

The Policy Consequences of Motivated Information Processing among the Partisan Elite

Online Appendix

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This appendix supplements the analyses presented in Anderson and Harbridge (2014).

Anderson, Sarah and Laurel Harbridge. 2014. "The Policy Consequences of Motivated Information Processing Among the Partisan Elite." American Politics Research 42(4): 700-728.

Appendix A provides robustness checks of the primary models in the paper using alternative cut-points for large cuts and large increases (25%, 40%, 60%, and 75%). The results indicate that the pattern of Democrats making large cuts is the not an artifact of the 50% threshold used in the paper. Though weaker at the most extreme versions, greater Democratic control of lawmaking institutions is associated with more big cuts.

Appendix B provides robustness checks of the primary models in the paper treating the number of Democratic lawmaking institutions as a factor variable. Relative to the baseline of holding one institution, Democratic control of both two and three institutions are positive and statistically significant in all specifications for *Increase* and *Big Cut*. As in the primary model specifications, these effects occur only in the first session of a Congress.

Appendix C provides an interaction between the number of Democratically controlled institutions and Democratically owned subaccounts, along with a three-way interaction with the second session of a Congress. The results emphasize the finding in the paper that the accuracy corrections seen by Democrats making large cuts are most apparent on issues owned by the Democratic Party.

Appendix D provides a robustness check of the primary models in the paper separating control of the number of congressional chambers held by Democrats and Democratic presidents. In contrast to

a compromise story, which would predict that big cuts may be driven by Democratic Congresses with Republican Presidents, the effect of both the number of chambers controlled by Democrats and the Democratic President term are both positive.

Appendix E provides a robustness check of Figure 1 in the paper separating out all observed constellations of party control over the 47 year period of analysis. Regardless of which branch is controlled by Democrats, controlling only one branch is associated with fewer large cuts relative to the cases when Democrats control either two or three lawmaking institutions.

ONLINE APPENDIX

Robustness Checks Using Alternate Cut-points for Large Cuts and Large Increases

Table A1: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes on All Subaccounts

	Big Cut (25%)	Big Increase (25%)	Big Cut (40%)	Big Increase (40%)	Big Cut (60%)	Big Increase (60%)	Big Cut (75%)	Big Increase (75%)
<i>Intercept</i>	1.25*** (0.25)	0.98*** (0.19)	0.71** (0.25)	0.50* (0.20)	0.092 (0.26)	0.24 (0.22)	-0.31 (0.27)	-0.0092 (0.23)
# <i>Democratic Institutions</i>	0.024 (0.060)	0.026 (0.046)	0.13* (0.061)	0.070 (0.050)	0.15* (0.064)	0.10^ (0.054)	0.17** (0.066)	.13* (.056)
<i>Second Session</i>	0.18 (0.15)	0.022 (0.12)	0.48** (0.16)	0.055 (0.13)	0.58*** (0.16)	-0.058 (0.14)	0.57*** (0.17)	-0.095 (0.14)
# <i>Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.034 (0.057)	-0.27*** (0.076)	-0.060 (0.061)	-0.33*** (0.080)	-0.022 (0.066)	-0.33*** (.082)	-0.014 (0.068)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	0.0080 (0.0099)	0.010 (0.0072)	0.0094 (0.0091)	0.011 (0.0079)	0.023* (0.0095)	0.011 (0.0085)	0.024* (0.0098)	0.0091 (0.0088)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.25** (0.082)	-0.81*** (0.066)	-0.38*** (0.085)	-0.77*** (0.073)	-0.34*** (0.090)	-0.76*** (0.079)	-0.30** (0.094)	-0.72*** (0.082)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-0.81*** (0.11)	-0.70*** (0.083)	-0.64*** (0.12)	-0.67*** (0.090)	-0.58*** (0.13)	-0.69*** (0.098)	-0.53*** (0.13)	-0.64*** (0.10)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	-0.036 (0.029)	-0.034^ (0.020)	-0.049^ (0.029)	-0.054* (0.022)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.063* (0.024)	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.062* (0.025)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.074** (0.022)	0.050** (0.016)	0.10*** (0.023)	0.022 (0.017)	0.12*** (0.024)	0.022 (0.019)	0.13*** (0.024)	0.023 (0.019)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	0.00016 (0.00059)	0.00040 (0.00043)	0.00060 (0.00060)	0.00033 (0.00047)	0.00033 (0.00062)	-0.00034 (0.00051)	0.00080 (0.00063)	-0.000087 (0.00052)
<i>N (obs)</i>	7076	12414	7076	12414	7076	12414	7076	12414
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	1142	1180	1142	1180	1142	1180	1142	1180
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	1.68	1.58	1.81	1.74	1.93	1.94	1.99	1.94
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-4129	-7115	-4083	-6355	-3857	-5714	-3721	-5469

Standard errors in parentheses. ^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A2: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes on Most Owned Subaccounts

	Big Cut (25%)	Big Increase (25%)	Big Cut (40%)	Big Increase (40%)	Big Cut (60%)	Big Increase (60%)	Big Cut (75%)	Big Increase (75%)
<i>Intercept</i>	1.92** (0.61)	1.48** (0.47)	0.73 (0.62)	1.27* (0.50)	0.25 (0.67)	0.80 (0.54)	0.15 (0.73)	0.71 (0.56)
<i># Democratic Institutions</i>	0.048 (0.15)	0.11 (0.12)	0.30* (0.15)	0.16 (0.12)	0.35* (0.16)	0.14 (0.13)	0.35* (0.18)	0.18 (0.14)
<i>Second Session</i>	0.55 (0.37)	0.54^ (0.30)	1.01** (0.38)	0.63^ (0.32)	0.94* (0.41)	0.51 (0.35)	0.78^ (0.44)	0.49 (0.36)
<i># Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.38* 0.18	-0.26^ (0.14)	-0.59** (0.18)	-0.38* (0.15)	-0.59** (0.20)	-0.27^ (0.16)	-0.54 (0.21)	-0.27 (0.17)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	0.030 (0.021)	0.035^ (0.019)	-0.015 (0.021)	0.0066 (0.020)	0.034 (0.023)	0.012 (0.022)	0.026 (0.024)	0.0099 (0.022)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.82*** (0.20)	-1.51*** (0.16)	-0.76*** (0.21)	-1.52*** (0.18)	-0.76*** (0.23)	-1.44*** (0.19)	-0.82** (0.26)	-1.48*** (0.20)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-1.30*** (0.28)	-1.48*** (0.20)	-0.84** (0.29)	-1.46*** (0.22)	-1.04** (0.33)	-1.50*** (0.24)	-1.14** (0.37)	-1.48*** (0.25)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	-0.11 (0.067)	-0.10* (0.053)	-0.070 (0.066)	-0.13* (0.060)	-0.089 (0.071)	-0.089 (0.060)	-0.066 (0.077)	-0.10 (0.062)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.0065 (0.052)	0.023 (0.041)	0.077 (0.052)	0.013 (0.043)	0.066 (0.057)	0.021 (0.046)	0.12^ (0.062)	0.032 (0.048)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	-0.00015 (0.0014)	-0.00053 (0.0012)	-0.0011 (0.0014)	-0.0037** (0.0013)	-0.00013 (0.0015)	-0.0043** (0.0014)	-0.0015 (0.0016)	-0.0043** (0.0014)
<i>N (obs)</i>	1206	1897	1206	1897	1206	1897	1206	1897
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	200	198	200	198	200	198	200	198
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	1.62	1.35	1.76	1.45	2.01	1.70	2.36	1.77
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-716.1	-1120	-706.2	-1034	-636.8	-939.1	-587.1	-902.4

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A3: OLS Regressions of Percentage in Each Category by Year (Big Cuts, Most Owned)

	25%	40%	60%	75%
<i>Intercept</i>	59.1*** (11.3)	36.7* (15.2)	28.7^ (14.3)	25.1^ (14.8)
<i># Democratic Institutions</i>	6.49* (3.08)	10.7* (4.15)	11.0** (3.9)	9.84* (4.03)
<i>Second Session</i>	19.7* (8.38)	28.8* (11.3)	28* (10.6)	24.7* (10.9)
<i># Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-10.8** (3.91)	-14.3* (5.28)	-14.4** (4.95)	-12.3* (5.11)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	0.45 (0.44)	0.23 (0.59)	0.54 (0.55)	0.52 (0.57)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-8.9* (4.07)	-7.35 (5.48)	-5.66 (5.14)	-5.44 (5.31)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-14.2* (5.61)	-11.0 (7.57)	-11.9 (7.1)	-13.1^ (7.33)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	-0.61 (1.35)	0.078 (1.82)	-0.18 (1.71)	0.035 (1.77)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.13 (1.07)	1.15 (1.44)	0.70 (1.35)	0.89 (1.39)
<i>N</i>	47	47	47	47
<i>R2</i>	0.40	0.33	0.36	0.33
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.27	0.19	0.23	0.19

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A4: OLS Regressions of Percentage in Each Category by Year (Big Increases, Most Owned)

	25%	40%	60%	75%
<i>Intercept</i>	58.4*** (13.3)	44.8*** (12)	31.7** (10.9)	29.7** (10.7)
<i># Democratic Institutions</i>	-0.64 (3.61)	0.48 (3.28)	0.74 (2.99)	0.56 (2.93)
<i>Second Session</i>	-0.63 (9.83)	-1.73 (8.93)	-2.15 (8.12)	-4.3 (7.96)
<i># Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.82 (4.59)	-1.12 (4.17)	0.12 (3.79)	0.96 (3.72)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.27 (0.51)	-0.64 (0.47)	-0.51 (0.42)	-0.52 (0.42)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-16.3** (4.77)	-12.6** (4.34)	-9.03* (3.94)	-7.47^ (3.86)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-18.6** (6.58)	-15.8* (5.98)	-13* (5.44)	-11.2* (5.33)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	-0.42 (1.59)	-0.26 (1.44)	0.31 (1.31)	0.178 (1.29)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	-0.19 (1.25)	-0.43 (1.14)	-0.31 (1.03)	-0.43 (1.01)
<i>N</i>	47	47	47	47
<i>R2</i>	0.35	0.34	0.29	0.26
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.21	0.21	0.14	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Robustness Checks Using the Number of Democratic Institutions as a Factor

Table B1: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes on All Subaccounts

	Change	Increase	Big Cut	Big Increase
<i>Intercept</i>	1.53*** (0.14)	0.36** (0.12)	0.39 (0.23)	0.26 (0.19)
<i>2 Democratic Institutions</i>	0.49*** (0.075)	0.69*** (0.065)	0.32* (0.13)	0.30** (0.10)
<i>3 Democratic Institutions</i>	0.28*** (0.075)	0.63*** (0.067)	0.32* (0.13)	0.26* (0.11)
<i>Second Session</i>	0.15** (0.057)	0.55*** (0.054)	0.22* (0.10)	0.0061 (0.088)
<i>2 Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.38*** (0.090)	-0.68*** (0.079)	-0.29^ (0.16)	-0.18 (0.12)
<i>3 Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.22* (0.093)	-0.86*** (0.081)	-0.59*** (0.16)	-0.13 (0.13)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.021** (0.0069)	0.024*** (0.0057)	0.011 (0.011)	0.00017 (0.0090)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.71*** (0.051)	-0.20*** (0.046)	-0.38*** (0.091)	-0.75*** (0.078)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-0.44*** (0.067)	-0.033 (0.061)	-0.61*** (0.12)	-0.70*** (0.096)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	0.12*** (0.020)	0.016 (0.016)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.044^ (0.024)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.083*** (0.015)	0.090*** 0.01	0.13*** (0.024)	0.026 (0.018)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	0.00054 (0.00039)	-0.0021*** (0.00032)	0.00073 (0.00062)	0.00054 (0.0050)
<i>N (obs)</i>	23631	19490	7076	12414
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	1228	1228	1142	1180
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	0.89	0.85	1.91	1.87
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-10271	-11851	-3937	-5968

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table B2: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes on Most Owned Subaccounts

	Change	Increase	Big Cut	Big Increase
<i>Intercept</i>	1.67*** (0.33)	0.053 (0.30)	0.55 (0.59)	1.11* (0.46)
<i>2 Democratic Institutions</i>	0.39* (0.18)	1.01*** (0.16)	0.55^ (0.33)	-0.10 (0.26)
<i>3 Democratic Institutions</i>	0.22 (0.19)	1.18*** (0.16)	0.87** (0.33)	0.36 (0.26)
<i>Second Session</i>	0.016 (0.13)	0.82*** (0.13)	0.19 (0.27)	0.10 (0.22)
<i>2 Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.17 (0.22)	-0.72*** (0.20)	0.061 (0.42)	0.067 (0.30)
<i>3 Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.019 (0.23)	-1.44*** (0.20)	-1.31*** (0.40)	-0.80* (0.32)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.050** (0.018)	0.046** (0.015)	0.016 (0.027)	0.02 (0.02)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.94*** (0.12)	0.13 (0.11)	-0.83*** (0.23)	-1.37*** (0.19)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-0.37* (0.17)	0.21 (0.15)	-1.09*** (0.33)	-1.31*** (0.22)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	0.10* (0.050)	-0.0070 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.073)	-0.10^ (0.059)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.090* (0.036)	0.094** (0.030)	0.087 (0.057)	0.0052 (0.045)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	0.00059 (0.0010)	-0.0045*** (0.00084)	-0.0011 (0.0015)	-0.0033* (0.0013)
<i>N (obs)</i>	3823	3103	1206	1897
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	209	209	200	198
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	0.88	.75	2.08	1.52
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-1707	-1898	-645.3	-994.1

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table B3: OLS Regressions of Percentage in Each Category by Year (Most Owned Subaccounts)

	Change	Increase	Big Cut	Big Increase
<i>Intercept</i>	80.1*** (4.72)	-52.4*** (10.7)	30.1* (12.7)	39.4*** (10.5)
<i>2 Democratic Institutions</i>	4.88 (2.94)	15.5* (6.67)	22** (7.95)	-4.58 (6.52)
<i>3 Democratic Institutions</i>	3.23 (2.91)	22.3** (6.6)	25** (7.85)	2.59 (6.45)
<i>Second Session</i>	-1.56 (2.63)	16.6** (5.96)	13.8^ (7.1)	-6.57 (5.83)
<i>2 Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.707 (3.58)	-9.64 (8.14)	-14.3 (9.69)	10.1 (7.95)
<i>3 Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	0.312 (3.65)	-23.5** (8.29)	-28.1** (9.87)	-1.81 (8.1)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.26 (0.23)	1.19* (0.51)	0.20 (0.61)	-0.22 (0.50)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-12.2*** (1.98)	6.74 (4.5)	-3.73 (5.35)	-10.1* (4.4)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-4.58^ (2.62)	7.53 (5.96)	-11 (7.09)	-13* (5.82)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	1.04 (0.647)	-0.453 (1.47)	1.29 (1.75)	0.082 (1.44)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.39 (0.50)	1.14 (1.14)	1.27 (1.36)	-0.45 (1.11)
<i>N</i>	47	47	47	47
<i>R2</i>	0.70	0.48	0.44	0.34
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.62	0.33	0.28	0.15

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Robustness Checks Using An Interaction With Democratically Owned Subaccounts

Table C1: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes Interacted with Most Owned Subaccounts

	Change	Increase	Big Cut	Big Increase
<i>Intercept</i>	1.58*** (0.16)	0.44** (0.14)	0.47^ (0.26)	0.34 (0.22)
<i># Democratic Institutions</i>	0.15*** (0.041)	0.25*** (0.035)	0.073 (0.067)	0.066 (0.056)
<i>Second Session</i>	0.26* (0.10)	0.75*** (0.091)	0.38* (0.17)	-0.13 (0.15)
<i>Most Owned</i>	-0.057 (0.19)	-0.84*** (0.17)	-0.72* (0.33)	-0.50 (0.32)
<i># Dem Inst. x Second Session</i>	-0.15** (0.051)	-0.37*** (0.045)	-0.21* (0.086)	0.011 (0.070)
<i># Dem Inst. x Most Owned</i>	-0.032 (0.089)	0.32*** (0.079)	0.47** (0.15)	0.31* (0.13)
<i>Second Session x Most Owned</i>	-0.34 (0.24)	0.92*** (0.22)	0.79^ (0.42)	0.85* (0.36)
<i># Dem Inst. x Second Session x Most Owned</i>	0.18 (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.11)	-0.48* (0.21)	-0.40* (0.17)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.0059 (0.0062)	0.040*** (0.0052)	0.016^ (0.0094)	0.0083 (0.0083)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.75*** (0.050)	-0.26*** (0.045)	-0.42*** (0.089)	-0.78*** (0.077)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-0.42*** (0.067)	-0.011 (0.060)	-0.60*** (0.12)	-0.67*** (0.095)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	0.097*** (0.019)	-0.0070 (0.015)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.052* (0.023)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.067*** (0.014)	0.075*** (0.012)	0.12*** (0.023)	0.021 (0.018)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	0.00085* (0.00039)	-0.0018*** (0.00032)	-0.00062 (0.00061)	-0.00041 (0.00049)
<i>N (obs)</i>	23631	19490	7076	12414
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	1228	1228	1142	1180
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	0.89	0.84	1.90	1.86
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-10284	-11863	-3934	-5966

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Robustness Checks Using Number of Congressional Chambers Held By Democrats + Democratic President

Table D1: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes on All Subaccounts

	Change	Increase	Big Cut	Big Increase
<i>Intercept</i>	1.71*** (0.16)	0.33* (0.14)	0.43^ (0.26)	0.21 (0.21)
<i># Democratic Chambers</i>	0.22*** (0.041)	0.37*** (0.038)	0.18* (0.073)	0.18** (0.062)
<i>Democratic President</i>	-0.096 (0.065)	0.16** (0.053)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.040 (0.082)
<i>Second Session</i>	0.18^ (0.092)	0.91*** (0.084)	0.50** (0.16)	0.039 (0.14)
<i># Dem Chambers x Second Session</i>	-0.17*** (0.048)	-0.46*** (0.044)	-0.25** (0.086)	-0.15* (0.071)
<i>Dem President x Second Session</i>	0.028 (0.080)	-0.38*** (0.068)	-0.44*** (0.13)	0.21^ (0.11)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.018** (0.0068)	0.033*** (0.048)	0.015 (0.010)	-0.00030 (0.0088)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.68*** (0.053)	-0.20*** (0.048)	-0.36*** (0.096)	-0.77*** (0.081)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-0.48*** (0.069)	-0.049 (0.061)	-0.64*** (0.12)	-0.68*** (0.097)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	0.077*** (0.020)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.056^ (0.031)	-0.048* (0.024)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.066*** (0.014)	0.077*** (0.012)	0.12*** (0.023)	0.021 (0.018)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	0.00050 (0.00039)	-0.0020*** (0.00032)	-0.00082 (0.00062)	-0.00050 (0.00050)
<i>N (obs)</i>	23631	19490	7067	12414
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	1128	1228	1142	1180
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	0.89	0.785	1.91	1.87
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-10276	-11869	-3936	-5965

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Note: Multi-level logistic models allowing the intercept to vary by subaccount. Dependent variable definitions are as follows: “Change” (1 if the nominal percentage change is larger than +/- 3%, 0 otherwise); “Increase” (1 if the subaccount changed and had a positive change or a subaccount inception, 0 if subaccount changed and had a negative change); “Big Cut” (1 if the subaccount was cut more than 50%, 0 if cut less than/equal to 50%); “Big Increase” (1 if the subaccount was increased more than 50% or created (inception), 0 if increased less than/equal to 50%).

Table D2: Nested Multilevel Logit Models of Spending Changes on Most Owned Subaccounts


	Change	Increase	Big Cut	Big Increase
<i>Intercept</i>	1.64*** (0.39)	-0.11 (0.33)	0.38 (0.67)	0.76 (0.52)
<i># Democratic Chambers</i>	0.13 (0.099)	0.64*** (0.094)	0.41* (0.19)	0.16 (0.15)
<i>Democratic President</i>	0.032 (0.16)	0.46*** (0.13)	0.44^ (0.25)	0.22 (0.20)
<i>Second Session</i>	-0.060 (0.22)	1.53*** (0.21)	1.01* (0.41)	0.64^ (0.34)
<i># Dem Chambers x Second Session</i>	-0.048 (0.12)	-0.65*** (0.11)	-0.49* (0.22)	-0.42* (0.17)
<i>Dem President x Second Session</i>	0.20 (0.20)	-0.92*** (0.17)	-1.06** (0.33)	-0.25 (0.26)
<i>Avg. Net Seats Gained by Democrats</i>	-0.039* (0.018)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.025)	0.011 (0.022)
<i>PAYGO</i>	-0.97*** (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.82** (0.25)	-1.45*** (0.20)
<i>Gramm-Rudman-Hollings</i>	-0.32^ (0.17)	0.19 (0.15)	-1.05** (0.33)	-1.28** (0.23)
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	0.096^ (0.051)	-0.060 (0.039)	-0.066 (0.072)	-0.086 (0.058)
<i>Surplus as Percent of GDP (lagged)</i>	0.075* (0.035)	0.080** (0.030)	0.082 (0.056)	0.0063 (0.044)
<i>Days Past FY</i>	0.0010 (0.0010)	-0.0045*** (0.00083)	-0.0016 (0.0015)	-0.0033^ (0.0013)
<i>N (obs)</i>	3823	3103	1206	1897
<i>N (NSAs)</i>	209	209	200	198
<i>Varying intercept by NSA</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
σ_{NSA}	0.88	0.74	2.07	1.52
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-1708	-1903	-649	-995

Standard errors in parentheses.

^ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Note: Multi-level logistic models allowing the intercept to vary by subaccount. Dependent variable definitions are as follows: “Change” (1 if the nominal percentage change is larger than +/- 3%, 0 otherwise); “Increase” (1 if the subaccount changed and had a positive change or a subaccount inception, 0 if subaccount changed and had a negative change); “Big Cut” (1 if the subaccount was cut more than 50%, 0 if cut less than/equal to 50%); “Big Increase” (1 if the subaccount was increased more than 50% or created (inception), 0 if increased less than/equal to 50%).

Robustness Checks of Big Cuts by All Observed Constellations of Party Control
Figure E: Distribution of Budget Cuts



Note: Y-axis measures the percent of subaccount cuts that fall into the big cut category (greater than 50%). Only subaccounts that fall under Democratic issue ownership are included.