“The Belief Structure and Causes of Canadian Foreign Policy Attitudes”

Thomas J. Scotto  
*University of Essex*

Jason Reifler  
*Loyola University Chicago (until July 14, 2007)*  
*Georgia State University (starting August 13, 2007)*

Allan Kornberg  
*Duke University*

Harold D. Clarke  
*University of Texas at Dallas*

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Abstract

Recent studies of public opinion in the realm of international affairs have rejected the long-held notion that citizens, both in the United States and in other advanced democracies, are incapable of forming structured foreign policy beliefs. In this paper, we extend these findings to the Canadian case, utilizing Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to conclude that the foreign policy preferences of Canadians can be ordered along three dimensions that we believe indicate beliefs about the need for self defence ("Homeland Militarism"), involving Canadian forces in international missions ("Constrain Forces Abroad"), and reaching out to the less fortunate through non-military means ("Internationalism"). After discussing the structure and relationship between the dimensions, we find that positions along these dimensions can be explained to varying degrees by partisan identification and ideology with regional cleavages in public attitudes being the exception rather than the rule.
There is a great deal of research concerning the U.S. public’s attitudes on matters of international affairs--however there is considerably less research on the Canadian public’s attitudes on foreign policy. Global events and a substantial re-evaluation of the long-held assumption that mass publics have incoherent and unstable attitudes on foreign policy issues have reinvigorated the study of public opinion as it relates to international affairs. Although there are a few exceptions (cf. Hurwitz et al. 1993; Bjereld and Ekengren 1999; Munton and Keating 2001), the majority of the research in this area remains confined to the American case. Empirical analyses of survey questions that tap public opinion on international affairs in the United States establish that Americans order their beliefs on these issues along a defined multi-dimensional issue space. In this paper, we test the external validity of multi-dimensional belief structures, utilizing a nationally representative survey of the Canadian electorate conducted in 2004. Utilizing Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), we find that Canadian foreign policy beliefs can be structured along three dimensions we label Homeland Militarism, Forces Abroad, and Internationalism. This configuration bears a close resemblance to a model employed by Chittick et al. (1995) to model American foreign policy beliefs. Our confidence in the three dimensional latent variable model is enhanced after a further analysis finds that the public’s positions on these dimensions can be partially explained by the political attitudes held by Canadian citizens such as partisan identification and ideology.

**Foreign Policy Attitudes and their Structure:**

Studies of public opinion towards international affairs in the United States and elsewhere was stymied after well-known American scholars working in the area of public
opinion (cf. Lippmann 1922; Almond 1950) argued that citizen attitudes on these matters were capricious at best, and dangerous at worst. This view became substantially entrenched, especially among those who subscribe to a realist worldview (e.g. Morgenthalau 1978). Holsti (1992) nicely summarizes this long-standing Almond-Lippman consensus as three key propositions: 1) opinions about foreign policy are volatile and emotional; 2) they have little effect on foreign policy; and 3) attitudes (to the extent that they exist at all) lack a coherent structure. Considerable research over the last 20 years has chipped away at each of these propositions.

One of the main concerns of the realists is that “the rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a public whose preferences are emotional rather than rational” (Morgenthalau, 1978:558, quoted in Holsti 1992), but recent research finds much coherence in American attitudes. For example, Page and Shapiro (1988) find the U.S. public has stable preferences about foreign affairs, noting that fluctuations in public opinion usually come in response to actual events. Similarly, Wlezien (1996) compares public preferences for defence spending to a thermostat, and shows that opinions for more or less defence spending respond to actual levels of spending. Jentleson’s work (1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998) finds that the U.S. public is actually “pretty prudent” when it comes to the public’s support for military intervention.

The second proposition that opinion about foreign affairs plays little role in shaping foreign policy has also been debunked. Public opinion has affected actual foreign policy through two primary routes—through elections and through the (often incorrect) perceptions that policy-making elites possess about what the public wants in
foreign policy. For the former route, the role of opinion on foreign policy in shaping electoral outcomes is increasingly well documented. Aldrich et al. (1989), Nincic and Hinkley (1991), and Anand and Krosnick (2003) provide illuminating evidence that foreign policy can matter a great deal in U.S. presidential elections.¹ Recent work by Gelpi et al. (in press) notes that foreign policy attitudes mattered for the 2004 election between George W. Bush and John Kerry. For the latter route, Kull and Destler (1999) show just how wide the gaps between policy makers perceptions of what the public wants can be from what the public actually wants. Moreover, many policy-makers believe that the U.S. public is so casualty sensitive that support for missions will collapse “once the body bags start coming home.” This incorrect perception of the public’s willingness to tolerate casualties has certainly played a role in constraining use of the military (e.g. Kosovo—Priest 1999).

Perhaps the greatest amount of research has challenged the claim the third of Holsti’s propositions that the U.S. public lacks structure in its attitudes about foreign policy (Chittick et al. 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Richman et al. 1997; Wittkopf 1986; 1990; 1994). The literature has firmly come to accept that public attitudes about foreign affairs have structure. Nonetheless, there is still healthy disagreement just exactly how (and along how many dimensions) foreign policy attitudes are structured, and we hope to both inform and extend this debate by utilizing data from the Canadian public and the technique of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to more rigorously test the dimensionality of that public’s foreign policy beliefs.

¹ See Aldrich et al. (2006) for a review essay on foreign policy and “the electoral connection.”
U.S. Foreign Policy Attitudes: Two, Three, or Four Dimensions?

Perhaps the most famous argument in favour of the U.S. public having well structured foreign policy attitudes comes from Eugene Wittkopf (1986; 1990; 1994). Wittkopf argues that foreign policy attitudes are structured along two dimensions: cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism. Respectively, these two “faces of internationalism” reflect support for international efforts to achieve peace (or support for détente) and a willingness to use the military (and realpolitik instruments of power) to achieve international objectives. Those with affirmative positions on both dimensions extend an arm beyond U.S. borders, yet do so with one open hand and one clenched fist.

While a two dimensional model is elegant and easy to explicate, Chittick et al. (1995) argue that a third dimension is necessary to completely explain U.S. attitudes about foreign policy. Conceptualising foreign policy beliefs as a three dimensional construct with separate dimensions for multilateralism-unilateralism, militarism-nonmilitarism, and internationalism-isolationism, Chittick et al. (1995) argue that these three dimensions reflect the basic goals of foreign policy—identity, security, and prosperity, and the authors use these dimensions to predict preferences on several specific foreign policy issues. In this regard, Chittick et al.’s (1995) analysis is similar to work done by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), modelling foreign policy attitudes in a hierarchical structure, in which core values (ethnocentrism and morality of warfare) inform “postures” (or dimensions) of militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism. They contend that preferences for specific foreign policy issues flow from the more general attitudes captured by the postures/dimensions.
Richman et al. (1997) up the dimensional ante by positing that attitudes are best described by four different underlying dimensions: Global Altruism, Global Interests, Security, and a fourth dimension that captures domestic consequences of international involvement. Chittick and Freyberg-Inan (2001) make the case that the data collected as part of the 1994 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) survey reveals four dimensions: identity (which they rename “community”), prosperity, global security, and national security. Both then are more suggestive of change in the post Cold War environment than Wittkopf (1994). It is interesting that there are in effect separate militarism dimensions—one for domestic security and one for the use of force for missions other than national security. Below, we hypothesize and find a similar structure of multiple military dimensions in the Canadian public.

Thus there are several competing models of the structure of foreign policy attitudes, and the differences between the models are the number and meaning of the latent dimensions. Wittkopf (1986; 1990; 1994) argues for two dimensions, Chittick et al. (1995) and Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) both make the case for the three dimensions, and Richman et al. (1997), and Chittick and Freyberg-Inan (2001) advocate a four factor solution. In our study below, we discuss the choice between two and three factor rival models of foreign policy belief systems, setting aside the four factor models. We do so because the fourth factor models consistently draw upon citizens’ attitudes about economic attitudes about free trade and a nation’s economic dealings with other countries. While these are legitimate foreign policy concerns, these attitudes tend to load with domestic economic considerations.\(^2\) We believe adding a fourth dimension that is

\(^2\) In the Canadian study we utilize in our estimations for this paper, there did contain a question probing attitudes towards the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A series of exploratory principal
dominated by domestic economic concerns clouds interpretation of the structure of foreign policy attitudes.

Not surprisingly, there is substantial common ground across the competing models. All models clearly propose that militarism is an important dimension that structures attitudes. The consistent militarism dimension captures those elements of foreign policy related to traditional realpolitik security concerns (strong military, defend allies, not backing down from enemies). Three of the four models, Wittkopf (1986; 1990; 1994) being the exception, capture an internationalism/isolationism dimension that measures the degree to which citizens want to be actively engaged with other countries and people (issues like aid and peacekeeping). While we agree with Chittick et al. (1995) that Wittkopf’s two-dimensional model does not do a good job of capturing this facet of internationalism, we disagree somewhat with their labelling the dimension multilateralism/unilateralism. In our view, this dimension of active engagement with the world is thematically closer to an internationalism/isolationism dimension than it is to a multilateralism/unilateralism. Aid and, to a lesser extent, peacekeeping do not necessarily require the cooperation, or even consent, of multiple donor states. A country can unilaterally engage in either aid or peacekeeping.

**Exporting Models of American Foreign Policy Opinion Abroad**

There are relatively few attempts to see how well these models of public opinion generalize from the U.S. to other countries. Hurwitz et al. (1993) examine attitudes in components analyses (PCA) and follow-up Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) of the data revealed attitudes towards NAFTA constituted its own dimension. As expected, secondary analyses suggested a correlation with beliefs about government intervention in the economy, a topic outside of the scope of this paper.
Costa Rica to see whether their hierarchical constraint model works in a democratic country that is substantially different than the U.S. They find that the hierarchical core values approach does work, but that the dimension of militarism does not constrain the policy beliefs of Costa Ricans. Bjereld and Ekengren (1999) compare the foreign policy attitudes of a traditional “middle power,” Sweden, to the preferences of those of the U.S., and they find that Swedish attitudes are explained by two dimensions—a militant internationalism dimension (a la Wittkopf 1990) and an identity dimension (like that of Chittick et al.1995). Jenkins-Smith et al. (2004) compare the structure of U.S. and British foreign policy attitudes using a hierarchical model. Although the model is not easily compared to the models discussed above, it deserves mention because it does show a similar structure of attitudes among U.S. and U.K. publics.

**Canadian Attitudes About Foreign Policy**

While the literature extending structural models of foreign policy attitudes to non-US samples is quite thin, the literature on Canadian foreign policy attitudes borders on non-existent. Nonetheless, there are a few studies to provide direction. Topically, public support for peacekeeping missions has received the most attention. Martin and Fortmann (1995) report a finding in-line with Wlezien’s (1996) “thermostat” model, noting that support for peacekeeping ebbs and flows in response to actual events. They note that as the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, Canadians appeared to become less worried about domestic security concerns. At this time, support for an “internationalist” foreign policy with peacekeeping as a key component trumped realist visions. However, Martin and Fortmann (1995) and Munton (2002) both note that support for peacekeeping and foreign
aid declined during the mid 1990s as domestic budgetary concerns and less than successful Canadian missions in Bosnia and Somalia captured the headlines. The decline in spending on matters of defence and foreign affairs in the early mid 1990s was seen as a major culprit behind Canada’s retreat from broad internationalism to a policy of selective international engagement that fit Canadian self-interest (Rioux and Hay 1998).

Nonetheless, Martin and Fortmann (2001) claim that the Canadian public is resilient in its commitment to internationalism. Criticizing elites for accepting the view that public opinion is incoherent on matters of foreign affairs, they claim that the public will come around to supporting potentially costly and dangerous foreign policy goals if leaders stand firm in their commitments to such policies.\(^3\) Noël, Thérien, and Dallaire (2004), are skeptical of Martin and Fortmann’s (2001: 51) claim that there is a “silent internationalist majority” among the Canadian public. Importantly, Noël et al. (2004) note that support for foreign aid is not randomly distributed across the Canadian population but rather linked to ideological and political beliefs as well as demographic factors. We return to this point we address later in the paper.

Munton and Keating (2001) attempt to frame the positions Canadians take on specific matters of foreign policy as functions of latent beliefs. They use exploratory factor analysis to develop a four factor model of Canadian attitudes towards “internationalism” that, in many ways, resembles the models that stem from U.S. data. However, in order for Munton and Keating to write an article on mass attitudes of Canadians toward liberal internationalism in 2001, they had to rely on a survey conducted in 1985!

\(^3\) However, as would be expected, the authors do note that public support for an activist foreign policy does decline when costs and risks of such activities are made more explicit.
Munton and Keating (2001) use this data to find four factors of Canadian attitudes about “internationalism.” These four are: 1) active internationalism; 2) economic internationalism; 3) ideological internationalism; and 4) independent internationalism. The first dimension appears to be a general preference for Canada’s level of activity in the world. The second is largely dominated by issues of trade. The third dimension relates to specific policies, rather than a general level of activity. The fourth and final dimension deals with Canada’s relationship with the United States. While these dimensions are somewhat different than the foreign policy dimensions in the models discussed above, there are also some similarities. Moreover, the analysis by Munton and Keating (2001) suggests that there is structure to Canadian foreign policy attitudes. We test similar propositions here using much more recently collected data and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).

Using this literature as a guide, we focus on the structure Canadian foreign policy attitudes. We pay particular attention to the number of dimensions asking whether Canadian foreign policy attitudes best represented by two or three dimensions. We conclude with an analysis that test the ability of four sets of variables (region, demographics, ideology, and partisan identification) to predict values on the latent dimensions.

**Measures and Methods**

We investigate the structure of foreign policy attitudes among the Canadian public utilizing survey data from the 2004 Political Support in Canada Study (PSC). The data come from the mail-back portion of a panel survey, and was administered to 1,058
respondents who participated in phone interviews shortly before and after the nation’s June 2004 federal election. The survey instrument contained a battery of seven items designed to tap citizen attitudes towards “Canada’s Role in the World” and a second battery of items tapping attitudes toward immigration. All items have response categories that are three point ordinal scales (“agree,” “not sure,” and “disagree”). Question wording and response distributions are presented in Table 1.

[Table 1 about Here]

Our first goal is to ascertain the underlying dimensionality of Canadian foreign policy attitudes. Not only are we interested in the number of dimensions—two (cf. Wittkopf 1986, 1990), or three (cf. Chittick et al. 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987)—but we are also interested in the content of the dimensions, and how they relate to structures suggested by prior theoretical and empirical research. We use Confirmatory Factor

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4 The 2004 PSC study was supported by U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) grants to Dr. Kornberg (#0420401) and Drs. Kornberg and Scotto (#0422569). Support for data cleaning and the analyses contained in this paper was enhanced by a Faculty Research Grant made to Drs. Scotto and Reifler administered through the Academic Relations Section of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Forty-two percent of the original sample answered the mail-back portion of the study. The data are weighted to account for the attrition of those answering only the telephone waves of the study, household size, and a Quebec over-sample.

The immigration question we chose for the analyses was asked first on a battery of seven questions on that topic. Other questions on this controversial subject probed the impact increased migration to Canada would have on more specific policies (e.g. the status of the French language in the nation).

The question probing attitudes towards the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the foreign policy battery but was excluded after a series of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (EFAs and CFAs) of the data (See footnote 2).

5 In the analyses to follow, we employ the so-called “two-step” approach to SEM that dates back to Burt (1973, 1976), and James et al. (1982). We do this because we want to: a) establish whether a two or three factor model best maps the Canadian foreign policy issue space; and b) establish latent variables that future researchers can reliably use as exogenous or endogenous variables regardless of their covariates of interest. The fit statistics and results reported in Appendix A and Table 2 are from the measurement model without exogenous predictors. There is a large and lively debate as to the appropriateness of this approach over the alternative technique of simultaneously estimating the measurement and causal components of the SEM. Volume 7, Issue 1 of the journal Structural Equation Modelling has 6 articles on the controversy with both sides of the debate represented. Hayduk (1996: Chapter 2) shows that the magnitude of the indicators on a factor, the inter-correlation between factors, and overall model fit will vary when exogenous forces are added to a measurement model. Since we are testing the propensity of the respondent’s scores on the latent variables to be a function of groups of independent variables, and all are unlikely to be statistically
Analysis (CFA) to assess the validity of several competing theoretical models. We select the “best” model using a combination of $\chi^2$ exact fit tests and making small adjustments to specifications of correlated errors in order to improve model fit (c.f. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993)).

We first attempt to replicate a two factor model with indicators that correspond to Wittkopf’s (1986, 1990) dimensions of “co-operative internationalism” and “militant internationalism,” with the Foreign Aid, UN, Peacekeeping, and Immigration variables as indicators of co-operative internationalism and the Iraq, Fight Terror, and Military Spending questions designated as indicators of militant internationalism (Figure 1a). We also attempt to replicate the structure of Chittick et al.’s (1995) three dimensional model with a “Militarism” dimension (containing the Fight Terror and Military Spending indicators), a “Multilateralism” dimension (containing the Iraq, UN, and Peacekeeping variables), and an “Internationalism” dimension (containing the Immigration, Foreign Aid, and Peacekeeping variables) (Figure 1b).

The two factor model failed to yield an admissible solution. Specification checks indicated that the residual variance for the Iraq variable was negative, a so-called

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significant fit of the full SEM is likely to decline. To avoid the Type 2 error of rejecting a measurement model that fits the data, the structure, fit statistics, and slope coefficients for the indicators and correlations between the factors are reported in Appendix A and Table 2 before the addition of exogenous predictors.

All estimations in this paper were analyzed using MPLUS, Version 4.1. Because of the categorical nature of the data, the program’s Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (WLSMV) estimator was employed and the indicators should be interpreted as ordered probit coefficients. For the analyses in Appendix A and Table 2, missing data is treated as “pairwise present,” which Cameron McIntosh (personal e-mail) notes computes the input correlations using only the cases that have complete data for the dependent variables. The polychoric correlation matrix used in the estimations in Table 3 was generated based on all available information, and McIntosh notes this procedure accommodates missing data to be modelled as a function of the covariates (independent variables). In the results presented in Appendix A, 2 cases had to be excluded because the respondent failed to answer any of the seven questions yielding a final sample size of 1056. Of the remaining respondents, no fewer than 97 percent answered each of the questions. Eighteen additional cases were excluded from estimations presented in Table 3 because of missing data on the exogenous covariates.
Heywood case (c.f. Bollen 1989: 282-286). Opposition to Canada’s involvement in the Iraq War was modestly correlated with support for requiring UN approval for the usage of the Canadian military overseas. Modification indices suggest that answers to the latter question were a better indicator of support or opposition for militant-internationalism than they were for cooperative internationalism. Further, the largest degree of misfit was found to be associated with our failure to specify Peacekeeping as an indicator for both dimensions. While we believe that making these modifications would severely stretch the substantive meaning of Wittkopf’s two dimension construct (1986, 1990), we attempt these changes to see if any two factor solution is satisfactory.

After making these changes, overall exact and approximate fit statistics still indicate poor model fit (See Appendix A). The fit of the model was subsequently improved by (1) permitting the error terms between Fight Terror and three other indicators to be correlated; and (2) freeing an error covariance between the Military Spending and Peacekeeping indicators. Although specifying the error co-variances appears entirely reasonable, it is difficult to ignore the loss in parsimony necessary to obtain a two factor model of foreign policy beliefs that passes the $\chi^2$ exact fit test. Further, the impact of freeing four error co-variances exposes additional weaknesses in the two factor model--the Militant Internationalism factor explains over 75 percent of the variance in the Iraq indicator, but less than 10 percent of the variance in the Fight Terror

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7 Modification indices give “the expected drop in chi-square if the parameter in question is freely estimated” and they are frequently looked to by SEM practitioners to gain a better empirical understanding of the poor performance of their theoretical models (cf. Muthén and Muthén 1998-2006: 507).

8 The close fit statistics provided are the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) which can be thought of as the average discrepancy between the observed and model implied correlations weighted by the degrees of freedom, and the consensus is that close fit is attained when this statistic is below 0.05 (Browne and Cudeck 1992). The Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) is a weighted measure of the difference between sample variances and co-variances and those estimated for a population. A model with a WRMR below 1.00 is generally judged to have close fit and simulations have shown it to generate acceptable Type 1 and 2 error rates when used with CFA (Yu 2002).
and less than 15 percent of the variance in the Military Spending indicators are explained by this latent Militarism dimension. In other words, the dimension being generated by the five indicators (Iraq, Fight Terror, Military Spending, UN, and Peacekeeping) is dominated by the Iraq question.\(^9\)

In contrast to the two factor model posited by Wittkopf, the three factor alternative that takes its cue from the work of Chittick et al. (1995) performs quite well. As hypothesized, the close fit statistics (RMSEA=0.05 and WRMR=0.86) indicate that the estimated model produces correlations among the indicators that come close to matching those observed directly from the data. For reasons mentioned above, an examination of the Modification indices for the three factor model indicated the presence of correlated measurement error between a pair of indicators. Freeing the error covariance between the Fight Terror and Peacekeeping indicators yields a three factor model of the Canadian public’s foreign policy issue space that is both grounded in theory and generates a statistically exact fit of the data (\(\chi^2=11.63; p=0.114\)). Fit is further improved by freeing another “nuisance error parameter” between the Peacekeeping and Military Spending variables (\(\chi^2=7.28; p=0.403\)).

In total, we judge the three factor model to be superior to the rival two factor model for the following reasons: 1) the three factor model attains exact fit without any modification between the indicators and the latent dimensions; 2) the three factor model is more parsimonious than the two factor alternative, because model modifications done to obtain exact fit on the former sacrifice fewer degrees of freedom than those undertaken for the latter; 3) the average residual variance for the indicators in the three factor model

\(^9\) Results of the MPLUS estimations providing the residual variances are available on the corresponding author’s website.
is far less than that obtained in the two factor model, and 4) all indicators had more than 25 percent of their variance explained by the three factors. However, the labels we assign to the dimensions are a slight variation on Chittick et al.’s (1995) theme. Canadian unilateral use of force is rarely presented to policymakers or the public as a realistic policy option. As a consequence, we expect that this “internationalism” dimension would end up measuring support for the use of force for non-security type missions (or more accurately, measures support for placing constraints on the Canadian use of the military abroad). The militarism dimension captures beliefs about Canada’s readiness to defend its homeland. The “multilateralism” dimension, which as we discuss above, we believe is actually a measure of internationalism, or engagement with peoples and cultures beyond Canadian borders. We therefore name our three dimensions 1) Homeland Militarism; 2) Forces Abroad; and 3) Internationalism. We consider the dual military dimensions an intriguing result because it mirrors work done by Chittick and Freyberg-Inan (2001).

Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the final three factor model. To estimate the variances of the latent dimensions, the strongest indicator on each dimension was fixed at 1.0. A respondent receiving a high score on the Homeland Militarism factor is concerned with Canada having sufficient resources and will to defend the nation against modern threats.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast, people with high scores on the Forces Abroad dimension are hesitant about putting Canadians in harms way, whether the cause involves joining the United States in Iraq or participating in peacekeeping missions, a role assumed by Canada since the era of Lester Pearson.\textsuperscript{11} Individuals scoring high on this

\textsuperscript{10} For the Fight Terror and Iraq questions, agreement with the questions is coded -1 and disagreement is coded 1. For the remaining five questions, disagreement is coded -1 and agreement is coded 1. For all of the questions, respondents who were “not sure” of their position were coded 0.
dimension also want to see Canada seek UN approval before deploying its military abroad. High scores on the Internationalism dimension signify that the respondent believes that Canada best engages itself with the world by opening its borders to peoples from other lands and providing foreign aid and peacekeeping forces to troubled nations or regions.

[Table 2 about Here]

The relationship between three dimensions warrants mention. Although they are distinct dimensions, support for a strong defence at home is significantly correlated (-0.35) with support for using Canadian forces abroad. The correlation coefficient is negative because a high score on the Homeland Militarism dimension is associated with an activist stance on defending the nation and a low score on the Constrain Forces Abroad dimension signals agreement with the idea that Canada should be able to use its military as it sees fit in the global arena. The substantive interpretation between the positive correlation (0.29) between the Forces Abroad and Internationalism factors signals that many reject the argument that the military must be used to project Canada’s global standing. Our empirical analysis finds no relationship between the need to strengthen the military and fight terrorism and support or opposition for what we are calling liberal internationalism. The insignificant relationship between these two latent dimensions has policy implications that we will elaborate on in the discussion section.

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11 The interpretation of the negative sign of the Peacekeeping indicator on the Forces Abroad dimension is that those agreeing with Canada’s participation in Peacekeeping Operations are sceptical of Canada needing UN Approval to use its armed forces abroad, and were open to Canada joining the United States in the conflict in Iraq.
Explaining the Dimensions

We hypothesize that a person’s positions on the three dimensions could be caused by different forces known to separate the Canadian public on domestic and other political issues (cf. Clarke et al. 1996): region, demographics, and core political beliefs such as identification with one of Canada’s federal parties or identifying with the ideological right or left. To test our hypotheses, we simultaneously regressed our three latent variables onto the three groups of exogenous predictors. The results reported in Table 3 tell a clear story: core political beliefs play a key role in differentiating the foreign policy beliefs of Canadians, and, after controlling for partisanship, ideology, and demographic forces, differences across Canada’s vast and often politically dissimilar regions (mostly) disappear. For example, identification with the Conservative Party and declaring oneself ideologically to the right leads an individual to score higher on the Homeland Militarism dimension, indicating support more funding for the Canadian military and action against terrorism whereas those on the ideological left are more sceptical of this course of action.

[Table 3 About Here]

12 We consider partisan identification to be causally prior to beliefs about the foreign policy questions and use the partisan identification the respondents reported in the pre-election telephone wave of the study. In this wave, respondents identifying with a party were subsequently asked about the strength of their identification. For variable measuring identification with one of the four parties with seats in the House of Commons, those identifying “very strongly” were coded 3, a “fairly strong identification” was coded 2, and a “not very strong” identification was coded 1. The “left” or the “right” controls for ideology were coded 1 only if the respondent reported a left/right or centre-left/right orientation when first asked the question. Those reporting that they “leaned” in one direction in a follow-up prompt were coded zero. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 thru 95. Education is a 5 point ordinal variable coded “0” if the respondent had less than a high school education, “1” if the respondent had some high school, “2” if the respondent reported completing high school, “3” if the respondent reported having some post high school education but did not obtain a university degree, and “4” if the respondent obtained a university degree or post-graduate education. The remaining exogenous variables are dichotomous and control for the possible influence region and gender has on foreign policy attitudes.

13 The latent variables are continuous, and the coefficients on the exogenous predictors are linear (McIntosh, Personal E-mail).
The partisan and ideological divide is most prevalent on the dimension that captures beliefs about the use of Canadian forces abroad. In line with what we know about the party platforms, the New Democrats, those on the ideological left, and the sovereignist Bloc Quebecois oppose joining offensive coalitions. Conservative identifiers find themselves on the opposite side of the Forces Abroad dimension, and are the one group of Canadians more willing to see Canada use its military abroad but less enthusiastic about Canada projecting itself through the use of soft power and peacekeeping. Those on the ideological left favour a distinct Canadian presence abroad—they want the nation to be active in peacekeeping missions and supportive of foreign aid, but want to limit the use of hard military force abroad.

Although the standardized effects of demographic variables on foreign policy attitudes pale in comparison to the influence of partisan identification or ideology, older citizens rate higher on the Homeland Militarism dimension. More educated citizens are significantly more likely to support both varieties of Canadian influence abroad. On the Internationalism dimension, a gender gap appears, with men more likely to score higher on the Internationalism dimension, indicative of their greater tendency to support aid to troubled areas and accept foreigners into Canada. Although regionalism is an important part of the discussion in studies of voter choice and attitudes towards domestic policies in Canada, outside of Quebec, regional differences were the exception rather than the rule. Only British Columbia stands out as having citizens that are more interested in aggressively protecting homeland security and seeing Canada project itself on the world stage through benevolent actions. As has been true in the past, Quebeckers continue to distinguish themselves by opposing the build-up and use of force both to defend Canada
and for use abroad, a likely reaction to a military that is largely English speaking and has a historically British lineage (cf. Granatstein 2004). However, it is important to note that these attitudes cannot be seen as solely a function of sovereigntist sentiment in the province-- those that did not identify with the Bloc Quebecois were also more sceptical of the military in comparison to Canadians in the rest of Canada.

Taken together these findings show that, like their peers in other advanced democracies, Canadians can order their foreign policy beliefs along a theoretically valid set of latent dimension, and the positions of the Canadian public along these dimensions is readily explained by the partisan and cleavage structures present in the country. In our discussion, we draw on these findings and those found in the literature to examine how the Canadian public compares with publics in other Middle Powers and the reasons Canadian foreign policy belief structures differ slightly from those found in these nations. We then discuss the challenges this belief structure could pose for elites attempting to formulate Canadian defence policy.

**Discussion**

One of the challenges facing Canadian foreign policy-makers is arriving at policy choices consistent with Canadian values. Perceptions that the Canada public supports a foreign policy consistent with “liberal internationalism” abound. Clear and concise understandings of exactly what policy choices are consistent with “liberal internationalism” do not. Our results show that the Canadian public has substantial variation in foreign policy preferences. More importantly, Canadian foreign policy attitudes have a coherent three dimension structure to them. There are three clear
dimensions of Canadian opinion when it comes to foreign policy—homeland defence, constraint of using forces abroad, and internationalism.

Ultimately, what do Canadians want from their foreign policy? There is widespread support for a stronger military, and Canadians do not cower at the possible consequences of attacking terrorist organizations. In findings similar to what has been observed in other middle power liberal democracies (e.g. Sweden, see Bjereld and Ekengren (1999)), a militarism dimension is supported more strongly than we initially expected. Beyond homeland defence, large numbers of Canadians are prepared to use the military in peacekeeping missions. However, Canadians have a very strong preference that the use of force abroad be supported by the international community. There is strong opposition to suggesting that Canada should have been involved in the Iraq War. We suspect that this opposition is driven largely from the lack of international consensus and support for the American led mission. Although Canada’s two closest allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, supported the War, too many key international players did not.

While Canada could unilaterally choose to deploy peacekeepers, the Canadian public appears to prefer actions that are in concert with the international community. Canadians appear to have an uncomfortable relationship with the use of military force. They are far from pacifist, but neither are they eager to deploy. Interestingly, there is greater support for participation in peacekeeping operations—even if it means putting the lives of Canadian soldiers at risk—than there is for spending more money on foreign aid. Finally, Canadians are largely supportive of immigration.
As the results in the previous sections demonstrate, these attitudes are highly structured. Moreover, the underlying latent attitudes are best explained by explicitly political attitudes like ideology and partisan identification. Attitudes have a coherent structure and are tied to other explicitly political judgments. From this, we conclude that foreign policy matters for Canadian citizens. Significantly less clear is whether foreign policy matters for Canadian politics.

Aldrich et al. (1989) propose several necessary conditions for foreign policy to matter in U.S. presidential elections. First, foreign policy attitudes must be accessible and salient. Second, elites must present different platforms for voters to choose. Given the clear structure of Canadian foreign policy attitudes, we are convinced that attitudes are accessible. Moreover, our reading of elite level debates suggests that the political parties do in fact possess different views of what Canadian foreign policy should be. Thus, the extent to which foreign policy matters in Canadian politics is largely a function of the issue salience. We cannot say for certain why foreign policy is not more salient, or what would make it so. Nonetheless, the Canadian public has well formed attitudes when it comes to foreign policy.
**Figure 1a:** A Two Dimensional Model of Foreign Policy Issue Beliefs

![Two Dimensional Model of Foreign Policy Issue Beliefs](image)

**Figure 1b:** A Three Dimensional Model of Foreign Policy Issue Beliefs

![Three Dimensional Model of Foreign Policy Issue Beliefs](image)
**Table 1: Support and Opposition to Specific Foreign Policy Actions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada needs to spend more money to strengthen its armed forces.</td>
<td>65.51%</td>
<td>25.47%</td>
<td>9.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada should not try to combat terrorist organizations because that will encourage the terrorists to attack us.</td>
<td>13.16%</td>
<td>74.96%</td>
<td>11.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada should have joined with the United States and Great Britain in the war against Iraq.</td>
<td>13.66%</td>
<td>78.33%</td>
<td>8.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada should not use its armed forces abroad unless it gets approval from the United Nations.</td>
<td>65.89%</td>
<td>24.69%</td>
<td>9.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada should participate in peacekeeping operations abroad even if it means putting the lives of Canadian soldiers at risk.</td>
<td>69.17%</td>
<td>18.26%</td>
<td>12.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowing more immigrants from foreign countries will enrich Canada's culture with new ideas and customs.</td>
<td>46.30%</td>
<td>16.10%</td>
<td>37.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada should spend more money on foreign aid to developing countries</td>
<td>30.84%</td>
<td>48.52%</td>
<td>20.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2: Factor Loadings, Latent Factor Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Factor 1 Homeland Militarism</th>
<th>Factor 2 Constrain Forces Abroad</th>
<th>Factor 3 Internationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada Needs to Spend More Money to Strengthen its Armed Forces [Agree=1]</td>
<td>1.00 (0.72)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.49/0.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Should Not Try to Combat Terrorist Organizations Because That Will Encourage the Terrorists to Attack Us [Agree=-1] (0.74/0.26)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Should Have Joined with the United States and Great Britain in the War Against Iraq [Agree=-1] (0.32/0.69)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Should Not Use its Armed Forces Abroad Unless it Gets Approval from the United Nations [Agree=1] (0.61/0.38)</td>
<td>0.75 (0.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Should Participate in Peacekeeping Operations Abroad Even if it Means Putting the Lives of Canadian Soldiers at Risk [Agree=1] (0.70/0.30)</td>
<td>-0.50 (-0.42)</td>
<td>0.77 (0.60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowing More Immigrants From Foreign Countries Will Enrich Canada's Culture With New Ideas And Customs [Agree=1] (0.41/0.59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Should Spend More Money on Foreign Aid to Developing Countries [Agree=1] (0.46/0.55)</td>
<td>0.96 (0.74)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlated Error Variances**
- Peacekeeping with Terrorism (0.37)
- Peacekeeping with Defence Spending (0.17)

**Correlation Matrix**
- Militarism 1.00
- Constrain Forces Abroad -0.35 1.00
- Internationalism \(0.05^{NS}\) 0.29 1.00

**Model Fit**
- \(\chi^2(7) = 7.28\) (P<0.40)
- Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 0.006
- Weighted Root Square Residual 0.428

Notes: Standardized Factor Loadings in Parentheses
NS: Correlation Coefficient Not Significant
Table 3: *Latent Variable Estimations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Homeland Militarism</th>
<th>Forces Abroad</th>
<th>Internationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Identification</td>
<td>0.057 (0.049)</td>
<td>0.111* (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Identification</td>
<td>0.167** (0.060)</td>
<td>-0.275*** (0.066)</td>
<td>-0.100* (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.P. Identification</td>
<td>-0.039 (0.066)</td>
<td>0.272*** (0.080)</td>
<td>0.103# (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Quebecois</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.182*** (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Ideology</td>
<td>-0.238* (0.115)</td>
<td>0.468* (0.172)</td>
<td>0.779*** (0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Ideology</td>
<td>0.620*** (0.151)</td>
<td>-0.171 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.091 (0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.013 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.123* (0.044)</td>
<td>0.224*** (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.012*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.108 (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.085 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.263*** (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>0.280# (0.147)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.145)</td>
<td>0.197# (0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie Provinces</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.133)</td>
<td>-0.089 (0.145)</td>
<td>0.147 (0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>-0.598*** (0.113)</td>
<td>0.268# (0.141)</td>
<td>0.119 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Provinces</td>
<td>0.059 (0.164)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.165)</td>
<td>-0.048 (0.134)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latent Variable R²: 0.450 0.353 0.288

Model Fit: \( \chi^2_{WLSMV}(44)=70.417 \) RMSEA: 0.024 WRMR=0.765

Notes: * p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
N=1037; Unstandardized Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Appendix: Steps in Fitting Models

**A. Wittkopf’s Two Dimensional Militant and Cooperative Internationalism Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competing Models</th>
<th>( \chi^2 ) (WLSMV)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>( \Delta \chi^2 )</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>WRMR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hypothesized Model</td>
<td>177.39</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. After Peacekeeping Freed on Militant Dimension</td>
<td>177.39</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. After UN Approval Freed on Militant Dimension</td>
<td>87.27</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-90.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. After UN Approval Fixed to 0 on Cooperative Dimension</td>
<td>102.48</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>+15.21</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. After Freeing Error Covariance between Fight Terror and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>54.56</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-47.92</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. After Freeing Error Covariance Between Fight Terror and Military Spending</td>
<td>34.98</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-19.58</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. After Freeing Error Covariance Between Peacekeeping and Military Spending</td>
<td>14.44</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-20.54</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. After Freeing Error Covariance Between Fight Terror and Immigration</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>-4.73</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Chittick et al.’s Three Dimensional “Militarism, Internationalism, and Multilateralism” Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competing Models</th>
<th>( \chi^2 ) (WLSMV)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>( \Delta \chi^2 )</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>WRMR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hypothesized Model</td>
<td>27.90</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. After Freeing Error Covariance between Peacekeeping and Fight Terror</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>-16.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. After Freeing Error Covariance between Peacekeeping and Military Spending</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>-4.35</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weighted N=1056

\[ \text{RMSEA=} \quad \text{Root Mean Square Error of Approximation} \]
\[ \text{WRMR=} \quad \text{Weighted Root Mean Square Residual} \]
References


