican copartisans to the right, as well, as they attained leadership positions within the party.