

Decomposition and Interpretation of Treatment Effects in Settings with Delayed Outcomes*

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Abstract

This paper studies settings where the analyst is interested in identifying and estimating the average causal effect of a binary treatment on an outcome. We consider a setup in which the outcome realization does not get immediately realized after the treatment assignment, a feature that is ubiquitous in empirical settings. The period between the treatment and the realization of the outcome allows other observed actions to occur and affect the outcome. In this context, we study several regression-based estimands routinely used in empirical work to capture the average treatment effect and shed light on interpreting them in terms of ceteris paribus effects, indirect causal effects, and selection terms. We obtain three main and related takeaways. First, the three most popular estimands do not generally satisfy what we call *strong sign preservation*, in the sense that these estimands may be negative even when the treatment positively affects the outcome conditional on any possible combination of other actions. Second, the most popular regression that includes the other actions as controls satisfies strong sign preservation *if and only if* these actions are mutually exclusive binary variables. Finally, we show that a linear regression that fully stratifies the other actions leads to estimands that satisfy strong sign preservation.

KEYWORDS: delayed outcomes, treatment effects, regression, total effects, partial effects, indirect effects, sign preservation.

JEL classification codes: C12, C14.

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1 Introduction

We study settings where the analyst is interested in identifying and estimating an average causal effect of a binary treatment on an outcome, and the treatment status is determined in the context of a randomized controlled experiment or an observational study under conditional independence assumptions. We focus on settings where the outcome of interest does not get immediately realized after treatment assignment, a feature that is ubiquitous in empirical settings, including the study of long-run effects in economic history (Nunn, 2008; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Juhász, 2018; Angelucci et al., 2022), the analysis of long-term valuation in industry settings (Jain and Singh, 2002; Akhtari et al., 2021), and randomized experiments in economics and other social sciences (Beaman et al., 2013; Moderna, 2021). The delay in the realization of the outcomes creates a time window between the treatment assignment and the realization of the outcome that, in turn, opens up the possibility for other observed endogenous actions to take place before the outcome is finally realized; see Figure 1 for a graphical representation. In this context, we study the interpretation of several popular estimands that arise from running regressions of the outcome on the treatment and different ways of “controlling” for the other actions. We emphasize that our use of the term “regression” refers to a linear projection that is free of any modeling assumptions on potential outcomes or conditional means. Some of these estimands are not only popular in the economics literature, see, e.g., Fagereng et al. (2021); Heckman et al. (2013); Chernozhukov et al. (2021), but are also widely used across other social sciences, like psychology and political science, as shown by the large number of citations (over 120K) associated with the regression approach popularized by Baron and Kenny (1986). For each of these estimands, our results present a decomposition that facilitates their interpretation in terms of *ceteris paribus* effects of the treatment on the outcomes, indirect effects caused by the other actions, and selection terms; and provide a framework that allows us to clarify under what type of conditions the practice of “controlling” for the presence of other actions leads to estimands that admit the desired interpretation.

The main findings of this paper can be grouped into three sets of results. First, the standard practice of studying estimands that arise from a regression of an outcome on the treatment, with or without “controlling” for the other actions in such regressions, does not satisfy what we call *strong sign preservation*. Strong sign preservation, formally characterized in Definition 3.3, is satisfied when an estimand that intends to measure a *ceteris paribus* causal effect of a treatment on an outcome is positive when the effect of the treatment on the outcome is positive conditional on *all* possible values of the other actions. Failure to satisfy strong sign preservation introduces a Simpson’s Paradox-like sign reversal where the estimands may be negative even when the treatment positively affects the outcome for any possible combination of other actions. Second, the most popular estimand that linearly controls for the other actions in the regression, and that

we label the long regression, does not generally provide benefits relative to the short regression that includes no controls whatsoever. More concretely, while neither the short nor the long regression satisfies strong sign preservation, the estimand associated with the long regression admits a decomposition in terms of weighted averages of well-defined causal effects but where the weights could potentially be negative. This feature introduces yet another source that may separate the sign of the estimand from the sign of *ceteris paribus* causal effects. Notably, this feature also occurs when the regression includes interaction terms between the treatment and the other actions. Perhaps our most salient result is the one in Theorem 4.2, which shows that the long regression delivers easy-to-interpret results *if and only if* the other actions are all binary and mutually exclusive random variables. Finally, while the non-parametric identification of the effects we study is straightforward under the stronger version of our identifying assumptions and immediately follows from a saturated regression, we also show that a linear regression that correctly controls for the other actions by complete stratification (an approach we label as the strata fixed effects regression due to its connection with the standard practice of including strata fixed effects in randomized controlled trials with covariate adaptive randomization; see Bugni et al. (2018, 2019)) always leads to estimands that automatically satisfy strong sign preservation.

The decompositions we derive for each of the five estimands we study can be interpreted as decomposing a “total” effect into a “direct” and an “indirect” effect (and possibly “selection” effect depending on the assumptions), and so our results are linked to the vast literature on mediation analysis, see, e.g., Baron and Kenny (1986), Pearl (2001), Robins (2003), Imai et al. (2010), Glynn (2012), and Remark 2.1 for a discussion. However, as opposed to the literature on mediation that studies the type of assumptions that would identify the causal effects of the so-called *mediators*, which in our context would simply be the other actions taken before the outcome is realized, here our goal is not to identify these indirect effects but rather to gain a better understanding of how to properly interpret certain popular estimands of the effect of the treatment on the outcome. Despite the different goals, our results speak directly to the dominant empirical practice in the mediation literature and point to limitations in the scope of such a practice. In particular, we show that the validity of the long regression (and the long regression with interaction terms) not only depends on identifying assumptions like sequential ignorability as shown by Imai et al. (2010), but also on the mediators being scalar valued and a correctly specified linear model for potential outcomes.

Beyond the literature on mediation analysis, our paper also connects to several strands of research in econometrics and biostatistics. First, we are not the first to acknowledge the importance of the distinctions between “partial” and “total” causal effects in the econometrics literature, where early discussions include those in Manski (1997) and Heckman (2000); see Remark 3.1. For example, Manski (1997, pages 1321

and 1323) provides two interpretations of potential outcomes (one that keeps other actions fixed and another one that lets the other actions change in response to treatment) and clarifies that the interpretation of treatment effects depends on how we think about potential outcomes. Our goal in this paper is not to dwell on discussions about the relative merits of partial or total effects, but rather seek to understand when and how commonly used estimands in empirical work admit either of these interpretations. Second, our results are also related to a large body of research that interprets regression-based estimands in various contexts and finds characterizations in terms of weighted averages of causal effects of interest, including the possibility of negative weights. Examples include [De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille \(2020\)](#); [Goodman-Bacon \(2021\)](#); [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#); [Borusyak et al. \(2022\)](#); [Athey and Imbens \(2022\)](#) in the case of two-way fixed effect estimands in difference in difference settings, [Heckman and Vytlacil \(2001\)](#); [Canay et al. \(2023\)](#) in the case of local instrumental variable estimands in marginal treatment effects settings, [Angrist \(1998\)](#); [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2022\)](#) in the case of contamination bias in regressions with covariate adjustments, and [Zhao and Ding \(2022\)](#) in the case of factor-based regressions in factorial experiments from a design-based perspective. The connection to all these papers is algebraic and mechanical, by virtue of shared basic properties of least squares, but the specific concerns and questions we consider here, as well as the main lessons from our analysis, are distinct. Third, our results on the failure of strong sign preservation of the popular estimands are also related to the so-called “surrogate paradox” in the literature on surrogacy, where the effect of the treatment on the surrogate could be positive, the surrogate and outcome could be positively correlated, yet the effect of the treatment on the outcome could be negative, see, e.g., [VanderWeele \(2013\)](#); [Chen et al. \(2007\)](#). Fourth, the decompositions we derive for the specific case of the short regression are analogous to those derived in the literature on causal interactive effects, where units may be subject to multiple types of exposures (say, genetic and environmental), see, e.g., [VanderWeele and Tchetgen \(2014\)](#); [Robins and Greenland \(1992\)](#). Our focus on a variety of regression estimands, however, is distinct. Finally, an important characteristic of our setting is that the analyst observes the other actions, and this separates the types of concerns we focus on from those related to unobserved factors that may affect the outcome and may be affected by the treatment, see, e.g., [Rosenzweig and Wolpin \(2000\)](#).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic notation and provides motivating examples. Section 3 defines the main concepts we use throughout the paper, including partial causal effects, direct causal effects, and strong sign preservation. Section 4 introduces the five estimands we study, the short regression, the long regression, the long regression with interactions, the strata fixed effects regression, and the saturated regression, and then presents the main results on how each of these estimands admits different decompositions into direct, indirect, and selection effects. Finally, Section 5 concludes.




Figure 1: Timeline of actions. The first action, D , is assumed to be (conditionally) exogenous and is the main action of interest (so we refer to it as the treatment). The outcome is not instantaneous and may take a short or long period of time to get realized. In the meantime, units choose the value of the other actions A_1, \dots, A_K .

2 Setup and Notation

Consider a setting where Y denotes the (observed) outcome of interest, \tilde{A} denotes a vector of actions that the individuals or units under study may take, and X denotes observed covariates that include features beyond actions. We partition the vector of actions \tilde{A} into the main action of interest, denoted by D , and “other” actions, denoted by A , i.e.,

$$\tilde{A} = (D, A) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A} . \quad (1)$$

All actions are assumed to be discrete, with the main action, D , further assumed to be binary, i.e., $\mathcal{D} \equiv \{0, 1\}$. The other actions, A , are a K -dimensional vector taking values in

$$\mathcal{A} \equiv \{a = (a_1, \dots, a_K) : a_j \in \mathcal{A}_j \text{ and } j = 1, \dots, K\} , \quad (2)$$

where $\mathcal{A}_j \subseteq \mathbb{N}$, $0 \in \mathcal{A}_j$, and $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ when $|\mathcal{A}_j| = 2$. That is, A_j can take arbitrary values in \mathbb{N} as long as 0 is always in the support and that A_j is binary when \mathcal{A}_j only has two elements.

The setting we study in this paper is one with the following characteristics. First, the analyst controls the action of interest D via a randomized controlled experiment (or, alternatively, by an exogeneity assumption like selection on observables). We therefore alternatively call this action the “treatment”. Second, the outcome Y is not instantaneous and takes some time to get realized within the timeline of the experiment. In the period in-between the treatment assignment and the realization of the outcome, the other actions contained in A get chosen by the units participating in the experiment. Figure 1 illustrates the setting. Below we describe some empirical applications in economics, social sciences, and industry that naturally fit into this setting.

The first class of applications that fit our framework is the literature that study long-run outcomes in economics. There, interest typically lies in a treatment that happened several years in the past (oftentimes hundreds of years ago) on some outcome of interest

in more recent times. For example, [Voigtländer and Voth \(2012\)](#) study the effect of the existence of Black Death pogroms in 1349 (D) on the level of anti-Semitism in the Nazi Germany in 1920s (Y) at the city level. Other actions that are included in the analysis include city population in 1920s (A), among other variables that are determined closer to the realization of the outcomes. Other examples include [Nunn \(2008\)](#); [Juhász \(2018\)](#); [Angelucci et al. \(2022\)](#), among many others. In these applications it is common to argue that the treatment is exogenous invoking selection on observables assumptions or, in some cases, relying on instrumental variables approaches. Our results are limited to settings exploiting conditional exogeneity.

The second class of applications include the analysis of long-term valuation in marketing and industry. There, the company (Uber, Google, AirBnb, Microsoft, etc) owns a platform where customers can engage in a variety of products offered by the platform (e.g., buying an item, leaving a review, making a reservation, ordering a delivery, subscribing to membership benefits, renting a movie, etc.) and is interested in measuring how much value (in the long run) a certain product brings to the company; see [Jain and Singh \(2002\)](#) for a review of the literature on life-time valuation in marketing. For example, [Akhtari et al. \(2021\)](#) discuss how AirBnB measures long-term value of actions and events that take place on their platform. The main case discussed in [Akhtari et al. \(2021\)](#) is the effect of a guest making a booking at AirBnB (D) on long-term impact (Y), where long-term impact is measured as the revenue created by the guest over 365 days. Other actions A would capture other relevant actions, most notably, cancellations, leaving a review on the platform, etc. While it is often possible to rely on randomized experiments to measure the causal effects of some of these actions, see, e.g., [Huang et al. \(2018\)](#), others are difficult to evaluate using experiments due to ethical, legal, or user experience concerns. In these cases, it is common practice to rely on selection on observables assumptions, and focus on a given action of interest at a time.

The third class of applications include clinical trials and randomized experiments with a follow up period between the treatment assignment and the realization of the outcome of interest. There, researchers typically fully control the assignment of the main treatment of interest but are unable to restrict behaviour in the follow up period. For example, the clinical trial run by [Moderna \(2021\)](#) to study the efficacy of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 infections. Participants in the study were randomized to Immediate Vaccination Group 1 (receiving the Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine on Day 1 and Day 29) or Standard of Care Group 2, with vaccination given at months 4 and 5. During the months following vaccinations, participants received visits that checked for infections and could include blood collection, nasal swabs, SARS-CoV-2 screening, COVID-19 symptom check, and questionnaires. In this example, D would be an indicator of whether the participant received a vaccine, Y would be an indicator of whether the participant got infected within the 4 months of the study, and A

would include other actions taken by the participants that could affect infection rates, like whether the participants wear masks in public, whether the participants avoid large gatherings, etc.¹ Another example is [Beaman et al. \(2013\)](#), who conduct a field experiment that provides free fertilizer to women rice farmers in Mali to measure how farmers choose to use the fertilizer and the overall impact on profitability. The authors distributed the fertilizer in May 2020 and conducted two follow-up surveys, one in August 2020 and one in December 2020, right after the harvest. In this example, D would be an indicator of whether the farmer received free fertilizer, Y would be a measure of output like crop yield or just profits, and A would include all relevant complementary agricultural inputs, such as labor, herbicides, and water usage. Due to its simplicity, we use this example to illustrate the concepts we define in the next section.

Remark 2.1. What we call the other actions in Figure 1 can be alternatively labeled as “mediator” variables since these are post-treatment variables that occur before the outcome is realized, see, e.g., [Baron and Kenny \(1986\)](#), [Pearl \(2001\)](#), [Robins \(2003\)](#), [Imai et al. \(2010\)](#), [Glynn \(2012\)](#), and [Hernan and Robins \(2023, Ch. 23\)](#) for a recent book treatment. However, our work deviates from this literature in two important ways. First, while the literature on causal mediation analysis focuses on the identification of causal effects induced by mediators, our focus in this paper is to understand whether common estimands that are used to capture causal effects of main action D on the outcome Y admit clear interpretations through the lens of total and direct effects. Second, our decompositions in terms of direct and indirect effects are defined in terms of potential values for all of the actions, including those that may be labeled as mediators, and this implies “indirect” effects in our context do not coincide with the definition of indirect effects in the mediation literature but rather with the so-called “controlled” effects discussed by [Pearl \(2001\)](#) and [Robins \(2003\)](#); see Remark 3.2 for additional discussion on this distinction. It is worth noting, however, that several of our results have implications for the causal mediation literature, and we discuss these implications as we present our main results. ■

Remark 2.2. The problems associated with the presence of the other actions A could arise in settings that do not require the presence of “delayed outcomes”. For example, the factorial experiments considered by [Zhao and Ding \(2022\)](#), the problems associated with “bad controls” discussed by [Angrist and Pischke \(2008\)](#), or the mediation framework described in Remark 2.1, are all about endogenous actions that are not necessarily related to delayed outcomes. While we do not need to invoke delayed outcomes to introduce the type of interpretation challenges we discuss here, we choose to do so because it directly speaks to the examples that motivated this paper. ■

¹In this paper we abstract away from spillover effects between individuals, which could be relevant in the context of this and other examples we describe.

We denote potential outcomes by $Y(d, a)$ and their expectation by

$$\mu(d, a) \equiv E[Y(d, a)] . \quad (3)$$

Depending on the setting, we may expand a into (a_1, \dots, a_K) and write $Y(d, a_1, \dots, a_K)$ instead of $Y(d, a)$, although we prioritize the more concise notation whenever possible. We also introduce the concept of a pooled potential outcome to isolate the counterfactual outcome associated with the main action of interest (the treatment),

$$Y(d) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} Y(d, a) I\{A(d) = a\} , \quad (4)$$

where $A(d)$ denotes potential outcomes for the actions A as a function of the treatment d . Finally, the observed outcome Y is related to potential outcomes by the relationship

$$Y = \sum_{(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}} Y(d, a) I\{(D, A) = (d, a)\} . \quad (5)$$

With this notation, we can state our basic maintained assumption as follows, where we denote by X the covariates or pre-determined variables.

Assumption 2.1. For all $d \in \mathcal{D}$, $D \perp Y(d) \mid X$.

Assumption 2.1 can be obtained by the design of the experiment (as in [Beaman et al., 2013](#)) or by relying on a rich set of covariates that would make the exogeneity requirement credible (as assumed in [Akhtari et al., 2021](#)). As we will discuss in the next sections, while this assumption is enough to identify certain types of “total” effects of D on Y and is a natural starting point to uncover causal effects of D on Y , it does not lead to clean interpretations of *ceteris paribus* causal effects. For this reason, we also consider a stronger version of this assumption that requires conditional exogeneity of potential outcomes with respect to A as well. Formally, we state this as follows.

Assumption 2.2. For all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$, $(D, A) \perp Y(d, a) \mid X$.

Assumption 2.2 essentially re-interprets the problem as a problem of multiple conditionally exogenous treatments where, out of all possible treatments (D, A) , the analyst is interested in the effect of D only. As such, it may not be credible in settings where a randomized controlled experiment randomly assigned D across units but not A , but it is often invoked in settings where the main identification argument relies on selection on observables. The assumption is strong in the sense that it is sufficient to non-parametrically identify $\mu(d, a)$ from the data via the approach in [Section 4.5](#); yet it is not strong enough to deliver a clean interpretation of popular estimands that are often used in practice, as we show in the next sections. In addition, it is worth noting

that this assumption is implied by the so-called sequential ignorability assumption, a commonly used assumption in the literature on mediation analysis; see Section 4.2.

Remark 2.3. All the parameters we consider in this paper are characterized by conditional means. It would then be sufficient for all of our formal results to work with versions of Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 that only require conditional mean independence, as opposed to full independence. We choose to maintain full independence for clarity. ■

3 Causal Treatment Effects

We start by discussing the type of counterfactual treatment effects that could interest the researcher in the canonical setting where D is binary. Viewing $Y(d, a)$ as a function of two types of actions immediately suggests that there could be partial effects, total effects, direct effects, and indirect effects, all of which may or may not be of interest in the context of a concrete application. Understanding the variety of causal effects that one could describe, in turn, will help us provide representations and interpretations of commonly used target parameters, like the average treatment effect (ATE), in terms of these types of causal effects. We start with what is perhaps one of the most natural types of *ceteris paribus* effects in Definition 3.1.

Definition 3.1 (Average Partial Causal Effect). An **average partial causal effect** of D on the outcome Y is any difference of the form $\mu(d, a) - \mu(d', a)$, where the value $a \in \mathcal{A}$ is kept constant.

Definition 3.1 defines an average partial causal effect of the main action as a mean comparison that keeps the value of the other actions unchanged in both states of the comparison. In the farming application of Beaman et al. (2013), it would capture the average causal effect of using fertilizer on the crop yield, while keeping other inputs, like labor, herbicides, and water usage, constant in the counterfactual comparison.

The *ceteris paribus* effect in Definition 3.1 could also be defined conditional on certain events or subpopulations. In order to account for this, we also consider the concept in Definition 3.1 conditional on some set Ω , i.e.,

$$E[Y(d, a) - Y(d', a) \mid \Omega] , \quad (6)$$

where Ω is a function of (D, A, X) . For example, $\Omega = I\{D = 1\}$ would lead to an average partial causal effect on the treated and $\Omega = I\{X = x\}$ would lead to an average partial causal effect for units with covariates x .

The definition of a partial causal effect for the main action delivers a potentially different causal effect for each possible value of the other actions or, alternatively, provides

a collection of partial causal effects indexed by $a \in \mathcal{A}$. While the goal could just be to identify such a collection of effects, in many settings it may be natural to aggregate this collection of partial effects in a way that summarizes the effect of the main action on the outcome of interest. The following definition defines a direct causal effect as any weighted average of partial causal effects.

Definition 3.2 (Average Direct Causal Effect). The **average direct causal effect** of D on the outcome Y is any convex combination of average partial causal effects of D on Y . That is,

$$\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega(a) (\mu(d', a) - \mu(d, a)) , \quad (7)$$

where $\omega(a) \in [0, 1]$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega(a) = 1$.

In the context of our farming example with A only capturing low and high water usage for simplicity, the parameter (7) combines the average causal effect of using fertilizer on the crop yield for units with high water usage, say $A = 1$, and units with low water usage, say $A = 0$. Average direct causal effects could be defined conditional on a set Ω by weighting terms like those in (6). The definition does not determine how the groups are weighted, but it requires that no group is assigned a negative weight. In this sense, any average direct causal effect satisfies *strong sign preservation*, as defined below.

Definition 3.3 (Strong Sign Preservation). A parameter Δ that measures a causal effect of the main action D on the outcome Y satisfies **strong sign preservation** if

$$\mu(d', a) - \mu(d, a) > 0 \text{ for all } a \in \mathcal{A} \text{ implies } \Delta > 0 .$$

In our farming example with A only capturing low and high water usage, strong sign preservation of a parameter Δ implies that whenever fertilizers improve the expected crop yield both for units with high water usage and units with low water usage, Δ should be positive as well. As the name suggests, strong sign preservation does not allow for the possibility of what it is typically referred to as *sign reversal*, understood as a situation where $\Delta < 0$ when $\mu(d', a) - \mu(d, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

Remark 3.1. While strong sign preservation may be perceived as a key requirement for parameters that intend to identify partial causal effects, it may not be a reasonable requirement in settings where the counter-factual question of interest involves total effects, as introduced and discussed in the next section. The distinctions between “partial” and “total” causal effects have appeared in the literature in a variety of contexts, even beyond the mediation analysis literature discussed in Remark 2.1, where Pearl (2001) and Robins (2003) provide comprehensive treatments on these distinctions. For example, Heckman (2000) defines a causal effect as a partial derivative and states that while the assumption that an isolated action can be varied independently of others is strong but

“...essential to the definition of a causal parameter”. In fact, [Heckman \(2000, page 47\)](#) writes “Defining causality within a model is relatively straightforward when the causes can be independently varied. Defining causality when the causes are interrelated is less straightforward and is a major achievement of econometrics”. [Manski \(1997, page 1321 and 1323\)](#), in turn, provides two interpretations of potential outcomes (one that keeps other actions fixed and another one that lets the other actions change in response to the main action) and clarifies that the interpretation of treatment effects depends on how we think about potential outcomes. Here, we do not dwell on discussions about the relative merits of partial or total effects but rather seek to understand whether commonly used estimands in empirical work admit either of these (commonly sought after) interpretations under different assumptions. ■

Remark 3.2. Our definitions of average causal partial effects and average direct causal effects are not analogous to the notions of total causal effects, causal mediation effects, and natural direct effects that are commonly used in the mediation analysis literature. For example, the average natural direct effect corresponds to $E[Y(1, A(0)) - Y(0, A(0))]$ in our notation, where $A(d)$ denotes potential outcomes for the actions A as a function of the treatment d . Contrary to these types of effects that are defined in terms of potential actions, $A(d)$, the effects we focus on in this paper are defined in terms of specific values of the actions A , say $A = a$ for any $a \in \mathcal{A}$, and are therefore analogous to the notions of a controlled effect that have been discussed in [Pearl \(2001\)](#); [Robins \(2003\)](#), among others. ■

4 Decomposing Common Estimands

In this section we analyze five natural and highly popular estimands intended to capture treatment effects of D on Y . For each of these estimands, we derive a decomposition in terms of parameters that can be labeled according to [Definitions 3.1 and 3.2](#) and discuss under what assumptions they can be interpreted as intended. In order to keep our exposition as simple as possible and be able to zoom-in on the type of concerns we intend to highlight, in what follows we abstract away from issues related to improper control of the covariates X . In other words, we ignore the role of the covariates in the type of regressions we consider. This could be interpreted as a situation where the covariates are discrete, and the regressions are viewed as within-cell regressions with cells given by $X = x$, or more generally, where the covariates have been already accounted for by other means, like clustering or via a partially linear model, among many possibilities. In particular, we do not consider the possibility that the analyst improperly controls for these covariates by simply including a linear term in X in the regressions, as this would create additional problems to those discussed here; see [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2022\)](#) for a detailed treatment on the consequences of not properly controlling for confounders.

We also re-iterate that our use of the term “regression” refers to a linear projection that is free of any modeling assumptions on potential outcomes or conditional means.

The first such estimand is the usual difference in means, which we write here as the slope coefficient Δ_{short} in a regression (projection) of Y on D and a constant term,

$$\textbf{short regression: } Y = \beta + \Delta_{\text{short}}D + U , \quad (8)$$

where $E[UD] = 0$ by properties of projections and $E[U|D] = 0$ follows from D being binary. We call this the short regression.

The second estimand is the slope coefficient D in a linear regression of Y on D , a constant term, and the K actions A_1, \dots, A_K ,

$$\textbf{long regression: } Y = \Delta_{\text{long}}D + \theta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^K \theta_j A_j + V , \quad (9)$$

where $E[VD] = E[VA_j] = 0$ by properties of projections. We call this the long regression.

The third estimand is the slope coefficient D in a linear regression of Y on D , a constant term, the K actions A_1, \dots, A_K , and their interactions with D ,

$$\textbf{long reg. with interactions: } Y = \Delta_{\text{inter}}D + \theta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^K \theta_j A_j + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j A_j D + e , \quad (10)$$

where $E[eD] = E[eA_j] = E[eA_j D] = 0$ by properties of projections. We call this the long regression with interactions. Note that this is not a fully saturated regression in general, since the random variables A_j is allowed to take arbitrary values in \mathbb{N} .

The fourth estimand is the slope coefficient D in a regression of Y on D and a set of indicator functions for all the values that A takes,

$$\textbf{sfe regression: } Y = \Delta_{\text{sfe}}D + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \theta(a)I\{A = a\} + \nu , \quad (11)$$

where $E[\nu D] = E[\nu I\{A = a\}] = 0$ by properties of projections. Note that this is a regression of Y on D with “strata fixed effects”, where the event $\{A = a\}$ defines a stratum for each value of a . As a result, we call this the strata fixed effect (sfe) regression. The regression in (11) can also be interpreted as a regression of Y on D and A where the linear component that captures the effect of A is fully saturated; i.e.,

$$\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \theta(a)I\{A = a\} = \sum_{a_1 \in \mathcal{A}_1} \sum_{a_2 \in \mathcal{A}_2} \cdots \sum_{a_K \in \mathcal{A}_K} \theta(a)I\{A_1 = a_1\}I\{A_2 = a_2\} \cdots I\{A_K = a_K\} .$$

The last set of estimands are the slope coefficients $\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a)$, for $a \in \mathcal{A}$, in a saturated regression of Y on a set of indicator functions for all the values that A takes and their interactions with D ,

$$\text{sat regression: } Y = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \gamma(a) I\{A = a\} + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) I\{A = a\} D + \epsilon, \quad (12)$$

where $E[\epsilon D I\{A = a\}] = 0$ by properties of projections and $E[\epsilon | D, I\{A = a\}] = 0$ follows from D and $I\{A = a\}$ being binary for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$. We call this the saturated (sat) regression.

Remark 4.1. The use of short, long, and interaction regressions in the social science literature is ubiquitous; see [Zhao and Ding \(2022\)](#) for a recent analysis on the properties of these regressions in factorial experiments from a design-based perspective. When [Glynn \(2012\)](#) discusses the popularity of these regressions, he writes that long regressions are so pervasive within the social science and empirical mediation literature that “examples are too numerous to cite.” Indeed, [Baron and Kenny \(1986\)](#), the paper that largely established the use of these and related regressions, has over 122,000 citations as of 2023. ■

4.1 Short regression

The short regression is algebraically very simple, so we build up toward the main result introducing the main concepts and notation along the way. The other regressions, on the contrary, have more opaque derivations, and so in those cases, we first present the formal results and then discuss their interpretation.

The slope coefficient Δ_{short} in (8) equals $\Delta_{\text{short}} = E[Y|D = 1] - E[Y|D = 0]$ by elementary arguments. If we define

$$\pi_d(a) \equiv P\{A = a | D = d\}, \quad (13)$$

and note that

$$E[Y|D = d] = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} E[Y(d, a) | D = d, A = a] \pi_d(a),$$

we can decompose Δ_{short} into the following three terms,

$$\Delta_{\text{short}} = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^s + \Delta_{\text{ind}}^s + \Delta_{\text{sel}}^s \quad (14)$$

where

$$\Delta_{\text{dce}}^s \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] \quad (15)$$

$$\Delta_{\text{ind}}^s \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)) (E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0) | D = 0, A = 0]) \quad (16)$$

$$\Delta_{\text{sel}}^s \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) (E[Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a]) . \quad (17)$$

The three terms in the above decomposition for Δ_{short} have a clear interpretation and show that there are two channels of endogeneity introduced by the fact that the other actions, A , take place in-between the treatment assignment and the realization of the outcome of interest. The term in (15), Δ_{dce}^s , captures an average direct causal effect on the treated, as in Definition 3.2. Note that this term conditions on $\Omega = I\{D = 1, A = a\}$ and so it is a conditional effect like those defined in (6). The term in (16), Δ_{ind}^s , admits a clean interpretation for each value $a \in \mathcal{A}$ under additional assumptions we introduce below. Without additional assumptions, this term is a type of “indirect” effect that contains the product of the difference in conditional probabilities, $\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)$, and a term that confounds the average partial causal effect of A moving from 0 to a on Y , with selection that arises from the distinct conditioning sets $\{D = 0, A = a\}$ and $\{D = 0, A = 0\}$. Finally, the term in (17), Δ_{sel}^s , is a selection term that captures the fact that the action $A = a$ may not be independent of $Y(0, a)$ and D .

Two points are worth highlighting. First, the above decomposition does not invoke either Assumption 2.1 or Assumption 2.2. Importantly, while Assumption 2.1 guarantees that

$$\Delta_{\text{short}} = E[E[Y | D = 1, X] - E[Y | D = 0, X]] = E[Y(1) - Y(0)] , \quad (18)$$

where $Y(d)$ are the pooled potential outcomes in (4), it is not enough to characterize Δ_{short} as an average direct causal effect or as a parameter that satisfies strong sign preservation. In particular, the two endogeneity channels, Δ_{ind}^s and Δ_{sel}^s , in the decomposition of Δ_{short} could be positive or negative and, more importantly, lead to Δ_{short} to have the opposite sign to Δ_{dce}^s . Second, the two endogeneity channels, Δ_{ind}^s and Δ_{sel}^s , are conceptually different. While the channels entering the term Δ_{ind}^s are difficult to shut down, the selection term Δ_{sel}^s can be set equal to zero under Assumption 2.2.

Under Assumption 2.2 the three terms entering the decomposition for Δ_{short} simplify

in the following way,

$$\Delta_{\text{dce}}^s = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) (\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)) \quad (19)$$

$$\Delta_{\text{ind}}^s = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)) (\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)) \quad (20)$$

$$\Delta_{\text{sel}}^s = 0 . \quad (21)$$

That is, the first two terms are now a function of the unconditional expectations $\mu(d, a)$ defined in (3), and the selection term Δ_{sel}^s is no longer present. Importantly, the term Δ_{ind}^s is still part of the decomposition since Assumption 2.2 does not restrict how A may affect outcomes, so that $\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0) \neq 0$, nor does it affect how the main action may affect the other ones, so that $\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a) \neq 0$. Aside from removing the term capturing selection bias, Assumption 2.2 also delivers a clean interpretation to the indirect effects captured by Δ_{ind}^s . Each summand in Δ_{ind}^s contains the average partial causal effect of A moving from 0 to a on Y , $\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)$, multiplied by the difference $\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)$, which admits a causal interpretation of an average direct causal effect of D on A under the additional assumption $A(d) \perp D$ - where here we use $A(d)$ to denote potential outcomes for the other actions. As an illustrative example, suppose that

$$\begin{aligned} \mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) &> 0 \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A} \\ \mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0) &< 0 \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A} \\ \pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a) &> 0 \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A} . \end{aligned}$$

That is, D increases the mean outcome for any value of a and also increases the probability that the other actions take the value a , while the other actions decrease the mean outcome relative to $a = 0$ under no treatment ($D = 0$). In this case, Δ_{ind}^s is immediately negative and the sign of Δ_{short} gets determined by the relative magnitudes of Δ_{ind}^s and Δ_{dce}^s . In the other extreme where $\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the decomposition shows that Δ_{short} amplifies the average direct causal effect of D on Y by taking a piece $\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)$ of the effect of A on Y , $\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)$. This shows that Δ_{short} measures a total causal effect of D on Y , as we explain in Remark 4.3 below.

We can interpret the terms entering the decomposition of Δ_{short} in (14) in the context of the examples we introduced in Section 2. For example, in the farming example where Y is crop yield, D is an indicator of the use of fertilizer, and A is, for simplicity, an indicator of high water usage. In this setting, Δ_{dce}^s captures the average direct causal effect of using fertilizer on the crop yield, where the effect weights units with high and low water usage according to the respective probabilities of these actions happening for the treated, $\pi_1(a)$. The term Δ_{ind}^s , in turn, captures a piece of the causal effect of water usage on crop yield that depends on the magnitude of differential water usage between

the treated and the untreated. If water usage causally improves crop yield in the absence of fertilizer, and getting an exogenous fertilizer incentivizes units to increase their water usage, this term would be positive.

The following theorem summarizes our discussion above.

Theorem 4.1. Consider the short regression in (8) and assume $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$. Then, Δ_{short} can be decomposed as in (14)-(17). If Assumption 2.2 holds, then $\Delta_{\text{sel}}^s = 0$ and Δ_{dce}^s and Δ_{ind}^s simplify to the expressions in (19) and (20).

Remark 4.2. It is important to note that, even under the stronger exogeneity condition in Assumption 2.2, the parameter Δ_{short} does not satisfy strong sign preservation as defined in Definition 3.3. Indeed, it is certainly possible that $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and yet $\Delta_{\text{short}} < 0$ due to $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^s < -\Delta_{\text{dce}}^s < 0$. This phenomenon, which is reminiscent of the Simpson’s paradox, is present in similar ways in other causal inference settings; including two-way fixed effects as in De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020) or the surrogate paradox as in VanderWeele (2013). ■

Remark 4.3. Under Assumption 2.2 and $A(d) \perp D$, Δ_{short} is a linear combination of average partial causal effects, and it captures a “total” effect rather than a “partial” effect, as discussed in Remark 3.1. To understand this, notice that Δ_{ind} in (20) is the product of $\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)$ and $\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)$ for each $a \in \mathcal{A}$. Both of these terms are partial effects, where $\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)$ is the average partial effect of D on A and $\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)$ is the average partial effect of moving A from 0 to a on the outcome Y for units with $D = 0$. With this interpretation, Δ_{short} captures a total effect of D on Y that adds up the direct effect of D on Y , captured by Δ_{dce}^s , and the indirect effect that D has on Y via its effect on A and how A affects Y . This distinction between partial and total effects mimics the usual one associated with total and partial derivatives in mathematical analysis. Whether total or partial effects are relevant in the context of a given application has already been discussed elsewhere; see, for example, Manski (1997); Heckman (2000); Imai et al. (2010); Glynn (2012). Our main goal here is to clarify the interpretation of estimands like Δ_{short} in terms of these notions. ■

In what follows, we prioritize results that hold under Assumption 2.2, with discussions on how the main implications would be affected if Assumption 2.2 is replaced by its weaker analog, Assumption 2.1. In general, moving from Assumption 2.2 to Assumption 2.1 in all of the cases we study below leads to the same implication: interpreting the estimands under consideration becomes difficult as a selection term, like Δ_{sel}^s above, becomes present. Indeed, Robins and Greenland (1992) argued early on in the empirical mediation literature that direct and indirect effects cannot be separated in randomized controlled trials without additional assumptions; a problem that at least within the literature in development economics appears to be well understood, see, for example, Mel et al. (2009); Duflo et al. (2011); Beaman et al. (2013).

Assumption 2.2 may be particularly difficult to defend in RCT settings in which only D is randomized. On the other hand, this assumption is more natural in settings in which the identification argument relies on selection on observables, which are commonly used in applications in marketing or the literature on long-term outcomes.

4.2 Long Regression

A seemingly natural, and certainly popular, way to mitigate the presence of indirect effects and obtain an estimand that satisfies strong sign preservation is to control for the other actions linearly as in (9); an approach we called the long regression. Our main result below shows that the slope coefficient Δ_{long} in (9) admits a decomposition similar to that derived by Δ_{short} , and thus includes a combination of direct effects and indirect effects. However, except in some special cases, the coefficients multiplying each average partial causal effect, as in Definition 3.1, could be negative and so Δ_{long} may be negative even in the absence of indirect effects. We formalize this below and provide a proof in Appendix A.

Theorem 4.2. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$ and that the covariance matrix of (D, A) is positive definite. Then, the coefficient Δ_{long} in (9) admits the decomposition

$$\Delta_{\text{long}} = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^1 + \Delta_{\text{ind}}^1, \quad (22)$$

where

$$\Delta_{\text{dce}}^1 \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) (\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)) \quad (23)$$

$$\Delta_{\text{ind}}^1 \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) (\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)), \quad (24)$$

and $\{\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ and $\{\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ are as defined in Theorem A.1 and satisfy $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$. Furthermore, the following statements are equivalent:

- (a) A are mutually exclusive binary variables, i.e., $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for $j = 1, \dots, K$ and $A_j A_l = 0$ for all $j, l = 1, \dots, K$ with $j \neq l$.
- (b) For any distribution of (A, D) , $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) \geq 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$.
- (c) For any distribution of (A, D) , $\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

Theorem 4.2 shows that Δ_{long} can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects, but it leaves open the possibility that the coefficients entering each of these terms could,

in general, be negative. An immediate implication is that, except in the special case where the actions in A are all mutually exclusive binary variables, which includes the case where A is a scalar binary variable as a special case, the term Δ_{dce}^1 could be negative even if $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$. This is because $\omega_{\text{dce}}(a)$ may be negative for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$. As a result, Δ_{long} generally does not satisfy strong sign preservation for the following two reasons. First, it may be possible that $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^1 < -\Delta_{\text{dce}}^1$, so that the indirect effect dominates the direct effect. This phenomenon is the same as the one we discussed for the short regression. Second, even in the absence of indirect effects, where $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^1 = 0$, the term Δ_{dce}^1 could be negative by itself even if $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, due to $\omega_{\text{dce}}(a) < 0$ for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$. This second possibility represents a stark distinction between the long regression estimand, Δ_{long} , and the short regression estimand, Δ_{short} , in the sense that Δ_{long} does not even measure a total causal effect of D on Y without additional assumptions, cf. Remark 4.3. It is also important to highlight that this result does not depend on the distribution of Y given (A, D) , and so Δ_{long} and Δ_{dce}^1 could be arbitrarily negative, even if $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, when the actions are not mutually exclusive and binary.

We emphasize that the results in Theorem 4.2 are all *equivalent*. Obtaining an easy-to-interpret characterization of Δ_{long} in terms of partial effects when the actions are all binary and mutually exclusive should not come as particularly surprising given related results on the properties of this estimand in different but related settings (see, for example, Zhao and Ding, 2022; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2022). To the best of our knowledge, however, a novel lesson of Theorem 4.2 is that this is precisely *the only way* to guarantee a proper weighted average representation for Δ_{long} for any distribution of (A, D) . Importantly, the equivalence we establish in Theorem 4.2 also holds under the weaker Assumption 2.1. In that case, formally presented in Theorem A.1 in the appendix, the decomposition of Δ_{long} includes a selection term Δ_{sel}^1 but the equivalence between the properties of the weights $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a)$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a)$ and the actions A being mutually exclusive binary variables is preserved. This result could also be interpreted in the context of “bad controls” discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2008), as it clarifies the unique way in which seemingly bad controls could actually become “good controls”.

Remark 4.4. Replacing Assumption 2.2 with Assumption 2.1 leads to a decomposition of Δ_{long} that introduces three changes relative to the one in Theorem 4.2. First, the term Δ_{dce}^1 becomes a linear combination of expectations that condition on $\Omega = I\{D = 1, A = a\}$. Second, the interpretation of Δ_{ind}^1 becomes convoluted for the same reasons discussed for Δ_{ind}^s before. Finally, the decomposition additionally includes a selection term that is conceptually identical to Δ_{ind}^s in the short regression. However, the equivalence between the properties of the weights $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a)$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a)$ and the actions A being mutually exclusive binary variables remains unchanged. The details of these expressions are presented in Theorem A.1 in the appendix. ■

The possibility of $\omega_{\text{dce}}(a)$ being negative for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$ does not rely on pathological data generating processes and may arise in rather simple settings under reasonable distributions for (A, D) . This raises an important red flag for the use of linear in A regressions, as they may lead to results that are quite difficult to interpret and, in general, do not offer an improvement relative to the short regression in (8). Below we illustrate this situation with two canonical simple cases: one where A is a scalar random variable taking multiple values, and another one where $A = (A_1, A_2)$ with A_1 and A_2 being binary. Additional examples appear in the proof of Theorem 4.2.

Consider first the case where $A = A_1$ is a scalar random variable taking values in $\mathcal{A}_1 = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, \bar{a}_1\}$. The regression in (9) simplifies to

$$Y = \Delta_{\text{long}} D + \theta_0 + \theta_1 A_1 + V . \quad (25)$$

Theorem A.1 in the appendix provides general closed-form expressions for $\{\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ and $\{\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ that, when applied to this specific example, lead to

$$\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) \propto \left(\pi_1(a) - \frac{\text{Cov}(D, A_1)(a - E[A_1])}{\text{Var}(A_1)(1 - p)} \right) , \quad (26)$$

where $p = P\{D = 1\}$. From this expression, it follows that any distribution of (A, D) for which

$$\frac{\text{Cov}(D, A_1)(a - E[A_1])}{\text{Var}(A_1)(1 - p)} > \pi_1(a) ,$$

would lead to negative weights. For example, consider the case where $p = 0.8$, $\bar{a}_1 = 3$, $\{A|D = 1\} \sim \text{Bi}(3, 0.8)$, and $\{A|D = 0\} \sim \text{Bi}(3, 0.2)$, where $\text{Bi}(n, \pi)$ denotes a Binomial distribution with n trials and success probability π . In this case, $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(3) = -0.41 < 0$. Figure 2 plots the weights $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a)$ as a function of p and shows that $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(3)$ is negative for any $p > 0.4$ in this example.

Next, consider the case where $A = (A_1, A_2)$ with A_1 and A_2 both being binary variables, so that $\mathcal{A} = \{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)\}$. The regression in (9) simplifies to

$$Y = \Delta_{\text{long}} D + \theta_0 + \theta_1 A_1 + \theta_2 A_2 + V .$$

The closed-form expressions for $\{\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ and $\{\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ derived in Theorem A.1 also simplify to this case and lead to simple conditions for which

$$\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(1, 1) = -\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(1, 0) . \quad (27)$$

That is, whenever one of the average partial causal effects gets a positive weight, the other necessarily gets a negative one. As an illustrative example, consider the case where




Figure 2: Weights $\omega_{\text{dce}}^l(a)$ as a function of p when $\{A|D=1\} \sim \text{Bi}(3, 0.8)$, and $\{A|D=0\} \sim \text{Bi}(3, 0.2)$

$\text{Cov}[A_1, A_2] = 0$,

$$P\{D=1\} = P\{A_2=1\} = \frac{1}{2}, \quad P\{A_1=1 \mid D=1\} = 2P\{A_1=1\}, \quad (28)$$

and

$$P\{A_1=A_2=1 \mid D=1\} = P\{A_1=1, A_2=0 \mid D=1\} = \frac{1}{4}. \quad (29)$$

Using the expressions in Theorem A.1, we obtain $\omega_{\text{dce}}^l(1, 0) = -\omega_{\text{dce}}^l(1, 1) = -0.30$, which one more time illustrates that negative weights arise naturally in settings with non-pathological DGPs. In the proof of Theorem 4.2, we present even simpler counter-examples that also illustrate how the weights $\{\omega_{\text{ind}}^l(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ are generally non-zero and potentially negative, as well as how $\omega_{\text{dce}}^l(a)$ may be negative without necessarily satisfying (27).

Remark 4.5. It is important to note that, even under the stronger exogeneity condition in Assumption 2.2, the parameter Δ_{long} does not generally satisfy strong sign preservation as defined in Definition 3.3. Indeed, it is certainly possible that $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and yet $\Delta_{\text{long}} < 0$ due to either $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^l < -\Delta_{\text{dce}}^l < 0$ or simply $\Delta_{\text{dce}}^l < 0$ because of negative weights $\{\omega_{\text{dce}}^l(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$. This second condition implies that *not even* Δ_{dce}^l satisfies strong sign preservation and thus, in general, Δ_{long} does not offer much of a benefit relative to Δ_{short} , as Δ_{short} can at least be interpreted as a kind of “total” effect, as discussed in Remark 4.3. ■

Remark 4.6. As discussed in Remark 4.1, the long regression in (9) is used extensively in the social sciences and the mediation literature. In economics, Heckman et al. (2013, Eq. (6)) consider a long regression in the context of a more restrictive model for potential outcomes that is linear and separable in (d, a) . More recently, Fagereng et al. (2021, Eq. (7)) use the same mediation model from Heckman et al. (2013), in combination with the

long regression in (9), to disentangle the average causal effect on outcomes into direct and indirect effects. The causal interpretation assigned to the estimands in these last set of papers is correct under the modeling assumptions for potential outcomes, despite both applications involving actions A that are multidimensional and non-mutually exclusive. Our results, however, imply that the main conclusions from such an analysis delicately rely on a linear model for $\mu(d, a)$ and do not generally extend to nonlinear ones. ■

The results in Theorem 4.2 are novel to the best of our knowledge, though there are related results that differ in focus and scope. For example, Imai et al. (2010) study the interpretation of the long regression popularized by Baron and Kenny (1986) under an assumption they refer to as *sequential ignorability* and a linear model for potential outcomes. We state this assumption below.

Assumption 4.1 (Sequential Ignorability). Let $A(d)$ denote the potential outcome for A and assume that

$$(Y(d', a), A(d)) \perp D \mid X = x \quad (30)$$

$$Y(d', a) \perp A(d) \mid D = d, X = x, \quad (31)$$

for $d, d' = 0, 1$ and all x , where in addition $0 < P\{D = d \mid X = x\}$ and $0 < P\{A(d) = a \mid D = d, X = x\}$ for all d, x , and a .

The results in Imai et al. (2010) about the long regression in (9) invoke

- (a) sequential ignorability,
- (b) a scalar random variable A (though not necessarily binary), and
- (c) a linear model for $\mu(d, a)$ in (d, a) .

Under conditions (a)-(c) above, Imai et al. (2010, Theorem 2) shows that Δ_{long} identifies $\bar{\zeta} = \bar{\zeta}(1) = \bar{\zeta}(0)$ where

$$\bar{\zeta}(d) \equiv E[Y(1, A(d))] - E[Y(0, A(d))] = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)) \pi_d(a), \quad (32)$$

and the equality follows from Assumption 4.1 implying $Y(d', a) \perp A(d) \mid X = x$; see Lemma B.2 in Appendix B. The linear model for $\mu(d, a)$ implies that the difference $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)$ does not depend on the value of a , and so it is just a constant that we can denote by $\bar{\zeta}$ without loss of generality. The fact that $\bar{\zeta} = \bar{\zeta}(1) = \bar{\zeta}(0)$ then follows from $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_d(a) = 1$ for $d \in \{0, 1\}$.

The additional assumptions (a)-(c) mentioned above have implications on the conclusions of Theorem 4.2, which does not invoke any of these assumptions. In particular,

the linearity of $\mu(d, a)$ implies that Δ_{dce}^1 in (23) equals $\bar{\zeta} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = \bar{\zeta}$ by the weights adding up to one according to Theorem 4.2. The same linearity assumption also implies that

$$\Delta_{\text{ind}}^1 \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) (\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)) \propto \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) a = 0 ,$$

where the last equality follows from Theorem A.1 in the appendix. We conclude that Theorem 4.2 coincides with the results in Imai et al. (2010) in delivering Δ_{long} being equal to $\bar{\zeta}$ under the additional assumption that $\mu(d, a)$ is linear in (d, a) . This means that, while sequential ignorability is a stronger assumption than Assumption 2.2 (we prove this claim in Lemma B.1 in Appendix B), the main driving force of this result is the linear model for the potential outcomes or, equivalently, the linear model for $\mu(d, a)$.² As we discussed in Remark 4.6, this linearity assumption has been used in economic applications, e.g., Heckman et al. (2013); Fagereng et al. (2021), and while it imposes enough restrictions to provide a clean interpretation to the coefficient Δ_{long} , our results show that such a clean interpretation generally breaks down when $\mu(d, a)$ is not linear in (d, a) .

Remark 4.7. We note that while Theorem 4.2 is a result on how to properly interpret Δ_{long} in the context of a long regression, Imai et al. (2010, Theorem 2) is a result on the identification of *natural* indirect effects via the same type of regression and the additional conditions (a)-(c) above. Related to our discussion in Remark 3.2, the *natural* indirect effect does not coincide with our notion of indirect effect in Theorem 4.2. To see the difference, note that the *natural* indirect effect, defined as $\bar{\delta}(d) = E[Y(d, A(1)) - Y(d, A(0))]$, can be written as

$$\bar{\delta}(d) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (\mu(d, a) - \mu(d, 0)) (\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)) , \quad (33)$$

under sequential ignorability, and is distinct from Δ_{ind}^1 in (24) because $\omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) \neq \pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)$. Conceptually, the literature on mediation analysis defines an indirect effect as a target parameter and then determines conditions under which such indirect effects could be identified from the data. In contrast, we characterize the decomposition of estimands in terms of average direct causal effects, as defined in Definition 3.2, and then group the remaining terms as indirect or selection terms, depending on the case. We note, however, that our indirect effects coincide with those characterized by $\bar{\delta}(d)$ in the case of the short regression from Section 4.1. That is, Δ_{ind}^s in (20) equals $\bar{\delta}(0)$. ■

²Sequential ignorability without a linear model for potential outcomes has been also used in the literature on causal mediation analysis to construct semi-parametrically efficient estimators; see Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser (2012).

4.3 Long regression with interactions

A common variant of the long regression is the one that additionally includes the interactions between the K actions, A_1, \dots, A_K , and the treatment D ; i.e., the slope coefficient Δ_{inter} in (10). We call this the long regression with interactions. Our main result below shows that the slope coefficient Δ_{inter} in (10) admits a decomposition with the same shortcomings as the one we derived for Δ_{long} , including the possibility of Δ_{inter} being negative even in the absence of indirect effects. We formalize this below and provide a proof in Appendix A.

Theorem 4.3. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$ and that the covariance matrix of (D, A, AD) is positive definite. Then, the coefficient Δ_{inter} in (10) admits the decomposition

$$\Delta_{\text{inter}} = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^i + \Delta_{\text{ind}}^i, \quad (34)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{dce}}^i &\equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) (\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)), \\ \Delta_{\text{ind}}^i &\equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) (\mu(0, a) - \mu(0, 0)), \end{aligned}$$

and $\{\omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ and $\{\omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ are as defined in Theorem A.2 and satisfy $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$. Furthermore, the following statements are equivalent:

- (a) A are mutually exclusive binary variables, i.e., $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for $j = 1, \dots, K$ and $A_j A_l = 0$ for all $j, l = 1, \dots, K$ with $j \neq l$.
- (b) For any distribution of (A, D) , $\omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) \geq 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$.
- (c) For any distribution of (A, D) , $\omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

Theorem 4.3 is analogous to Theorem 4.2 and has very similar implications. Except in the special case where the actions in A are all mutually exclusive binary variables, which includes the case where A is a scalar binary variable as a special case, the term Δ_{dce}^i could be negative even if $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$. This is because $\omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a)$ may be negative for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$. As a result, Δ_{inter} generally does not satisfy strong sign preservation for the same two reasons Δ_{long} did not satisfy it either. That is, (a) it is possible that $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^i < -\Delta_{\text{dce}}^i$, and (b) even if $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^i = 0$ the term Δ_{dce}^i could be negative by itself, even if $\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, due to negative weights. Again, this second possibility separates Δ_{long} and Δ_{inter} from the short regression estimand, Δ_{short} .

Remark 4.8. Replacing Assumption 2.2 with Assumption 2.1 leads to a decomposition of Δ_{inter} that introduces three changes relative to the one in Theorem 4.3. First, the term Δ_{dce}^i becomes a linear combination of expectations that condition on $\{D = 1, A = a\}$. Second, the interpretation of Δ_{ind}^i becomes convoluted for the same reasons discussed for Δ_{ind}^s . Finally, the decomposition additionally includes a selection term that is conceptually identical to Δ_{ind}^s in the short regression. The details of these expressions are presented in Theorem A.2 in Appendix A. ■

The possibility of $\omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a)$ being negative for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$ does not rely on pathological data generating processes and may arise in relatively simple settings under reasonable distributions for (A, D) . We present simple examples in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Since these examples are analogous to those in Section 4.2, we do not describe them in detail here. In terms of the example illustrated in Figure 2, the weights $\omega_{\text{dce}}^i(3)$ are flat in p and equal -1.02 .

Remark 4.9. Similar to the long regression in (9) that we discussed in Remarks 4.1 and 4.6, the interaction regression is used extensively in the mediation literature. In the context of mediation analysis, this variant has been popularized and advocated by Judd and Kenny (1981); Kraemer et al. (2002, 2008). However, the main goal in that particular setting has been to test for the existence of mediation effects using the estimated coefficients in (10), see Kraemer et al. (2008) for details on the proposed test and Imai et al. (2010) for a result that shows that, under Assumption 4.1, such a test does not provide evidence in favor or against the parameter $\bar{\delta}(d)$ in (33) being zero. Our results, on the other hand, imply that even in settings where mediation effects are a nuisance and the main goal is to interpret the coefficients directly related to the treatment D , the main conclusions depend on the distribution of (A, D) . ■

While Theorem 4.3 focuses on the properties of the estimand Δ_{inter} , in settings with interactions terms, it is most often the case that the analyst would rather focus on the estimand $\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j E[A_j]$ (or, simply, $\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j a_j$ for given values a_j , $j = 1, \dots, K$). In Lemma B.4 in Appendix B, we show that

$$\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j E[A_j] = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^{i*}(a) (E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a)]) + \omega_{\text{ind}}^{i*}(a) (E[Y(0, a) - Y(0, 0)]) ,$$

where the “weights” $\{(\omega_{\text{dce}}^{i*}(a), \omega_{\text{ind}}^{i*}(a)) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ may be negative in general, and thus leading to an estimand with similar properties to those of Δ_{inter} . The one special case where the estimand $\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j E[A_j]$ identifies the intended causal effects is when $\mu(d, a)$ is assumed to take the functional form

$$\mu(d, a) = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 d + \sum_{j=1}^K \kappa_{2,a} a_j + d \sum_{j=1}^K \kappa_{3,j} a_j , \quad (35)$$

which is equivalent to assuming that the conditional mean of the observed outcome, Y , is correctly specified in the interaction regression in (10). Lemma B.5 in Appendix B shows that $\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j a_j = \mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)$ in this case, delivering an average partial causal effect given $a = (a_1, \dots, a_K)$, as defined in Definition 3.1. It follows from these results that a clean interpretation of Δ_{inter} or $\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \sum_{j=1}^K \lambda_j a_j$ in terms of the definitions introduced in Section 3 essentially depends on a correctly specified linear model for potential outcomes and does not generally apply to nonlinear models, similarly to our results about the long regression in Section 4.2.

4.4 Strata fixed effects (SFE) regression

A lesson from Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 is that adding the other actions linearly in the regression is attractive only when the actions are mutually exclusive. This suggests that if we could mechanically make the actions mutually exclusive, we could obtain an estimand that is free from indirect effects and satisfies strong sign preservation. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is possible by considering the slope coefficient Δ_{sfe} in (11), where the regression controls for all possible values of A , i.e., $\{I\{A = a\} : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$. We refer to this regression as a strata-fixed effects regression, given its connection with the standard practice of including strata fixed effects in randomized controlled trials with covariate adaptive randomization; see Bugni et al. (2018, 2019). Our main result below shows that Δ_{sfe} in (11) admits a decomposition similar to the ones previously derived for Δ_{short} and Δ_{long} , but this one is free from indirect effects. This is formalized below.

Theorem 4.4. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$. Let $\pi_d(a)$ be defined as in (13). Then

$$\Delta_{\text{sfe}} = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) (\mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)) , \quad (36)$$

where the weights $\{\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ are given by

$$\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) \equiv \frac{\pi_1(a)\pi_0(a)}{\sum_{a' \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a')\pi_0(a')} , \quad (37)$$

and satisfy $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) = 1$ and $\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) \geq 0$.

Theorem 4.4 shows that Δ_{sfe} identifies an average direct causal effect as in Definition 3.2. Importantly, it does not contain indirect effects and, as a result, Δ_{sfe} satisfies strong sign preservation as in Definition 3.3. The weight $\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a)$ admits a simple representation and depend only on the conditional probabilities that the action a happens for the treated and control group, $\pi_1(a)$ and $\pi_0(a)$. These weights are generally different than the weights associated with the direct effect in the short regression, Δ_{dce}^s , which are

simply $\pi_1(a)$, unless D and A are independent. We emphasize that the result in Theorem 4.4 does not require the other actions, A , to be singled-valued or mutually exclusive.

The estimand Δ_{sfe} has been studied in other settings. For example, Bugni et al. (2018, 2019) study the properties of this estimand and present results on how to properly compute standard errors in randomized controlled experiments with covariate adaptive randomization. These papers, however, do not represent Δ_{sfe} as a weighted average of causal effects since the strata are not viewed as counter-factual features in such experiments. As another example, Angrist (1998) studies regressions of Y on D under Assumption 2.1 and considers a linear regression that saturates on the covariates, X , to obtain an expression that parallels the one in Theorem 4.4; see Angrist (1998, footnote 11). In this sense, our result may be interpreted as another instance where stratifying confounding variables leads to easy-to-interpret results (though, it is important to notice that this result relies on the fact the treatment variable D in our case is binary, c.f. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2022)).

Remark 4.10. Replacing Assumption 2.2 with Assumption 2.1 in Theorem 4.4 leads to

$$\Delta_{\text{sfe}} = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^f + \Delta_{\text{sel}}^f, \quad (38)$$

where, for $\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a)$ as in (37),

$$\Delta_{\text{dce}}^f \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] \quad (39)$$

$$\Delta_{\text{sel}}^f \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) \left(E[Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a] \right). \quad (40)$$

The two terms, Δ_{dce}^f and Δ_{sel}^f , are directly comparable to the terms Δ_{dce}^s and Δ_{sel}^s in (14). In particular, Δ_{sel}^f is a selection term similar to Δ_{sel}^s in (17), with the only difference being the weights $\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a)$ replacing $\pi_1(a)$. ■

4.5 Saturated (SAT) Regression

We now turn our attention to the last set of estimands we study in this paper; the slope coefficient Δ_{sat} in (12). As we have stated in the introduction, under Assumption 2.2, it follows that $\mu(d, a)$ is immediately identified from $E[Y | D = d, A = a]$ for any $d \in \{0, 1\}$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and so identification of any contrast of means $\mu(d, a)$ is straightforward. From this, it immediately follows that the same result could be achieved by running a saturated regression, as in (12), that we re-write here for readability,

$$Y = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \gamma(a) I\{A = a\} + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) I\{A = a\} D + \epsilon.$$

Standard results on saturated regressions imply that $\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) = \mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a)$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, and so $\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a)$ captures an average causal partial effect of D on Y for each value of the other actions, $a \in \mathcal{A}$, aligned with Definition 3.1. For completeness, we state and prove this result formally in Theorem A.4 in the appendix. The same theorem also shows that replacing Assumption 2.2 with Assumption 2.1 leads to a decomposition of $\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a)$ that includes a selection term, as it was also the case for the other estimands we considered. Finally, we note that this approach is equivalent to a multi-way ANOVA, since the mean for the outcome variable depends exclusively on categorical variables.

5 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we study settings where the analyst is interested in identifying and estimating an average causal effect of a binary treatment on an outcome, in instances where the outcomes are “delayed” in the sense that they do not get immediately realized after treatment assignment. This delay in the realization of the outcomes creates a time window between the treatment assignment and the realization of the outcome that, in turn, opens up the possibility for other observed endogenous actions to take place before the outcome is realized. In this context, we decompose popular estimands that arise from running regression of the outcome on the treatment and different ways of “controlling” for the other actions. Our decompositions have immediate implications on the interpretation of these estimands in applications. All in all, our results provide a framework that allows analysts to understand under what conditions the practice of “controlling” for the presence of other actions leads to estimands that admit causal and ceteris paribus interpretations. Perhaps our most salient result is the one that shows that the most popular estimand that linearly controls for the other actions in the regression, with or without interactions with the treatment, does not even identify a total causal effect without additional assumptions. In this sense, these estimands do not generally provide benefits relative to a simple regression of outcome on treatment.

A Proofs

Proof of Theorem 4.1. This proof follows from derivations in Section 4.1 and basic algebraic manipulations. ■

Theorem A.1. Consider the long regression in (8) and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$. Assume that the variance-covariance matrix of (A, D) is positive definite and

let $M = \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1}$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{long}} &= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] \\ &\quad + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) (E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0) | D = 0, A = 0]) \\ &\quad + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) (E[Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a]) , \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-1})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) &\equiv \frac{\pi_1(a) [\text{Var}(D) - P\{D = 1\} \sum_{j=1}^K M_j (a_j - E[A_j])]}{\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D)} \\ \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) &\equiv \frac{\text{Var}(D) [\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)] - P\{A = a\} \sum_{j=1}^K M_j (a_j - E[A_j])}{\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D)} , \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-2})$$

and $\pi_d(a)$ is defined in (13). Furthermore, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = 1$, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = \mathbf{0}$, and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$.

Proof. Let $\theta \equiv (\theta_j : j = 1, \dots, K)$. By properties of projections,

$$E[(1, D, A')'(Y - (\Delta_{\text{long}} D + \theta_0 + \theta' A))] = \mathbf{0} . \quad (\text{A-3})$$

Profiling θ_0 leads to

$$\text{Cov}(D, Y) = \text{Var}(D) \Delta_{\text{long}} + \text{Cov}(A, D)' \theta \quad (\text{A-4})$$

$$\text{Cov}(A, Y) = \text{Cov}(A, D) \Delta_{\text{long}} + \text{Var}(A) \theta . \quad (\text{A-5})$$

Since $\text{Cov}(D, A)$ is positive definite, $\text{Var}(A)$ is positive definite. Then, (A-5) implies that $\theta = \text{Var}(A)^{-1} (\text{Cov}(A, Y) - \text{Cov}(A, D) \Delta_{\text{long}})$. If we plug this into (A-4), we get

$$(\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D)) \Delta_{\text{long}} = \text{Cov}(D, Y) - M \text{Cov}(A, Y) . \quad (\text{A-6})$$

Since $\text{Cov}(D, A)$ is positive definite, $\text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D) > 0$, and so (A-6) implies that

$$\Delta_{\text{long}} = \frac{\text{Var}(D) \Delta_{\text{short}} - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \text{Cov}(A_j, Y)}{\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D)} , \quad (\text{A-7})$$

where we used that $\text{Var}(D) \Delta_{\text{short}} = \text{Cov}(D, Y)$. For any $j = 1, \dots, K$, some algebra shows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cov}(A_j, Y) &= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] (a_j - E[A_j]) \pi_1(a) E[D] \\ &\quad + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0) | D = 0, A = 0]) (a_j - E[A_j]) P\{A = a\} \\ &\quad + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (E[Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a]) (a_j - E[A_j]) \pi_1(a) E[D] . \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-8})$$

Then, (A-1) follows from combining (14), (A-7), and (A-8).

To show $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = 1$, consider the following derivation.

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) &\stackrel{(1)}{=} \frac{\text{Var}(D) - P\{D = 1\} \sum_{j=1}^K M_j(E[A_j|D = 1] - E[A_j])}{\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D)} \\ &\stackrel{(2)}{=} \frac{\text{Var}(D) - M \text{Cov}(A, D)}{\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, D)} \stackrel{(3)}{=} 1, \end{aligned}$$

where (1) holds by $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) a_j = E[A_j|D = 1]$, and (2) holds by $P\{D = 1\}(E[A_j|D = 1] - E[A_j]) = \text{Cov}(A_j, D)$, and (3) holds by definition of M .

We show $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$ by the following derivation applied to its numerator:

$$\text{Var}(D) \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} [\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)] - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} P\{A = a\} \sum_{j=1}^K M_j(a_j - E[A_j]) = 0,$$

where the equality holds by $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_0(a) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} P\{A = a\} = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} P\{A = a\} a_j = E[A_j]$.

Finally, we show $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$ for any $u = 1, \dots, K$. Once again, we focus on the following derivation applied to its numerator:

$$\begin{aligned} &\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u \text{Var}(D) [\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)] - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u P\{A = a\} \sum_{j=1}^K M_j(a_j - E[A_j]) \\ &\stackrel{(1)}{=} \text{Var}(D) [E[A_u|D = 1] - E[A_u|D = 0]] - M \text{Cov}(A_u, A) \\ &\stackrel{(2)}{=} \text{Cov}(D, A_u) - \text{Cov}(D, A) \text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, A_u) \stackrel{(3)}{=} 0, \end{aligned}$$

where (1) holds by $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_d(a) a_j = E[A_j|D = d]$ for $d = 0, 1$, and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u P\{A = a\} (a_j - E[A_j]) = \text{Cov}(A_u, A_j)$, (2) holds by $\text{Var}(D) [E[A_u|D = 1] - E[A_u|D = 0]] = \text{Cov}(D, A_u)$ and the definition of M , and (3) holds by the fact that $\text{Var}(A)^{-1} \text{Cov}(A, A_u)$ equals a column vector with zeros except for a one in the u th position. ■

Proof of Theorem 4.2. The first part follows from Theorem A.1, which also yields $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$. To complete the proof, we now show the equivalence between (a), (b), and (c).

First, we show that (a) implies (b) and (c). To this end, assume (a) holds. Then, the long regression in (9) is equivalent to an SFE regression in (11). To see why, note that (a) implies that A is a K dimensional vector that is either equal to 0 or a canonical vector (i.e., a vector with a 1 in only one of its coordinates and zeroes otherwise). If we then let $\theta(a) = \theta_0$ for $a = 0$ and $\theta(a) = \theta_j$ for a being the canonical vector with j th coordinate equal to one, we get

$$\theta_0 + \theta' A = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \theta(a) I\{A = a\}.$$

Therefore, $\Delta_{\text{long}} = \Delta_{\text{sfe}}$ and Theorem A.3 imply (b) (with $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = \omega_{\text{dce}}^f(a)$) and (c).

Second, we show that (b) or (c) implies (a) or, equivalently, the negation of (a) implies the negation of (b) and the negation of (c).

Start by considering the case when $K = 1$. Then, (a) fails when $\mathcal{A} \neq \{0, 1\}$. For example, consider the case where $\mathcal{A} = \{0, 1, 2\}$ with $\{A|D = 1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $\{A|D = 0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, and $P\{D = 1\} = 0.5$, where $\text{Bi}(n, p)$ denotes a Binomial distribution with n trials and probability p . With this distribution of (A, D) , the weights in (A-2) become $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1 \approx [-0.1, 0.76, 0.34]$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}}^1 \approx [-0.14, 0.28, -0.14]$, and so (b) and (c) fail.

Next, consider the case when $K = 2$. In this case, (a) can fail when (i) $\mathcal{A}_j \neq \{0, 1\}$ for some $j = 1, 2$ or (ii) $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for all $j = 1, 2$ but $A_1 A_2 \neq 0$. For (i), consider $\{A_1|D = 1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $\{A_1|D = 0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, $P\{D = 1\} = 0.5$, $A_2 \perp \{D, A_1\}$, and $\text{Var}(A_2) > 0$. The fact that $A_2 \perp \{D, A_1\}$ and $\text{Var}(A_2) > 0$ implies that A_2 drops out of the expressions in (A-2), and the example becomes identical to the one considered when $K = 1$, where (b) and (c) fail. For (ii), let $\text{Ber}(p)$ denote a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p and consider $\{A_j|D = 0\} \sim \text{Ber}(0.1)$ and $\{A_j|D = 1\} \sim \text{Ber}(0.7)$ for $j = 1, 2$, with $P\{D = 1\} = 0.5$, so that $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for $j = 1, 2$ and $P\{A_1 A_2 = 0\} \approx 0.45$. With this distribution of (A, D) , the weights in (A-2) become $\omega_{\text{dce}}^1 \approx [0.34, 0.38, 0.48, -0.10]$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}}^1 \approx [-0.14, 0.14, 0.14, -0.14]$, and so (b) and (c) fail.

Finally, consider the case $K > 2$. Then, (a) can fail when (i) $\mathcal{A}_j \neq \{0, 1\}$ for some $j = 1, \dots, K$ or (ii) $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for all $j = 1, \dots, K$ but $A_j A_l \neq 0$ for some $j, l = 1, \dots, K$ with $j \neq l$. In either case, we can repeat the examples used for $K = 2$ by adding coordinates $j = 3, \dots, K$ with $\{A_j : j > 2\} \perp \{D, \{A_j : j \leq 2\}\}$, and $\text{Var}(A_j) > 0$ for $j > 2$. By construction, $\{A_j : j > 2\}$ drops out of the expressions in (A-2), and the examples considered with $K = 2$ imply the failure of (b) and (c). ■

Theorem A.2. Consider the interaction regression in (10) and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in D \times \mathcal{A}$. Assume that the variance-covariance matrix of (A, D, AD) , denoted by Σ_{inter} , is positive definite and let $M = \text{Cov}(D, W) \text{Var}(W)^{-1}$ with $W \equiv (A', A'D)'$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{inter}} = & \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] \\ & + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) (E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0) | D = 0, A = 0]) \\ & + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) (E[Y(0, a) | D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a) | D = 0, A = a]) , \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-9})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) & \equiv \frac{\pi_1(a) \left[\sigma_D^2 - p \sum_{j=1}^K M_j (a_j - E[A_j]) - p \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} (a_j - p E[A_j | D = 1]) \right]}{\sigma_D^2 - M \text{Cov}(W, D)} \\ \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) & \equiv \frac{\sigma_D^2 (\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j p_a (a_j - E[A_j]) - p \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} (\pi_1(a) a_j - p_a E[A_j | D = 1])}{\sigma_D^2 - M \text{Cov}(W, D)} , \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-10})$$

$p = P\{D = 1\}$, $p_a = P\{A = a\}$, $\sigma_D^2 = \text{Var}(D)$, and $\pi_d(a)$ is defined in (13). Furthermore, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) = 1$, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = \mathbf{0}$, and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$.

Proof. Let $\theta = (\theta_j : j = 1, \dots, K)$, $\lambda = (\lambda_j : j = 1, \dots, K)$, and $\alpha = (\theta', \lambda')'$. By properties of projections,

$$E[(1, D, A', DA')'(Y - (\Delta_{\text{inter}} D + \theta_0 + \alpha' W))] = \mathbf{0} . \quad (\text{A-11})$$

Profiling θ_0 leads to,

$$\text{Cov}(D, Y) = \text{Var}(D)\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \text{Cov}(W, D)'\alpha \quad (\text{A-12})$$

$$\text{Cov}(W, Y) = \text{Cov}(W, D)\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \text{Var}(W)\alpha . \quad (\text{A-13})$$

Since Σ_{inter} is positive definite, $\text{Var}(W)$ is positive definite. Then, (A-13) implies that $\alpha = \text{Var}(W)^{-1}(\text{Cov}(W, Y) - \text{Cov}(W, D)\Delta_{\text{inter}})$. If we plug this into (A-12), we get

$$(\text{Var}(D) - M \text{Cov}(W, D))\Delta_{\text{inter}} = \text{Cov}(D, Y) - M \text{Cov}(W, Y) . \quad (\text{A-14})$$

Since Σ_{inter} is positive definite, $\text{Var}(D) - \text{Cov}(W, D)'\text{Var}(W)^{-1}\text{Cov}(W, D) > 0$ and so (A-14) implies that

$$\Delta_{\text{inter}} = \frac{\text{Cov}(D, Y) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \text{Cov}(A_j, Y) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} \text{Cov}(DA_j, Y)}{\text{Var}(D) - M \text{Cov}(W, D)} , \quad (\text{A-15})$$

where we used that $\text{Var}(D)\Delta_{\text{short}} = \text{Cov}(D, Y)$. For any $j = 1, \dots, K$, some algebra shows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cov}(A_j, Y) &= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a](a_j - E[A_j])\pi_1(a)p \\ &\quad + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (E[Y(0, a)|D = 0, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0)|D = 0, A = 0])(a_j - E[A_j])p_a \\ &\quad + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (E[Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0)|D = 0, A = 0])(a_j - E[A_j])\pi_1(a)p , \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-16})$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cov}(DA_j, Y) &= p \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a]\pi_1(a)(a_j - pE[A_j|D = 1]) \\ &\quad + p \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (E[Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a)|D = 0, A = a])\pi_1(a)(a_j - pE[A_j|D = 1]) \\ &\quad + p \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (E[Y(0, a)|D = 0, A = a] - E[Y(0, 0)|D = 0, A = 0])(\pi_1(a)a_j - p_a E[A_j|D = 1]) . \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-17})$$

By plugging in (14), (A-16), and (A-17) into (A-15), (A-9) follows.

To show $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) = 1$, consider the following derivation.

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) &\stackrel{(1)}{=} \frac{\sigma_D^2 - p \sum_{j=1}^K M_j (E[A_j|D = 1] - E[A_j]) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} \sigma_D^2 E[A_j|D = 1]}{\sigma_D^2 - M \text{Cov}(W, D)} \\ &\stackrel{(2)}{=} \frac{\sigma_D^2 - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \text{Cov}(D, A_j) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} \text{Cov}(D, DA_j)}{\sigma_D^2 - M \text{Cov}(W, D)} \stackrel{(3)}{=} 1 , \end{aligned}$$

where (1) holds by $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) = 1$, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a)a_j = E[A_j|D = 1]$, and $\sigma_D^2 = p(1-p)$, (2) holds by $p(E[A_j|D = 1] - E[A_j]) = \text{Cov}(D, A_j)$ and $\sigma_D^2 E[A_j|D = 1] = \text{Cov}(DA_j, D)$, and (3) holds by definition of M .

We show $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$ by the following derivation applied to its numerator:

$$\sigma_D^2 \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} p_a(a_j - E[A_j]) - p \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (\pi_1(a)a_j - p_a E[A_j|D=1]) = 0,$$

where the equality holds by $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_0(a) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} p_a = 1$, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} p_a a_j = E[A_j]$, and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_1(a)a_j = E[A_j|D=1]$.

Finally, we show $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$ for any $u = 1, \dots, K$. Once again, we focus on the following derivation applied to its numerator:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u \sigma_D^2 (\pi_1(a) - \pi_0(a)) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u p_a(a_j - E[A_j]) - p \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u (\pi_1(a)a_j - p_a E[A_j|D=1]) \\ \stackrel{(1)}{=} \sigma_D^2 [E[A_u|D=1] - E[A_u|D=0]] \\ - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \text{Cov}(A_u, A_j) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} p (E[A_u A_j|D=1] - E[A_u]E[A_j|D=1]) \\ \stackrel{(2)}{=} \text{Cov}(D, A_u) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_j \text{Cov}(A_j, A_u) - \sum_{j=1}^K M_{j+K} \text{Cov}(DA_j, A_u) \\ \stackrel{(3)}{=} \text{Cov}(D, A_u) - \text{Cov}(D, W) \text{Var}(W)^{-1} \text{cov}(W, A_u) \stackrel{(4)}{=} 0, \end{aligned}$$

where (1) holds by $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_d(a)a_j = E[A_j|D=d]$ for $d = 0, 1$, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u P\{A=a\}(a_j - E[A_j]) = \text{Cov}(A_u, A_j)$, and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a_u p_a = E[A_u]$, (2) holds by $\text{Var}(D)[E[A_u|D=1] - E[A_u|D=0]] = \text{Cov}(D, A_u)$ and $p(E[A_u A_j|D=1] - E[A_u]E[A_j|D=1]) = \text{Cov}(DA_j, A_u)$, (3) holds by the definition of M , and (4) holds by the fact that $\text{Var}(W)^{-1} \text{Cov}(W, A_u)$ equals a column vector with zeros except for a one in the u th position. ■

Proof of Theorem 4.3. The first part follows from Theorem A.2, which also yields that $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^i(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$. To complete the proof, we now show the equivalence between (a), (b), and (c).

First, we show that (a) implies (b) and (c). To this end, assume (a) holds. Then, the long with interactions regression in (10) is equivalent to an SAT regression in (11). To see why, note that (a) implies that $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathbf{0}_{K \times 1}, \{e_j : j = 1, \dots, K\}\}$, where $e_j \in \mathbb{R}^{K \times 1}$ has a one in the j 'th coordinate and zero otherwise. By defining $A_0 = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^K A_j$, $\gamma(a) = \theta_0$ and $\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) = \Delta_{\text{inter}}$ for $a = 0$, and $\gamma(a) = \theta_0 + \theta_j$ and $\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) = \Delta_{\text{inter}} + \lambda_j$ for $a = e_j$ with $j = 1, \dots, K$, we get

$$\Delta_{\text{inter}} D + \theta_0 + \theta' A + \lambda' A D = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \gamma(a) I\{A=a\} + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) I\{A=a\} D.$$

Therefore, $\Delta_{\text{inter}} = \Delta_{\text{sat}}(0)$ and Theorem A.4 imply (b) (with $\omega_{\text{dce}}(0) = 1$ and $\omega_{\text{dce}}(e_j) = 0$ for $j = 1, \dots, K$) and (c).

To conclude, we now show that (b) or (c) implies (a) or, equivalently, the negation of (a) implies the negation of (b) and the negation of (c).

First, consider the case when $K = 1$. Then, (a) fails when $\mathcal{A} \neq \{0, 1\}$. For example, if $\{A|D=0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $\{A|D=1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, and $P\{D=1\} = 0.5$, and so $\mathcal{A} = \{0, 1, 2\}$. By evaluating this information on (A-10), we get $\omega_{\text{dce}} \approx [0.19, 1.62, -0.81]$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}} \approx$

$[-0.72, 1.44, -0.72]$, i.e., (b) and (c) fail.

Second, consider the case when $K = 2$. Then, (a) can fail when (i) $\mathcal{A}_j \neq \{0, 1\}$ for some $j = 1, 2$ or (ii) $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for all $j = 1, 2$ but $A_1 A_2 \neq 0$. For (i), consider $\{A_1|D = 0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $\{A_1|D = 1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, $P\{D = 1\} = 0.5$, $A_2 \perp \{D, A_1\}$, and $\text{Var}(A_2) > 0$. The fact that $A_2 \perp \{D, A_1\}$ and $\text{Var}(A_2) > 0$ implies that A_2 drops out of the expressions in (A-10), and the example becomes identical to the one considered when $K = 1$ and, thus, (b) and (c) fail. For (ii), consider $\{A_j|D = 0\} \sim \text{Be}(0.3)$ and $\{A_j|D = 1\} \sim \text{Be}(0.9)$ for $j = 1, 2$, and $P(D = 1) = 0.5$, and so $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for $j = 1, 2$ and $P(A_1 A_2 = 0) \approx 0.25$. By evaluating this information on (A-10), we get $\omega_{\text{dce}} \approx [0.19, 0.81, 0.81, -0.81]$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}} \approx [-0.72, 0.72, 0.72, -0.72]$, i.e., (b) and (c) fail.

Finally, consider $K > 2$. Then, (a) can fail when (i) $\mathcal{A}_j \neq \{0, 1\}$ for some $j = 1, \dots, K$ or (ii) $\mathcal{A}_j = \{0, 1\}$ for all $j = 1, \dots, K$ but $A_j A_l \neq 0$ for some $j, l = 1, \dots, K$ with $j \neq l$. In either case, we can repeat the examples used for $K = 2$ by adding coordinates $j = 3, \dots, K$ with $\{A_j : j > 2\} \perp \{D, \{A_j : j \leq 2\}\}$, and $\text{Var}(A_j) > 0$ for $j > 2$. By construction, $\{A_j : j > 2\}$ drops out of the expressions in (A-10), and the examples considered with $K = 2$ imply the failure of (b) and (c). ■

Theorem A.3. Consider the SFE regression in (11), and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$. Then,

$$\Delta_{\text{sfe}} = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^f + \Delta_{\text{sel}}^f, \quad (\text{A-18})$$

where

$$\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) \equiv \frac{P\{D = 0|A = a\}P\{D = 1|A = a\}P\{A = a\}}{\sum_{\tilde{a} \in \mathcal{A}} P\{D = 1|A = \tilde{a}\}P\{D = 0|A = \tilde{a}\}P\{A = \tilde{a}\}} \quad \text{for all } a \in \mathcal{A} \quad (\text{A-19})$$

$$\Delta_{\text{dce}}^f \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a] \quad (\text{A-20})$$

$$\Delta_{\text{sel}}^f \equiv \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) (E[Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a)|D = 0, A = a]) . \quad (\text{A-21})$$

Furthermore, note that $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) = 1$ and $\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) \geq 0$.

Proof. By properties of projections,

$$E[YD] = \Delta_{\text{sfe}} E[D] + \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \theta(a) E[I\{A = a\}D] \quad (\text{A-22})$$

$$E[YI\{A = a\}] = \Delta_{\text{sfe}} E[DI\{A = a\}] + \theta(a) P\{A = a\} \text{ for all } a \in \mathcal{A} . \quad (\text{A-23})$$

By $P\{A = a\} > 0$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, (A-23) implies that

$$\theta(a) = E[Y|A = a] - \Delta_{\text{sfe}} E[D|A = a] \quad \text{for all } a \in \mathcal{A} . \quad (\text{A-24})$$

Then, (A-22), (A-24), and some algebra imply that

$$\begin{aligned} & E[Y|D = 1] - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} E[Y|A = a] P\{A = a|D = 1\} \\ &= \Delta_{\text{sfe}} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{P\{D = 1|A = a\}P\{D = 0|A = a\}P\{A = a\}}{P\{D = 1\}} , \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A-25})$$

Under $P\{A = a\} > 0$ and $P\{D = 1|A = a\} \in (0, 1)$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, (A-25) implies that

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_{\text{sfe}} &= \frac{P\{D = 1\}E[Y|D = 1] - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} E[Y|A = a]P\{A = a, D = 1\}}{\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} P\{D = 1|A = a\}P\{D = 0|A = a\}P\{A = a\}} \\ &= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) (E[Y|A = a, D = 1] - E[Y|A = a, D = 0]) .\end{aligned}\quad (\text{A-26})$$

By doing algebra on (A-26), (A-18) follows. Finally, verifying $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) = 1$ and $\omega_{\text{sfe}}(a) \geq 0$ is straightforward given the definition in (A-19). ■

Proof of Theorem 4.4. This result follows immediately from Theorem A.3. ■

Theorem A.4. Consider the SAT regression in (12) and assume that $P\{D = d, A = a\} > 0$ for all $(d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$. Then, for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$,

$$\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^{\text{t}}(a) + \Delta_{\text{sel}}^{\text{t}}(a) , \quad (\text{A-27})$$

where

$$\Delta_{\text{dce}}^{\text{t}}(a) \equiv E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a] \quad (\text{A-28})$$

$$\Delta_{\text{sel}}^{\text{t}}(a) \equiv E[Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a)|D = 0, A = a] . \quad (\text{A-29})$$

Furthermore, under Assumption 2.2, $\Delta_{\text{sel}}^{\text{t}}(a) = 0$ and

$$\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) = \Delta_{\text{dce}}^{\text{t}}(a) = \mu(1, a) - \mu(0, a) . \quad (\text{A-30})$$

Proof. Fix $a \in \mathcal{A}$ arbitrarily throughout this proof. By projection,

$$\begin{aligned}E[YI\{A = a\}] &= \gamma(a)P\{A = a\} + \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a)E[DI\{A = a\}] \\ E[YDI\{A = a\}] &= (\gamma(a) + \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a))E[DI\{A = a\}] .\end{aligned}\quad (\text{A-31})$$

By $P\{A = a\} > 0$, (A-31) implies that

$$\gamma(a) = E[Y|A = a] - \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a)P\{D = 1|A = a\} \quad (\text{A-32})$$

$$E[YD|A = a] = (\gamma(a) + \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a))P\{D = 1|A = a\} . \quad (\text{A-33})$$

By plugging in (A-32) into (A-33), we get

$$E[YD|A = a] - E[Y|A = a]P\{D = 1|A = a\} = \Delta_{\text{sat}}(a)P\{D = 1|A = a\}P\{D = 0|A = a\} . \quad (\text{A-34})$$

By (A-34) and $P\{D = 1|A = a\} \in (0, 1)$, we get that

$$\Delta_{\text{sat}}(a) = E[Y(1, a)|D = 1, A = a] - E[Y(0, a)|D = 0, A = a] . \quad (\text{A-35})$$

The desired result follows from adding and subtracting $E[Y(0, a)|D = 1, A = 1]$ to (A-35). ■

B Auxiliary Lemmas

Lemma B.1. The following statements are true.

- (a) Assumption 4.1 implies Assumption 2.2.
- (b) Assumption 2.2 does not imply Assumption 4.1.
- (c) Assumption 4.1 implies that $Y(\tilde{d}, a) \perp A(d) \mid X$ for $(\tilde{d}, d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}$.

Proof. Part (a). For any $(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}, y, a, d)$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y, A(d) = a, D = d \mid X\} &\stackrel{(1)}{=} P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y \mid X\} P\{A(d) = a \mid X\} P\{D = d \mid X\} \\
 &\stackrel{(2)}{=} P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y \mid X\} P\{A(d) = a, D = d \mid X\} \\
 &\stackrel{(3)}{=} P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y \mid X\} P\{A = a, D = d \mid X\}, \quad (\text{B-36})
 \end{aligned}$$

where (1) holds by (30) and (31), (2) holds by (30), and (3) holds by $A(D) = A$. Since $(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}, y, a, d)$ is arbitrary, (B-36) implies Assumption 2.2.

Part (b). Consider the following example. Assume $X \perp (D, (A(d) : d \in \mathcal{D})', (Y(\tilde{d}, a) : (\tilde{d}, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A})')'$, $Y(d, a) = 0$ for all (d, a) , $(A(1), A(0)) = (D, D)$, and $D \sim \text{Be}(0.5)$. Since $Y(d, a) = 0$, it is independent of $(D, A(D)) = (D, D)$. Thus, Assumption 2.2 holds. By $Y(d, a) = 0$ for all (d, a) and also $A(d) = D$, we have $Y(\tilde{d}, a) \perp A(d) \mid D$, so (31) holds. However, $(Y(\tilde{d}, a), A(d)) = (0, D) \not\perp D$, and so (30) and Assumption 4.1 fail.

Part (c). For any $(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}, y, a, d)$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y, A(d) = a \mid X\} &\stackrel{(1)}{=} P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y, A(d) = a \mid X, D\} \\
 &\stackrel{(2)}{=} P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y \mid X, D\} P\{A(d) = a \mid X, D\} \\
 &\stackrel{(3)}{=} P\{Y(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}) \leq y \mid X\} P\{A(d) = a \mid X\}, \quad (\text{B-37})
 \end{aligned}$$

where (1) and (3) hold by (30), and (2) holds by (31). Since $(\tilde{d}, \tilde{a}, y, a, d)$ is arbitrary, (B-37) implies Assumption 2.2. ■

Lemma B.2. Assume the conditions in Theorem 4.2, and that

$$\mu(d, a) = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 d + \kappa_2' a \quad \text{for all } (d, a) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathcal{A} \quad (\text{B-38})$$

for some constants $\kappa_0, \kappa_1, \kappa_2$. First, the coefficients in (9) satisfy $\Delta_{\text{long}} = \kappa_1$, $\theta_0 = \kappa_0$, and $\theta_1 = \kappa_2$. Second, the terms in the decomposition in (22) are $\Delta_{\text{dce}}^1 = \kappa_1$ and $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^1 = 0$.

Proof. Assumption 2.2 implies that $E(Y \mid D = d, A = a) = \mu(d, a)$ which, combined with (B-38), implies that the conditional expectation of Y is linear in $(1, a, d)$. From here, the first result holds because the linear regression consistently estimates the parameters of a linear conditional expectation. The second part follows immediately from combining (B-38) with $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a \omega_{\text{ind}}^1(a) = 0$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^1(a) = 1$ (both shown in Theorem A.1). ■

Lemma B.3. The examples used in the proofs of Theorem 4.2 and 4.3 can be completed to satisfy Assumption 4.1.

Proof. For brevity, we focus on the example in the proof of Theorem 4.2 when $K = 1$. A similar argument can be made for all other examples.

Recall that the example in the proof of Theorem 4.2 when $K = 1$ is as follows: $\{A|D = 0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $\{A|D = 1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, and $P\{D = 1\} = 0.5$, and so $\mathcal{A} = \{0, 1, 2\}$. The example is silent about X or $\{Y(d, a) : (d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}\}$, and so it is unclear whether Assumption 4.1 holds or not. We now provide one way to complete the specification of the example in a manner compatible with Assumption 4.1.

Assume that $X \perp (\{Y(d, a) : (d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}\}, D, \{A(\tilde{d}) : \tilde{d} \in \mathcal{D}\})$, $\{Y(d, a) : (d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}\}$ non-stochastic and equal to $\{\mu(d, a) : (d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}\}$, $A(0) \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $A(1) \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, $D \sim \text{Be}(0.5)$, and $\{A(1), A(0), D\}$ are independent random variables. These conditions imply that $A(0) \stackrel{d}{=} \{A(0)|D = 0\} = \{A|D = 0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.3)$, $A(1) \stackrel{d}{=} \{A(1)|D = 1\} = \{A|D = 1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, and $P\{D = 1\} = 0.5$, as required by the example. Next, we show that the completed example satisfies Assumption 4.1. First, we have that (30) holds from the fact that X is independent of the rest of the problem, $\{Y(d, a) : (d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}\}$ is non-stochastic, and $A(d) \perp D$. Second, we have that (31) follows from the fact that X is independent of the rest of the problem and $\{Y(d, a) : (d, a) \in \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{A}\}$ is non-stochastic. ■

Lemma B.4. Consider the setup in Theorem 4.3 and that A is scalar. Then, the coefficients in (10) satisfy the following decomposition:

$$\Delta_{\text{inter}} + E[A]\lambda = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^{\text{i}\star}(a)(E[Y(1, a) - Y(0, a)]) + \omega_{\text{ind}}^{\text{i}\star}(a)(E[Y(0, a) - Y(0, 0)]) , \quad (\text{B-39})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta &= \text{Var}(AD) \text{Var}(A) - (\text{Cov}(DA, A))^2 \\ \Psi &= 1 + \frac{E[A]}{\Delta} (\text{Cov}(A, DA) \text{Cov}(A, D) - \text{Var}(A) \text{Cov}(DA, D)) \\ \omega_{\text{dce}}^{\text{i}\star}(a) &= \Psi \omega_{\text{dce}}^{\text{i}}(a) + \frac{E[A]}{\Delta} (\text{Var}(A) p \pi_1(a) (a - p E[A|D = 1]) - \text{Cov}(A, DA) (a - E[A]) \pi_1(a) p) \\ \omega_{\text{ind}}^{\text{i}\star}(a) &= \Psi \omega_{\text{ind}}^{\text{i}}(a) + \frac{E[A]}{\Delta} (\text{Var}(A) p (\pi_1(a) a - p_a E[A|D = 1]) - \text{Cov}(A, DA) (a - E[A]) p_a) . \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B-40})$$

Moreover, $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^{\text{i}\star}(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^{\text{i}\star}(a) = 0$. Furthermore, it is possible to have $\omega_{\text{dce}}^{\text{i}\star}(a) < 0$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}}^{\text{i}\star}(a) \neq 0$ for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

Proof. By properties of projection,

$$(\text{Var}(W))^{-1} (\text{Cov}(W, Y) - \text{Cov}(W, D) \Delta_{\text{inter}}) = \alpha = (\theta', \lambda')' .$$

We can use the fact that A is scalar to obtain an explicit formula for $(\text{Var}(W))^{-1}$. With this

expression in hand, we get

$$\Delta_{\text{inter}} + E[A]\lambda = \Psi\Delta_{\text{inter}} + \frac{E[A]}{\Delta}(\text{Var}(A)\text{Cov}(DA, Y) - \text{Cov}(A, DA)\text{Cov}(A, Y)), \quad (\text{B-41})$$

By plugging in the expressions for (A-9), (A-16), (A-17) on the right-hand side of (B-41), imposing Assumption 2.2, we obtain (B-39) and (B-40).

By the definition of $\{(\omega_{\text{dce}}^{i*}(a), \omega_{\text{ind}}^{i*}(a)) : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ in (B-40) and repeating arguments used in the proof of Theorem A.2, it is immediate to show that $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{dce}}^{i*}(a) = 1$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \omega_{\text{ind}}^{i*}(a) = 0$.

To conclude, it suffices to find an example in which $\omega_{\text{dce}}^{i*}(a) < 0$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}}^{i*}(a) \neq 0$ for some $a \in \mathcal{A}$. To this end, consider an example with $\{A|D=0\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.9)$, $\{A|D=1\} \sim \text{Bi}(2, 0.1)$, and $P\{D=1\} = 0.3$, and so $\mathcal{A} = \{0, 1, 2\}$. By evaluating this information on (B-40), we get $\omega_{\text{dce}} \approx [-0.2, 1.08, 0.12]$ and $\omega_{\text{ind}} \approx [-0.26, 0.52, -0.26]$, i.e., (b) and (c) fail. ■

Lemma B.5. Assume the conditions in Theorem 4.3, and that

$$\mu(d, a) = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 d + \kappa_2 a + \kappa_3' ad \quad \text{for all } (d, a) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathcal{A} \quad (\text{B-42})$$

for some constants $\kappa_0, \kappa_1, \kappa_2, \kappa_3$. Then, the coefficient in (10) satisfies $\Delta_{\text{inter}} = \kappa_1$, $\theta_0 = \kappa_0$, $\theta = \kappa_2$, and $\lambda = \kappa_3$. Furthermore, the decomposition in (34) are $\Delta_{\text{dce}}^i = \kappa_1$ and $\Delta_{\text{ind}}^i = 0$.

Proof. Assumption 2.2 implies that $E(Y|D=d, A=a) = \mu(d, a)$ which, combined with (B-42), implies that the conditional expectation of Y is linear in $(1, a, d, ad)$. From here, the first result follows from the fact that the linear regression consistently estimates the parameters of a linear conditional expectation. The second part follows from combining $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} a\omega_{\text{ind}}^i(a) = 0$ (shown in Theorem A.2) and (B-42). ■

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