[Contact] [Resume] [Research]
CONTACT
Mailing address:
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA
My office is Room 3230 in
Arthur Andersen Hall
Telephone: 847-491-8482
Facsimile: 847-491-7001
e-mail: wo@northwestern.edu
RESUME
RESEARCH
Completed Working Papers:
“Self-esteem preferences and imaginary effects in information processing”, Northwestern University, Mimeo (preliminary and incomplete), May 2016.
“Pareto-Improving Measures in Contest Design: An Application to Competition for College Admissions”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, in preparation (will be posted soon).
“Effort-Maximizing Contests”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, Mimeo, revised in March 2016.
“Bid Caps in All-Pay Auctions and Other Contests”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, Mimeo, March 2016.
“Large Contests without Single-Crossing”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, Mimeo, August 2015.
“Efficient Cooperation in Simple Strategies”, with Mikhail Safronov, Northwestern University, Mimeo, March 2016.
"Penalty-card strategies in repeated games", with Mikhail Safronov, Northwestern University, Mimeo, revised in December 2015.
"The Market for Narcotics. Is there a Case for Regulatory Policy?," Princeton University, September 1998.
Published (or Forthcoming) Papers:
[31] "A More General Pandora Rule?" with Richard Weber, Journal of Economic Theory, (2015), 160, 429-437.
An originally submitted version of the paper, which contains additional material can be found in arXiv.
[30] "Search for an object with two attributes," with Asher Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory, (2016), 161, 145-160.
[29] "Large Contests," with Ron Siegel, Econometrica, (2016), 86, 835-854.
An online appendix
"Appendix"
[28] "Simultaneous Selection", with Rakesh Vohra, Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2016), 200, 161-169.
[27] "Selecting a discrete portfolio", with Rakesh Vohra, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014), 55, 69-73.
[26] "Attributes", with Diego Klabljan and Asher Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, (2014), 88, 190-206.
[25] "Calibration and Expert Testing, a chapter for Handbook of Game Theorey, Volume IV".
[24] "Effective Persuasion", with Ying Chen, International Economic Review, (2014), 319-347.
[23] "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall and (Almost) Perfect Monitoring", with George Mailath, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 71, 174-192.
An unpublished addendum
"Addendum"
[22] "The principal-agent approach to testing experts", with Marcin Peski, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 89-113.
[21] "A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 174-213.
[20] "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal", with Drew Fudenberg, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 72, 86-99.
[19] "Falsifiability", with Alvaro Sandroni, American Economic Review, (2011), 101, 788-818.
[18] "A Model of Consumption-Dependent Temptation", Theory and Decisions, (2011), 70, 83-93.
[17] "Manipulability of Comparative Tests", with Alvaro Sandroni, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, (2009), 106, 5029-5034.
[16] "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring?", with Johannes Hörner, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2009), 124, 1773-1814.
[15] "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests", with Alvaro Sandroni, Mathematics of Operations Research, (2009), 34, 57-70.
[14] "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests", with Alvaro Sandroni, Econometrica, (2008), 76, 1437-1466.
[13] "A NonManipulable Test", with Alvaro Sandroni, Annals of Statistics, (2009), 37, 1013-1039.
[12] "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games", Economics Bulletin, (2007), 58 (3), 1-16.
[11] "A Non-Differentiable Approach to Revenue Equivalence", with Kim-Sau Chung, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 469-487.
[10] "Contracts and Uncertainty", with Alvaro Sandroni, Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 1-13.
[9] "Preferences over Sets of Lotteries", Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007), 567-595.
[8] "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring", with Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 74 (2006), 1499-1544.
[7] "Rich Language and Refinements of Cheap-Talk Equilibria", Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006), 164-186.
[6] "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games" with Jeff Ely and Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 73 (2005), 377-415.
An unpublished appendix can be found here
"Dispensibility of Public Randomization Device"
[5] "Informal Communication", Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 180-200.
[4] "Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods" with Howard Rosenthal, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6 (2004), 707-735.
[3] "Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Provision of Excludable Public Goods", Games Econonic Behavior 46 (2004), 88-114.
[2] "A Simple and General Solution to King Solomon’s Problem", Games Econonic Behavior 42 (2003), 315-318.
[1] "Perfect Folk Theorems. Does Public Randomization Matter?" International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 147-156.
The list of my mathematical publications can be found at
http://www.ams.org/mathscinet/basicsearch
[Select field author and search for olszewski, wojciech]
My review of the book "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships" by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson published in Games and Economic Behavior.
TEACHING
The course material for Econ 310-2, 361, 401, 412 is available via the Northwestern Course Management System (Blackboard)
