<div align="center">**Online Appendix for**

"Legislative Institutions as a Source of Party Leaders' Influence"</div>

Online Appendix 1: Text of Email Invitation

Dear \\${e://Field/Title} \\${m://LastName}:

My name is (Redacted) and I am a professor of political science at (Redacted). I am conducting research on how state legislators make policy decisions. As researchers we often try to make inferences about politics without hearing from the experts like yourself. The survey is designed to try to learn more about how legislators weigh different considerations when making decisions. This will greatly contribute to understanding how state legislative politics works and the relationship between legislators and their voters. Your experience as a legislator in \\${e://Field/State} would be very valuable.

To take the confidential, 5-minute survey, please click the link below.
\\${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey}

All of your responses (as well as your decision to participate in this study) will be confidential so that only the researchers and those responsible for research oversight will have access to the individual responses. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate, to end participation at any time, or to refuse to answer any individual question.

If you have further questions, you may contact me at (Redacted).

If you would like to talk with someone else about any dimension of the research, you may contact the (Redacted). Additional information is available at (Redacted).

Clicking on the link to the survey represents your agreement to participate in this research study. Link to survey: $1//SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey.

Sincerely,
(Redacted)

Online Appendix 2: Details of Placebo Test

As a placebo test of the effect of state institutions, we analyzed the effect of state legislature institutional arrangements on the weighted preferences of U.S. Senators. Our approach to decomposing the weighted preferences of U.S. Senators follows from Levitt (1996). First, we measured Senators' weighted preferences by using their Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores between 1997 and 2012. Second, we estimated district preferences by the average ADA score among House members in each state and party leader preferences by the average score of same-party Senators. To estimate Senators' individual preference we estimate an initial model that includes individual fixed effects along with our measures of leaders' preference and voters' preference. Like Levitt (1996), we then use the predicted values from those fixed effects as a measure of legislators' personal preference. We then estimate a model that includes our measure of legislator's personal preference along with the measures for leaders' and voters' preferences.

Our estimation strategies follow directly from Levitt (1996), and so, like him, we drop Senators in states with three or fewer House districts. The results in Figure 4 of the paper are based on a constrained regression that estimates Equation 2. The results of our placebo test show that the effect of *state-level* institutions are insignificant in predicting the weighted preferences of *federal* Senators. This is further evidence that the main results we find in the paper represent the effect of institutions on legislators' behavior and not some form of omitted variable bias related to the state and public officials from states with those types of institutions.

Online Appendix 3: Distribution of Survey Responses and Selection Model

Figure O1: Distribution of Responses to 2014 State Legislative Survey

Note: This presents the distribution of responses for our survey. Darker shades of blue represent more responses from that state (with the number of responses by state shown at the center of each state).

Table O1: Comparison of Survey Sample to State Legislator Population

	% in Sample	% in Population
Female	27	24
Republican	47	52
Term Limits	27	26
In Majority	61	64
Majority Sets Agenda	74	66^
Leadership Controls Committee Assignments	81	83

	Mean in Sample	Mean in Population
Squire Index	0.16	0.20^

^ A chi-squared test indicates that the proportion of legislators in our survey serving in a legislature where the majority sets the agenda is significantly greater (at $p<0.05$) than in the population of legislators. A t-test indicates that the mean Squire score in the sample is significantly different (at $p<0.05$) than the mean in the population. For all other attributes, a chi-squared test allows us to reject the null that the distributions are different.

Table O2. Selection Model for Sample

Dependent Variable = Part of Sample	Logit
Republican	-0.302*
	(0.117)
Female	0.218
	(0.129)
In Majority	-0.058
	(0.117)
Term Limited	0.048
	(0.127)
Squire Index	-3.296*
	(0.581)
Control Committee Assignments	-0.198
	(0.144)
Constant	-2.053*
	(0.189)
Observations	6,778

Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05. *Majority Sets Calendar* is omitted because of missingness in that variable in the dataset.