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The semantics and pragmatics of *and everything**

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Distinguishing between semantic and pragmatic factors in utterance interpretation is often problematic. The meaning of *and everything* is a case in point. Unlike the meaning of other set-marking tags (cf. Ball and Ariel 1978), the meaning of *and everything* is non-compositional. We propose that *and everything* instantiates a type of open proposition, obtained by replacing the entire conjunction with a variable. Semantically, *and everything* conveys only that the variable is to be instantiated by at least one other (typically unspecified) member of some inferrable set. However, in certain contexts the use of *and everything* may also generate an R-implicature (Horn 1984) to the effect that the proposition in question is true not only of *some* other member(s) of the set, but in fact of *all* members. In addition, the use of an L + H* pitch accent on *and everything* conveys that the anchoring constituent exemplifies a high value on some scale; which particular scale is evoked is inferrable from the anchoring element itself and the context.

1. Introduction

While the interpretation of every utterance will draw on both semantic and pragmatic factors, distinguishing between the two is not always straightforward. A case in point is the class of conventional implicature, as illustrated in (1), where *but* is used to conventionally implicate that some type of contrast exists between the conjuncts:

(1) My parents were poor but honest.

The place of such implicatures in linguistic theory is problematic, in that they are neither truth-functional (i.e. prototypically semantic) nor entirely context-dependent (i.e. prototypically pragmatic). Even if a boundary between the semantic and pragmatic domains could be agreed upon, however, it may

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nonetheless be difficult to determine on which side of the boundary a particular aspect of utterance meaning falls.

For example, in (2) it would seem that the meaning of *and everything* is straightforwardly compositional, i.e. determined by the semantics of the lexical items *and* plus *everything*.

(2) A: Oh no! It looks like it's going to rain. We'd better bring in all the food from outside.

B: Ok. You get the burgers and drinks. I'll get the chips and everything.

While clearly the *everything* of *and everything* in (2) does not mean literally 'everything' (even if restricted to some specified universe of discourse), it might appear that the *everything* includes all members of some inferrable set of snack foods. That is, it would be quite odd for B to, say, bring in the tortilla chips and pretzels, but leave behind the popcorn.

We will argue in this paper, however, that the meaning of *and everything* is in fact *non-compositional*, while at the same time contributing to the truth conditions of the utterance. Consider the example in (3):

(3) All the kids were there. We had to bring balloons, and cookies and everything. (Associated Press Newswire, 1989)

In (3), use of *and everything* does not seem to convey that the kids had to bring with them every member of some relevant set (e.g. the set of party items). Instead, we propose that (3) is true just in case *some* other member(s) of a contextually-determined inferrable set had to be brought. However, in certain contexts, e.g. (2), the use of *and everything* may generate an R-implicature (Horn 1984) to the effect that the proposition in question is true not only of (the referent of) the constituent to which *everything* is conjoined, which we term the 'anchoring constituent', but also of all other members of the inferrable set.

2. Previous studies

Ball and Ariel (1978) include *and everything* within a larger class of non-interchangeable tags sharing a common function, which is "to suggest, without specifying, other conjuncts or disjuncts similar in some relevant respect to the preceding" (1978: 36). They include in this class such tags as *or something*, *or what have you*, *or anything*, *et cetera*, *and stuff*, *and so on*, and so on. Dines (1980) similarly includes *and everything* within a group of so-called 'set-marking tags' which, she argues, are stigmatized as working-class speech. Dines assumes that these tags, including *and stuff*, *and stuff like that*, *or*

anything, and *or something*, inter alia, represent variants of an underlying variable whose theoretical basis is a common function, that of “marking the preceding element as a member of a set”, or, more specifically, cueing the listener to “interpret the preceding element as an illustrative example of some more general case” (1980: 21). As we will show below, in the case of *and everything* this characterization is overly general; while we will show that *and everything* does in fact mark the preceding conjunct as a member of a set, it is not the case that the conjunct is necessarily illustrative of the entire set in question, nor need it be true that the set itself represent a “more general case” of the conjunct in question. Consider (4):

- (4) We may do some things with just keyboards or we may do a full-blown big band arrangement with horns and everything. (Associated Press Newswire, 1989)

Here the speaker doesn't seem to be conveying that the entire set of big-band instruments will be used, of which horns is an 'illustrative member'; rather, s/he is conveying only that horns and some unspecified other big-band instruments will be used.

Moreover, as noted by Ball and Ariel (1978), the tags in question are not interchangeable within the same context; consider the examples in (5)–(6):

- (5a) Ms. Andrus said the check was in surprisingly good condition. “It had the stub on it and everything,” she said. (Associated Press Newswire, 1988)
- (5b) Ms. Andrus said the check was in surprisingly good condition. #“It had the stub on it and stuff like that,” she said.
- (6a) Roger Boisjoly wrote letters, and some of them used pretty strong language like “catastrophic results” and stuff like that, and yes, I was aware of all those letters. (transcripts from the Presidential Commission on Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 3/19/86)
- (6b) #Roger Boisjoly wrote letters, and some of them used pretty strong language like “catastrophic results” and everything, and yes, I was aware of all those letters.

In (5), use of *and everything* is felicitous, while use of *and stuff like that* is not. Conversely, in (6), use of *and stuff like that* is felicitous, while use of *and everything* is not.

Given that Dines' various 'set-marking' tags are not interchangeable, it is not clear that they are best dealt with as sociolinguistically conditioned realizations of a single underlying discourse function. Instead, an examination of our corpus suggests that *and everything* has a distinct meaning and discourse function.

3. The meaning of *and everything*

Our analysis of over 600 naturally-occurring tokens suggests that the meaning associated with *and everything* is more constrained than has previously been proposed. Observe first that the meaning of *and everything* is not compositional.¹ Although the truth-conditional meaning of *and* – i.e. logical conjunction – is clearly represented in the meaning of *and everything*, the meaning of the lexical item *everything* is not. For example, in (3) above, use of *and everything* does not convey that the kids had to bring with them every member of some relevant set (e.g. the set of party items), only that they had to bring something other than the mentioned balloons and cookies.

Instead, we propose that *and everything* instantiates a type of open proposition, obtained by replacing the entire conjunction (i.e., *and everything* plus the anchoring constituent) with a variable. Use of *and everything* conveys that the variable is to be instantiated by at least one other (typically unspecified) member of some inferrable set (cf. Ball and Ariel 1978, Dines 1980).² To illustrate, consider (7):

(7) We may do some things with just keyboards or we may do a full-blown big band arrangement with horns and everything. (= (4))

First, we obtain the open proposition by replacing the meaning of the conjunction *horns and everything* with a variable, as in (8):

(8) We may do a full-blown big band arrangement with X.

And everything, then, means that the variable is instantiable with at least one other member of some inferrable set of which ‘horns’ is a member, i.e. the set of band instruments. One plausible instantiation of the open proposition in (8) is given in (9):

(9) We may do a full-blown big band arrangement with horns and drums.

Thus, the speaker’s use of *horns and everything* conveys that not only horns

¹ In this sense, *and everything* seems to differ from *or something*, which Ball and Ariel 1978 argue is indeed compositional.

² While the set is inferrable, the relevant member need not be. In this sense, *everything* in this expression, while morphologically definite, is cognitively indefinite. Therefore, *and everything* can felicitously occur in *there*-sentences, which have also been argued to be sensitive to information status rather than morphological status (Rando and Napoli 1978, Ziv 1982, Prince 1992). Consider (i):

(i) The party was pretty dull. There was beer and everything, but hardly any food.

Here, although the relevant set (alcoholic beverages) is inferrable, the particular members of this set that were present at the party are not; it is this cognitive indefiniteness that renders the use of *and everything* in (i) felicitous.

but also some other member(s) of the inferred set will be part of the planned big band arrangement. As evidence that this meaning is indeed truth-conditional, consider (10):

- (10a) They served beer at the party.
 (10b) They served beer and everything at the party.

Observe that (10a) and (10b) are truth-conditionally distinct; that is, if beer and nothing else was served at the party, (10a) is true but (10b) is false.

While the alternative instantiations of the variable need not exhaust the members of the set, they may remain unspecified for a variety of reasons (cf. Ball and Ariel 1978:41, Dines 1980:29), for example because they are irrelevant, unmentionable, inferrable from the evoked element, or simply unknown, as illustrated in (11a)–(11d), respectively:

- (11a) Shepard was in “tip-top” shape and had “worked out for over six months at least, running and everything,” to prepare for the academy, said his brother, Thomas Jr. (Associated Press Newswire, 1988)
 (11b) There was no indication Prasad also was bludgeoned, as first reports indicated, Riccio said. “With all the blood and everything, that’s the way it looked.” Riccio said. “The bullet apparently passed right through the head.” (Associated Press Newswire, 1988)
 (11c) I met Spike [Lee] and the fellows that were building. They had to take measurements for my house, corners, windows and everything. (Associated Press Newswire, 1989)
 (11d) They gave me a new terminal. [...] It’s a fancy one – NCD, it’s called. Big screen, with windows and a little mailbox and clock and everything. (EP to GW in e-mail, 3/3/92)

In (11a), it is not relevant what other forms of exercise resulted in Shepard’s “tip-top shape”, only that running did not exhaust the set. In (11b), use of *and everything* allows the speaker to avoid mentioning other possibly disturbing physical details of the bludgeoning. In (11c), the other parts of the house that had to be measured are clearly inferrable. Finally, in (11d), the speaker herself did not know what other special features the terminal had (as evidenced by her inability, when asked, to identify any).³ Of course, there may be any number of other motivations for a speaker to avoid specifying alternative instantiations of the variable; however, in all cases felicitous use of *and everything* requires that such instantiations exist and constitute members of a well-defined (and in principle enumerable) set.

³ Interestingly, this last example illustrates that the use of *and everything* may be felicitous even when neither the speaker nor the hearer can identify the set members in question.

Now we are in a position to account for the apparent infelicity of (6b). Given our analysis, the successful interpretation of *and everything* requires that the speaker believe that the anchoring NP is a member of a clearly defined, enumerable set (although, as we saw above in (11d), we need not be able to identify specific alternative members of that set, as long as we can characterize it). However, in the case of (6b), there is no such clearly defined, enumerable set; that is, in this context, *catastrophic results* does not readily lend itself to being interpreted as a member of a clearly defined set.

Interestingly, the interpretation associated with *and everything* can block a scalar inference that might otherwise have been drawn (Horn 1972, Hirschberg 1985, *inter alia*).⁴ Consider (3) above without *and everything*:

(12) All the kids were there. We had to bring balloons and cookies.

Here, one would be licensed to infer that the speaker was obligated to bring *only* balloons and cookies. However, with *and everything*, the speaker in effect cancels the scalar implicature that could have been associated with (12), and conveys that other items had to be brought as well.

In addition, the understanding conventionally associated with *and everything* may provide the lower boundary for a subsequent scalar inference, by limiting alternative instantiations of the variable to members of the inferrable set, as exemplified in (13):

(13) A: What do you think of John?

(13) B: Well, he's a good programmer and everything.

Here, the use of *and everything* allows the speaker to convey that John is a competent programmer (and possesses at least some other related computational skill). The context in this example licenses a subsequent Quantity-based inference to the effect that John's competence does not extend beyond programming (e.g. into the social arena).

4. *And everything* and the Hornian division of pragmatic labor

As we saw earlier in (2), the use of *and everything* can license an interpretation of exhaustiveness – i.e., an interpretation under which the *everything* of *and everything* includes *all* other members of the set in question. However, we

⁴ According to Horn (1972), a scalar inference is one drawn from a speaker's use of a 'scalar predicate', i.e. a predicate corresponding to a value on an entailment-based scale. When a speaker refers to such a value, the hearer is licensed to infer that it represents the highest value that the speaker can affirm while observing the Maxims of Quantity and Quality. All higher values, therefore, are inferred to be false or otherwise inappropriate.

have also seen that this interpretation falls outside the realm of truth conditions; moreover, since the exhaustive interpretation does not apply to all uses of *and everything*, it is not a conventional, context-independent aspect of meaning.

Thus, the exhaustive interpretation associated with *and everything* is neither compositional nor conventional, but rather a case of Gricean conversational implicature (Grice 1975). Indeed, this implicature satisfies all of Grice's diagnostics (as modified in Hirschberg 1985) for *conversational* implicature. First, note that the meaning of *and everything* is non-detachable, since a truth-conditionally equivalent expression, as in (14), retains the implicature.

- (14a) A: Oh no! It looks like it's going to rain. We'd better bring in all the food from outside.
 B: Ok. You get the burgers and drinks. I'll get the chips and everything. (= (2))
- (14b) A: Oh no! It looks like it's going to rain. We'd better bring in all the food from outside.
 B: Ok. You get the burgers and drinks. I'll get the chips and related items.

In both cases, one is licensed to infer that B will bring in *all* the snack foods.

In addition, this implicature is both cancelable (without contradiction) and reinforceable (without redundancy), as illustrated in (15a)–(15b), respectively:

- (15a) I'll get the chips and everything, but I won't be able to get the pretzels.
 (15b) I'll get the chips and everything, and in fact I'll get all the snack foods.

In (15a), the second clause felicitously cancels the implicature associated with the first, i.e. that the speaker would get *all* the snack foods; in (15b), the second clause felicitously reinforces this implicature. From this it follows that the interpretation of exhaustiveness sometimes associated with *and everything* constitutes a conversational implicature.

This conversational implicature can be analyzed as a type of Hornian R-inference. Horn's (1984) 'division of pragmatic labor' reduces the Gricean maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner (Grice 1975) to two competing principles. Briefly, the hearer-based 'Q Principle' is a lower-bounding principle, inducing upper-bounding implicata (thus, *John ate two apples* Q-implicates 'John did not eat four apples'), while the speaker-based 'R Principle' is an upper-bounding one, inducing lower-bounding implicata (thus, *John ate the brownies* R-implicates 'John ate all the brownies').⁵ In this way, a hearer of (11c) will infer that measurements were taken not only for the corners and

⁵ See also Levinson's (1987) related notion of I-implicature.

windows, but for all other stereotypical (hence inferrable) parts of the house as well. Thus, the inference associated with *and everything* is licensed by Horn's speaker-based 'R Principle': "Say no more than you must (given Q)"; that is, use of *and everything* may implicate that all other set members instantiate the variable of the open proposition as well, in a context in which the speaker does not need to enumerate them explicitly.

5. The role of pitch accent

Up to this point, we have ignored the role of intonation in the use and interpretation of *and everything*. An examination of our corpus reveals that oral tokens of *and everything* are typically produced with one of two intonational patterns, as exemplified in (16):

- (16a) I'm keeping the little table in my kitchen. My guests can sit there and have coffee and everything. (C.P. to G.W. in conversation, 8/25/91)
 (16b) They cleaned it up that night. They steam-cleaned it and everything! (discussion of maintenance staff's carpet-cleaning after a water pipe burst; A.W. to B.B. in conversation, 10/22/91)

While the use of the lexical expression *and everything* evokes a set, the intonation with which it is uttered may in addition evoke a scale and license certain inferences with respect to that scale. In the production of (16a), the tag was deaccented (i.e. did not bear a pitch accent), while in (16b), it was uttered with an L+H* pitch accent (Pierrehumbert 1980).⁶ In both cases, the speaker conveyed that the relevant proposition was also true of other members of some inferrable set (in (16a), perhaps, {eat danish, read the paper, chat ...}, and, in (16b), something like {vacuum, sweep, mop up ...}). However, when the tag is uttered with an L+H* pitch accent, an additional interpretation is induced. As noted in Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 1990, the use of this pitch accent evokes a salient scale. They observe that "The evocation of a salient scale plus predication can convey the effect of speaker commitment to the instantiation of the open expression with the accented item" (1990: 296).

The scale evoked by an L+H* pitch accent on *and everything* is distinct from the set evoked lexically by the use of the tag, and is the basis for the inference that the anchoring constituent exemplifies a high value on that scale. Thus, while in the deaccented (16a), 'have coffee' represents a more or less

⁶ Following Pierrehumbert (1980), we take pitch accents to be local minima or maxima in the fundamental frequency (F_0) contour. Pitch accents fall on some stressed syllables in an intonational phrase. In Pierrehumbert's system, there are six types of pitch accent in English: simple high (H*) and low (L*) tones as well as four combinations of these (L*+H, L+H*, H*+L, H+L*), differing in the relative position of tones and in the alignment of tones to stressed syllables.

arbitrary member of the set of kitchen-table activities, in (16b) the L+H* accent on *and everything* indicates that the anchoring VP is not an arbitrary member of the set of carpetcleaning methods. Rather, 'steam-cleaned' exemplifies a high value on some inferrable scale – in this case, the scale of DEGREES-OF-THOROUGHNESS, itself inferrable from the evoked set member.

To take another example, consider (17):

- (17) As for Thorson, he said, "We just knew he was up for it because of how good he was. He's going to be a Rhodes scholar and everything!"
(Associated Press Newswire 1989)

Here, the set evoked by the use of *and everything* might be {academic benchmarks}, of which 'being a Rhodes scholar' is a member, while the scale evoked by the (presumed) use of the L+H* intonation might be termed DEGREES-OF-ACADEMIC-ABILITY. It is important to note that, although the set evoked by the expression and the scale evoked by the intonation are in this case closely related, they are nonetheless distinct. While 'being a Rhodes scholar' is a member of the set of academic benchmarks, it is not itself a value on the scale DEGREES-OF-ACADEMIC-ABILITY; rather, it suggests a high level of academic ability, i.e., a high value on that scale.

Finally, contrast the use of an L+H* pitch accent in (18a), where a high scalar value is being exemplified, with the use of the same pitch accent in (18b), exemplifying a presumably non-high value:

- (18a) D: A hundred dollars an hour!
S: A hundred and ten, Dorothy – this guy's got the little beard and everything!
(discussion of psychiatrist's fees; "Golden Girls", 10/26/91)
- (18b) A: So, what does your new boyfriend look like?
B: # He's got the/a little beard and everything!

In the context in (18b), there is no basis for interpreting *a little beard* as corresponding to a high value on an inferrable scale; hence infelicity results. Note that B's reply in (18b) is fine with *and everything* deaccented.

Thus, use of the L+H* accent conveys that the anchoring constituent exemplifies a high value on some scale; which particular scale is evoked is inferrable from the anchoring element itself and the context. This scalar interpretation is distinct from the set-member interpretation conveyed by the lexical expression *and everything* independently of the intonation with which it is produced.

In summary, *all* instances of *and everything* lexically convey that the

proposition in question is true not only of the constituent to which *everything* is conjoined, but also of some other member(s) of an inferable set. Given the literal meaning of *everything*, the fact that the expression *and everything* needn't include *all* members of the inferred set indicates that *and everything* – while semantically still a conjunction – is nonetheless semantically non-compositional. The additional interpretation of exhaustiveness that is sometimes conveyed by *and everything* is due, we have argued, to a subsequent pragmatic inference and not to the semantic meaning of the expression. Thus, what might seem to be a case of a straightforward compositional meaning in fact displays an interesting interplay between semantics and pragmatics.

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