

## Political Consequences of Partisan Prejudice

Richard M. Shafranek 

Northwestern University

---

*Political conflict sometimes spills over into unrelated areas of our lives. A growing literature documents examples of partisan considerations influencing judgments and behaviors in ostensibly nonpolitical contexts such as the workplace, academia, and dating, among others. To date, the focus has been on demonstrating these phenomena, with scant consideration of their downstream effects. When politics spills over into nonpolitical settings—that is, when political considerations influence nonpolitical judgments or behaviors—what are the consequences? I address this question with a novel theory and a nationally representative survey experiment. I find that norms exist regarding the spillover of political considerations into nonpolitical matters—and that spillover can have its own political consequences. When one’s copartisans discriminate against members of the other party, it can lead to decreased partisan identification and depolarization. Partisan discrimination in nonpolitical settings can—in some sense ironically—reduce affective polarization. That said, partisans also appear to hold a double standard: They expect copartisans to give an edge to fellow copartisans.*

---

**KEY WORDS:** affective polarization, partisanship, prejudice, social norms

A growing body of research in political science concerns itself with the influence of political considerations on nonpolitical decisions and social interactions. Scholars have documented partisan conflict in a variety of ostensibly nonpolitical domains, observing that partisans may favor copartisans or discriminate against political opponents in academic (Inbar & Lammers, 2012; Munro, Lasane, & Leary, 2010; Rom & Musgrave, 2014), criminal justice (Gordon, 2009), economic (Gift & Gift, 2015; McConnell, Margalit, Malhotra, & Levendusky, 2018), laboratory (Fowler & Kam, 2007; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Lelkes & Westwood, 2017), residential (Gimpel & Hui, 2015; Hui, 2013; Shafranek, 2019), romantic (Huber & Malhotra, 2017; Nicholson, Coe, Emory, & Song, 2016), and workplace (Deichert, 2016) settings. Research suggests that prejudice based on partisan affiliation can even exceed that based on race (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), although other studies reassuringly note that partisan prejudice tends to fall short of provoking violence (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017). These observations have even been echoed in the mass media: For example, a 2017 *New York Times* article suggests that the rental market increasingly features roommate want ads that express specific political preferences, with “Trump supporters need not apply” becoming a particularly common refrain (Rogers, 2017).

By this point, it is well established that partisan considerations may sometimes spill over into nonpolitical settings to influence social and economic decisions that are ostensibly unrelated to politics. What has been largely ignored by this literature, however, are the *consequences* that may result from these behaviors. Particularly since some recent research argues that the actual extent of

affective polarization and the degree to which people prefer social distance from members of the other party may be overstated (Klar, Krupnikov, & Ryan, 2018), it is important to assess whether these phenomena have any political implications. When political considerations find their way into nonpolitical domains—or, more worryingly, when partisanship turns into outright prejudice against members of the other party—what does it mean for politics?

Scholars have often viewed the spillover of partisan conflict into nonpolitical areas as the result of affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). Iyengar and Westwood (2015), for instance, attribute to affective polarization the tendency of political cues to “influence decisions outside of politics,” which can lead partisans to discriminate against members of the other party. But when this does occur, what impact does it have on political matters: Is the relationship a reciprocal one, whereby affective polarization begets spillover which further intensifies affective polarization? Experiencing or witnessing the social consequences of affective polarization might impact polarization in turn: For example, reading about an instance in which a member of the other party discriminates against a copartisan is unlikely to endear that party to its opponents. Similarly, if partisan identities are increasingly brought to bear on social situations (see Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018), this may increase the importance of political identification across the board. On the other hand, if a copartisan unfairly discriminates against a member of the other party, such a breach might lead to *diminished* partisan identification and/or depolarization. Indeed, recent work suggests that uncivil behavior from the in-party may be depolarizing (Druckman, Gubitza, Levendusky, & Lloyd, 2019).

If the spillover of political considerations into nonpolitical domains has consequences—especially when it takes the form of discrimination—these consequences may depend partly on the existence of relevant social norms. Yet, another point largely ignored in prior work is the normative appropriateness of this kind of behavior. Researchers in this area argue that one reason for the partisan prejudice we have observed in a variety of settings is the lack of norms proscribing favoritism or discrimination along partisan lines (e.g., Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). To date, this matter also remains unexplored.

The study that follows addresses these questions. I start in the next section by offering a framework for investigating the impact of partisan prejudice. I then test my predictions with a nationally representative survey experiment. I find that norms may exist regarding the spillover of political considerations into at least one kind of nonpolitical matter and that this spillover can have its own political consequences. Specifically, when one’s copartisans discriminate against members of the other party, it can lead to decreased partisan identification and depolarization. Partisan discrimination in nonpolitical settings can in fact *decrease* affective polarization. At the same time, partisans also appear to hold a double standard: They seem to expect copartisans to unfairly advantage fellow copartisans.

### The Effects of Partisan Prejudice

Just as “irrelevant” (i.e., nonpolitical) events can sometimes influence political attitudes (e.g., Achen & Bartels, 2016; Busby, Druckman, & Fredendall, 2017), the research highlighted in the previous section suggests that the reverse is both possible and perhaps even common: Political identities are sometimes brought to bear on nonpolitical settings and situations. But is the spillover of political considerations into nonpolitical circumstances politically consequential?

We can imagine many ways that political considerations might influence nonpolitical matters. To date, work in political behavior has generally considered two varieties of spillover: political consumerism (e.g., Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005) on the one hand, and the influence of partisan identities on interpersonal interactions in *prima facie* nonpolitical contexts (the workplace, academia, etc.) on the other. This article focuses on the second variety. When partisanship serves not

only as a political cue, but also as a *social* one (e.g., Iyengar & Westwood, 2015)—and, more specifically, when partisanship turns into prejudice and leads partisan identifiers to discriminate against members of the other party or unfairly favor members of their own party—what are the effects on partisan identification and polarization? There is reason to expect that both might be impacted. For one, perceived discrimination tends to increase social-group identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Given that is the case for groups as varied as Latino/Latina adolescents (Armenta & Hunt, 2009) and people with body piercings (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001), the same may be true for partisans. Likewise, it stands to reason that extending partisan conflict to additional domains might also give partisans more reason to dislike one another, further exacerbating affective polarization.

Prejudice encompasses more than just than discrimination; it describes “a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual experience” (Allport, 1954, p. 6). Partisan prejudice can thus provoke discrimination along partisan lines, but it can also lead to favoritism. Whereas discrimination is “an unjustified negative or harmful action toward the members of a group simply because of their membership in that group” (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2010, p. 394), ingroup favoritism, or ingroup bias, can be considered the flip side of this (Tajfel & Turner, 1979); it is “special treatment for people we have defined as being part of our ingroup” (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2010, pp. 397–398). Prior work is replete with partisan examples of both scenarios: for instance, discriminating against members of the other party in academic hiring (Inbar & Lammers, 2012) or unfairly favoring copartisans in college admissions decisions (Munro et al., 2010). This study examines the impact of both partisan discrimination and favoritism.

The consequences of partisan prejudice are likely to be shaped by the degree to which it is considered normatively acceptable. Norms are the “implicit or explicit rules or principles that . . . guide or constrain behavior” (van Kleef, Wanders, Stamkou, & Homan, 2015). Some scholars (e.g., Iyengar & Westwood, 2015) have suggested that the behavioral manifestations of partisan prejudice arise partly as a result of the relative lack of injunctive norms proscribing favoritism or discrimination along political lines, in contrast to the general consensus that similar behavior on the basis of other social categories—race, for instance—is unacceptable. Certainly, politics is one arena in which ingroup/outgroup divisions necessarily entail some degree of conflict, unlike many other social divides. Nonetheless, one might expect political behavior in social settings to be at least somewhat circumscribed by social norms, and indeed there is research to suggest the existence of norms regulating political conduct in situations that are not themselves explicitly political. Most of this work deals with expressive conduct or other overtly political acts—finding, for instance, that social norms often seem to constrain political discussion in social settings (Gibson, 1992; Wyatt, Katz, Levinsohn, & Al-Haj, 1996).

If political talk is unacceptable in some settings, political discrimination or favoritism may be even less so. The presence or absence of these norms should influence the extent to which partisan prejudice has consequences, then, and the psychology of norm enforcement ought to shape these consequences. While the normative appropriateness of prejudicial feelings varies by target, prejudice is generally considered by most people to be unacceptable with regard to most social groups (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). As such, we should expect that:

*H1:* Nonpolitical situations involving partisan prejudice will be evaluated as more inappropriate than comparable situations that do not involve partisan prejudice, all else constant.

While both partisan discrimination and partisan favoritism can be considered manifestations of partisan prejudice, individuals should view discrimination as more of a norm violation than favoritism. Ingroup favoritism is likely more common in the contemporary United States than discrimination, since “legal, ethical, and normative constraints against hostile discrimination widely prevail,” but there are “few parallel constraints against . . . favoritism” (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 680).

Along these lines, many scholars contend that favoritism, not discrimination, is the primary mechanism which reproduces intergroup inequality in contemporary American society—in part because fewer concerted efforts have been made to expose and combat the insidious effects of ingroup favoritism, in comparison to outgroup hostility and discrimination (DiTomaso, 2015). In light of this, we should expect that

*H2:* Partisan discrimination will be considered less appropriate than partisan favoritism, all else constant.

Supposing that partisan prejudice is normatively unacceptable—discrimination particularly so—and that consequences follow from violating these norms, what pattern of consequences should we expect to observe? Norm violations provoke negative emotional responses (e.g., anger, derogatory social judgments, and sanctioning; van Kleef et al., 2015). When the violation comes from one's ingroup—here, a fellow member of one's political party—we should expect people to distance themselves, diminishing identification with that group for the sake of maintaining their positive self-image. Furthermore, individuals tend to evaluate norm violations differently when they are committed by members of an ingroup versus members of an outgroup (Cranmer & Cranmer, 2013; Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Due to the relevance of fellow ingroup members to one's own social identity, individuals tend to make more extreme judgments about ingroup members than outgroup members: Likeable ingroup members are rated more positively, and unlikeable ingroup members more negatively, than similar outgroup members (Marques et al., 1988). Owing to this “black sheep effect” (Marques & Paez, 1994), then, we should expect to see larger effects on partisan identity importance and affective evaluations of the parties when these norms are violated by members of one's ingroup (i.e., one's copartisans) than similar violations committed by members of an outgroup (i.e., the other party).

*H3A:* Ingroup norm violations (i.e., partisan discrimination or favoritism) will be considered less appropriate than similar outgroup norm violations, all else constant.

*H3B:* Ingroup norm violations should diminish partisan identity importance and reduce affective polarization.

In sum: Partisan prejudice will be regarded as normatively inappropriate; ingroup norm violations are less acceptable than outgroup norm violations and will come with greater consequences; and discrimination is less acceptable than favoritism and will likewise carry greater consequences. Considering these hypotheses in conjunction, we should expect subjects to react most strongly when their copartisans (H3) discriminate against a member of the other party (H2). Together, these expectations allow us to formulate a corollary hypothesis which predicts, specifically, that in-party discrimination against the out-party should lead to both deidentification and depolarization—and that these shifts should be larger than any produced by other experimental conditions. The following section outlines the experimental design and describes how each of these hypotheses will be tested.

## Methods

Nationally representative probability-based survey data were collected via GfK, an international market and custom research firm, from December 2 to December 14, 2016. A total of 2,073 subjects completed the survey; data on subjects' demographic characteristics and partisan affiliation (see Table A1) were obtained from GfK prior to the survey itself. The study presented scenarios of partisan favoritism and discrimination in the workplace. People are generally aware that discrimination along partisan lines is a possibility in everyday life (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017); furthermore,

previous work has shown that partisanship can impact evaluations of one's coworkers (Deichert, 2016) and may influence hiring decisions (Gift & Gift, 2015; Inbar & Lammers, 2012). At the same time, the workplace is an arena likely to be subject to norms against prejudicial treatment in general: Federal law in the United States bars employment discrimination on the basis of a myriad of social categories. This allows for an interesting contrast, as this is generally not the case when it comes to partisan affiliation.

Subjects were assigned to read one of several vignettes. These vignettes describe a workplace incident: A hiring manager is screening job applicants prior to interviewing them for an opening; after viewing the applicant's resume, the hiring manager googles the applicant's background and learns of his partisan affiliation and then either offers him an interview or declines to offer an interview.<sup>1</sup> The advantage of this approach is not just its simplicity, but also that it ought to produce fairly conservative estimates of the possible effects of partisan prejudice. Because the incident described in this study is hypothetical, it affects third parties of no relation to the subjects, and the experimental manipulation takes the form of a brief text-based vignette; movement on any of the dependent variables should be considered quite telling. At the same time, the setup grants a modicum of external validity: It is conceivable that ordinary people might come across anecdotes such as these in their daily lives, just as they might hear about similar instances of race- or gender-based discrimination or favoritism.

Respondents were randomly assigned (with equal probability) to one of eight experimental conditions or a control condition. Three elements of the vignettes were experimentally varied: the partisanship of the job applicant, the partisanship of the hiring manager, and the outcome of the situation (favoritism versus discrimination versus a fair outcome). The basic text of the vignette is as follows, with varied elements displayed in brackets:

*Scott, a [{copartisan} / {member of the other party}], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening at his firm. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is [less / more] qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is [also a {copartisan} / a {member of the other party}]. After learning this, Scott decides [to offer Tom an interview despite his inferior qualifications / not to offer Tom an interview despite his superior qualifications].*

Note that "copartisan" and "member of the other party" are relative to respondents' partisan affiliation (e.g., Republicans see "Republican" for copartisan and "Democrat" for "member of the other party," etc.). The vignettes described subjects' qualifications ("... [less/more] qualified than the other applicants") in order to make it clear, when relevant, that the situation involved favoritism or discrimination (for example, when the hiring manager decides to interview a "less qualified" candidate who is a member of their party—or declines to interview a "more qualified" candidate who is a member of the other party, respectively). Besides favoritism and discrimination conditions, the experiment also featured equivalent "fair outcome" conditions (e.g., the hiring manager decides *not* to interview a "less qualified" candidate who is a member of the same party—or offers an interview to a "more qualified" candidate who is a member of the other party). These conditions allow us to parse out the effects of merely mentioning partisanship in a nonpolitical context, as opposed to (at least implicitly) using it as the basis for a nonpolitical judgment; they also allow for a test of Hypothesis 1. Table 1 summarizes each condition; see the appendix for the full text of each vignette. Note that the factors are not fully crossed for theoretical reasons: A full cross would produce several

<sup>1</sup>At least one study (Acquisti & Fong, n.d.) suggests that employers do sometimes search online for job candidates' social media accounts—and may discriminate on the basis of demographic information discovered there.

**Table 1.** Experimental Conditions

Number	Name	Perpetrator	Target	Outcome	<i>N</i>
0	Control	n/a			238
1	In-party favoritism	In-party	In-party	favoritism	234
2	In-party discrimination	In-party	Out-party	discrimination	216
3	Out-party favoritism	Out-party	Out-party	favoritism	244
4	Out-party discrimination	Out-party	In-party	discrimination	245
5	In-party nonfavoritism	In-party	In-party	Fair outcome	223
6	In-party nondiscrimination	In-party	Out-party	Fair outcome	232
7	Out-party nonfavoritism	Out-party	Out-party	Fair outcome	216
8	Out-party nondiscrimination	Out-party	In-party	Fair outcome	225

combinations which are nonsensical and of no interest for the present study (e.g., copartisan “discrimination” against a fellow copartisan).

The hypotheses laid out in the previous section are evaluated in terms of three key variables: affective partisan polarization, partisan identity importance, and ratings of the appropriateness of each vignette. After reading their assigned vignettes, subjects completed feeling thermometer ratings of each of the parties as a measure of affective partisan polarization. Next, subjects were asked about the importance of their own partisan identity (“How important to you is your identification as a [Democrat/Republican]?” on a scale ranging from 1 to 7). Finally, subjects were asked to rate the appropriateness (“In the vignette you just read, how appropriate was the hiring manager’s behavior?” 1 [*extremely inappropriate*] to 7 [*extremely appropriate*]) of the vignette they were assigned to read. Subjects in the control condition read no text, instead proceeding directly to the dependent measures. Because they did not receive a vignette to evaluate, they did not complete the appropriateness measure.

Given these measures and the hypotheses outlined above, what pattern of results should we expect to observe? Table 2, below, summarizes the connections among the hypotheses outlined in the previous section and the specific experimental conditions described above. First, in accord with Hypothesis 1, the favoritism and discrimination conditions (1, 2, 3, 4) should each be evaluated as less appropriate than the corresponding “fair treatment” conditions (5, 6, 7, 8). Second, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the discrimination conditions (2, 4) should be considered less appropriate than the favoritism conditions (1, 3). Hypothesis 3A predicts that conditions featuring ingroup norm violations (1 and 2) should be rated as less appropriate than corresponding conditions featuring outgroup norm violations (3 and 4), and Hypothesis 3B holds that these conditions (1, 2) should decrease partisan identity importance and should be depolarizing relative to the control condition. The corollary of

**Table 2.** Summary of Expectations

Hypothesis	Expectation
<i>H1</i> : Partisan prejudice will be evaluated as more inappropriate than comparable situations that do not involve partisan prejudice, all else constant.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 will be evaluated as less appropriate than Conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8.</li> </ul>
<i>H2</i> : Partisan discrimination will be considered less appropriate than partisan favoritism, all else constant.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conditions 2 and 4 should be considered less appropriate than conditions 1 and 3, respectively.</li> </ul>
<i>H3A</i> : Ingroup norm violations—i.e., ingroup partisan prejudice against the outgroup—will be considered less appropriate than similar outgroup norm violations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conditions 1 and 2 will be evaluated as less appropriate than Conditions 3 and 4.</li> </ul>
<i>H3B</i> : Ingroup norm violations should diminish partisan identity importance and should be depolarizing.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conditions 1 and 2 will yield lower partisan identity importance and will be depolarizing.</li> </ul>

these two hypotheses taken together (H3A and H3B) is that ingroup discrimination against the out-group—that is, condition 2—should produce the most de-identification and depolarization.

Beyond this, in what directions should we expect affective polarization to move? Some conditions ought to ameliorate it, while others may exacerbate it. As noted, conditions 1 and 2 ought to be depolarizing. Ingroup norm violations should produce less favorable thermometer ratings of the in-party, relative to the control condition. Since there is no reason to expect that *out*-party ratings will be lower in these conditions, the net effect should be depolarization (i.e., a smaller difference between in-party and out-party thermometer evaluations) relative to the control condition. On the other hand, the inverse should be true for conditions 3 and 4, which should be polarizing. In these cases, out-party norm violations should lead to lower out-party feeling thermometer ratings, while in-party ratings should either remain constant or increase, leading to net polarization (i.e., a larger difference between in-party and out-party thermometer evaluations) relative to the control condition.

### Results

Subjects’ demographic characteristics are summarized in Table 3. Note that this table groups independent “leaners” (i.e., those who identify as independents but lean toward one party or the other) together with partisans. Likewise, the vignettes treated leaners (i.e., in terms of whether they saw Democrats or Republicans as the out-party) as members of the party they leaned towards, in keeping with prior research which suggests that while independent leaners may eschew outward identification with a party, their political preferences tend to match those of ordinary partisans (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016; Lascher & Korey, 2011). Pure independents were randomly assigned to see either Democrats or Republicans as the out-party; the results remain substantively unchanged when these subjects are excluded from the analyses.


Do norms exist regarding spillover, and does spillover have political consequences? In brief, the answers to these questions appear to be “yes” and “yes.” Below, I outline the evidence for these norms and review the impact of spillover on affective polarization and partisan identity importance.

**Table 3.** Sample Demographic Characteristics

Female	48.1%
White	70.1%
Age (mean)	49.1
Democrat (including leaners)	50.9%
Independent (excluding leaners)	3.9%
Republican (including leaners)	45.1%
Liberal	27.9%
Moderate	36.8%
Conservative	35.2%
Household income (median)	\$60,000 to \$74,999
Education (median)	Some college, no degree

#### *Normative Appropriateness*

To assess norms regarding spillover, I rely on measures of the vignettes’ “appropriateness” (described above). In terms of appropriateness, results showed clear support for Hypothesis 1: Across the board, subjects rated the “fair treatment” conditions as significantly more appropriate than the conditions involving discrimination or favoritism. Figure 1, below, shows that each favoritism or discrimination condition is rated as significantly less appropriate than any of the “fair outcome” conditions (not only well below the midpoint on a 7-point scale, but in some cases—for example, condition 4—close to the minimum possible rating). At least in the most cursory of senses, people seem to have clear views that partisan prejudice is unacceptable relative to more egalitarian conduct.



**Figure 1.** Appropriateness by condition. Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

Not only are these differences statistically significant, they are substantively large: Taken together, the difference between the average appropriateness of the four favoritism/discrimination conditions and the four “fair treatment” conditions is more than 3 points on a 7-point scale. Additionally, each discrimination condition was rated as significantly less appropriate ( $p < .01$ , two-tailed test) than its corresponding favoritism condition, offering strong support for Hypothesis 2. Here, the difference was equal to approximately 0.5 points on a 7-point scale.

Subjects did not hold their copartisans to higher standards than members of the other party, contrary to expectations (H3A). In fact, the opposite proved to be the case. Subjects rated in-party discrimination against a member of the other party as significantly more appropriate than out-party discrimination against a copartisan ( $p < 0.1$ , two-tailed test). Similarly, subjects rated in-group favoritism as significantly more appropriate for copartisans than for members of the other party ( $p < 0.1$ , two-tailed test). In other words, Democrats seem to consider it more appropriate for Democrats to discriminate against Republicans than for Republicans to discriminate against Democrats; the opposite is also the case. Of course, it is possible that rather than holding different standards of conduct, partisans are simply inclined to perceive the same behaviors differently when they are performed by copartisans rather than members of the out-party (for a similar example, see Druckman et al., 2019).

We also observe significant differences in the *believability* of the vignettes across conditions. After reading the vignettes, subjects were asked “how frequently do you believe this type of situation occurs in the workplace?” on a 7-point scale from “extremely infrequently” to “extremely frequently.” Subjects reported greater belief that the situations described in the “fair treatment” conditions (5 through 8) occur frequently in the workplace compared with the vignettes describing partisan favoritism or discrimination (conditions 1 through 4)—a small but statistically significant difference ( $p < 0.1$ , two-tailed test). Notably, subjects found the notion of a copartisan discriminating against a member of the other party significantly less believable than the reverse ( $p < 0.1$ , two-tailed test). Perhaps due to partisan-motivated reasoning and/or the self-enhancement goals that accompany ingroup membership, subjects appeared less willing to entertain the possibility that copartisans might engage in this kind of behavior.




*Partisan Identity Importance*

Turning next to partisan identity importance, we see that partisan prejudice can influence identity, albeit in a limited number of cases (Figure 2). Partisan prejudice involving out-party actors engaging in favoritism or discrimination does not produce appreciable shifts in partisan identity importance relative to the control condition. However, when subjects read about copartisans discriminating against members of the other party (condition 2), they subsequently report lower levels of partisan identity importance relative to the control condition. This offers partial support for Hypothesis 3B, and strong support from the corollary derived by considering Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 in conjunction. As predicted, in-party discrimination against the out-party, among the four favoritism/discrimination conditions, produces the largest shift in identity importance relative to the control condition.

Interestingly, subjects also report lower levels of partisan identity importance when they read about members of their own party treating copartisans “fairly” (condition 5)—that is, *not* displaying favoritism toward them. It is possible that when subjects are led to consider that group membership may not confer the advantages typically associated with being part of an ingroup (i.e., favoritism), they subsequently devalue that identity. This comports with a line of research showing that individuals may actually *prefer* ingroup members who display favoritism toward other ingroup members (Castelli & Carraro, 2010; Castelli, Tomelleri, & Zogmaister, 2008).

It is worth noting that these shifts in partisan identity importance seem to be almost entirely due to movement among strong partisan identifiers. Partisan leaners in the treatment conditions did not report levels of identity importance significantly different from those in the control condition; there was some movement among weak identifiers, but the bulk of the shifts occurred among strong partisans. This pattern of results seems sensible: It is not surprising that we see few changes in identity importance among those who attached little importance to these identities in the first place (Figure 2).




**Figure 2.** Partisan identity importance by condition. Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals; the red dashed line is the mean identity importance for the control condition. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$  (relative to control condition, two-tailed test). [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]

### Affective Polarization

Partisan prejudice also has consequences for affective polarization. Affective polarization was measured as the absolute value of the difference between feeling thermometer evaluations of the parties, following prior work (e.g., Mason, 2015). In several cases—two out of four treatment conditions—exposure to brief vignettes about partisan prejudice significantly altered levels of affective polarization relative to the control condition, as shown in Figure 3. In keeping with the corollary of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, reading about one’s copartisans discriminating against the other party *diminishes* affective polarization. This depolarization is driven both by lower evaluations of the in-party *and* higher evaluations of the out-party.

Neither in-party favoritism (toward a fellow partisan) nor out-party discrimination (against subjects’ copartisans) had significant effects on affective polarization. However, both reading about copartisans treating members of the other party fairly (condition 6) and members of the *other* party treating members of one’s in-party fairly (condition 8) decreased affective polarization relative to the control condition. These results make intuitive sense: If our typical expectation of cross-partisan interactions is one of conflict and contention, then being exposed to examples of fair treatment despite partisan differences ought to somewhat ameliorate overall affective polarization.

Most of the significant shifts in affective polarization occurred among those with the lowest levels of (pretreatment) partisan identification (i.e., leaners), with fewer changes occurring across treatment conditions among stronger identifiers. This lends additional support to research which suggests that affective polarization is primarily concentrated among strong partisans (Klar et al., 2018). These strong partisans were entirely unmoved in their evaluations of the parties by the “fair treatment” conditions.



**Figure 3.** Feeling thermometer difference by condition. Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals; the red dashed line is the mean feeling thermometer difference for the control condition. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$  (relative to control condition, two-tailed test). [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]

*Differences by Partisanship*

Do we observe the same pattern of results across partisan groups? In general, the answer is yes. In large part, subjects react to these vignettes similarly regardless of their own partisan affiliation. However, one point is worth noting here. Republicans appear to be more disappointed by in-party nonfavoritism than Democrats. When Democrats read about an instance in which copartisans decline to give fellow Democrats an unfair advantage (i.e., condition 5), the importance they attach to their partisan identity remains unchanged relative to the control condition. However, for *Republicans*, this vignette significantly diminishes the importance they attach to their partisan identity ( $p = .008$ , two-tailed test) by 0.7 points on a 7-point scale, or 35% of a standard deviation. This distinction could be due to differences between Democrats and Republicans regarding their orientations toward social hierarchies and their tendencies toward what Haidt (2012) calls “groupishness.” Conservatives tend to emphasize “group-binding loyalty” to a greater extent than liberals (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009); if this is the case, it makes sense that ingroup nonfavoritism would lead Republicans to devalue their partisan identities more than Democrats. This is also apparent in the feeling thermometer ratings: Democrats who read about in-party nonfavoritism report ratings no different than Democrats in the control condition, while Republicans who read about in-party nonfavoritism are significantly less polarized (i.e., there is a smaller gap between their affective evaluations of the two parties).

**Discussion**

When partisanship impacts nonpolitical interpersonal interactions—specifically, when it takes the form of partisan prejudice in the workplace—people consider this unacceptable, and political consequences may follow. People seem to have clear ideas that this kind of conduct—that is, favoritism or discrimination in a nonpolitical context on the basis of partisan affiliation—is unacceptable: Subjects’ “appropriateness” ratings suggest that norms do exist regarding expectations of fair treatment in the workplace regardless of one’s political affiliation (see Figure 1). This is noteworthy given the proclivity of partisans to engage in “expressive responding” or “partisan cheerleading” when answering survey measures (see e.g., Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2013; Bullock & Lenz, 2019). Here, at least, seemingly few partisans chose to express their distaste for members of the other party by claiming that favoritism or discrimination that disadvantages them was acceptable; rather, even strong partisans rated these behaviors as clearly inappropriate.

The political consequences that result from reading about this kind of incident seem to be at least partly shaped by the psychology of norm enforcement. Research in social psychology reveals a tendency to “regard ingroup deviants more negatively than outgroup deviants” (van Kleef et al., 2015, p. 27). If this is the case, then we should expect subjects to react more negatively to ingroup norm violations than similar norm violations committed by outgroup members (Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014). In keeping with this, and with the fact that discrimination is generally considered to be less appropriate than favoritism, we see that in-party discrimination against the out-party (condition 2) leads to both de-identification and depolarization, as we would expect. This coheres with other recent work demonstrating conditions which may affectively depolarize the electorate; one such study, for example, shows that exposure to incivility leads to depolarization when it comes from an in-party source (Druckman et al., 2019). Along similar lines, other work suggests that the use of counter-normative protest tactics can reduce support for social movements by reducing identification with those movements (Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017). Furthermore, the pattern of results documented here—i.e., de-identification and depolarization in the face of “nonpolitical” partisan conflict—would seem to align with work suggesting that many Americans are turned off by partisan conflict in general (e.g., Klar & Krupnikov, 2016; Klar et al., 2018).

These findings—and the generally minimal effects of out-party discrimination/favoritism on both affect and identification—may also reflect a distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms. Injunctive norms prescribe how one *ought* to behave, while descriptive norms refer to the perceived behavior of others (van Kleef et al., 2015). It may be that in-party violations of these norms are seen as inappropriate in an injunctive sense, but uncommon in a descriptive sense; outgroup violations, on the other hand, may be seen as similarly inappropriate, but descriptively more common. If this is the case, it is possible that affective evaluations of the out-party already “price in” the possibility of this kind of conduct. The results for the vignettes’ believability, described above, lend some support to this explanation.

Perhaps surprisingly, none of the vignettes featured in this study appear to exacerbate affective partisan polarization. Reading about instances of partisan prejudice—whether favoritism or discrimination performed by members of the other party, or by members of one’s own—does not seem to increase the gap between affective evaluations of the two parties. If these norms exist, why then do we see so little movement on these variables when members of the other party violate them? Another possible explanation for the null out-party findings with regard to affective polarization is that preexisting levels of partisan animus, attributable to the pre-survey environment, established a ceiling for affective polarization. In other words, our dislike for the other party may be as great as it is going to get, and a simple vignette will not change that; or, on the other hand, we may already expect that members of the outgroup are likely to violate these norms. Along these lines, it is worth noting that this survey experiment was fielded directly in the wake of the 2016 election.

### Conclusion

Political scientists have long noted the influence of social (and other “nonpolitical”) factors on political processes. Recent research has also demonstrated that partisan considerations may similarly color nonpolitical judgments and behaviors (particularly interpersonal interactions). This article shows that at least one such instance in which political considerations influence nonpolitical behaviors—partisan prejudice in the context of the workplace—comes with its own set of political consequences. Even when represented in the fairly cursory form of hypothetical, text-based vignettes, partisan conflict in a social setting exerted meaningful effects on each of the political variables considered in this study. Furthermore, these results contribute to our understanding of the limitations of partisan prejudice (e.g., Lelkes & Westwood, 2017). While the behavior described in this study’s vignettes may or may not occur in the real world, most people—even strong partisans—consider workplace favoritism or discrimination based on partisan affiliation to be inappropriate. Similarly, when directly asked to rate how frequently partisan discrimination or favoritism actually occurs in the workplace, most respondents report that it is significantly less common than fair treatment.

An important caveat is that this research deals with people who simply *learn about* an instance of partisan prejudice, rather than those who perpetrate or directly experience it; the consequences may be different for each of these groups. However, this can also be considered a strength of these findings, in that it likely *underestimates* the extent of consequences to partisan prejudice relative to real-world incidents. At the same time, we should be cautious about overinterpreting these results. The durability of these effects remains to be seen; do they persist over time? Furthermore, do they indicate real shifts in affect and identification, or do these patterns instead reflect momentary embarrassment or demand effects? Future research should attempt to document the nature and persistence of these findings. Additional work would also do well to move beyond the mode of survey experiments to consider the impact of real-world partisan prejudice on these outcomes. Furthermore, while these findings suggest that people may perceive norms regarding the appropriateness of making nonpolitical decisions on the basis of partisan affiliation, the present data do not allow us to distinguish between norms of this sort and general norms of fairness in hiring. Future research should

attempt to untangle the two, perhaps by asking subjects to evaluate the normative appropriateness of using partisanship as a criterion in other kinds of nonpolitical decisions.

The fairness conditions paint a somewhat hopeful picture. The significant decrease in affective polarization seen in conditions 6 and 8 suggest that when partisans treat members of the other party fairly, even in a nonpolitical context, these acts may help to bridge the partisan divide. However, these results also raise other questions—for example, if norms do exist proscribing the sort of partisan prejudice detailed in several of these vignettes, then why does so much other scholarship show that it can and does occur? Beyond allowing us to conclude that norms may exist regarding the spillover of political considerations into nonpolitical domains, an additional takeaway from this research is that it appears to support the arguments of scholars who argue that ingroup favoritism is more common and pervasive in American society than hostile discrimination against an outgroup. Interestingly, this pattern of results seems to contradict research which suggests that contemporary political behavior is often motivated more by a desire to oppose the out-party than a desire to support one's in-party (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016, 2018). Not only is partisan ingroup favoritism viewed as more acceptable than partisan discrimination, in some cases it may even be expected.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Jamie Druckman, members of the Druckman political science research lab, discussants at MPSA, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and advice. Financial support for this research came from Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) (Grant #1628057). This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Northwestern University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Richard M. Shafranek, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208. Email: RichardShafranek2018@u.northwestern.edu

### REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, I., & Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century. *Electoral Studies*, *41*, 12–22.
- Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. W. (2018). Negative partisanship: Why Americans dislike parties but behave like rabid partisans. *Political Psychology*, *39*(S1), 119–135.
- Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2016). *Democracy for realists: Why elections do not produce representative government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Acquisti, A., & Fong, C. M. (n.d.). *An experiment in hiring discrimination via online social networks*. Retrieved from <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2031979>
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Armenta, B. E., & Hunt, J. S. (2009). Responding to societal devaluation: Effects of perceived personal & group discrimination on the ethnic group identification & personal self-esteem of Latino/Latina adolescents. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *12*(1), 23–39.
- Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Akert, R. M. (2010). *Social psychology*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for group identification & well-being. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, *77*(1), 135–149.
- Bullock, J. G., Gerber, A. S., Hill, S. J., & Huber, G. A. (2013). Partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics (No. w19080). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *10*, 519–578.
- Bullock, J. G., & Lenz, G. (2019). Partisan bias in surveys. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *22*, 325–342.
- Busby, E. C., Druckman, J. N., & Fredendall, A. (2017). The political relevance of irrelevant events. *Journal of Politics*, *79*(1), 346–350.
- Castelli, L., & Carraro, L. (2010). Striving for difference: On the spontaneous preference for ingroup members who maximize ingroup positive distinctiveness. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *40*(6), 881–890.
- Castelli, L., Tomelleri, S., & Zogmaister, C. (2008). Implicit ingroup metafavoritism: Subtle preference for ingroup members displaying ingroup bias. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*(6), 807–818.

- Crandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O'Brien, L. (2002). Social norms and the expression and suppression of prejudice: The struggle for internalization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*(3), 359–378.
- Cranmer, M., & Cranmer, S. J. (2013). The impact of Hispanic and white group cues on attitudes towards the violation of generic norms. *PLoS ONE*, *8*(12), e83154. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0083154>
- Deichert, M. A. (2016). *Partisan identity and the cultural stereotypes of political parties*. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
- DiTomaso, N. (2015). Racism and discrimination versus advantage and favoritism: Bias for versus bias against. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *35*, 57–77.
- Druckman, J. N., Gubitz, S. R., Levendusky, M. S., & Lloyd, A. M. (2019). How incivility on partisan media (de-) polarizes the electorate. *Journal of Politics*, *81*(1), 291–295.
- Feinberg, M., Willer, R., & Kovacheff, C. (2017). *Extreme protest tactics reduce popular support for social movements* (SSRN working paper). Retrieved from [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2911177](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911177)
- Fowler, J. H., & Kam, C. D. (2007). Beyond the self: Social identity, altruism, and political participation. *Journal of Politics*, *69*(3), 813–827.
- Gibson, J. L. (1992). The political consequences of intolerance: Cultural conformity and political freedom. *American Political Science Review*, *86*(2), 338–356.
- Gift, K., & Gift, T. (2015). Does politics influence hiring? Evidence from a randomized experiment. *Political Behavior*, *37*(3), 653–675.
- Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. (2015). Seeking politically compatible neighbors? The role of neighborhood partisan composition in residential sorting. *Political Geography*, *48*, 130–142.
- Gordon, S. C. (2009). Assessing affective polarization in federal corruption prosecutions. *American Political Science Review*, *103*(4), 534–554.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Personality Processes and Individual Differences*, *96*(5), 1029–1046.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Pettigrew, T. F. (2014). With malice toward none and charity for some: Ingroup favoritism enables discrimination. *American Psychologist*, *69*(7), 669–684.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York, NY: Vintage.
- Huber, G., & Malhotra, M. (2017). Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior. *Journal of Politics*, *79*(1), 269–283.
- Hui, I. (2013). Who is your preferred neighbor? Partisan residential preferences and neighborhood satisfaction. *American Politics Research*, *41*(6), 997–1021.
- Inbar, Y., & Lammers, J. (2012). Political diversity in social and personality psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *7*(5), 496–503.
- Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018). Partisanship as social identity; Implications for the study of party polarization. *The Forum*, *16*(1), 23–45.
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: Social identity perspective on polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *76*(3), 405–431.
- Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(3), 690–707.
- Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Spears, R. (2001). Rebels with a cause: Group identification as a response to perceived discrimination from the mainstream. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *27*(9), 1204–1213.
- Klar, S., & Krupnikov, Y. (2016). *Independent politics: How America disdain for parties leads to political inaction*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., & Ryan, J. B. (2018). Affective polarization or partisan disdain? Untangling a dislike for the opposing party from a dislike of partisanship. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *82*(2), 379–390.
- van Kleef, G. A., Wanders, F., Stamkou, E., & Homan, A. C. (2015). The social dynamics of breaking the rules: Antecedents and consequences of norm-violating behavior. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *6*, 25–31.
- Lascher, E. L., & Korey, J. L. (2011). The myth of the independent voter, California style. *California Journal of Politics and Policy*, *3*(1). <https://doi.org/10.5070/P20W2R>
- Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2017). The limits of partisan prejudice. *Journal of Politics*, *79*(2), 485–501.
- Marques, J. M., & Paez, D. (1994). The “black sheep effect”: Social categorization, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *5*(1), 37–68.
- Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J. (1988). The “black sheep effect”: Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a function of group identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*(1), 1–16.
- Mason, L. (2015). “I disrespectfully agree”: The differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(1), 128–145.

- McConnell, C., Margalit, Y., Malhotra, N., & Levendusky, M. (2018). The economic consequences of partisanship in a polarized era. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1), 5–18.
- Mendoza, S. A., Lane, S. P., & Amodio, D. M. (2014). Ingroup punishment of fairness norm violations in the ultimatum game. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 5(6), 662–670.
- Munro, G. D., Lasane, T. P., & Leary, S. P. (2010). Political partisan prejudice: Selective distortion and weighting of evaluative categories in college admissions applications. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 40(9), 2434–2462.
- Nicholson, S. P., Coe, C. M., Emory, J., & Song, A. V. (2016). The politics of beauty: The effects of partisan bias on physical attractiveness. *Political Behavior*, 38(4), 883–898.
- Rogers, K. (2017, February 10). Roommates wanted. Trump supporters need not apply. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/us/politics/roommates-trump-supporters.html>
- Rom, M. C., & Musgrave, P. (2014). Political bias in grading: Identifying problems, proposing solutions. *Journal of Political Science Education*, 10(2), 136–154.
- Shafranek, R. M. (2019). Political considerations in nonpolitical decisions: A conjoint analysis of roommate choice. *Political Behavior* <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09554-9>. [Epub ahead of Print]
- Stolle, D., Hooghe, M., & Micheletti, M. (2005). Politics in the supermarket: Political consumerism as a form of political participation. *International Political Science Review*, 26(3), 245–269.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole.
- Wyatt, R. O., Katz, E., Levinsohn, H., & Al-Haj, M. (1996). The dimensions of expression inhibition: Perceptions of obstacles to free speech in three cultures. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 8(3), 229–247.

## Appendix

### Vignettes

*Main instructions:* Several recent surveys of human resources professionals have documented workplace experiences such as the following example. Please read and respond to the text below.

*Condition 1 (in-party/in-party favoritism):*

Scott, a [copartisan], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening at his firm. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *less* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is also a [copartisan]. After learning this, Scott decides to offer Tom an interview despite his inferior qualifications.

*Condition 2 (in-party/out-party discrimination):*

Scott, a [copartisan], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *more* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is a [member of the other party]. After learning this, Scott decides not to offer Tom an interview despite his superior qualifications.

*Condition 3 (out-party/out-party favoritism):*

Scott, a [member of the other party], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *less* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is also a [member of the other party]. After learning this, Scott decides to offer Tom an interview despite his inferior qualifications.

*Condition 4 (out-party/in-party discrimination):*

Scott, a [member of the other party], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *more* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is a [copartisan]. After learning this, Scott decides not to offer Tom an interview despite his superior qualifications.

*Condition 5 (in-party/in-party fair):*

Scott, a [copartisan], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *less* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is also a [copartisan]. Even though they are members of the same party, Scott decides not to offer Tom an interview due to his qualifications.

*Condition 6 (in-party/out-party fair):*

Scott, a [copartisan], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *more* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is a [member of the other party]. Even though they are members of different parties, Scott decides to offer Tom an interview due to his qualifications.

*Condition 7 (out-party/out-party fair):*

Scott, a [member of the other party], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *less* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is also a [member of the other party]. Even though they are members of the same party, Scott decides not to offer Tom an interview due to his qualifications.

*Condition 8 (out-party/in-party fair):*

Scott, a [member of the other party], is a hiring manager and is currently reviewing resumes for a job opening. One of the resumes belongs to Tom, who is *more* qualified than the other applicants. While reviewing Tom's information, Scott googles Tom and discovers that he is a [copartisan]. Even though they are members of different parties, Scott decides to offer Tom an interview due to his qualifications.

## Measures

After the vignette, subjects will complete the following measures:

1. *Feeling thermometer*: Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some groups. Specifically, we'd like you to rate them using a feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you do not feel favorable toward the group and that you do not care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you do not feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.



Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate...

- a The Democratic party
- b The Republican party

2. How important to you is your identification as a [Democrat/Republican/Independent]? (1 [*extremely unimportant*] to 7 [*extremely important*])
3. In the vignette you just read, how appropriate was the hiring manager's behavior? (1 [*extremely inappropriate*] to 7 [*extremely appropriate*])
4. How frequently do you believe this type of situation occurs in the workplace? (1 [*extremely infrequently*] to 7 [*extremely frequently*])

### Statistical Results

**Table A1.** Appropriateness by Condition

Condition	Appropriateness
Control	n/a
1	2.534188
2	2.037559
3	2.26749
4	1.780992
5	5.153846
6	5.469828
7	5.112676
8	5.493213

**Table A2.** PID Importance by Condition

Condition	PID Importance	<i>p</i> -value
Control	3.857143	n/a
1	3.785408	0.6870
2	3.488372	0.0439
3	3.586066	0.1253
4	4.004082	0.4023
5	3.443946	0.0256
6	3.826087	0.8650
7	3.912037	0.7649
8	3.647321	0.2482

**Table A3.** Feeling Thermometer Difference by Condition

Condition	Feeling Thermometer Difference	<i>p</i> -value
Control	43.33047	n/a
1	39.39056	0.1553
2	34.44186	0.0014
3	33.77917	0.0005
4	40.56148	0.3073
5	38.25225	0.0684
6	33.19214	0.0003
7	39.32243	0.1479
8	35.46818	0.0051