Adversarial Coordination and Public Information Design

Nicolas Inostroza
U of Toronto

Alessandro Pavan
Northwestern

May 30, 2025

Motivation

- Coordination: central to many socio-economic environments
- Damages to society of mkt coordination on undesirable actions can be severe
  - Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS)
  - creditors + speculators with heterogenous beliefs about size of *nonperforming loans*
  - default by MPS: major crisis in Eurozone (and beyond)
- Government intervention
  - limited by legislation passed in 2015
- Information Design (e.g., stress testing): **instrument of last resort**

Questions

- Structure of optimal policy?
  - What information should be passed on to mkt?
- "Right" notion of transparency?
- Optimality of
  - pass/fail policies
  - monotone rules
- Properties of persuasion in global games?

Related literature

- **Adversarial Coordination/Unique Implementation:** Segal (2003), Winter (2004), Sakovics and Steiner (2012), Frankel (2017), Halac et al. (2020), Halac et al. (2021)...

- **Global Games w. Endogenous Info:** Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006, 2007), Angeletos and Pavan (2013), Edmond (2013), Goldstein and Huang (2016), Denti (2022), Szkup and Trevino (2015), Yang (2015), Galvao and Shalders (2020), Morris and Yang (2021), Li, Song & Zhao (2023), Morris, Oyama & Takahashi (2024), Alonso & Zachariades (2021)...

- **Persuasion and Information design:** Alonso and Camara (2016a), Arieli and Babichenko (2019), Bardhi and Guo (2017), Basak and Zhou (2020, 2025), Che and H¨orner (2018), Doval and Ely (2020), Galperti and Perego (2020), Gick and Pausch (2012), Gitmez and Molavi (2022), Heese and Lauermann (2021), Inostroza (2021), Laclau and Renou (2017), Mathevet et al. (2020), Shimoji (2021), Taneva (2019)...

Plan

- Baseline Model
- Perfect Coordination Property
- Pass/Fail
- Monotone Policies
- Enrichments
- Micro-foundations

Global Games of Regime Change

- Specific game in spirit of Rochet and Vives (2004)
- Information designer: Policy maker (PM)
- Agents: investors, $i \in [0,1]$
- Actions

$$a_i = \begin{cases} 1 & (pledge) \\ 0 & (not\ pledge) \end{cases}$$

- $A \in [0,1]$: aggregate pledge
- Regime change: default
- Default outcome: $r \in \{0,1\}$, with

$$r = \begin{cases} 0\,(\text{default}) & if \quad A \leq 1-\theta \\ 1 & if \quad A > 1-\theta \end{cases}$$

- "fundamentals" θ: liquidity, performing loans, etc.
- Supermodular game w. dominance regions: $(-\infty, 0]$ and $(1, +\infty)$
- θ drawn from abs. continuous cdf F, smooth density f

Stylized Global Game of Regime Change

- PM's payoff

$$U^P(\theta, A) = \begin{cases} W(\theta) > 0 & \text{if } r = 1 \\ L(\theta) < 0 & \text{if } r = 0 \end{cases}$$

- Agents' payoff from not pledging (safe action) normalized to zero
- Agents' payoff from *pledging*

$$u = \begin{cases} g(\theta) > 0 & \text{if } r = 1 \\ b(\theta) < 0 & \text{if } r = 0 \end{cases}$$

Beliefs

- $\mathbf{x} \equiv (x_i)_{i \in [0,1]} \in \mathbf{X}$: signal profile with each

$$x_i \sim p(\cdot|\theta)$$

  i.i.d., given θ.

- $p(x|\theta)$ strictly positive over an open interval $\varrho_\theta \equiv (\underline{\varrho}_\theta, \bar{\varrho}_\theta)$ containing θ.

- $\mathbf{X}(\theta) \subset \mathbb{R}^{[0,1]}$: collection of signal profiles consistent with θ

- Example 1: $x_i = \theta + \sigma\xi_i$ with $\xi_i \sim N(0,1)$
- Example 2: $x_i = \theta + \sigma\xi_i$ with $\xi_i \sim U(-1,1)$

Disclosure Policies (Stress Tests)

- *Stress Test* $\Gamma = (S, \pi)$
  - S: set of scores/grades/disclosures
  - $\pi : \Theta \to \Delta(S)$

Timing

1. PM announces $\Gamma = (S, \pi)$ and commits to it
2. $(\theta, \mathbf{x})$ realized
3. $s \in S$ drawn from $\pi(\theta)$ and publicly announced
4. Agents simultaneously choose whether or not to pledge
5. Default outcome and payoffs

Solution Concept: MARP

- Robust/adversarial approach
- PM does not trust her ability to coordinate mkt on her favorite course of action
- **Most Aggressive Rationalizable Profile** (MARP):

  minimizes PM's payoff across all profiles surviving *iterated deletion of interim strictly dominated strategies* (IDISDS)
- $a^{\Gamma} \equiv (a_i^{\Gamma})_{i \in [0,1]}$: MARP consistent with Γ (a_i^{Γ}: complete plan of action)

Perfect Coordination Property [PCP]

Definition 1

$\Gamma = \{S, \pi\}$ satisfies **PCP** if, for any $\theta \in \Theta$, any exogenous information $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}(\theta)$, any $s \in supp(\pi(\theta))$, and any pair of individuals $i, j \in [0, 1]$, $a_i^\Gamma(x_i, s) = a_j^\Gamma(x_j, s)$, where $a^\Gamma \equiv (a_i^\Gamma)_{i \in [0,1]}$ is MARP consistent with Γ

Perfect Coordination Property [PCP]

Theorem 1

Given any regular Γ*, there exists regular* Γ^* *satisfying* ***PCP*** *and s.t., when agents play according to MARP under both* Γ *and* Γ^**, at any* θ*, default probability same under* Γ^* *and* Γ*. Transition from* Γ *to* Γ^* *yields Pareto improvement (PM indifferent, no agent worse off, some agents strictly better off).*

- Regularity: MARP well defined

(formal proof)

Perfect Coordination Property [PCP]

- Policy $\Gamma^* = (S^*, \pi^*)$ removes any **strategic uncertainty**
- It preserves **structural uncertainty**
- Under Γ^*, agents know actions all other agents but not *beliefs rationalizing such actions*
- Inability to predict beliefs that rationalize other agents' actions essential to minimization of default risk
- "Right" form of transparency
  - conformism in beliefs about mkt response
  - ...not in beliefs about "fundamentals"

PCP: Lesson

Optimal policy combines:

- public **Pass/Fail** announcement
  - eliminate strategic uncertainty
- additional disclosures necessary to guarantee that, when $r = 1$ announced (i.e., when bank passed test), all agents pledge under MARP

Pass/fail Policies

- When is optimal policy binary?

Theorem 2

Suppose $p(x|\theta)$ log-supermodular. Given any regular Γ satisfying PCP, there exists regular binary policy $\Gamma^* = (\{0,1\}, \pi^*)$ also satisfying PCP and s.t., when agents play according to MARP under both Γ and Γ^*, for any θ, prob of default and payoffs (for each agent and PM) same under Γ^* and Γ.

- MARP in threshold strategies: signals other than regime outcome can be dropped (averaging over s) without affecting incentives

- Result hinges on Log-SM of $p(x|\theta)$, i.e., on MLRP
  - relative optimism across agents invariant in Γ

(Example-PF)

Optimality of Monotone Tests



Figure: Optimal Monotone Policy.

Foundation for Monotone Tests

$$x_{max} \equiv \sup \left\{ x : \int_{\Theta} u\left(\theta, 1 - P\left(x|\theta\right)\right) \mathbb{I}(\theta > 0) p\left(x|\theta\right) \mathrm{d}F\left(\theta\right) \leq 0 \right\}$$

Condition M: Following properties hold:
(i) $\inf \Theta(x_{max}) \leq 0$;
(ii) for any $\theta_0, \theta_1 \in [0,1]$, with $\theta_0 < \theta_1$, and $x \leq x_{max}$ s.t. (a) $\theta_1 \leq P(x|\theta_1)$ and (b) $x \in \varrho_{\theta_0}$,

$$\frac{U^P(\theta_1, 1) - U^P(\theta_1, 0)}{U^P(\theta_0, 1) - U^P(\theta_0, 0)} > \frac{p\left(x|\theta_1\right) b\left(\theta_1\right)}{p\left(x|\theta_0\right) b\left(\theta_0\right)}.$$

Theorem 3

Suppose $p(x|\theta)$ log-supermodular and Condition M holds. Given any regular Γ satisfying PCP, there exists deterministic binary monotone $\Gamma^{\hat{\theta}} = (\{0,1\}, \pi^{\hat{\theta}})$ satisfying PCP s.t, when agents play according to MARP under both Γ and Γ^*, PM's payoff weakly higher under $\Gamma^{\hat{\theta}}$ than under Γ.

Sub-optimality of Monotone Tests

Example 1

Suppose that, for any θ,

(a) $g(\theta) = g$, $b(\theta) = b$, $W(\theta) = W$, and $L(\theta) = L$;

(b) $\theta \sim U[-K, 1+K]$, $K \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$;

(c) $x_i = \theta + \sigma\epsilon_i$, with $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and $\epsilon_i \sim U[-1, 1]$, with $\sigma < K/2$.

There exists $\sigma^{\#} \in (0, K/2)$ such that, for all $\sigma \in (0, \sigma^{\#})$, there exists (deterministic) *non-monotone* policy satisfying PCP yielding PM payoff strictly higher than optimal monotone policy.

Optimality of Monotone Tests



Here: $g = 1 - c$, $b = -c$

Sub-optimality of Monotone Tests

- Let $\theta^{MS} \in (0,1)$ be implicitly defined by $\int_0^1 u(\theta^{MS}, l)dl = 0$
- $D^{\Gamma} \equiv \left\{ d_i = (\underline{\theta}_i, \bar{\theta}_i] : i = 1, ..., N \right\}$: partition of $[0, \theta^{MS}]$ induced by deterministic Γ
- $\Delta(\Gamma) \equiv \max_{i=1,...,N} |\bar{\theta}_i - \underline{\theta}_i|$: mesh of D^{Γ}

Example 2

Suppose $\theta \sim U[\mathbb{R}]$ and $x_i = \theta + \sigma\varepsilon_i$, with $\varepsilon_i \sim N(0,1)$. Assume that, for any θ, $g(\theta) = g$, $b(\theta) = b$, $W(\theta) = W$ and $L(\theta) = L$. There exists $\bar{\sigma} > 0$ and $\mathcal{E} : (0, \bar{\sigma}] \to \mathbb{R}_+$, with $\lim_{\sigma \to 0^+} \mathcal{E}(\sigma) = 0$, s.t, for any $\sigma \in (0, \bar{\sigma}]$, the following is true: given any deterministic binary Γ satisfying PCP and s.t. $\Delta(\Gamma) > \mathcal{E}(\sigma)$, there exists another deterministic binary Γ^* with $\Delta(\Gamma^*) < \mathcal{E}(\sigma)$ that also satisfies PCP and yields PM payoff strictly higher than Γ.

Extensions

- Default iff $R(\theta, A, z) \leq 0$
  - z drawn from Q_θ: residual uncertainty
- PM's payoff

$$\hat{U}^P(\theta, A, z) = \begin{cases} \hat{W}(\theta, A, z) & \text{if } r = 1 \\ \hat{L}(\theta, A, z) & \text{if } r = 0 \end{cases}$$

- Agents' payoffs

$$\hat{u}(\theta, A, z) = \begin{cases} \hat{g}(\theta, A, z) & \text{if } r = 1 \\ \hat{b}(\theta, A, z) & \text{if } r = 0 \end{cases}$$

- Expected payoff differential: $u(\theta, A)$
- PM's expected payoff conditional on $r = 1$: $W(\theta, A)$
- PM's expected payoff conditional on $r = 0$: $L(\theta, A)$

Generalizations

Condition PC. For any $\tau \in \Delta\Delta(\Theta)$ consistent with F

$$\int \left(\int \left(\begin{array}{l} \left[\mathbf{1}\left(u(\theta, A(\theta; G)) > 0\right) U^P(\theta, 1)\right] \\ +\mathbf{1}\left(u(\theta, A(\theta; G)) \leq 0\right) U^P(\theta, 0) \end{array} \right) G\left(\mathrm{d}\theta\right) \right) \tau(\mathrm{d}G)$$

$$\geq \int \left(\int U^P(\theta, A(\theta; G)) G\left(\mathrm{d}\theta\right) \right) \tau(\mathrm{d}G).$$

where $A(\theta; G)$ is MARP consistent with G

- Condition PC: limited misalignment in objectives between PM and agents

Generalizations

Theorem 4

Given any regular policy $\Gamma = (\mathcal{S}, \pi)$*, there exists another regular policy* Γ^* *satisfying PCP and s.t, when, under both* Γ *and* Γ^* *agents play according to MARP: (1) for any* θ*, no agent is worse off under* Γ^* *than under* Γ*, and some agents are strictly better off; (2) if, for any* θ *and* $s \in \mathsf{supp}(\pi(\theta))$*, regime outcome is deterministic, then, for any* θ*, probability of default under* Γ^* *same as under* Γ*; (3) when Condition PC holds, PM better off under* Γ^* *than under* Γ*.*

Generalizations

Condition FB. For any x, $u(\theta, 1 - P(x|\theta)) \geq 0$ (alternatively, $u(\theta, 1 - P(x|\theta)) \leq 0$) implies that $u(\theta'', 1 - P(x|\theta'')) > 0$ for all $\theta'' > \theta$ (alternatively, $u(\theta', 1 - P(x|\theta')) < 0$ for all $\theta' < \theta$).

Generalizations

Theorem 5

Suppose $p(x|\theta)$ *log-supermodular and Condition FB holds. Given any regular policy* $\Gamma = (\mathcal{S}, \pi)$ *satisfying PCP, there exists regular binary policy* $\Gamma^* = (\{0,1\}, \pi^*)$ *also satisfying PCP and s.t., when agents play according to MARP under both* Γ *and* Γ^**, for any* θ*, probability of default and payoffs (for each agent and PM) same under* Γ^* *and* Γ*.*

Generalizations

$$x_{max} \equiv \sup \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R} : \int_{\Theta} u\left(\theta, 1 - P\left(x|\theta\right)\right) \mathbf{1}(\theta > \underline{\theta}) p\left(x|\theta\right) \mathrm{d}F\left(\theta\right) \leq 0 \right\}.$$

Condition M*.
(i*) $\inf \Theta(x_{max}) \leq \underline{\theta}$;
(ii*) For any $\theta_0, \theta_1 \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$, with $\theta_0 < \theta_1$, and $x \leq x_{max}$ s.t. (a) $u(\theta_1, 1 - P(x|\theta_1)) \leq 0$ and (b) $x \in \varrho_{\theta_0}$,

$$\frac{U^P(\theta_1, 1) - U^P(\theta_1, 0)}{U^P(\theta_0, 1) - U^P(\theta_0, 0)} > \frac{p\left(x|\theta_1\right) u\left(\theta_1, 1 - P\left(x|\theta_1\right)\right)}{p\left(x|\theta_0\right) u\left(\theta_0, 1 - P\left(x|\theta_0\right)\right)}.$$

(iii*) $|u(\theta, 1 - P(x|\theta))|$ log-supermodular over $\left\{(\theta, x) \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \times \mathbb{R} : u(\theta, 1 - P(x|\theta)) \leq 0\right\}$.

Generalizations

Theorem 6

Suppose $p(x|\theta)$ *log-supermodular and Conditions PC, FB, and M* hold. Given any regular policy* Γ*, there exists regular deterministic binary monotone policy* $\Gamma^{\hat{\theta}} = (\{0,1\}, \pi^{\hat{\theta}})$ *satisfying PCP and s.t., when agents play according to MARP under both* Γ *and* $\Gamma^{\hat{\theta}}$*, PM's payoff weakly higher under* $\Gamma^{\hat{\theta}}$ *than under* Γ*.*

Comparative statics: increase in uncertainty

- Former liabilities: D
- Bank's legacy asset delivers
  - $I(\theta) \in \mathbb{R}$ end of period 1
  - $C(\theta)$ end of period 2
- Bank can issue (i) **new shares** OR (ii) **short-term debt**
- Potential investors submit market orders
- Noise traders $z \sim Q_\theta$

Comparative statics: increase in uncertainty

- $Y(p, \theta, z)$: exogenous demand for shares (alternatively, debt)
- Market clearing price $p^{\star}(\theta, A, z)$ solves

$$q + 1 - A = A + Y(p^{\star}, \theta, z).$$

- Default:

$$R(\theta, A, z) = I(\theta) + \rho_S q p^{\star}(\theta, A, z) - D \leq 0$$

Comparative statics: increase in uncertainty

Analysis can be used to study

- effect of different recapitalization policies
  - (q_E, q_D)
- role of uncertainty for toughness of optimal stress tests
  - uncertainty about bank's profitability: σ
  - uncertainty about macro variables: z

Proposition 1

There exists $\bar{\sigma} > 0$ *such that, for any* $\sigma, \sigma' \in (0, \bar{\sigma}]$, *with* $\sigma' > \sigma$: $\theta_E^*(\sigma') < \theta_E^*(\sigma)$ *and* $\theta_D^*(\sigma') > \theta_D^*(\sigma)$.

Conclusions

- Public information design under adversarial coordination
- Key properties:
  - Perfect coordination property ("right" notion of transparency)
  - Optimality of Pass/Fail policies
  - Monotone rules
- Extension 1: PM uncertain about mkt's beliefs
  - robust-undominated design (see also Dworczak & Pavan (2021))
- Extension 2: Elicitation and persuasion (see also Inostroza (2021))

THANKS!

PCP Proof

- Let $r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) \in \{0, 1\}$ be default outcome at $\omega \equiv (\theta, \mathbf{x}, s)$ when agents play according to a^{Γ}

- Let $\Gamma^* = \{S^*, \pi^*\}$ be s.t. $S^* = S \times \{0, 1\}$ and

  $\pi^*((s, r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}))|\theta) = \pi(s|\theta)$, all (θ, s) s.t. $\pi(s|\theta) > 0$

- After receiving $s^* \equiv (s, 1)$, agents use Bayes' rule to update beliefs about $\omega \equiv (\theta, \mathbf{x}, s)$:

$$\partial \Lambda_i^{\Gamma^*}(\omega|x_i, (s, 1)) = \frac{1\{r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) = 1\}}{\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(1|x_i, s)} \partial \Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(\omega|x_i, s)$$

  where

$$\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(1|x_i, s) \equiv \int_{\{\omega : r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) = 1\}} d\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(\omega|x_i, s)$$

PCP Proof

- Let $a^{\Gamma}_{(n)}$, $a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n)}$ be most aggressive profile surviving n round of IDISDS under Γ and Γ^*, respectively

Definition 2

Strategy profile $a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n)}$ less aggressive than $a^{\Gamma}_{(n)}$ iff, for any $i \in [0,1]$,

$$a^{\Gamma}_{(n),i}(x_i, s) = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n),i}(x_i, (s,1)) = 1$$

Lemma 1

For any n, $a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n)}$ *less aggressive than* $a^{\Gamma}_{(n)}$

PCP Proof

- Induction
- Let $a_0^\Gamma = a_0^{\Gamma^*}$ be strategy profile where all agents refrain from pledging, regardless of their (endogenous and exogenous) information
- Suppose that $a_{(n-1)}^{\Gamma^*}$ less aggressive than $a_{(n-1)}^\Gamma$
- Note that $r(\omega|a^\Gamma) = 0 \Rightarrow r(\omega|a_{(n-1)}^\Gamma) = 0$
  ($a_{(n-1)}^\Gamma$ more aggressive than $a^\Gamma = a_\infty^\Gamma$)
- Hence, $r(\omega; a^\Gamma) = 1$ "removes" from support of agents' beliefs states $\omega = (\theta, \mathbf{x}, s)$ for which default occurs under $a_{(n-1)}^\Gamma$

PCP Proof

- Payoffs from pledging in case of default are negative
- Payoff from **pledging** under Γ^* when agents follow $a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_i^{\Gamma^*}(x_i,(s,1);a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}) = & \quad \frac{\int_\omega u(\theta,A(\omega;a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}))1\{r(\omega;a^{\Gamma})=1\}d\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(\omega|x_i,s)}{\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(1|x_i,s)} \\
> & \quad \frac{\int_\omega u(\theta,A(\omega;a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}))d\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(\omega|x_i,s)}{\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(1|x_i,s)} \\
= & \quad \frac{U_i^{\Gamma}(x_i,s;a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)})}{\Lambda_i^{\Gamma}(1|x_i,s)}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Hence, $U_i^{\Gamma}(x_i,s;a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}) > 0 \Rightarrow U_i^{\Gamma^*}(x_i,(s,1);a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}) > 0$

PCP Proof

- That $a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n-1)}$ less aggressive than $a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)}$ along with supermodularity of game implies that

$$U_i^{\Gamma^*}(x_i,(s,1);a^{\Gamma}_{(n-1)})>0 \Rightarrow U_i^{\Gamma^*}(x_i,(s,1);a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n-1)})>0$$

- As a consequence,

$$a^{\Gamma}_{(n),i}(x_i,s)=1 \;\Rightarrow\; a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n),i}(x_i,(s,1))=1$$

- This means that $a^{\Gamma^*}_{(n)}$ less aggressive than $a^{\Gamma}_{(n)}$.

PCP Proof

- Above lemma implies MARP under Γ^*, $a^{\Gamma^*} \equiv a^{\Gamma^*}_{(\infty)}$, less aggressive than MARP under Γ, $a^{\Gamma} \equiv a^{\Gamma}_{(\infty)}$
- In turn, this implies that $r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) = 1$ makes it common certainty that $r(\omega; a^{\Gamma^*}) = 1$
- Hence, all agents pledge after hearing that $r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) = 1$
- Similarly, $r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) = 0$ makes it common certainty that $\theta \leq 1$. Under MARP, all agents refrain from pledging when hearing that $r(\omega; a^{\Gamma}) = 0$

Go back

Example-PF



- Assume $g(\theta) = k$, $b(\theta) = -k$
- Pledging rationalizable iff $Pr(r = 1) \geq 1/2$

Example PF/Suboptimality



- No disclosure: under MARP, $a_i^{\Gamma}(x_i) = 0$, all x_i

Example P/F Suboptimality



- Suppose PM informs agents of whether θ is extreme or intermediate
- $a_i^{\Gamma}(x_i, s) = 1$, all (x_i, s)

Example P/F Suboptimality



- If, instead, PM only recommends to pledge (equivalently, Γ is pass/fail): $a_i^\Gamma(x_i, 1) = 0$ for all x_i
- **Suboptimality of P/F policies (+ failure of RP)**

Go back