WILLIAM P. ROGERSON CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION:

B.A., Economics, University of Alberta, 1976Ph.D., Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 1980

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS:

Applied Micro-Economic Theory, Industrial Organization, Regulation, Cost Accounting, Telecommunications, Defense Procurement.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

2015-Present	Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Chair of Market Economics, Northwestern University
2015-Present	Director, Center for Business Institutions, Northwestern University
2007-Present	Research Director, Program on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy, Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Northwestern University
2001-Present	Co-Director, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Northwestern University
1990 – 2015	Professor of Economics, Northwestern University
2000-2015	Director, Program in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences (MMSS), Northwestern University
2009 – 2014	Chair, Department of Economics, Northwestern University

2009-2012	Harold and Virginia Anderson Teaching Chair, Northwestern University
1998-1999	Chief Economist, Federal Communications Commission (while on leave from Northwestern)
1996-1998	Chair, Department of Economics, Northwestern University
1989-1990	Olin Fellow, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago (while on leave from Northwestern)
1984-1990	Associate Professor of Economics, Northwestern University
1980-1984	Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University

HONORS, AWARDS:

Elected to Northwestern Associated Student Government Faculty Teaching Honor Roll for 2009-2010, 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2016-17.

Keynote Speaker at UBC Sauder School of Business 31st Summer Conference on Industrial Organization, Vancouver, BC, July 14-15, 2017.

Elected Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2017.

Keynote Speaker at CRESSE 11th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, Rhodes, Greece, June 30-July 4, 2016.

Keynote Speaker at FTC 8th Annual Conference on Microeconomics, Washington, DC, November 11-12. 2015.

Appointed to Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Chair in Market Economics, September 1, 2015.

Appointed to Harold and Virginia Anderson Teaching Chair, September 1, 2009 – August 31, 2012.

Keynote Speaker at European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) Workshop on Accounting and Economics, Bergen, Norway, June 22-23, 2006.

Elected Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1999.

Olin Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago, October 1, 1989 - June 30, 1990.

Household International Professorship in Economics, September 1987 - August 1989

Shelby Cullom Davis Fellowship, 1979

Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship, 1979-80

Earl C. Anthony Fellowship, 1976-77

Graduated from the University of Alberta with distinction, 1976

RESEARCH GRANTS:

Searle Fund For Policy Research, Research Grant, "Regulation of Interconnection Between Telecommunications Carriers in the Emerging Competitive Environment," June 2002-May 2004.

Smith Richardson Foundation, Inc. Research Grant, "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," March 1, 1993 - May 31, 1995.

NSF Grant SES-8906751, "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors," August 1, 1989 - July 31, 1991.

Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation Research Grant, "An Economic Analysis of Defense Procurement Regulations," June 1989 - December 1991.

NSF Grant IRI-8705477, "Contracting Under Asymmetric Information," July 1987 - December 1989

NSF Grant SES-8504304, "Moral Hazard, Reputation, and Product Quality," April 1985 - September 1987

NSF Grant SES-8320451, "Moral Hazard, Reputation, and Product Quality," March 1984 - March 1985

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Research Director, Program on Anti-Trust Economics and Competition Policy, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Northwestern University, September 2007- present.

Senior Fellow, Searle Center on Law Regulation and Economic Growth, Northwestern University, January 2007- present.

Co-Editor, *Economic Inquiry*, October 2007- December 2012.

Chair of Northwestern's Program Review Committee, September 2002 - June 2003.

Member of Northwestern's Program Review Committee, September 2000 - June 2003.

Member of Program Committee, Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC) September 2001-September 2003.

Member of Editorial Board, Review of Accounting Studies, September 1993 to December 2003.

Member of the Illinois Economic Policy Council, September 1999 to September 2000

Member of the Editorial Board, Journal of Industrial Economics, October 1995- Sept. 1998.

Editor, Defense and Peace Economics, January 1995 - December 1998.

Member of Editorial Board, Defense and Peace Economics, September 1991 - December 1998.

Consultant to: Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Institute for Defense Analysis, Logistics Management Institute, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), RAND Corporation, US Department of Justice.

PUBLICATIONS:

"Economic Theories of Harm Raised by the Proposed Comcast/TWC Transaction," in *The Antitrust Revolution*, 7th *Edition*, edited by John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, *forthcoming*.

"Vertical Mergers in the Video Programming and Distribution Industry: The Case of Comcast-NBCU," in *The Antitrust Revolution*, 6th Edition, edited by John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, 534-575.

"On the Relationship Between Historic Cost, Forward-Looking Cost, and Long Run Marginal Cost, *Review of Network Economics*, 10(2), 2011, Article 2.

"The Applications Barrier to Entry and Its Implications for the Microsoft Remedies: A Comment on Marco Iansiti and Greg Richards", with Michael L. Katz, *Antitrust Law Journal*, 75(3), 2009, 723-728.

"Inter-temporal Cost Allocation and Investment Decisions," *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(5), October 2008, 931-950.

"The LCAMR Missile: A Case Study," in Rick Antle, Froystein Gjesdal, and Pierre Jinghong Liang, eds., *Essays in Accounting Theory in Honor of Joel S. Demski*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2007, 251-282.

"Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic

Review, 93(3), June 2003, 919-926.

"The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, The Principle of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation," *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 2000, 119-147.

"Inter-Temporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives," *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(4), 1997, 770-795.

"The Economics of University Indirect Cost Reimbursement in Federal Research Grants," (with Roger Noll) in Roger Noll, ed., *Challenges to the Research University*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1997.

"Incentive Models of the Defense Procurement Process," in Keith Hartley, and Todd Sandler, eds., *The Handbook of Defense Economics*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1995, 309-346.

On the Use of Transfer Prices in DoD: The Case of Repair and Maintenance of Depot Level Reparables by the Air Force. Logistics Management Institute Research Report PA303RD2, January 1995, Logistics Management Institute, McLean, VA.

"Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 8(4), Fall 1994, 65-90.

"Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital Under Prospective Pricing," *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 3(1), Spring 1994, 7-52.

"Inefficiently Low Production Rates in Defense Procurement: An Economic Analysis," in Jim Leitzel and Jean Tirole, eds., *Incentives in Defense Procurement*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

"Optimal Depreciation Schedules for Regulated Utilities," *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, 4, 1992, 5-33.

"Overhead Allocation and Incentives for Cost Minimization in Defense Procurement," *The Accounting Review*, 67, 1992, 671-690.

"Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," *Review of Economic Studies*, 59(4), October 1992, 777-794.

Overhead Allocation and Incentives for Cost Minimization in Defense Procurement. RAND Research Report R-4013-PA&E, 1992, RAND, Santa Monica, CA.

"Incentives, the Budgetary Process, and Inefficienctly Low Production Rates in Defense Procurement," *Defence Economics*, 3, 1991, 1-18.

"Excess Capacity in Weapons Production: An Empirical Analysis," *Defence Economics*, 2, 1991, 235-250.

"Quality <u>vs</u>. Quantity In Military Procurement," *American Economic Review*, 80, March 1990, 83-92.

An Economic Framework for Analyzing DoD Profit Policy. RAND Research Report R-3860-PA&E, 1991, RAND, Santa Monica, CA.

Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation. RAND Research Report R-3635-PA&E, 1991, RAND, Santa Monica, CA.

"Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation," *Journal of Political Economy*, 97, December 1989, 1284-1305.

"A Comment on Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record," *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 6, Special Issue, Conference on "The Organization of Political Institutions", 1991, 155-166.

"Price Advertising and the Deterioration of Product Quality," *Review of Economic Studies*, 55, April 1988, 215-230.

"A Note on the Existence of Single Price Equilibrium Price Distributions," *Review of Economic Studies*, 54, April 1987, 339-342.

"The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Capital and Entry When Price Guarantees Quality," *Journal of Political Economy*, 95, August 1987, 797-809.

"Robust Trading Mechanisms" with Kathleen Hagerty, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 42, June 1987, 94-107.

"The First-Order Approach to Principal Agent Problems," *Econometrica*, 53, November 1985, 1357-1368.

"Repeated Moral Hazard," *Econometrica*, 53, January 1985, 69-76 (Reprinted in *The Economics of Contracts*, Patrick Bolton, ed., UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.)

"Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," *Rand Journal of Economics*, Spring 1984, 39-53. (Reprinted in *Economics of Contract Law*, Douglas Baird, ed., UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.)

"A Note on the Incentive for a Monopolist to Increase Fixed Costs as a Barrier to Entry," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 396, May 1984, 399-402.

"Consumer Misperceptions, Market Power and Product Safety," with Mitchel Polinsky, Bell

Journal of Economics, 14, No. 2, (Fall 1983), 581-589.

"Reputation and Product Quality," Bell Journal of Economics, 14, No. 2, (Fall 1983), 508-515.

"The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Bell Journal of Economics*, 13, No. 2, (Autumn 1982), pp. 391-401.

"Agriculture in Development: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," with Robert Bates, *Public Choice*, 35, (1980), pp. 513-527.

"Aggregate Expected Consumer Surplus As a Welfare With an Application to Price Stabilization," *Econometrica*, 49, No. 2, (March 1980), pp. 423-436.

BOOK REVIEWS:

"Review of *Economics for An Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz*, edited by Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, Ravi Kanbur, and Barry Nalebuff," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2005, forthcoming.

"New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications Regulation," (review of *Competition in Telecommunications*, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole), *University of Chicago Law Review*, 67, Fall 2000, 1489-1505.

"Review of *A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation*, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole," *Journal of Political Economy*, 102, 1994, 397-402.