soil types. By the turn of the twentieth century, the major debates had been resolved, although growers continued to look to the scientific community in Montpellier for direction in choosing suitable rootstock.

This book is interesting and very readable, but it is not the definitive history of phylloxera, for economic, social, and political factors are totally absent. Therefore, while the author looks for scientific reasons to explain the possible slow replanting in a particular region (nature of soil, problems of rootstock, etc.), he ignores whether it would have been actually profitable or not for the growers to do so. Likewise, the “level and quality of state intervention” may have been the key to fighting phylloxera, but the attitudes of peasants to respond to eradication programs (and therefore their success) depended much more on the level of compensation promised (183). In this book, as in much of the literature, the peasant grower is largely absent. Finally, as the author notes, phylloxera led to a new viticulture, but quite what this entailed is never really explained.

The strength of the book is therefore in the telling of the French story prior to 1900, and in particular the debates between scientists, growers, and institutions connected with the sector. It should be read not just by curious wine drinkers, but also by those with a serious interest in the history of plant disease and how communities respond to a major threat to their livelihood.

James Simpson

_Universidad Carlos III de Madrid_


Recently, historians have fastened onto “modernization” as a framework for understanding US relations with the developing world after the Second World War. Technocratic values, particularly as advocated by modernization theory, are said to have shaped the form and the content of US policymaking. Much of the writing on modernization,
however, has assessed its intellectual history and has said surprisingly little about the actual projects that the United States sponsored. We are fortunate to have two studies, by Nick Cullather and David Ekbladh, that follow the story of US-led development, mainly in Asia, over the course of the twentieth century, both focusing as much on what US actors did as on what they said they would do.

A major achievement of both works is to connect postwar development policy to its prewar precursors. For Cullather, the “ideals of modernization” had taken shape by the beginning of the twentieth century (41). Following Wilbur O. Atwater’s 1896 invention of the calorie as a uniform measure of the content of previously incommensurable foodstuffs, experts could look abroad and see countries that were not just different, but measurably deficient. As the world was rocked by a series of international crises, the countable lack of resources in the global South became a matter of urgent concern for the United States. Development became, in effect, a numbers game—a race to outpace hunger by raising the nitrogen content of soil, increasing the caloric content of rice and wheat, and irrigating and covering more acres with improved plant stock. Left out of the equation, of course, were matters that did not lend themselves readily to numerical assessment such as the quality of food, the structure of property relations, and the maintenance of cultural traditions. But once the “world food problem” had been registered, US aid officials had a hard time focusing on much else, and thus Cullather traces a continuous arc from the relief campaigns of World War I to the Green Revolution in Asia in the 1960s (14).

Ekbladh, similarly, finds the modernization complex in embryonic form well before the United States had much official business in Asia. But for Ekbladh the core of the enterprise was not eradicating hunger as much as it was launching large-scale, multipurpose, state-led development projects, specifically along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The TVA is, for Ekbladh, “a grand synecdoche,” standing for the US style of development “both domestically and internationally” (8). If the image of modernization for Cullather is a sheaf of genetically engineered dwarf wheat, representing technical expertise, for Ekbladh it is a hydroelectric dam, representing technology lashed to the power of the central state. Focusing frequently on the top-down aspects of development, Ekbladh includes chapters on occupied South Korea, where the government’s modernization campaign served as a “proving ground” for US economic
assistance, and Vietnam, where the deterioration of Lyndon Johnson’s attempts to build a “TVA on the Mekong” represented a larger failure of the modernization ideal (114).

Although both authors identify modernization as a thread connecting the proto-development efforts of the interwar period to the full-blown ones of the 1960s, they differ in how much power they ascribe to it. Ekbladh, who believes that the modernization impulse was the core of a consensus of developers after the TVA, finds strong continuities between different moments in development history. Even during the 1950s, when officials seemed noticeably indifferent to modernization despite their active engagement with the global South, Ekbladh explains that the torch of modernization was kept aloft by a sort of government-in-waiting composed of experts who took jobs with international institutions, foreign states, religious organizations, and philanthropic foundations, when they could not find them in the Eisenhower administration. It is a creative turn on Ekbladh’s part, and it opens up the topic by introducing a new set of actors and institutions. Cullather, who is more attentive to the varieties of development, explores two other government campaigns during the 1950s: community development and land reform. Cullather identifies these as “transitional” forms of development that did not fit perfectly with the model of statist modernization and for that reason have generally been overlooked by historians. In drawing attention to them, Cullather suggests that the imagination of US policymakers may have been more capacious than we had previously registered.

Despite their occasional disagreements, the two books work well together, in part because the differences in emphasis between them means that there is surprisingly little overlap as Cullather traces the road to the Green Revolution and Ekbladh follows the trail of the TVA. These two routes to modernization only converge with the full flowering of modernization theory in the 1960s and then, in the 1970s, with its disintegration. The range of material covered in these two accounts suggests that there is much more to learn as we uncover the history of development.

Daniel Immerwahr
Columbia University