Ties that Bind: City Delegations in Congress

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Abstract

Situated in a vulnerable position within the federal system, cities and their leaders are consistently faced with formal restrictions and logical constraints on policymaking options. To represent their distinctive governance preferences and pursue “city interests,” cities and their leaders often find it necessary or at least strategic to operate at higher levels of government. Among other strategic imperatives, voting cohesion in favor of a city position is imperative for policy success at these higher levels; however, cities—like other places only moreso—are home to a multiplicity of voices and political perspectives on the issues that divide the polity; they are often deeply divided. Given such divisions, how can a city represent itself cohesively in higher levels of government, in pursuit of the strategies above, which might make city governance more possible? In this paper, I theorize two local institutions that have fostered urban unity in higher-level legislative voting: the municipal border and the traditional party organization. Using congressional roll call data and measures of local institutional (and constituency) affinity, I find that each serves to integrate political representation across districts, and enhances cohesion among representatives despite high levels of potentially conflict-generating heterogeneity.

Reader’s Note: This is largely an excerpted chapter from a book project in progress. In the subsequent chapter I demonstrate that the features of “city delegations” was especially important for the development of civil rights liberalism within the (non-southern) Democratic party throughout the “urban interlude” of the 1930s-1950s, and contributing to the mid-century party schism and realignment of subsequent decades. Earlier, the book chronicles the historical trajectories of big-city representation in the House—the rise to the national agenda of city issues, the development of an increasingly cohesive, and increasingly partisan, bloc of big-city representatives, and the subsequent development of a full urban-rural continuum that defines national partisan and ideological politics.

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1 Cities in a Polity

Large cities create distinctive demands for governance in a wide range of areas. Density, heterogeneity of all kinds, and overall size all make cities different than other kinds of political communities, so we are never surprised that urban-rural rivalry has long been a powerful element of political conflict in the United States. In almost all states and at the national level, a partisan gap has developed between urban and rural constituencies. The effects of density, heterogeneity, and size are likely to be particularly powerful in key areas in which governments attempt to intervene in economic matters—redistribution of resources, provision of public goods, and regulation of economic actors. However, there are many reasons that local action alone will be insufficient for effectively supplying the tools to resolve these local governance challenges. Faced with the formal restrictions on policymaking at the state level and logical constraints derived from inter jurisdictional competition, cities and their leaders often find it necessary or at least strategic to represent their distinctive governance preferences and pursue “city interests” at higher levels of government.[1]

Representing a city interest in higher-level politics presents its own challenges, however. First, city representatives rarely constitute an outright majority, so they must attract allies and work within coalitions. Second, urban interests often face a high degree of hostility from non-urban representatives or constituencies, making city issues potentially quite contentious.[2] Thus the “city” position on many issues may face many hurdles to enactment. Most analysts agree, however, that for cities to effectively pursue urgent governance needs at higher levels, a basic strategic imperative is for unity in a city delegation on behalf of some position. This has been observed for a long time. For instance, in a 1930 treatise on “The History and Theory of Lawmaking by Representative Government,” Rep. Robert Luce

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[1] See, for instance, Peterson (1981). Though Peterson argues specifically about redistributive policies, would-be regulators or providers of public goods may face a similar logic.

[2] This dynamic is obvious in state legislatures, where urban-rural conflict is often quite sharply defined, and where hostile out-state interests often antagonize city interests; it is a weaker, but nonetheless important, dynamic in national politics.
(R-MA) wrote that

...the great increase of effective force which comes from the election of a large number of representatives of one city—representatives who represent, not, in fact, their separate districts, but the whole city, representatives who are responsible to the same public opinion, and, in fact represent but one combined interest of the citizens of the city—the great accumulation of power created by that combination so far outweighed the effective power of a great number of scattered representatives of widely divided centers of population, small centers of population, that a difference in the ratio... went but a small way toward equalization.3

Luce was less convinced than his rural colleagues of this alleged unity’s overwhelming power, but the argument remained compelling decades later, when in debate over the implementation of “one-person, one-vote” rules for representation following the Supreme Court’s rulings in *Baker v. Carr* and *Reynolds v. Sims*, Rep. John Vorys (R-OH) observed that “those of us who have served in the state legislature know of the power that is more than numerical that goes with the organization of the big cities.”4 More recently, and perhaps more rigorously, studies of state legislatures including [Weir, Wolman and Swanstrom (2005)](10.1177/0748805108329140) and [Burns et al. (2009)](10.1177/0736898X09336770) have found that urban unity is a prerequisite for success in state legislatures peopled with hostile rural opponents.

However, the determination of a “city” position is rarely straightforward, and unity should not be taken as a given. Because of their high levels of social conflict, cities are prone to political chaos and sometimes appear to be “ungovernable”5. Capital flight, crime, congestion, labor and social unrest, pollution, and even weather all present recurrent, powerful governance challenges to American cities typically faced with severe resource constraints. Overlaid on top of these chronic governance problems is the high level of ethnoracial diversity present in many cities, which can intensify or create conflict in its own right. The patternings of race and class across space within cities, fostered by

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3 Emphasis added. [Luce (1930), pp.364-367](10.1037/cd.1930.1.3.364)


local practice and policies at all levels in every American city, mean that these conflicts may take place within the city but also across legislative districts, meaning that local political conflict can be transmitted or intensified in representative institutions, which are based on that same segregated territory. The result of these many cleavages and constrained resources can often resemble irresolvable “hyperpluralism,” resulting in fragility, chaos, and the constant danger of civic crisis. These governance challenges have at times made cities fairly unpleasant places to live or do business for those with other options, prompting exit by many and further compounding these problems. For a city delegation to cohesively pursue desired policies at higher levels, it must somehow resolve this local disharmony.

2 Unity from Diversity

In the face of these often dissonant social and political realities, several important institutional arrangements, distinctive in cities, have been developed to resolve such conflict and provide civic political order. Indeed, much of the study of urban politics focuses on these institutions, which provide a kind of “horizontal integration” of politics and policy across the face of the city.

There are two main categories of institutions of horizontal integration: jurisdictional and organizational. The chief jurisdictional institution is the city boundary and the central city government that oversees governance of the territory within. This kind of horizontal integration is common to all cities, and is what makes size an important characteristic of urbanicity. We often take the city boundary for granted, but this invisible line is an important political institution. The larger the city, the more likely that different kinds of areas will be included within the same jurisdiction. As American political communities get “fenced off” into smaller and often more homogeneous units (often suburbs), this

\footnote{DeLeon (1992)}
shapes representational politics. Gainsborough (2001) finds that the “suburbanization” of American politics leads to a strengthening of political localism and increasing support for small-government policies, while Oliver (2001) finds that homogeneity leads to diminished political participation and civic capacity in these smaller local polities. The current tendency among policy leaders and activists to promote regional governance solutions is an indication of the importance of these municipal boundaries.

When heterogeneous collections of residents, constituencies, and representatives are forced to come together in a central place for municipal matters, they may conflict, but they will at least interact, and have a part in the citywide accord. This process is at the heart of the ideal-type pluralism described by Dahl (1961) and others. It is far from obvious that power is as dispersed as the early pluralists believed, but it does seem clear that the most legitimate participants in government are persons and groups from within the political community, and the processes they engage in do typically result in binding legislative or administrative decisions. Persons and representatives from outside the border do not have a seat at that table. The citywide accord is likely to entail decisions about the allocation of goods and services over space within the city; these decisions are most often made centrally, so access to and participation in these centralized city decision-making processes is important—for residents who want access to city services and public goods, and for elites who want to take credit for their provision or direct them in particular ways for some reason or other. Membership in this common community itself makes representatives more cohesive in national politics, even though the districts themselves are not formally associated with citywide governance.

Along with jurisdictional institutions, organizational institutions of horizontal integration include the many more visible institutions that have been created to help provide political order in cities, from parties and machines to informal regimes. Unlike jurisdic-

\(^7\) See, for instance, ?.
\(^8\) For instances or conceptual outlines of strong local parties in cities, see Banfield and Wilson (1963), Bridges (1984) and Mayhew (1986).
tional horizontal integration, the strength of organizations vary across cities: some cities have strong citywide institutions of horizontal integration, while these kinds of organizations are virtually absent in others. In places where these institutions are strong, political ties between different areas of the city are particularly strong. Where a single boss or small group controls access to office and resources, as in the strongest machines, that boss has many resources with which to enforce political discipline and order within the city; elected officials dependent on that central decisionmaker for (re-)nomination and material delivery of goods and services to their constituencies are likely to attend to the will of the center. Cities with strong local partisan institutions are often referred to as “machine” cities, while those with institutions that undermine local parties are typically labeled “Reform” cities. These kinds of local partisan arrangements have become rarer over time. While they were once the “characteristic form of local government,” traditional parties/partisan machines were weakened by various social and institutional changes over the 20th Century.

Each of these institutional configurations, formally or informally, has the important effect of channelling or limiting the potentially infinitely varied content of public participation in policymaking to some ultimate decision, enacted and enforced by an established authority. While each is often, and often fairly, criticized as undemocratic, these criticisms are oblique to the deep crisis of the 20th century American city, beset on all sides by both demands for action and constraints on resources and authority. In such a context, representation and responsiveness to public opinion on particular issues are important, but must coexist with, and at times accede to, the primary good of political order. Political order can be established through these institutions of horizontal integration, forging a citywide

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9 This dichotomy is a useful and age-old analytical distinction, though the categories are seldom as clean-cut as that in reality. For classic accounts of machine politics, see Gosnell (1937) and Erie (1988). Bridges (1997) outlines instances and characteristics of Reform regimes, and Trounstine (2008) draws an important connection between these institutional arrangements and partisan-style machines, conceptualizing each kind of political order as a subset of the broader category “monopoly.” Stone (1989) conceptualizes the elite urban regime and describes some of its characteristics in action in Atlanta. Note that Mayhew (1986) uses behavioral measures to quantify “traditional party” strength, and his observations map quite neatly onto the institutional configurations embodied in this Reform-Machine dichotomy.

10 Huntington (1968)
Crucially, these institutions of horizontal integration, which force plural interests into resolution, have been developed in cities but not in other social spaces of comparable size, as described below.

2.1 City Delegations: Smoothing preferences.

Institutions of horizontal integration act on city delegations by smoothing out diverse preferences into a more cohesive bloc, just as they can create political order in a fractious political and social local environment. Myriad factors influence legislative decision making, and the composition of a constituency is frequently employed to explain legislator behavior. The city delegation complicates traditional models of representation by adding an extracameral intermediary between constituency and legislative behavior. Consider Figure 1, a model of representation. At left, there are four hypothetical districts to be represented in a legislature. District-level characteristics, abstracted as different colors or patterns at left, are reflected unmediated in representation at right.

In such model, the atomistic districts are unlinked, and representation is largely determined by district-level characteristics. When districts share district-level characteristics, they are likely to “agree” on a particular policy in question, and this agreement should be reflected in their representatives’ behavior. When they are very different on demographic or other fundamentals, however, it may be harder to coordinate action, even when the

11Again, this citywide “accord” may be undemocratic, and may reflect neither the “will of all” the city’s residents nor the abstract “general will” of the city as a corporate body, but it is an enforceable policy or position that results from the deliberation and workings of the institutions of horizontal integration. I choose the language of “accord,” as opposed to “city interest” or “consensus” to reflect this idea—that there may be winners and losers, and this may reflect neither consensus nor the city’s organic interest.

12Mayhew (1966), Mayhew (1974), Fenno (1973). This is most consistent with the “preferences” perspective in the perennial debate over the relative importance of legislative parties and legislator/constituency preferences. See, eg. Krehbiel (1993). This mix of factors is in itself something fairly distinctive about American legislative politics, where relatively decentralized party institutions make strict party-line voting something less than a given, as it is in most other Western democracies.

13These differences may be softened by chamber party, a truism in the study of legislatures. But such studies rarely examine intracameral subdelegations, or patterns among them, which is the explicit focus of city delegation theory.
districts are part of the same legislative party. This is a relevant consideration in the historically relatively weak congressional party system in the U.S., and a big part of the meaning behind Tip O'Neill’s famous aphorism that “all politics is local.” It explains why we can sometimes predict party defections based on district-level constituency measures, and why votes can be won by party leaders by making locally-targeted concessions or pork.

In city delegations, however, district-level characteristics matter less, because they are filtered through a mediating institution of horizontal integration. This model is depicted informally in Figure 2. Here, the abstracted districts are just as different from each other as in the previous figure, but they are no longer atomistic; they are part of a broader citywide “molecule,” as indicated by the grey boundary around the districts. Inclusion within this group means that the constituencies and representatives share some common political identity, and their diverse preferences are at least somewhat filtered through the intermediate city institutions. Just as when several atoms, with different properties, are combined to create a distinctive molecule with new emergent properties, the result is that even when districts are very different from each other, they may still be very cohesive in the legislature because they are linked to the other districts in their city.
What links city districts to each other? Institutions of horizontal integration link city districts in a way that other districts, even those that are geographically adjacent, are not usually connected. Sets of districts that are not from within the same city are not connected by jurisdictional institutions at the local level. Delegations from the same state are within the same jurisdiction, but the greater geographic extent of states, the relatively limited scope and depth of state government, and the greater strength of local political ties makes local jurisdictional institutions much more powerful integrators. To the extent that policies affect the city as a whole, rather than particular districts within a city, there will be an impulse toward unity among these representatives. For instance, many supralocal programs distribute funds not to particular neighborhoods, but to municipalities or other political subdivisions for final expenditure. In a city with several congressional districts, a mayor or central office typically has discretion over how those funds were spent across districts.¹⁴

¹⁴The politically-motivated distribution of such goods is almost a truism of urban politics and has been rigorously observed in several studies, eg. Trownstine (2008), Hajnal and Trownstine (2010), and Phillips
The most important organizational institution of horizontal integration has been the local traditional party. A traditional party is defined as an autonomous organization that can successfully control access to nominations to office, a very important institutional site for shaping outcomes by controlling the personnel of representation, and these organizations served broad integrative functions in local politics. Urban machines are particularly powerful species of this kind of organization—they not only control nominations, but are very successful at winning office as well. In these organizations, “unity and hierarchy” make “organization decision-making relatively impervious to the influences of rival non-party groups, associations, and elites in the primary electorate.” This power to effectively choose candidates, and most officeholders, extends not just to local or state office, but often to congressional office as well. In New York and Chicago, the most important and deeply-studied Democratic cities and the homes of effective traditional party organizations, access to nominations was controlled by the local parties throughout the Long New Deal; similar local political conditions obtained in many of the other, smaller cities of the New Deal coalition. Wilson, in his close study of intraparty dynamics in three large cities, observed that the Chicago organization was “virtually unbeatable” in primaries even when the offices were statewide, and that in the (then) thirty years since the establishment of a citywide Democratic organization, “only one Democrat... has won

Mayhew (1986) provides an encyclopedia of midcentury organizations, and illustrates some of their important effects. Bridges calls the political machine (the strongest species of party, having been successfully organized), the “characteristic form of city government” in the 19th century, and though these institutions were weakened by reform and other factors, their structures and legacies are still evident in the cities they once dominated, and were certainly the most powerful political forces in many cities during the urban interlude. See Mayhew (1986), Mayhew (1986).

Mayhew (1986). This is the definitive, almost encyclopedic, text on such organizations.

Snowiss (1966), p.629


Though they each had their own particular histories. See Mayhew (1986) for state-by-state narratives of party strength and development. See Dorsett (1977) for closer case studies of several machines' relations with the national Democratic leadership under FDR, and for a picture of the complex working of New York City's local organizations, which have ties to both county and city.
nomination to an important office without regular organization backing."\(^{20}\) In New York, organization dominance was more effectively challenged within the party, but even as late as 1960 almost all New York City Democrats in Congress “owed at least their initial victories to organization slating.”\(^{21}\)

In each of these cities, party leaders from inside the city but outside the individual districts had significant influence in slating and supporting candidates for office, and in each place the city nominees, even after electoral success, were vulnerable to attack from within, and faced the danger of purge if perceived as disloyal to the organization\(^{22}\). Beyond conventional incentives such as career advancement and renomination for office, the traditional organizations were often able to rely on their agents in Congress because they were creatures of habit. These were men (almost invariably men) who had risen through the disciplined and unified local party organization [and were] well aware of the virtues of party unity...Chicago Democratic congressmen...value party cohesion as a positive good in need of little or no justification.\(^{23}\)

Unity and cohesion were themselves valued goods for such politicians, the product of socialization and habit as much as of continuous monitoring or oversight. On domestic issues in particular, such representatives—members from traditional parties with localist backgrounds and orientations—were extremely cohesive, and loyal as a bloc to the city position. This loyalty was given to both the local and national parties (the positions of the two typically overlapped), but if forced to choose, the local organization seems to have been the primary home for many of these representatives.\(^{24}\)

\(^{20}\) An incumbent governor defeated a Chicago-backed insurgent. p. 67
\(^{21}\) Mayhew (1986), p. 45
\(^{22}\) For instance, New York Democratic boss Carmine DeSapio successfully purged a rogue Democrat from the city's congressional caucus in 1949 (though the party was not omnipotent; DeSapio was unsuccessful in an effort to replace Adam Clayton Powell with someone more loyal to the organization in 1958, and the organization's pre-eminence was ultimately shattered by Mayor Wagner's defection in 1961). See Wilson (1962), p.47. In Chicago, the head of the Cook County Democratic organization (Mayor Kelly's mentor Patrick Nash, and then Mayor Daley himself) routinely slated loyal longtime party stalwarts for congressional seats, and manipulated statewide tickets to provide maximum benefits for the county organization. See Snowiss (1966) and Rakove (1975)
\(^{23}\) Snowiss (1966) p. 630
\(^{24}\) Rakove (1975)
In Los Angeles, by contrast, a large city with no traditional party organization, party-like activity during this era was limited to clubs that were both weaker and more local than the city-wide organizations present in Chicago and New York. Without a citywide political “umbrella,” political integration was much weaker. This is not to say that the Los Angeles congressional delegation was wholly disorganized or in disagreement all the time. After all, the city boundary still serves as a jurisdictional institution of horizontal integration. But without the added, potentially more powerful integration that comes from a city-wide organization, Los Angeles was less apt to represent itself cohesively in Congress. The traits and interests of the particular districts, and the rivalries between them, were more evident at in representation.

2.2 Cohesive representation?

In the rest of the paper, I test several of the observable implications of the city delegation theory described above. The basic logic of the theory is that city institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs)—developed to provide political order at home—foster cohesive representation in important issues of national politics, even though cities are more heterogeneous than comparable collections of representatives.

Before testing these claims, I will define a few terms that will be used in the analysis. First, in this analysis, a city district is a congressional district that is entirely or almost entirely within a large, central city. A city delegation is a collection of city representatives in the House of Representatives from the same city. Thus the Chicago city delegation, for instance, is the set of representatives from Chicago at any given time. Over the course of the 20th century, the Chicago city delegation ranged in size from 6 to 12 representatives.

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25 Wilson (1962) ch. 4
26 While such cohesion could theoretically be marshalled for indeterminate ends, in practice these blocs have supported the “doubly liberal” program of the urban political order.
27 A large central city is one that constitutes at least .1 percent of the population, or roughly half of a congressional district. This definition allows for a fairly consistent conception of what counts as a “city” over time. See ?.
A suburban district is a district wholly or mostly within the developed area surrounding a large city, and a suburban delegation is a collection of representatives from such districts from the same city’s metropolitan area. A metropolitan delegation encompasses both the city delegation and suburban delegation from a given metropolitan area. By cohesion, I mean the tendency to agree on roll call voting; the more likely the members of some pair or set of representatives is to agree, the more cohesive they are.

3 Tests of City Delegation Theory

Empirically, the main implication of city delegation theory is that collections of representatives that are bound by common local institutions of horizontal integration will be more cohesive than we might otherwise expect—and that delegation cohesion is a function of the presence and strength of such institutions. This section looks at this implication from several angles, focusing on cohesion among different groups of legislators in the House of Representatives.

Two basic hypotheses about city delegations should be true if local institutions play a role in fostering cohesion in representation. First, city delegations should be more cohesive than other comparable collections of districts that do not share a common local political community. This is the effect of the city boundary (the primary jurisdictional institution of horizontal integration) on legislative cohesion. To evaluate this hypothesis, we can compare the cohesion of city delegations with analogous delegations-of-interest, their suburban rings and their metropolitan area (that is, the city and the suburban ring).

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28 “Metropolitan, non-central city” in Census terms.
29 As in many other models of legislative behavior, the underlying theory is that representatives will tend to vote alike to the extent that they or their constituencies share characteristics and/or interests in common. Most of the time, this means they are members of the same congressional party, or their districts have similar characteristics (like including many farmers or African Americans), or they share some common personal experience (like being veterans). Here, the characteristic that the districts share is membership in a common local polity and/or political organization, and I test this model at the group level now and later at the dyad level.
Formally, this hypothesis is

\[ H_{\text{Jurisdictional}} : C_{\text{City}} > C_{\text{Metro,Suburbs}} \]  

(1)

where \( C \) is Cohesion of the subscripted delegations. Second, we can compare across cities, because cities vary in the strength of their IHIs. Cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration should be more cohesive than cities with weak IHIs. Because borders are generally of equal strength in all cities, the relevant IHI here is the party organization, where we expect strong-party cities to be more cohesive than weak-party cities. Formally, this hypothesis is

\[ H_{\text{Organizational}} : C_{\text{StrongIHI}} > C_{\text{WeakIHI}} \]  

(2)

I will test these hypotheses on representatives’ behavior at the group and individual levels. First, we can compare city delegations to suburban and metro delegations, with the expectation, drawn from the jurisdictional hypothesis, that cities will be more cohesive.\(^{30}\)

Comparing cities to their suburban rings is useful because they often have comparable numbers of representatives, because state and local politics are often characterized by a strong city-suburb rivalry (an indication that suburban districts do share some political affinity in common, just as city districts do), and because using these groups allows us to automatically “control” for factors related to region, geographical proximity, and urbanicity.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\)Later, using smaller units of analysis, I will control for more factors that might foster cohesion.

\(^{31}\)All members of both delegations (city and suburb) from each metro area are from the same region, and most are from the same state. High cohesion in a city delegation may be attributable to the fact that their districts abut one another. The same is true of suburban districts, however. All members within each delegation have similar scores on a measure of urbanicity. Of course, city delegations and suburban delegations differ in their urbanicity. The point here is that within-delegation variation on this measure is minimal, and similar across delegations.
3.1 Heterogeneity, not just diversity

It is important at this point to bear in mind that city delegations are typically more heterogeneous than other collections of districts, and this is different that saying a city is more diverse than its suburbs (though this statement is also usually true). We think of diversity as “not uniformity” in the sense that persons are less likely to be similar on observable traits in cities. For instance, New York City is considered to be very diverse, because it has lots of different kinds of people on dimensions of difference considered to be important: several large racial groups, roughly at numerical parity; many immigrants but also many native-born persons; many millionaires and many poor persons; thousands of Ivy-league graduates and many more without a college degree; economic specialization is greater, so people have different occupational and class identities; and so on. This is less true in the smaller, less diverse communities that are common in the suburbs or rural places. If you were to pick two New Yorkers at random, it is more likely that they would be “different” on whatever important dimensions you chose than if you picked two persons from a less diverse place; this is what we typically mean by diversity, at least when we are thinking carefully about it.\footnote{This is the verbal translation of the most common measures of diversity, including Simpson’s Index or the (inverse) Herfindahl Index.}

But New York’s high level of diversity need not lead to a heterogeneous city delegation for New York, it might just mean that New York districts were different from other kinds of districts. This baseline diversity is a necessary \textit{precondition} for delegation heterogeneity, but one other thing must be true for districts to be sufficiently different from each other: the different sorts of people that make a place diverse must also be unevenly grouped in the political space of the city. Richer people must be separated from the poorer ones, instead of sprinkled in evenly; whites separated from other racial groups; immigrants from natives; and so on. For various historical and economic reasons, many of them lamentable, this is usually the case in American cities.\footnote{See \citet{massey1993holistic} for the classic account.} It is also true in the suburbs, but
this phenomenon is more recent and in most cases not as advanced in those places. Because the diversity within a city is often “lumpy,” with concentrations of different groups, rather than even spacing across the city, city districts (not just city residents) tend to be quite different from each other, on average. The underlying implication is that with different kinds of constituencies, the pressures on representatives will be different; in a city delegation, therefore, agreement between representatives of such different districts might not occur “naturally.”

Because of diversity and segregation, city delegations are almost always more heterogeneous than their suburban ring delegations, and that this was especially true in the mid-20th century urban interlude. The rawest social building blocks for political coordination and similarity are weaker in cities than they are in the suburbs, so the stronger cohesion in representation we will find in later sections is all the more unexpected.

### 3.2 City delegation cohesion

Because city districts are so often quite different from each other on politically relevant measures, we might not expect city delegations to be very cohesive in how they represent themselves in national politics. On the other hand, there seems to be a general impression, articulated for instance by Rep. Vorys and other observers of city delegations, that city representatives were more “organized” than other sets of constituencies. We can test this impression with Rice cohesion scores, which measure the extent to which a group of voters agree. If city delegations foster cohesion, we would expect the cohesion scores of

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34 For a demonstrative example of city delegations’ higher levels of heterogeneity on important dimensions, see the Appendix.

35 Rice cohesion scores are one of the oldest and most intuitive measures in all of political science. Drawn from Rice (1928), they range from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning a bloc of voters is unanimous and 0 meaning they are perfectly split. Because Rice’s measures were designed for large numbers of voters, and are not appropriate for comparing among small blocs of different sizes, I use the adjustment recommended in Desposato (2005) to correct for the small size of the delegations being investigated as well as the differences across such small delegation sizes. The interpretation of these scores is quite intuitive: if a bloc has a cohesion score of .93, there is a 93 percent chance that any two randomly chosen members of that bloc agree.

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city delegations to be higher than those of suburban rings, even though the constituencies of those other places are similarly contiguous and have more in common in terms of their demography. Over time, this has indeed been the case. Figure 3 shows the average cohesion scores on all roll call votes for the four largest cities’ city delegation (in solid/blue) and suburban delegation (in dashed/red) and metropolitan area delegation (in dotted/green). As a benchmark of high cohesion, the horizontal grey dashed line represents the global mean of the two Congressional parties on this measure over time, y = .77.

In each case, the city delegation is generally more cohesive than its suburban hinterland and the metropolitan area that encompasses both blocs, despite the higher levels of cross-district heterogeneity that exist within the city delegations. The only time the suburban delegation’s cohesion exceeds that of the city is for New York during a brief time in the 1940s. These city delegations are particularly cohesive (as evaluated against the standard of a national party), while the other blocs are not particularly cohesive, much closer to or even below the average for a congressional party, even though they share important baseline affinities such as geographic proximity. This provides support for the power of jurisdictional institutions of horizontal integration in contributing to representational cohesion.

There is also variation among cities, however. If the effects of local political organizations matter for the character of city representation at higher levels, we should expect the cohesiveness of city delegations to vary with the strength of local institutions of horizontal integration. While all cities have jurisdictional boundaries that serve a centripetal function, not all cities have had the same intensity of organizational political centralization over the course of the 20th Century. Among the four large cities included in this analysis, there was great variation in the strength of these organizational institutions, as described in many studies. Philadelphia and Chicago (especially after Richard J. Daley’s tenure as mayor began in 1955) had very strong organizations that unified local politics.

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36Republicans have generally been a little more cohesive than Democrats. The parties’ average cohesion scores are .73 and .81, respectively.
Figure 3: **Average Cohesion Scores for City, Suburban, and Metro Delegations in Four Major Cities**: City delegations more cohesive than suburban delegations, despite being more heterogeneous. *Source: USR data, Voteview*
For Banfield and Wilson (1963), Chicago was characterized by an “extreme centralization of power” in the machine leadership, especially under Kelly and Daley. Philadelphia had a similarly powerful machine organization, though the mayor was typically not a part of it. New York’s local pattern of influence was “halfway” centralized; its Democratic organization was strong but far from hegemonic. County divisions within the city, and struggles between party factions made New York City’s local politics less integrated. Los Angeles’s local nonpartisan rules made it virtually impossible to integrate politics citywide; power there was decentralized and no significant citywide organizations existed.

Figure 4 takes the cohesion scores from the city delegations presented in Figure 3 and superimposes them on the same graph for ease of comparison. In keeping with the expectations of city delegation theory, city delegation cohesion is correlated with local institutional strength. Cities with traditions of powerful parties that largely control a city’s politics should have more cohesive delegations than cities without such strong organizations. From this graph, we can add to the observation that city delegations are more cohesive than suburban delegations the further observation that some city delegations tend to be more cohesive than others.

A similar observation can be made about the frequency with which cities were perfectly cohesive—that is, unanimous on a roll call vote. Table 1 shows that the relationship between local institutions and city delegation unanimity is present for all roll calls, for all domestic roll calls, and for substantive issues most obviously relevant to cities: housing, infrastructure and public works, transportation, and urban/regional development. In each of these categories, the cities with strong IHIs were much more likely to be unani-

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37 p. 104
39 Banfield and Wilson (1963), Wilson (1962)
40 Mayhew (1986), Banfield and Wilson (1963), Wilson (1962) reports on many of these dynamics in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles at midcentury. Mayhew (1986) provides summaries of party strength over time in these cities.
41 The American Institutions Project (AIP) dataset assigns substantive codes to all roll calls from the 45th to 104th Congress. I use the project’s substantive codes to identify the roll calls in each category here. City votes are those in the AIP categories of Public Works and Infrastructure, Public Works Employment, Urban and Regional Development, and Housing. For details, see Katznelson and Lapinski (2007).
Figure 4: **Average Cohesion Scores for Four Major City Delegations:** City delegations with stronger organizational institutions of horizontal integration were more cohesive than those with weaker ones. *Source: USR data, Voteview*
Table 1: Proportion of votes on which city delegations were unanimous, Congresses 70-100: Cities with strong IHIs are unanimous more often than cities with weaker IHIs.  
Source: USR Data, AIP

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<th>City</th>
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<th>Domestic Votes</th>
<th>City Votes</th>
<th>IR votes</th>
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<td>PHI</td>
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<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13962</td>
<td>10185</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>2814</td>
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Unanimity Among City Delegations

The relationship between IHIs and voting unanimity holds particularly well for domestic votes and votes that are directly related to cities. The size of a delegation is more relevant in an analysis of unanimity (as opposed to cohesion), because smaller delegations seem more likely to be unanimous.\(^{42}\) This probably helps to explain why New York is as infrequently unanimous as Los Angeles, but it cannot explain the difference between Los Angeles and Chicago or Philadelphia; for most of the time period, LA is about as large as either of those cities (or both), but it is perfectly cohesive far less often. Interestingly, the pattern is not as strong in the fourth category, International Relations votes. The demands and influence of the IHIs may not exert the same pressures on votes that are not as obviously relevant to cities themselves. This is an area for further investigation.

Of course, because congressional voting is closely related to a member’s party, much of a city’s cohesion can certainly be attributed to the partisan makeup of a city’s delegation—or more plainly the results of elections, when districts select their representatives. Winning seats in elections is a primary function of a traditional party, and this is

\(^{42}\)This is a relevant concern here, but not in the previous analysis, which made a mathematical adjustment for delegation size.
reflected in the partisan homogeneity of the strong-party cities. The most cohesive city
delegations, Chicago and Philadelphia, have often had one-party delegations, while New
York and Los Angeles have had more partisan division; this fact itself related to the strength
of local institutions of horizontal integration. Chicago’s citywide Democratic organization
was consolidated in the late 1920s and early 1930s under Anton Cermak, Edward Kelly,
and Pat Nash, and matured as a local hegemon in the mid-1950s when Daley assumed of-
43

ice, linking the formal heads of the local government and local party in the same person.\footnote{Keiser (1997)}

In Philadelphia, local party chiefs, who held grassroots mobilization power, converted \textit{en masse} to the Democratic Party in the 1930s\footnote{Though the mayorship was slower to change, and slower still to be openly associated with the regular party organization. See Mayhew (1986)} These cities were unified in their partisan mobilization, and their organizations were strong enough to elect a predictably cohesive bloc. Struggles within the Democratic Party in New York (between reformers and regulars in Manhattan, and between Manhattan and the other boroughs) left that city more open to Republican inroads at the Congressional level. Los Angeles had basically no local organization that included the entire city\footnote{Wilson (1962), Mayhew (1986)} so the personnel of the city delegation seems more closely related to district-level characteristics, rather than a city-wide political order. LA's city delegation wound up far less cohesive than the other cities, despite having generally lower levels of cross-district heterogeneity.

4  Cohesion and two-stage representation

With a closer analysis, the relationship between city, local party, national party, and ul-
timately roll call behavior can be more precisely delineated. In this section, I turn to a
smaller unit of analysis, the legislative dyad, to see more detailed patterns in the rela-
tionship between city institutions and representation. Figure 5 illustrates the theorized

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{sociograms.png}
\caption{Sociograms of legislative dyads in strong-party cities.}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
City & Local Party & National Party \\
\hline
Chicago & Democratic & Democratic \\
Philadelphia & Democratic & Democratic \\
New York & Democratic & Democratic \\
Los Angeles & Democratic & Democratic \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Party affiliation in strong-party cities.}
\end{table}

|43| Keiser (1997)|
|44| Though the mayorship was slower to change, and slower still to be openly associated with the regular party organization. See Mayhew (1986)|
|45| Wilson (1962), Mayhew (1986)|
causal (and temporal) flow in the shaping of roll call votes in Congress, beginning with “pre-political” district characteristics at left and ending with particular votes by representatives at right. This model entails the basic logic of the city delegation theory. At its base, the model contains the (sometimes competing, sometimes integrated) theories of congressional behavior that suggest that (sometimes competing, sometimes co-incident) pressures from electoral constituencies and congressional parties influence representatives’ behavior in Congress.\textsuperscript{46} This conventional model, focusing on district/constituency preference and/or congressional parties, is captured by influence pathways A1, A2, and C\textsuperscript{47}

City delegation theory complicates that model by hypothesizing effects from an extracameral institution from outside the district—the institution of horizontal integration (IHI)—as a factor that influences both party affiliation and roll call behavior. Strong local institutions of horizontal integration foster unity among representatives through the vehicle of local parties that tend to create city delegations that are more homogeneously of one party, but they also influence roll call voting even beyond that, by sending particularly loyal partisans (if they are Democrats) to the chamber. Conversely, city delegations may prompt agreement within a city delegation across national party lines (typically, this involves city Republicans “defecting” from their national party to join their city delegation). In this section, I will dig into the analysis of city delegation cohesion above with a statistical model of agreement among individual legislators.

The “cohesion gap” described in the previous section—the fact that city delegations, despite their relatively high levels of heterogeneity, are much more cohesive in national politics than their suburban rings, and usually more cohesive even than congressional parties—is partly a product of the partisan homogeneity of the delegations these cities send to congress.\textsuperscript{48} Suburban delegations, and those from the other cities, are more

\textsuperscript{46}Krehbiel (1998), Cox and McCubbins (1993), Aldrich (2011)
\textsuperscript{47}The classic “parties v. preferences” debate in the political science literature on legislative behavior is largely over the independent relative import of “C.”
\textsuperscript{48}eg, Chicago and Philadelphia’s congressional delegations are so cohesive in part because they are so heavily Democratic. The cohesion scores for these cities are very close to what we would expect if representatives voted along party lines. To test this, we can generate “expected” cohesion scores based solely on
Figure 5: **City Delegation Theory**: Local city IHIs complicate the traditional model of Congressional representation (denoted by the relationships of $A_1$, $A_2$, and $C$). Cities with strong IHIs will have more homogeneous congressional delegations ($B_2$), and their delegates will be more loyal partisans in roll call voting ($B_1$ and $B_3$).

split. This observation goes only halfway to explaining two things. First, geographic proximity is surely a dimension of affinity, so it seems somewhat “natural” that that city delegations would be made of members of the same party. But given the heterogeneous demographic building blocks, and political conflict in cities, this shared partisanship should not be taken for granted. Second, partisan affiliation cannot explain all of the cohesion we observe in city delegations, because city delegations are typically more cohesive than the congressional parties, as we can see from the grey lines in Figures 3 and 4 and if we break city delegations down into city *partisan* delegations (ie, New York Democrats and New York Republicans), they are almost unanimous almost all of the time. Congressional parties are much more rarely unanimous, despite the fact that coordinating legislative behavior is their main purpose. Nevertheless, party certainly matters quite a bit. We can get a glimpse of how much of city cohesion works through partisanship, and how local institutions still matter even when we account for party, with a closer analysis of congressional cohesion in a regression framework.

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partisan identification (ie, what would the cohesion score be if members of city delegation voted according to their partisan affiliation. When we compare these “expected” cohesion scores to the actual scores, there is no difference over 70 percent of the time. Observed cohesion is less than expected on 20 percent of votes (almost always when expected cohesion is 1 in Chicago or Philadelphia), and cohesion is higher than expected for about ten percent of roll calls. New York, with its notably liberal Manhattan Republicans, is exceptional, and is more often more cohesive than partisan affiliation would predict.
5 Pairwise cohesion

To evaluate the independent role of cities, city institutions, and congressional parties in shaping representation, we can use a statistical model of similarity in representation among congressional pairs, or “dyads,” to test which factors are associated with two representatives sharing party affiliation, or voting alike on a given proposal. To the extent that two individuals agree, this is akin to dyad-level “cohesion,” and the basis for larger cohesive blocs. The underlying logic is that two representatives are more likely to belong to the same party when they come from similar districts, and to agree on voting in the chamber when they share relevant characteristics such as party affiliation and constituency pressures.

If cities and their institutions foster cohesion, then city institutions—membership in the same city delegation, traditional party organization at home—should be independently associated with a greater tendency to be from the same party and to agree in Congress, even when we account for other important factors. In each case, the “informal” institutions of city horizontal integration, which are external to both the chamber and the district that elects the representative, should be associated with cohesion.

In Figure 5, representation is disaggregated into two phases: one in which representatives are selected for membership in the legislature and affiliate with national parties, and one in which representatives actually vote. Institutions of horizontal integration should be associated with fostering cohesion at each stage: by making it more likely that representatives from a city are in the same party, and by making it more likely that representatives from a city will vote alike, even when we account for party affiliation. I will take each of these phases in turn, testing dyad-level models that estimate the relationships between similarity and agreement at each of these phases of representation. In each of the analyses, the unit of analysis is a congressional dyad, first a pair of congress members, and then a pair of votes by those members. We can see what factors are associated with “agreement” between representatives. I test similar models first in agreement in members’
partisan identities and then agreement in roll call votes.

5.1 Selecting city delegations

First, I consider the makeup of the city delegation. Sending members from the same party, despite heterogeneous building blocks that are often oriented as rivals in local politics, is a key way to foster cohesion in a city delegation. The model of this phase of representation has several observable implications, which I evaluate below. The basic model to test the jurisdictional IHI hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) at the dyad level is

\[ Pr(Party) = City + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  

where each variable is a measure of similarity between the members of the dyad on the measure indicated. The underlying logic is that precameral similarities are likely to be associated with membership in the same national party. On all variables, high values indicate similarity, so a positive coefficient means that similarity on that measure is associated with similarity in the dependent variable of membership in the same congressional party.

For instance, “City” equals 1 if members are members of the same congressional party, 0 otherwise; if, city delegation theory predicts, membership in the same city is associated with agreement on roll calls, we expect the coefficient on this term to be greater than zero. This would provide support for Hypothesis 1 above.

Because many factors may be relevant in determining congressional agreement, I include several other explanatory variables in the model. First, there are several measures of geographical proximity. These categorical spatial variables are dichotomous indicators of agreement: 1 if from the same city, region, section, or state, and 0 otherwise.

Urbanicity measures are available from the USR dataset developed for this project for all of those congresses. In the regression, the difference between the dyads members’
scores on the seven-category ordinal USR measure (ranging from a rural 0 to a core city 6) is subtracted from six to give a measure of similarity on this dimension of demography and district character. Thus a pair of core city districts would be the have a score of 6, a pair of rural districts a 6, but a pair made up of a city district and a suburban district might have a 2, 3, or 4, depending on the particular character of the districts in question.

The demographic measures for dyadic similarity along ethnoracial diversity and class lines are only available for later congresses (congresses 78 to 105 in most of the columns in the table below), but were developed using a procedure as follows. “Race” is an estimate of similarity of the proportion of the electorate identified or identifying as “native white” in each congressional district. From the 73rd through 89th congresses, this is the total population, minus the proportion of the voting-eligible population that is black. For later years, data on racial identities including Hispanic and Asian are available from a combination of Lublin (1999) and Adler (2012). Once each district’s percent white has been estimated, I calculate the difference between the dyad members’ white populations, and subtract that value from one for use as a measure of ethnoracial similarity. For class similarity, I use the same procedure, using percent blue-collar from Adler (2012) as the initial measure. Union membership is an important element of partisan competition as well, and I include it in Model 3 in the table; however, in Adler (2012) this variable is measured at the state level and therefore not quite appropriate for a district-level analysis.

In all, there are four measures of spatial-geographic similarity (the primary explanatory variable of interest, City, and three secondary explanatory variables, State, Region, and Section), and three measures of district-level similarity on urbanicity, ethnoracial iden-
tity, and class dimensions. I estimate a the probit model with congress-level fixed effects to account for shifts in the overall partisan balance of the chamber (which would affect the baseline probability of two members being from the same party), with robust standard errors clustered by dyad (to account for continuities among districts and/or members). The broadest analysis here covers dyads from the 40th through 105th Congresses (from 1865 through 1997, respectively), while the models that include the class and race variables are limited to congresses where data is available, 73-89.

These models test a few of the observable implications of city delegation theory. First, city institutions should be related to the partisan composition of city delegations. At the dyad level, this means that a pair of legislators from the same city is more likely to be from the same party than an otherwise similar pair that is not from the same city, even when we account for other factors on which representatives’ districts may be similar. If this is true, the coefficient on “City”, the indicator that representatives represent the same local political community, should be greater than zero, even when all of these other known contributors to partisan conflict are taken into account.

Further, in keeping with the Organizational Hypothesis above, strong local IHIs should foster partisan cohesion among representatives from the same city even more. Cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration, like Chicago and Philadelphia, should have more homogeneous city delegations, because they are better able to resolve local conflict and pursue a city accord at a higher level with a delegation that shares a national partisan affiliation. Cities with weak institutions will be relatively disorganized across the city, and their districts will be less likely to cohere within one party because district-level forces will be more powerful, relative to citywide factors, in determining the representative from that place. This would be supported if we observe that the relationship between membership in the same city and same national party was stronger in cities with strong IHIs than cities with weak IHIs. To test this conditional hypothesis, I add a term interacting the indicator for a dyad sharing a city with a measure of local party strength.
David Mayhew’s Traditional Party Organization (TPO) scores, to Equation 3:

\[ Pr(Party) = City \times TPO + City + TPO + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  

(4)

In addition to estimating this interaction model on the full set of congressional dyads, I also test it on the subset of dyads that consist of two city representatives (from any city), and on the further subset of dyads made up of two representatives from the same city. In each case, according to city delegation theory, the strength of city-wide party organizations should be positively associated with representatives’ membership in the same party in national politics.

The results all of these models of congressional representation are included in Table 2. Table 3 lists marginal effects of interest, which have a more direct substantive interpretation. The results are broadly consistent across the models and subsets. We can see here that the coefficients of primary interest, those having to do with the IHIs of city co-membership and local institutions, are positively associated with membership in the same congressional party, even when we account for other likely factors such as geography and demography. In the first three columns, which test the Jurisdictional Hypothesis, the positive, significant coefficient on City is consistent with the theory that membership in the same local community is associated with sharing a national political party as well. From Table 3 columns 1 and 2 we can see that membership in the same city is associated with a 17-20 percent increased chance in being in the same party, depending on the subset of

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As in other empirical analyses in this study, TPO scores (which Mayhew assigns at the state level) here are adjusted to account for Mayhew’s observation that such organizations tend to be most common and strongest in cities. I adjust the scores based on the accounts available in his text. For ease of interpretation, in this analysis I then recode Mayhew’s TPO scores (adjusted to account for within-state variation as described in his text) into dichotomous “strong party” and “weak party” categories, and the variable used in the interaction and accompanying term is an indicator scored 1 if both members of the dyad were from places with traditional party organizations and 0 otherwise. TPO scores of 4 and 5 were counted as strong, 3 and less counted as weak. Louisiana is the only state that receives a 3 on Mayhew’s scores; alternative treatments of this state, such as exclusion, coding as either strong or weak, or introducing a third category, do not affect the substantive results of the analysis.
Congresses and whether race and class are included in the model.

The city boundary itself is not doing all of the work, however. Looking closer, columns 4-6 include tests of the organizational hypothesis, which holds that cities with stronger IHIs will have more cohesive delegations than cities with weak IHIs. The interactive term City*TPO is the key variable of interest in columns 4 and 5; in the regression framework, it evaluates the conditional hypothesis that the relationship between co-membership in a city and co-membership in a congressional party will be stronger in strong-party cities than in weak-party cities. It is positive and precisely measured in both models, providing support for the idea that strong organizational IHIs are associated with citywide agreement.

A clearer interpretation of this conditional hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 6, which depicts the conditional relationship for the subset of dyads consisting only of pairs of legislators from large cities. The vertical axis is the probability of two representatives belonging to the same party, all else equal. Along the horizontal axis there are two categories, being from the same city and not being from the same city. The top line is the probability of being in the same party for dyads whose members are both from high-TPO cities, the bottom line the probability of being in the same party for dyads whose members are not both from high-TPO cities (ie, one or neither of them might be). The important thing to note is that the slope of the top line is much greater than the slope of the bottom line: while being from the same city makes two representatives more likely to be in the same congressional party no matter what, the effect is greater for strong-city dyads. In this group, two strong-party city representatives are about 30 percent likely to be in the same party if they are not from the same city, but about 51 percent likely to be if they are from the same city, an increase of about 17 percent. Conversely, two members not both from strong parties are only about 8 percent more likely to be in the same party if they come from the same city. Thus in this pool having a strong organizational IHI appears to

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Estimates for this Figure were created using Clarify for Stata.
be about an 8 percent increase in the effect of being from the same city, a substantively significant increase in “cohesion.”

In the fifth column, which splits the sample to include only dyads from the same city, the apparent relationship is even stronger: members of a dyad from a strong party city are 13 percent more likely to have the same national party affiliation than if they are from a weak party city. These results, incorporating data over most of the 20th century, provide support for the importance of both jurisdictional and organizational institutions of horizontal integration in fostering unity within a city delegation through common congressional affiliation—that is, by having one party win the city’s several elections for congress.54

5.2 Discussion: Homogeneous delegations from heterogeneous constituencies

The results above provide support for the key hypotheses that local IHIs foster unity in the first phase of congressional representation, the selection of partisan representatives. Other results of the models are worth noting: being from the same region and section is positively associated with membership in the same party, but dyads from the same state are less likely to represent the same party, all else equal. This may reflect intrastate rivalries of various sorts. District-level characteristics include some surprises: while being similar in place character makes districts more likely to come from the same party (this reflects the broader urban-rural divide), class and race seem far less important, and similarity on these dimensions is actually associated with being represented by members of different parties—though note that when the sample includes only districts from the same city, the variables take on greater substantive significance, and the sign on the class variable switches, indicating that within cities, class and copartisanship are more closely associated. Finally, the

54Running the same tests on only congresses from the urban interlude actually increases the magnitude of the coefficients of interest, indicating that the relationship between IHIs and partisan affinity were particularly strong during that time, though the coefficients are positive and significant in all eras.
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Table 2: **Probit Regression Results:** CCity Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Congress fixed effects not listed here. *$p < .05$
Figure 6: **Strength of Same-city effect on large-city dyads by organization-type.** Congressional dyads, 1939-1999. Each line represents the modeled probability of two members being in the same party, depending on whether they are in the same city. The top line represents pairs from strong-party cities, the bottom line pairs not both from strong-party cities. The slope of the line for strong-party cities is greater than the slope for non-strong party cities. Difference in slope significant at $p < .05$, verified using method described in Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005) (not presented here). Sources: USR data, Voteview, Adler (2012), Lublin (1999). Estimated using Clarify in Stata.
Marginal effects of IHI and other explanatory variables on Congressional Party Affinity, 78th-105th Congress

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<th>Model</th>
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<th>State</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Urbanicity</th>
<th>RaceSim</th>
<th>ClassSim</th>
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Table 3: Marginal Effects: City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Cell entries are the marginal effects of similarity on dimensions at left on dyad co-membership in congressional party. Estimated with covariates held at appropriate levels.

extremely low pseudo-R-squared measure on the largest pools of dyads indicates that even these measures of “prepolitical” geographic and demographic similarity do not account for very much of the variation in the outcome variable. Politics is obviously complex, and simple similarity between districts tells us less than one percent of the story of who wins office.

5.3 Cohesive voting

The results of the previous analysis indicate that local IHI's are associated with representation by members of the same national party. This is obviously important, as congressional party is a strong predictor of how a member will ultimately vote in the halls of congress. But it is not the whole story. In addition to contributing to city delegations with unified party membership, institutions of horizontal integration should prompt cohesion in final voting. The step-by-step model of representation in Figure 5 includes a second site where IHI's can foster cohesion in representation, at the moment of roll call voting. In Figure
this is informally indicated by arrows $B_1$ and $B_3$. Some of the effects of IHIs work indirectly through congressional party (ie, via pathways $B_2$ and $C$), but because national American congressional parties are not strong or disciplined themselves, we may be able to observe a direct relationship between IHIs and legislative agreement.

In this section, I build on the previous analysis to consider whether membership in common IHIs fosters representational agreement even beyond membership in the same national party. In this dyadic analysis, membership in the same city delegation should be associated with agreement on final roll call votes, and this tendency should be strongest in cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration, all else equal. These effects should be manifest even when we control for congressional party, though some of the city’s effects flow through congressional party and into roll call voting behavior. I test this hypothesis with additional regression analyses of roll call votes, analogous to those in the previous section.

In the previous comparisons of congresspersons’ identities, there was just one observation per dyad per congress, and the dependent variable measured whether the seats were held by members of the same party. To analyze agreement on roll call votes, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the two representatives in the dyad agree in their vote.

In these analyses, there is one observation per “complete” dyad on a vote—a dyad is considered complete if both members voted on that particular roll call. The dyad is coded 1 if the two members of the dyad cast the same vote, zero if they disagreed. I then regress this agreement indicator on several covariates of similarity between the dyad elements. As in the analysis of party affinity, the explanatory variables are all measures of similarity, and values are the same for all roll calls in a given Congress: members’ similarity in party, and districts’ similarity in urbanicity, traditional party organization, racial (percent native

\[55\] Missing votes were dropped from the pool from which dyads were constructed. Representatives taking a clear position in absentia with a “paired” vote as recorded in the Congressional Record are included in complete dyads.

35
white) and class composition (blue collar and union) where available, region, section, and state.

To assemble data for this analysis, I used the set of roll call votes identified as pertaining to domestic policy by the American Institutions Project from the 73rd through 89th Congress, the range approximating the urban interlude. There are 1711 of these votes. Because the dyadic analysis creates very large datasets (about 90,000 dyads per vote), including all of these votes makes the following analysis computationally unwieldy. I randomly selected 150 contested votes from this larger set of 1711. Thus for the subsequent dyadic analysis of roll-call votes, I employ the following model to test the Jurisdictional Hypothesis:

\[
Pr(AgreeVote) = City + Party + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon
\]

(5)

where with the expectation that if membership in the same local polity fosters cohesion, the coefficient on City will be positive.

Testing the Organizational Hypothesis is a bit more complicated, because simply interacting traditional party organization with same-city origins is not enough; if local organizations matter, being from different parties in a strong-party city might make a dyad less likely to agree than an opposite-party dyad with no local basis for rivalry. I thus test this hypothesis on a much smaller subset of the data: those dyads composed of two representatives from the same city and the same congressional party. If the organizational hypothesis is correct, then those dyads that come from cities with strong local IHIs, as

56 A contested vote is one on which the majority had less than 75 percent of the total votes cast, except in the 73rd, 74th, 75th, and 86th congress, where a contested vote is one on which the majority had less than 85 percent of the total votes cast (several of these congresses were very one-sided in favor of the Democrats, so even party-line votes were likely to have 75 percent on one side). I repeated the analysis several times with different samples of 150 from the pool of 1711, and using different samples does not seem to change the inferential substance of the analysis. With more computing power and/or time, I can formally increase confidence in these results, but it seems unlikely that they will change much.
indicated by their TPO scores, should be more likely to agree than dyads that come from cities with weak IHIs. Formally, this model is

\[ \Pr(\text{AgreeVote}) = TPO + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  (6)

estimated using only dyads where city and party are the same, with the theoretical expectation that the coefficient on TPO will be greater than zero. In essence, this test “controls” for the effects of jurisdictional IHIs (by including only dyads whose elements come from the same city) and congressional party. An observed difference between dyads from cities with different strength of local parties would support the theory that the shape of local institutions matter for national representation.

The following analyses test these hypotheses associated with city delegation theory using roll calls from the 73rd through 90th congresses (roughly spanning the urban interlude). Multiple results are presented here to illustrate both robustness across slightly different subsamples of the data (given limited availability of class variables) and because the different models illustrate slightly different aspects of the patterns in the data. First, for models 1 through 3, I test a sample of all roll calls identified by the American Institutions Project dataset as having to do with domestic policy from the urban interlude.\(^{57}\) There are over 1,700 such votes, and there about 90,000 voting dyads associated with each of them; this number made analysis computationally unwieldy. For the results presented here, I sampled ten percent of those votes, and dropped uncontested votes from that sample.\(^{58}\) After sampling, the dataset for analysis included 6,411,206 total observations on 72 roll calls.\(^{59}\) In Table 4, these analyses are indicated by the label “All” in the top row. Second, I run the analysis using a set of votes that should be of particular interest to city delega-

\(^{57}\) The AIP Top-Tier category “Domestic Affairs.”

\(^{58}\) Contested votes are those on which neither side won more than 80 percent of the vote; I employ this somewhat unusually high level because of some particularly one-sided congresses during the era under investigation.

\(^{59}\) Alternative trials and samples, which included different votes, yielded results that were substantively the same as those presented here.
tions. These are the votes having to do with Housing, Public Works and Infrastructure, Urban and Regional Development, and Public Works Employment, again as identified by the AIP classification system.\footnote{These are all third-tier substance categories in the AIP, subsets of the broader Domestic Affairs category used in models 1-3.} The relationships predicted by the city delegation theory should be particularly strong on these votes, which have to do with a city’s interest.

Finally, I test the Organizational hypothesis with the same sample of votes from models 1 through 3 (a subset of all contested domestic affairs votes), but include only dyads from the same city and same party in the analysis. In this model, the key variable of interest is the indicator for local party strength, which is scored 1 if the dyad comes from a high-TPO city, and 0 if it comes from a low-TPO city. Measures of regional, sectional, and state similarity are dropped here (because all representatives from the same city are necessarily share those higher levels of geographic affinity).

Again, in each of these models, the dependent variable is agreement between two members casting votes on a roll call. All models presented were estimated with congress- and vote-level fixed effects to account for dynamics that might make agreement more or less likely during a congress or on a particular vote (though note that because uncontested votes were dropped, the votes in the analysis received between 50 and 80 percent support from the winning side in any case, so there is not a huge amount of variation there). Model 5, which includes only pairs from the same city and party, includes city-level fixed effects as well to account for unobserved features of particular cities that may make agreement more likely.\footnote{Each of these models was also run without each set of fixed effects, and without any fixed effects at all, as a robustness check in case these many indicators were biasing results (especially in case they were prompting false positives). In all cases, the key substantive interpretations of the coefficients of interest (ie, sign of coefficient and precision of estimation) were not affected by the inclusion of these indicators. In models without the indicators, the magnitude of the key relationships were actually larger, so the results presented here are relatively conservative, when compared to models that exclude the indicators for congress, vote, and city.} Table 4 lists the results of these six models evaluating the relationships predicted by city delegation theory and IHIs. Cells of primary interest for tests of city delegation theory are highlighted in grey.
## Tests of City IHI Influence on Roll Call Voting

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<td>(78+)</td>
<td>City Votes (78+)</td>
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Table 4: **Probit Regression Results:** City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Shaded rows are coefficients of interest. All models include (unlisted) congress- and vote-specific fixed effects, and model 7 also includes city fixed effects. *p < .05
In this table, we can see that the hypotheses related to the primary coefficients of interest are supported by the data. Being from the same city is positively associated with legislative agreement, even when we account for a host of other factors that might be important in determining voting position, particularly legislative party. Among dyads whose members both come from the same city and party, those from strong local-party cities are also more likely to agree. Taking these results a step further for ease of interpretation, Table 5 lists the marginal effects associated with the coefficients above, calculated while holding the other variables constant at appropriate values.

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Table 5: Marginal Effects: City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Cell entries are the marginal effects of similarity on dimensions at left on dyad co-membership in congressional party. Estimated with covariates held at appropriate levels. *p < .05

These estimated marginal relationships provide support for the idea that being from the same city does indeed foster cohesion among representatives in roll call behavior. Even when we account for other obvious factors like party affiliation, demography, and geographical proximity, representatives from the same city were, on average, about six to nine

\[62\] The geographic variables are all binary indicators of similarity, so marginal effects were estimated holding these constant at zero, which was both mode and median in each case, and therefore “typical.” The demographic measures of similarity (on urbanicity, race, and class variables) were held at their median. This is the same procedure used to create the estimates in Table 3.
percent more likely to agree on domestic policy than members not from the same city. This relationship was particularly strong on the issues that city governments mobilized around during the New Deal, including housing and public works. On these issues, the marginal increase in probability of members of the same city delegation agreeing rose to 12 percent. Sharing a city matters more on issues that matter more for cities.

Finally, the test of the organizational hypothesis on the subset of dyads whose members were from the same city and party also provides support for city delegation theory. Local copartisans who were from places with strong local parties, which provide stronger links between representatives from different parts of a city, were about 21 percent more likely to agree than local copartisans from places with weak local institutions. This is an almost unbelievably strong relationship, given the common sense believe that two representatives from the same city and in the same party might almost always agree in any case. But not only are pairs from cities with strong organizational IHIs more likely to share party affiliation, they are also more likely to be more cohesive partisan delegations when it comes time to vote. These local party organizations provide a strong glue holding representatives of heterogeneous constituencies together in the final phase of representation.

Again, the results of these dyad-level regressions support the main hypothesis of city delegation theory: that sharing common local institutional and political roots makes representatives more cohesive. Pairs of representatives that come from the same city are more likely to agree on roll call votes than pairs that do not, and this is especially true for those pairs that both come from cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration. Moreover, pairs of representatives from cities with such institutions (the most important of which are the traditional party organizations tested here) are more likely to come from the same party than those pairs who do not. Since partisan affiliation is an especially strong force for congressional behavioral agreement (that’s what these parties are for, more than anything else), creating a city delegation that is monolithic in its partisan identity is an important means by which local parties operate.
6 Discussion

The analyses in this chapter provide evidence of the association between extracameral institutions of horizontal integration and legislative cohesion predicted by city delegation theory. Cities are more cohesive in their legislative behavior than are other collections of legislators, and cities with strong organizational IHIs are more cohesive than cities with weak ones. This cohesion is partly attributable to the election of representatives that tend to be from the same party. Dyads from the same city are more likely to be affiliated with the same party, and this relationship is even stronger in cities with strong traditional parties. But even beyond party membership, city delegations foster cohesion in roll call voting on domestic policy issues. Representatives from the same city are more likely to agree with each other than those not from the same city, even across party lines, an indication that something like a city interest is being represented; representatives from the same city but from different parties may be cooperating or competing for the same median voter (or each at different times), but they are ultimately agreeing on policies relevant to the cities they represent.

Finally, among city representatives, those from the same local party are extremely cohesive. Chicago Democrats were unanimous on 85 percent of votes during the urban interlude; New York Democrats on 75 percent. These percentages increase to 90 percent (for each city) on “key” votes on which the parties were disagreed. Despite the fact that their constituencies were often quite different on important dimensions like race and class, these blocs of voters almost consistently spoke with one voice for a city position, and were particularly cohesive when their votes were most valuable. Whether this pattern of relationships holds for all substantive policy areas, or only those most relevant to cities (like “city” or domestic roll calls) is an area for further investigation.

Even when we account for many other geographic, demographic, and political fac-

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63Key votes are votes of particular importance to cities as identified in Congressional Quarterly weekly reports. See Caraley (1976).
tors that foster similar representation, city institutions are related to representation on domestic issues, particularly those of most obvious relevance to a city’s ability to manage the governance challenges of urbanicity. Institutions that link city constituencies make them more cohesive in their partisan affiliation and more likely to agree on policy. Of course, there is still much work that remains to more fully understand the precise mechanism for cohesion. For one, even with the inclusion of many likely explanatory factors, the model in this chapter still does not account for very much of the overall variation in whether or not dyads ultimately agree. But this is not an issue unique to the questions at hand—after all, I include what is thought to be the main determinant of vote behavior (national party affiliation) as an explanation in the model.

Second, a quantitative analysis like this cannot quite get into the why or how of city delegation cohesion. Electoral processes may lead to the selection of representatives that are more alike than their districts, or at least more mindful of citywide issues, and inclined to cohere based on something akin to true “preferences.” Such an arrangement would foster cohesion fairly simply and without the active exercise of power. Alternatively, discipline and monitoring by a central organizational leader may have been more continually applied, if the different pressures of different constituencies pulled representatives in different directions. This would entail more application of the subtle tools available to citywide organizations and their leaders, such as rearranging electoral slates, weakening incumbents or allowing challenges. The first possibility is widely assumed; the second would be very difficult to see. It is likely that both realities obtained in different circumstances and combinations, as Snowiss (1966) observed late in the urban interlude.

The broader theoretical contribution of this analysis is to identify a set of institutions that are external to the formal, ideal models of representation that focus on factors internal to the congress (like national party affiliation) or to a particular constituency (like demography). The city and related institutions “should be” irrelevant to national representation; but something about cities foster cohesion among their representatives to an
extent the usual suspects cannot fully explain. Such institutions linking several constituencies who have something in common at the local level (membership in a common political community and/or in a local political organization whose primary aims are focused at the local level), despite differences in the building blocks of politics, contribute to their commonality at a higher level as well.

7 Conclusion

Large cities are famous for fractious (and recurrently violent) politics at home, but they are notable for the cohesive way they represent themselves in national politics, on domestic issues in particular. More, differences in overall cohesion among cities are related to the institutional configuration of the cities themselves: cities with traditional party organizations are also more cohesive in national politics, in part because they elect more members from the same party. By creating such cohesive representative units, institutions of horizontal integration foster vertical integration as well: they transmit a disciplined, cohesive style of city politics into the higher legislature, making the effects of their local institutions felt in national legislative politics.

Beyond the parties themselves, it is certainly possible that other informal, extra-cameral local institutions may serve similar functions in places where traditional parties were not (or are no longer) present. In midcentury Detroit, for instance, the nominally nonpartisan local politics were often dominated by CIO unions, notably the UAW; such an organization could certainly play a powerful integrative role.\textsuperscript{64} In many formally nonpartisan cities, reform-style regimes may have integrated politics at the times when they held political “monopolies,”\textsuperscript{65} though the foregoing analysis indicates that nonpartisan cities tended to be less unified on average than those with partisan institutions.\textsuperscript{66} The precise

\textsuperscript{64}Mayhew (1986), p.157
\textsuperscript{65}As described in Trounstine (2008)
\textsuperscript{66}Additionally, the “reform” cities of the West and Southwest usually had smaller city delegations because of the timing of their development in national history. This does not mean their politics could not possibly
institutions can change or adapt over time as well. In contemporary Chicago, for instance, local politics have been formally nonpartisan since the late 1980s, but there has been little doubt of the continued power of the machine there, or of its sustained organizational ties up and down the chain of political authority.

The cohesive force of city delegations complicates Tip O'Neill’s famous observation that “all politics is local.” We usually understand this to mean that a politician will be responsive to his or her constituents’ interests, and potentially resistant to a national party line when the local conflicts with the national. This is true to a point, but we must be careful about how we understand “local,” at least for city politicians. The cohesion of city delegations indicates that city representatives are responsive to the city, including the part that they do not formally represent, as well as to their own particular district within the city. In each case, from the relatively weak ties of jurisdictional integration to the stronger bonds of organization-based linkages, the ultimate point is that for city representatives, important local politics can happen outside a representative’s district, even though they are still “local.”
References


8 Appendix: Delegation Heterogeneity

Cities are not only diverse, they also tend to create heterogeneous collections of districts when local demography is carved into representational constituencies. To illustrate this point, consider the following. Two important dimensions of difference in American politics (and in other societies) have always been class and race. Thus we might expect representatives of districts that differ from each other on measures of class and race to disagree with each other more than those from districts that are more alike—they would
have higher levels of “latent” conflict derived from demography.\textsuperscript{67}

We can measure these dimensions of latent conflict using census data to evaluate this idea of how different groupings of districts cohere using cities and their suburbs; we would expect more heterogeneous blocs to be less cohesive, because they are more different on average. Thus if a city delegation was both more heterogeneous and more cohesive, city delegation theory can provide a contributing explanation for this cohesion. For this and subsequent analyses, I use the four cities that have been, in general, the largest in the U.S. over the 20th century: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia. These cities not only represent the largest cases of city delegations (helpful for studying a city delegation), but (again helpful for analysis) they also had very different patterns of local institutional strength. Philadelphia and Chicago were generally run by strong-party, machine-style organizations for the period in question (though each had its own idiosyncratic departures from machine domination). New York had a strong but not hegemonic party system, and was also split organizationally across the larger boroughs. Los Angeles, as with most of the West, is formally nonpartisan locally with very weak institutions of horizontal integration. The first analyses will use information from these cities and their metro areas to evaluate the jurisdictional and organizational hypotheses above.

First, to show that city delegations are made up of districts that are different from each other, and thus lack the basis for “natural” cohesion, we can examine how different from each other the constituencies within city districts are. Using census data for each of these cities, I develop a city delegation cross-district two-dimensional heterogeneity score that measures how different from each other (as opposed to how internally diverse) the districts of the city delegation are. The same scores are developed for their suburban ring. If city delegations are more cohesive despite being more heterogeneous, this is may be due to the influence of institutions of horizontal integration, and make the alternative expla-

\textsuperscript{67}Region is another dimension that we would expect to contribute to latent conflict, among others. It surely does, but in following analysis all the groups I am comparing are blocs from within the same region, so this is not a factor here. It is taken into account in the subsequent individual-level tests of predictors of agreement below.
nation of cohesion based in “natural,” prepolitical similarity less persuasive.

While city delegations are not uniformly more diverse than their suburban ring delegations (for some cities, in some decades, the two blocs are actually comparably heterogeneous, especially on the economic dimension), this measure does confirm that there is almost always more heterogeneity among city delegations than among suburban delegations, and that this was especially true in the mid-20th century urban interlude. Figure 7 shows the two-dimensional heterogeneity scores for each city and its suburban ring over time; in each case, the city delegation shows more cross-district heterogeneity. On these two important dimensions, at least, the rawest social building blocks for political coordination and similarity are weaker in cities than they are in the suburbs.

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The heterogeneity scores are generated as follows. First, I identify the city and suburban area delegations using a unique dataset developed for this project and identifying the urbanity of congressional districts across history (this is the USR data used in all analyses here). The two dimensions of heterogeneity measured are class and race, two demographic identities of obvious relevance for both local and national politics. The data for each of these measures used in this diversity analysis are drawn from Lublin (1997), and therefore cover the 86th to 105th congresses. For each district, I use the median family income as the measure of class. Representatives have compelling reasons to be responsive to the median voter on many economic issues, so this seems an apt measure of a district’s central tendency on this dimension. As a measure of district-level racial diversity, I use the percent identified or identifying as “not white” in the district. This measure is imperfect, but changes in the way race and ethnicity have been measured make it difficult to find a better one over time. (In any case, this measure is fairly highly correlated with the available alternatives such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or percent black plus percent Hispanic after 1970, and the largest racial divide and conflict in the U.S. is most often characterized as between whites and non-whites, usually African Americans, and this is certainly true in the two-party system, where all non-white groups tilt disproportionately toward the Democratic Party, so the white-nonwhite dividing line is not a bad measure of latent group conflict.) Using all congressional districts, I standardize these variables to put them on a common scale within each Congress, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Thus districts that are poorer, or more white, than average have negative values, while those that are richer or less white have positive values. Standardizing these values weights the two dimensions equally for the ultimate additive index of diversity. Ultimately, we are interested not in each district’s level of these important variables, but in the extent to which the member districts of a given delegation are similar to or different from each other. Using these standardized measures of each dimension, the mean absolute deviation for each bloc is calculated (that is, the mean of the deviations from the bloc mean). This mean absolute deviation is employed as the bloc-level standardized measure of cross-group heterogeneity on that dimension. Then the two dimensions are simply added together to make the two-dimensional measure of heterogeneity. This gives us a sense of how different the raw district-based pressures on legislators are likely to be within a bloc.
Figure 7: Cross-District Heterogeneity Among Congressional Delegations (1960-2000): City delegations are almost always more internally heterogeneous than suburban delegations. Source: USR data, Lublin (1997)