Destabilizing Effects of Market Size in the Dynamics of Innovation*

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Abstract: In existing models of endogenous innovation cycles, market size alters the amplitude of fluctuations without changing the nature of fluctuations. This is due to the ubiquitous assumption of CES homothetic demand system, implying that monopolistically competitive firms sell their products at an exogenous markup rate in spite of the empirical evidence for the procompetitive effect of entry and market size. We extend a model of endogenous innovation cycles to allow for the procompetitive effect, using a more general homothetic demand system. We show that a larger market size and/or a smaller innovation cost, which causes the markup rate to decline through the procompetitive effect, has destabilizing effects on the dynamics of innovation under two complementary sets of sufficient conditions; i) when the price elasticity function is log-concave; and ii) when the demand systems belong to parametric families of “generalized translog” or “constant pass-through.”

Keywords: Dynamic monopolistic competition, Endogenous innovation cycles, the Judd model, H.S.A., Market size, Procompetitive effect, Piecewise-linear dynamical system, Periodic cycle, Robust chaotic attractor

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1. **Introduction**

How does market size affect the dynamics of innovation? Many existing studies have already investigated the market size effect on innovation and long run growth.\(^1\) However, innovation is not only a source of long run growth. It is also a source of fluctuations because innovations tend to arrive in waves, as many have pointed out.\(^2\) Yet, little is known about the market size effect on the patterns of fluctuations in innovation and aggregate dynamics. In existing models of *endogenous innovation cycles*, market size merely affects the amplitude of fluctuations. Its potential effects on the patterns of fluctuations are muted by the ubiquitous assumption of the CES homothetic demand system for innovated products, which implies that monopolistically competitive firms sell their products at an exogenously constant markup rate, in spite of the empirical evidence of *the procompetitive effect*; see, e.g., Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Feenstra and Weinstein (2017). That is, as more firms enter and compete against one another in a larger economy, they face more elastic demand for their products, which forces them to set their prices at lower markup rates. In the presence of such procompetitive effect, a larger market size relative to the innovation cost (or equivalently a smaller innovation cost relative to the market size) and the resulting competitive pressure would make innovators more sensitive to changing market environments, thereby causing instability in the dynamics of innovation.

To capture this mechanism, we extend the Judd (1985, section 4) model of endogenous innovation cycles to allow for the procompetitive effect. The Judd model offers an ideal setting for our purpose. First, it generates endogenous fluctuations along the unique equilibrium trajectory, unlike some other models of endogenous innovation cycles, which rely on expectational indeterminacy and multiple equilibria. Second, it is analytically tractable. Starting from any initial condition, its unique equilibrium trajectory can be obtained by iterating a skewed-V map (i.e., piecewise linear with two branches, decreasing in the lower branch and increasing in the upper branch). This class of maps generates a wide range of fluctuating patterns, including chaotic fluctuations, and yet it is simple enough to be characterized completely. In particular, one could study its properties by looking at a single constant number,

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\( \theta \), which we call the delayed impact of innovation. This constant number determines how much current innovations discourage future innovations; it is the key factor that generates incentives for innovators to synchronize their activities and creates temporal clustering of innovation in the model. Under CES, this constant number is a monotonically increasing transformation of the (exogenously) constant price elasticity of demand for each product, and hence negatively related to the (exogenously) constant markup rate. In particular, it is independent of any other parameters of the model, including the market size/innovation cost ratio.

We generalize the Judd model by extending its CES homothetic demand system to a more general homothetic demand system, H.S.A., which stands for Homothetic with a Single Aggregator. It is one of the classes of homothetic demand systems studied in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017), to which we further impose symmetry and gross substitutability to make it applicable to monopolistic competition, as in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2020, section 3). The key feature of monopolistic competition under H.S.A. is that the price elasticity of demand curve for each product is a function of its “relative price,” which is defined as its own price divided by the price aggregator, which is common across all products. This common price aggregator fully captures the competitiveness of the market.

We have chosen this class of demand systems for the following reasons. First, they are homothetic. Although there have been many attempts to develop monopolistic competition models without CES, they have typically done so by making the demand system nonhomothetic. However, in order to isolate the procompetitive effect of a market size change, it is useful to avoid introducing the market size effect operating through nonhomotheticity. Second, it contains as special cases not only CES but also homothetic translog demand systems, which have been used to introduce the procompetitive effect in monopolistic competition models. Third, under the additional assumption that the price elasticity function is increasing (i.e., the price elasticity goes up as one moves up along the demand curve; the so-called

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3For example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, Section II) extended their monopolistic competition model to a class of non-CES demand systems, which have been further explored by Behrens and Murata (2007), Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012), Dhingra and Morrow (2019), Latzer, Matsuyama, and Parenti (2019), among others. Although Dixit and Stiglitz called this class, “Variable Elasticity Case,” the well-known Bergson’s Law states that, within the class of demand systems they considered, they are homothetic if and only if they are CES. In other words, any departure from CES within this class introduces nonhomotheticity. See Parenti, Thisse, and Ushchev (2017) and Thisse and Ushchev (2018) for more discussions on this issue with extensive references.

Marshall’s second law of demand), H.S.A. exhibits the procompetitive effect.\(^5\) Fourth, the Judd model under H.S.A. remains equally tractable as the original Judd model under CES. Indeed, its dynamics are still characterized by a skewed-V map. The only difference from the case of CES is that both the markup rate as well as the delayed impact of innovation, \(\theta\), become functions of the market size/innovation cost ratio. Thus, by investigating the properties of these functions, we can use the Judd model under H.S.A. as a simple way of studying how the market size/innovation cost ratio affects the patterns of fluctuations in innovation dynamics through its procompetitive effect.

In our analysis, we identify two complementary sets of sufficient conditions under which an increase in the market size/innovation cost ratio increases the delayed impact of innovation, \(\theta\), through the procompetitive effect, and hence it has the destabilizing effects on the dynamics of innovation. The first is the log-concavity of the price elasticity function, that is, if it is not “too convex,” or if the price elasticity goes up when moving up along the demand curve, but not in a too accelerating way. The second set of sufficient conditions deals with the cases where the log-concavity condition does not hold. They are two parametric families within H.S.A., which we call “generalized translog” and “constant pass-through.” These two parametric families, even though both feature CES as the limit case, are characterized by the presence of the choke price. Interestingly, the possibility of chaotic fluctuations becomes more likely by approaching the limit case of CES within each family.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we revisit the Judd model under CES, derive a skewed-V map, which generates the equilibrium trajectory, and offer a full characterization of the properties. In doing so, we highlight its key features and explain the intuition why it generates endogenous fluctuations in innovation, why an increase in the (exogenously) constant elasticity of substitution between products has a destabilizing effect, and yet why it is independent of the market size/innovation cost ratio. In Section 3, we formally introduce symmetric H.S.A. demand systems with gross substitutes defined over a continuum of products. Then, we derive the dynamical system for the Judd model under H.S.A., which still features a skewed-V map. In Section 4, we introduce the additional assumption on H.S.A., which makes it consistent with the empirical evidence of the procompetitive effect. In Section 5, we

\(^5\)It should be pointed out that, in general, Marshall’s second law of demand is neither sufficient nor necessary for the procompetitive effect.
present two propositions. Proposition 1 states that, under H.S.A. with the procompetitive effect, the delayed impact of innovation, $\theta$, can take the same range of values as under CES, even though it now depends on the market size/innovation cost ratio. Proposition 2 states that the delayed impact of innovation, $\theta$, is strictly increasing in the market size/innovation cost ratio under the log-concavity of the price elasticity function. In Section 6, we go through four parametric families within H.S.A, all of which feature the procompetitive effect, and contain CES as a limit case. The first two, Example 1 and Example 2, additionally satisfy the log-concavity condition, and hence they demonstrate the power of Proposition 2. Then, we turn to Example 3, “generalized translog,” and Example 4, “constant pass-through,” both of which feature the choke price, hence the log-concavity condition does not hold. Yet, in both cases, an explicit calculation allows us to show that an increase in the market size/innovation cost ratio increases the delayed impact of innovation, $\theta$, and hence has the destabilizing effects on the dynamics of innovation. We conclude in Section 7. Appendices A through D offer some relatively more technical materials.


In his seminal work, Judd (1985) developed dynamic extensions of the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive model, in which innovators pay a one-time fixed cost of innovation to introduce a new (horizontally differentiated) product, but they hold onto their monopoly power over their own products only for a limited time. Thus, each product is sold initially at the monopoly price, and later at the competitive price. This creates a temporal clustering of innovation activities. Because of free entry to innovation activities, any potential innovator needs to enter when the market for its product is large enough to recover the cost of innovation. The size of the market depends in part on how the products with which it competes are priced. If this innovator chooses to enter when others do, some of its competing products are monopolistically priced. If this innovator enters after others have innovated, on the other hand, the market for its product would be too small to recover the cost of innovation, because competing products are more competitively priced as their innovators lose their monopoly power. So, this innovator would rather enter the market when others do, so that he enjoys his temporary monopoly power while they still hold monopoly, instead of waiting and entering the market after they have lost their monopoly. Or to put it differently, the full impact of aggregate innovations on the
competitive pressure occurs with a delay, which each innovator wants to avoid. This creates strategic complementarity in the timing of innovation, creating a synchronization of innovation activities and aggregate fluctuations.

Judd (1985) developed two models to capture this idea, of which we use the one, sketched by Judd (1985, section 4), and later examined in some detail by Deneckere and Judd (1992), for the analytical tractability. What makes this model particularly tractable is the additional assumptions that time is discrete, and that innovators can enjoy their monopoly for only one period, the same period in which they pay the innovation cost. In this section, we will revisit this version of the Judd model, highlighting the key features of the model, offering a full characterization, and explaining the intuition.

2.1. Representative Household: Time is discrete and denoted by \( t \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots \} \). The representative household of the economy supplies \( L \) units of labor, the only primary factor of production and taken as the numeraire, and consumes the single consumption good, \( C_t \), each period. The household has a well-defined intertemporal utility function, \( U(C_0, C_1, C_2, \ldots) \), but we could leave it unspecified. This is because, in the Judd model as well as in our extension, there exists no aggregate means to save. Hence, the interest rate adjusts endogenously in such a way the representative household spends its income each period, \( P_t C_t = L \).

2.2. Production of the Final (Consumption) Good: The competitive industry produces the single consumption good by assembling a continuum of differentiated intermediate inputs, using the CRS technology,

\[
C_t = Y_t = F(x_t),
\]

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6 In the other model presented in Judd (1985; sec. 3), time is continuous, and monopoly lasts for \( 0 < T < \infty \), and its equilibrium conditions are described by a system of delayed differential equations. Although not analytically tractable, Judd showed that there exists a minimum length of the monopoly power, \( T_c > 0 \), such that for \( T_c < T < \infty \), the dynamics of innovation exhibit persistent fluctuations along the equilibrium trajectory for almost all initial conditions. Thus, the discrete time assumption in Judd (1985, section 4) as well as in our extension is not crucial for generating fluctuations.

7 In this model, there is no asset other than the ownership of the innovating firms, whose market value is equal to zero, because the innovators have to pay the fixed cost of innovation in the same period they earn the monopoly profit, and there is free entry to innovation activities. Introducing other assets into this model, such as physical capital, as in Matsuyama (1999, 2001), or allowing for the innovators to retain the monopoly power more than one period, as in Judd (1985, section 3), would substantially complicate the analysis without adding much insight on the question addressed in this paper.
where \( \mathbf{x}_t = \{x_t(\omega); \ \omega \in \Omega_t\} \) is a vector of the intermediate inputs, with \( \Omega_t \) being the set of input varieties available for use in \( t \), and \( F(\mathbf{x}_t) \) is strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave in the interior, and linear homogeneous in \( \mathbf{x}_t \) for a given \( \Omega_t \). Its unit cost function is

\[
P_t = P(\mathbf{p}_t) \equiv \min_{\{x_t(\omega); \ \omega \in \Omega_t\}} \left\{ \int_{\Omega_t} p_t(\omega)x_t(\omega) d\omega \middle| F(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq 1 \right\},
\]

where \( \mathbf{p}_t = \{p_t(\omega); \ \omega \in \Omega_t\} \) is a vector of the input prices, and \( P(\mathbf{p}_t) \) is strictly increasing, quasi-concave, and linear homogeneous in \( \mathbf{p}_t \) for a given \( \Omega_t \). From the unit cost function, one could also recover the CRS production function, as follows:

\[
F(\mathbf{x}_t) \equiv \min_{\{p_t(\omega); \ \omega \in \Omega_t\}} \left\{ \int_{\Omega_t} p_t(\omega)x_t(\omega) d\omega \middle| P(\mathbf{p}_t) \geq 1 \right\}.
\]

From the Shephard’s Lemma, the demand curve for each input can be written as:

\[
x_t(\omega) = \frac{\partial P(\mathbf{p}_t)}{\partial p_t(\omega)} Y_t,
\]

which can be rewritten to show that the market share of each input is equal to the elasticity of \( P(\mathbf{p}_t) \) with respect to its price.

\[
\frac{p_t(\omega)x_t(\omega)}{p_t(\omega)Y_t} = \frac{p_t(\omega)\partial P(\mathbf{p}_t)}{P(\mathbf{p}_t)\partial p_t(\omega)}.
\]

Judd (1985) considers the case where this CRS technology is symmetric CES, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977; section I), as follows:

\[
C_t = Y_t = F(\mathbf{x}_t) = Z \left[ \int_{\Omega_t} [x_t(\omega)]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}
\]

with \( \sigma > 1 \), the (constant) elasticity of substitution, and \( Z > 0 \) a productivity parameter. The corresponding unit cost function is:

\[
P_t = P(\mathbf{p}_t) = \frac{1}{Z} \left[ \int_{\Omega_t} [p_t(\omega)]^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.
\]

Hence, eq.(1), the demand curve for each input, becomes

\[
x_t(\omega) = \frac{1}{Z} \left[ \frac{p_t(\omega)}{ZP(\mathbf{p}_t)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} Y_t = \frac{[p_t(\omega)]^{-\sigma}L}{[ZP(\mathbf{p}_t)]^{1-\sigma}} = \frac{[p_t(\omega)]^{-\sigma}L}{\int_{\Omega_t} [p_t(\omega)]^{1-\sigma} d\omega}
\]

so that the price elasticity of demand for each input is exogenously constant and equal to \( \sigma > 1 \). And eq.(2), the market share of each input, becomes:
\[
\frac{p_t(\omega) x_t(\omega)}{P_t Y_t} = \frac{p_t(\omega)}{P(p_t)} \frac{\partial P(p_t)}{\partial p_t(\omega)} = \left[ \frac{p_t(\omega)}{ZP(p_t)} \right]^{1-\sigma}.
\]

2.3. Differentiated Input Varieties: The set of differentiated inputs available for use in \( t, \Omega_t \), changes over time due to innovation, diffusion, and obsolescence. More specifically, \( \Omega_t \) is partitioned into \( \Omega^m_t \) and \( \Omega^c_t \). The former, \( \Omega^m_t \), is the set of the new inputs introduced \& sold exclusively (and monopolistically) by the innovators. They enjoy the monopoly power for just one period, the same period in which the innovators pay the innovation cost. The latter, \( \Omega^c_t \), is the set of all inputs that the economy inherited at the beginning of period \( t \). Because all these input varieties were innovated before period \( t \), their innovators have already lost their monopoly power, due to diffusion, and hence they are competitively supplied. In addition, all the input varieties in \( \Omega_t = \Omega^m_t + \Omega^c_t \) are subject to idiosyncratic obsolescence shocks, and only a fraction \( \delta \in (0,1) \) survives and carries over to the next period to be in \( \Omega^c_{t+1} \).

2.4. Production and Pricing of Differentiated Inputs: Producing one unit of each variety in \( \Omega_t \) requires \( \psi \) units of labor, the numeraire. Thus, the marginal cost of producing each input is equal to \( \psi \). The unit price of all competitively supplied input varieties in \( \Omega^c_t \) is equal to its marginal cost, \( \psi \). Since they all enter symmetrically in the production, they are produced by the same amount, \( x^c_t \), so that:

\[
p_t(\omega) = \psi \equiv p^c; \quad x_t(\omega) \equiv x^c_t \quad \text{for} \quad \omega \in \Omega^c_t.
\]  

(6)

In contrast, the unit price of all monopolistically supplied input varieties in \( \Omega^m_t \) is priced at the same exogenously constant markup, as \( p_t(\omega) = M\psi \), where \( M \equiv \sigma/(\sigma - 1) \), because each innovator/monopolist faces the demand curve eq.(5) with the constant price elasticity, \( \sigma > 1 \).

Again, due to the symmetry, they are all produced by the same amount, \( x^m_t \), so that:

\[
p_t(\omega) = \frac{\sigma \psi}{\sigma - 1} \equiv p^m; \quad x_t(\omega) \equiv x^m_t \quad \text{for} \quad \omega \in \Omega^m_t.
\]  

(7)

From eqs.(6)-(7),

\[
\frac{p^c}{p^m} = 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} < 1; \quad \frac{x^c_t}{x^m_t} = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{-\sigma} > 1;
\]

(8)

and hence the market share of a competitive variety relative to that of a monopolistic variety is
\[
\frac{p^c x_t^c}{p^m x_t^m} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma} \equiv \theta \in (1, e),
\]

which is a constant number, \( \theta \). It is monotonically increasing in \( \sigma \), with \( \theta \rightarrow 1 \), as \( \sigma \rightarrow 1 \), and \( \theta \rightarrow e = 2.718 \ldots \), as \( \sigma \rightarrow \infty \). It should also be pointed out that \( \theta \), though monotonically increasing in \( \sigma \), changes little in response to \( \sigma \) (\( \theta \approx 2.370 \) for \( \sigma = 4 \) and \( \theta \approx 2.627 \) for \( \sigma = 14 \)).

This constant number, \( \theta \), plays a crucial role in the analysis. To understand what it represents, plug the common prices given in eqs.(6)-(7), \( p_t(\omega) = p^c \) for \( \omega \in \Omega_t^c \) and \( p_t(\omega) = p^m \) for \( \omega \in \Omega_t^m \), into eq.(4) to obtain the expression for the TFP:

\[
\frac{Y_t}{L} = \frac{1}{P_t} = Z [V_t^c(p^c)^{1-\sigma} + V_t^m(p^m)^{1-\sigma}]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} = \frac{Z}{\psi} (V_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}
\]

where \( V_t^c \) and \( V_t^m \) denote the measures of \( \Omega_t^c \) and \( \Omega_t^m \), respectively, and

\[
V_t \equiv V_t^c + \frac{V_t^m}{\theta}.
\]

Eqs.(10)-(11) show that one competitive variety has the same impact on productivity with those of \( \theta > 1 \) monopolistic varieties. Thus, the effect of innovation on TFP is initially muted, when the newly introduced inputs are sold at the monopoly price; it reaches its full potential only after their innovators lost their monopoly power, and their innovations become competitively priced. Thus, \( \theta - 1 > 0 \) measures the delayed impact of innovation. This also means that past innovations are more discouraging than contemporaneous innovations to each innovator. To see this, plug the common prices given in eqs.(6)-(7), \( p_t(\omega) = p^c \) for \( \omega \in \Omega_t^c \) and \( p_t(\omega) = p^m \) for \( \omega \in \Omega_t^m \) in eq.(5), to obtain the demand curve faced by each innovator in equilibrium:

\[
x_t(\omega) = \frac{L(p_t(\omega))^{-\sigma}}{V_t^c(p^c)^{1-\sigma} + V_t^m(p^m)^{1-\sigma}} = \frac{L(p_t(\omega))^{-\sigma}}{V_t(\psi)^{1-\sigma}},
\]

which is inversely related to \( V_t \). Thus, from the point of view of the innovator/monopolist, competing against one competitive variety is equivalent to competing against \( \theta > 1 \) monopolistic varieties. In other words, \( \theta \) represents the toughness of competing against a competitive variety, relative to competing against a monopolistic variety. This creates an incentive for innovations to synchronize. Each innovator prefers enjoying its temporary monopoly power, while other innovators are enjoying their temporary monopoly power, i.e., before their innovations become competitively priced. Thus, \( \theta \) also measures the force for temporal clustering of innovations.
2.5. Introduction of New Varieties (Innovation): There is free entry to innovation activities. Anyone can introduce new input varieties at the beginning of each period, which requires $F$ units of labor per variety. Innovations in period $t$ must be rewarded by the monopoly profit earned in period $t$, as the monopoly power lasts only one period. Thus, unless the gross profit $(p^m - \psi)x_t^m = p^m x_t^m / \sigma = \psi x_t^c / \theta \sigma$ covers the cost of innovation, $F$, there is no entry/innovation. On the other hand, if there is active entry/innovation, the profit net of the innovation cost must be equal to zero. This can be written as the complementary slackness condition:

$$ V_t^m \geq 0; $$

$$ F \geq (p^m - \psi)x_t^m = p^m x_t^m / \sigma = \psi x_t^c / \theta \sigma; $$

$$ V_t^m[(p^m - \psi)x_t^m - F] = V_t^m[p^m x_t^m - (\psi x_t^m + F)] = 0. $$

2.6. Resource Constraint: Labor, the only primary factor of production, is used in the production of intermediate inputs as well as the innovation activities. Thus, the resource constraint of the economy is given by:

$$ L = V_t^c(\psi x_t^c) + V_t^m(\psi x_t^m + F). $$

Using eq.(9), eq.(11) and eq.(12), this can be further written as:

$$ L = V_t^c(p^c x_t^c) + V_t^m(p^m x_t^m) = V_t(\psi x_t^c) $$

For $V_t^m > 0$, eq.(12) implies $\psi x_t^c = \sigma \theta F$, so that this resource constraint implies $V_t = L/(\sigma \theta F)$. For $V_t^m = 0$, $V_t = V_t^c$. Hence, $V_t \equiv V_t^c + V_t^m / \theta = \max(L/(\sigma \theta F), V_t^c)$, from which

$$ V_t^m = \max \left\{ \frac{L}{\sigma F} - \theta V_t^c, 0 \right\}. $$

Eq.(13) shows that innovations are inactive ($V_t^m = 0$), when $V_t^c \geq L/(\sigma \theta F)$ and active ($V_t^m > 0$) when $V_t^c < L/(\sigma \theta F)$. Thus, $L/(\sigma \theta F)$ can be interpreted as the saturation level of competitive varieties, which kills any incentive to innovate. Eq.(13) also shows that, when innovations are active, one additional competitive variety crowds out $\theta > 1$ innovations. Note also that the scale of production of each of competitive and monopolistic varieties, $x_t^c = \sigma \theta (F/\psi)$ and $x_t^m = (\sigma - 1)(F/\psi)$, are independent of $L$. The size of the economy affects only how much innovation takes place.
2.7. Dynamical System: We are now ready to derive the law of motion for the economy. Recall that the economy inherits $V_t^c$ of competitive varieties at the beginning of period $t$. From eq.(13), this determines innovations, $V_t^m$. Due to idiosyncratic obsolescence shocks, only a fraction $\delta \in (0,1)$ of all the input varieties produced in period $t$ survive to period $t + 1$. Thus,

$$V_{t+1}^c = \delta (V_t^c + V_t^m) = \delta \max\left\{ \frac{L}{\sigma F}, (1 - \theta) V_t^c, V_t^c \right\}.$$ 

This defines the law of motion for $V_t^c$. However, it is more convenient to normalize $V_t^c$ with $L/(\sigma F)$, the saturation level of competitive varieties, by defining $n_t \equiv (\sigma \theta F / L)V_t^c$. Then, the above law of motion is simplified to:

$$n_{t+1} = f(n_t) \equiv \begin{cases} f_L(n_t) & \text{for } n_t < 1 \\ f_H(n_t) & \text{for } n_t > 1 \end{cases} \equiv \begin{cases} \delta \theta - \delta (\theta - 1) n_t & \text{for } n_t < 1 \\ \delta n_t & \text{for } n_t > 1 \end{cases}$$

where the two parameters satisfy

$$(\delta, \theta) \in (0,1) \times (1, e).$$

For any initial condition, $n_0$, the entire equilibrium trajectory of the economy can be obtained by iterating eq.(14).

Figure 1 illustrates eq.(14) for the case of $\delta(\theta - 1) > 1$. This dynamical system, eq.(14) is defined by a skewed V-shaped map, a 1-dimensional piecewise linear map $f(n_t)$ with two branches, one decreasing $f_L(n_t)$ and one increasing $f_H(n_t)$. It has two parameters, $\delta \in (0,1)$, the survival rate of each input varieties, and $\theta \in (1, e)$, the market share multiplier due to the loss of monopoly power by its innovator, which also captures the delayed impact of innovations and the force of temporal clustering of innovations.

Figure 1: The skewed V-map, drawn for $\delta(\theta - 1) > 1$. 
The economic intuition behind this map is easy to grasp. Recall that $n_t \equiv (\sigma \theta F / L) V^c_t$ is the range of competitive varieties the economy inherited, $V^c_t$, normalized by the saturation level, $L/(\sigma \theta F)$. Thus, for $n_t > 1$, no innovation takes place. In this phase, $n_t$ shrinks by the factor $\delta < 1$, due to the obsolescence shocks, which is why the map is below the 45º line. Hence, the economy eventually enters the phase, $n_t < 1$, where some innovations take place. In this phase, because an increase in $n_t$ crowds out innovations at the rate equal to $\theta > 1$, the total range of (both competitive and monopolistic) input varieties produced is decreasing in $n_t$ by the factor of $\theta - 1$. And because only $\delta$ fraction of them survives to the next period, a higher $n_t$ reduces $n_{t+1}$ at the rate equal to $\delta(\theta - 1) > 0$, which is why the map is downward-sloping in this range. (In Figure 1, $\delta(\theta - 1) > 1$.)

2.8. Properties of the Skewed-V map: One major advantage of eq.(14), a skewed V-map, is that its properties can be fully characterized in terms of the two parameters, $(\delta, \theta)$.

As seen in Figure 1, eq.(14) has a unique steady state,

$$n^* \equiv \frac{\delta \theta}{1 + \delta(\theta - 1)} < 1.$$  

Its stability depends on $\delta(\theta - 1) > 0$, the slope of $f_L(n_t)$, which is determined by the extent to which innovations in one period discourage those in the next period, which is equal to $\theta - 1$ (the delayed impact of an innovation) multiplied by $\delta$ (the probability with which innovated products survive for one period).

For $\delta(\theta - 1) < 1$, this effect dissipates over time, making the unique steady state $n^*$ stable. Indeed, one could easily show that it is not only locally stable but also globally attracting; that is, for any initial condition, the equilibrium trajectory converges to $n^*$. The speed of convergence to the steady state is inversely related to $\delta(\theta - 1)$ and approaches to zero, as $\delta(\theta - 1) \to 1$.

For $\delta(\theta - 1) > 1$, as drawn in Figure 1, innovations in one period discourage more innovations in the next period, making the unique steady state $n^*$ unstable. In this case, starting

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8Sushko and Gardini (2010, section 3.1) offers a complete analysis of continuous, piecewise linear maps with two branches, increasing in the lower branch, and decreasing in the upper branch, which they call “skew-tent maps”. By defining $y_t = -n_t$, our skewed-V map can be transformed into a skew-tent map, $y_{t+1} = T(y_t)$. 

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from any initial condition, the trajectory will eventually enter the interval, $[\delta, f_L(\delta)]$, depicted by
the red square in Figure 1, and once entered, it never leaves. In other words, this interval is both
absorbing and trapping. We shall call it the trapping interval. Furthermore, for almost all initial
conditions, the trajectory exhibits persistent fluctuations within the trapping interval. One could
also show that, within this trapping interval, there exists a unique period-2 cycle, $n^*_L \leftrightarrow n^*_H$, along which the trajectory oscillates between the phase of active innovation ($n_t = n^*_L < 1$) and the phase of no innovation ($n_t = n^*_H > 1$), where

$$\delta < n^*_L \equiv \frac{\delta^2 \theta}{1 + \delta^2 (\theta - 1)} < n^* \equiv \frac{\delta \theta}{1 + \delta (\theta - 1)} < 1 < n^*_H \equiv \frac{\delta \theta}{1 + \delta^2 (\theta - 1)} < f_L(\delta).$$

The stability of the period-2 cycle, $n^*_L \leftrightarrow n^*_H$, depends on $\delta^2 (\theta - 1)$, which measures the extent
to which innovations in one period discourage those in two periods later, which is equal to $\theta - 1$
(the delayed impact of an innovation) multiplied by $\delta^2$ (the probability with which innovated
products survive for two periods).

If $\delta^2 (\theta - 1) < 1 < \delta (\theta - 1)$, the period-2 cycle is stable. Even though $\delta (\theta - 1) > 1$
implies that enough of innovations in $t$ survives for one period to discourage innovations in $t + 1$, $\delta^2 (\theta - 1) < 1$ implies that not enough of them survives for two periods to discourage
innovations in $t + 2$, which makes the period-2 cycle stable. One could also show that the
equilibrium trajectory converges to the period-2 cycle for almost all initial conditions. Again, the
speed of convergence to the period-2 cycle is inversely related to $\delta^2 (\theta - 1)$ and approaches to
zero, as $\delta^2 (\theta - 1) \to 1$.

For $\delta^2 (\theta - 1) > 1$, the period-2 cycle, $n^*_L \leftrightarrow n^*_H$, is unstable. In this case, Deneckere and
In fact, recent advances in piece-wise linear dynamical systems, reviewed by Sushko and Gardini
(2010), allow us to say more. That is, there exists a unique chaotic attractor,\(^9\) consisting of

\(^9\)Most existing examples of chaos in economics are not attractors, as they rely on Li-Yorke (1975)’s “period-3
implies chaos,” which asserts only the existence of a chaotic (i.e., persistently aperiodically fluctuating) trajectory
for some initial conditions. And the set of the initial conditions leading to such trajectories can be measure zero. In
other words, even with the existence of a period-3 cycle, the trajectory may converge to a stable periodic cycle for
almost all initial conditions. Here, the trajectory converges to a chaotic attractor for almost all initial conditions.
$2^m$ cyclic intervals\textsuperscript{10}, where $m$ is a non-negative integer, which depends on the parameter values. And the trajectory converges to it for almost all initial conditions.

![Figure 2: Effects of an increase in $\delta$ (for $\theta = 2.5$). (In courtesy of L. Gardini & I. Sushko)](image)

Figure 2 illustrates these properties of eq.(14) by showing how the unique attractor changes as $\delta$ goes up, for $\theta = 2.5$, which corresponds to $\sigma \approx 6.3159$. For $\delta < (\theta - 1)^{-1} = 2/3$, the unique steady state $n^*$ is not only stable but also globally attracting. As $\delta$ passes $(\theta - 1)^{-1} = 2/3$, $n^*$ becomes unstable, as indicated by the solid graph of $n^*$ switching to a dotted graph. This gives rise to the stable period-2 cycle, $n^*_L \leftrightarrow n^*_H$. At $(\theta - 1)^{-0.5} \approx 0.8165$, the period-2 cycle becomes unstable, as indicated by a pair of the solid graphs of $n^*_L \leftrightarrow n^*_H$ switching to a pair of the dotted graphs. This gives rise to the chaotic attractor, which first consists of 8 cyclic intervals (as indicated in enlargement in the red box), which in turn merge to become the chaotic attractor consisting of 4 cyclic intervals, which in turn merge to become the chaotic attractor consisting of 2 cyclic intervals. Notice that, for $(\theta - 1)^{-0.5} \approx 0.8165 < \delta < 1$, the chaotic attractor always exists. Thus, the chaotic attractor here is robust; there exists no “window of periodicity,” unlike in a chaotic system generated by smooth maps.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}Along the chaotic attractor consisting of $k$ cyclic intervals, the trajectory visits each interval every $k$ periods but never return to the same value so that it ends up filling each interval.

\textsuperscript{11}Most existing examples of chaotic attractors in economics are not robust, as they are generated by smooth maps. In a smooth dynamical system, the set of parameter values for which a chaotic attractor exists is totally disconnected (i.e., containing no open sets). The chaotic attractor here is robust (i.e., it exists for an open set in the parameter space), since eq.(14) is nonsmooth due to its regime-switching feature. Note also that, in eq.(14), the loss of the stability of the period-2 cycle immediately gives rise to the chaotic attractor, without “the period-doubling route to chaos,” another familiar feature of smooth dynamical systems.
Figure 3 illustrates the existence regions of the different types of the unique attractor in the space of the two parameters, \((\delta, \theta)\). If \(\theta\) had no upper bound, the skewed-V shape map, eq.(14) could have, as its unique attractor, a stable \(k\)-cycle, or a chaotic attractor consisting of \(k\) cyclic intervals, where \(k\) can be any positive number. However, in the Judd (1985, section 4) model, which assumes CES, \(\theta = (1 - \sigma^{-1})^{1-\sigma} < e = 2.718 \ldots\) so that the unique attractor could only be a stable steady state, a stable 2-cycle, or a chaotic attractor of \(k = 2^m\) \((m = 0,1,2,\ldots)\) cyclic intervals. Along the red arrow, \(\theta = 2.5\), or \(\sigma \approx 6.3159\), which corresponds to the thought experiment in Figure 2. Recall that \(\theta\), though monotonically increasing in \(\sigma\), does not change much in response to \(\sigma\), with \(\theta \approx 2.370\) for \(\sigma = 4\), and \(\theta \approx 2.627\) for \(\sigma = 14\). Figure 3 thus indicates that the patterns observed for a wide range of \(4 < \sigma < 14\), which corresponds to \(2.370 < \theta < 2.627\), is qualitatively similar to those shown in Figure 2.

Figure 3 also shows that, for \(\sigma > 2\) (hence \(\theta > 2\)), a higher \(\delta\) makes endogenous fluctuations more likely. This is because more of innovations in the current period survives to crowd out innovations in the future. Figure 3 also shows that, for \(\delta > (e - 1)^{-1} \approx 0.582\), a higher \(\sigma\) (hence a higher \(\theta\)) makes endogenous fluctuations more likely.\(^{12}\) This is because the negative impact of competing products becoming competitively priced on the monopoly profit is

\[12\text{For } (e - 1)^{-1} \approx 0.582 < \delta < (e - 1)^{-1/2} \approx 0.763, \text{ endogenous fluctuations always exhibit a stable period-2 cycle. For } \delta > (e - 1)^{-1/2} \approx 0.763, \text{ a period-2 cycle loses the stability and give rise to a chaotic attractor, as } \sigma \text{ (hence } \theta\text{) become higher.}\]
much larger with a higher $\sigma$, which gives the innovators stronger incentive to avoid competition by clustering their innovation activities.\textsuperscript{13}

Note also that, even inside the region of the stable steady state, both a higher $\delta$ and a higher $\sigma$ (hence a higher $\theta$) slows down the speed of convergence to the steady state, which is inversely related to $\delta(\theta - 1)$, making the dynamics more persistent.

### 2.9. Implications of the CES assumption:

One salient feature of the dynamical system, eq.(14), is that it does not depend on $L/F$, which is a relevant measure of the market size from the point of view of innovators. Even though an increase in $L/F$ increases $V_t^m$ (the number of innovation and the mass of innovators competing against each other), $V_t^c$ (the variety of competitively supplied products), and hence the total variety of the inputs produced in the economy, the effects are only proportional.\textsuperscript{14} With $\delta$ and $\sigma$ (hence $\theta$) being separate parameters, $L/F$ has no effect on the dynamics of $n_t$.

This is because, under the CES assumption, eq.(5) or eq.(6), the price elasticity of demand for differentiated inputs, and hence the markup rate, are exogenous, and independent of the market size/innovation cost ratio, in spite of the ample evidence that the market size and the entry of new firms have the procompetitive effect. Even though the destabilizing impact of a higher $\theta$ shown in Figure 3 is suggestive of a potential link between the nature of competition and the patterns of fluctuations in innovation, the CES assumption precludes any possibility that the market size or the innovation cost might affect the patterns of fluctuations through its effect on market competition.

### 3. The Judd Model under H.S.A.

How would the dynamics of innovation change in the presence of the procompetitive effect? To address this question, we now extend the Judd model by using a class of CRS production functions, called H.S.A. This class of CRS production functions is chosen for the

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\textsuperscript{13}With a higher $\sigma$, monopolistic varieties are sold at a lower markup rate, so that the price decline caused by the loss of their monopoly power is smaller. However, with a higher $\sigma$, the price decline causes a larger increase in demand. This latter quantity effect dominates the former price effect, which is why $\theta$ is increasing in $\sigma$, and hence a higher $\sigma$ has the destabilizing effect.

\textsuperscript{14}Simple algebra shows $V_t^c = n_t(L/\sigma \theta F)$; $V_t^m = max\{1 - n_t, 0\}(L/\sigma F)$; $V_t = V_t^c + V_t^m/\theta = max\{1, n_t\}(L/\sigma \theta F)$, which are all proportional to $L/F$. From eq.(10), TFP and the real wage is monotone increasing in $L/F$, but not the effect is not proportional, unless $\sigma = 2$. 

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following reasons. First, it contains as its special cases not only CES but also homothetic translog, which have been used to introduce the procompetitive effect in monopolistic competition. Second, the dynamical system under H.S.A. remains equally tractable as the dynamical system under CES, because it is still characterized by a skewed-V map. The only difference from the case of CES is that \( \theta \), still a constant, now becomes a function of \( L/F \). Thus, by investigating the property of this function, the Judd model under H.S.A. offers a simple way of studying how the market size/innovation cost ratio affects the nature of fluctuations in innovation dynamics through its effect on \( \theta \) in the presence of the procompetitive effect.

3.1. Symmetric H.S.A. with gross substitutes: In Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017, section 3), we studied a class of homothetic functions that we called Homothetic with a Single Aggregator (H.S.A.), and in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2020, section 3), we restrict this class further by imposing the symmetry and gross substitutability, in order to make it applicable to monopolistic competitive settings. More specifically, a symmetric CRS production function, \( Y_t = F(x_t) \), or its unit cost function, \( P_t = P(p_t) \), belongs to the class of H.S.A. if it generates the demand system for inputs such that the market share of each input, which is always equal to the elasticity of \( P(p_t) \) with respect to its own price, as shown in eq.(3), can also be written as

\[
\frac{p_t(\omega)x_t(\omega)}{P_t Y_t} = \frac{p_t(\omega)}{P(p_t)} \frac{\partial P(p_t)}{\partial p_t(\omega)} = s\left(\frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)}\right).
\]  

Here, \( s : \mathbb{R}_{++} \to \mathbb{R}_+ \) is the market share function, which is twice continuously differentiable\(^{15}\) and strictly decreasing as long as \( s(z) > 0 \), with \( \lim_{z \to 0} s(z) = \infty \) and \( \lim_{z \to z^\dagger} s(z) = 0 \), where \( z^\dagger \equiv \inf\{z > 0 | s(z) = 0\} \), and \( A(p_t) \) is the common price aggregator, linear homogenous in \( p_t \), defined implicitly and uniquely by

\[
\int_{\Omega_t} s\left(\frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)}\right) d\omega = 1,
\]  

which ensures, by construction, that the market shares of all inputs are added up to one. Eqs.(15)-(16) state that the market share of an input is decreasing in its relative price, which is defined as its own price, \( p_t(\omega) \), divided by the common price aggregator, \( A(p_t) \). Notice that \( A(p_t) \) is independent of \( \omega \); it is “the average price” against which the relative prices

\(^{15}\)Twice continuous differentiability greatly simplifies the analysis. In Appendix A, we also discuss a piecewise (i.e., kinked) continuously differentiable example to illustrate how the analysis needs to be modified.
of all inputs are measured. In other words, one could keep track of all the cross-price effects in the demand system by looking at a single aggregator, $A(p_t)$, which is the key feature of H.S.A. The assumption that the market share function, $s(\cdot)$, is independent of $\omega$ is not a defining feature of H.S.A.; it is due to the symmetry of the underlying production function that generates this demand system. The assumption that it is strictly decreasing means that inputs are gross substitutes. Furthermore, with $\lim_{z \to 0} s(z) = \infty$ and $\lim_{z \to 2} s(z) = 0$, this assumption ensures that eq. (16) defines $A(p_t)$ uniquely no matter what the measure of $\Omega_t$ is.

Here are some additional (somewhat technical) remarks about this class of H.S.A. The reader, who is eager to find out how the Judd model is modified under H.S.A, may want to skip these remarks on the first reading.

**Remark 1:** Eqs.(15)-(16) define H.S.A. by restricting the properties of the demand system generated by a CRS production function. The natural question is then: do CRS production functions that generate such a demand system exist? The answer is yes. Indeed, for each demand system satisfying these properties, there exists a strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave in the interior, CRS production function, uniquely determined up to a positive scalar; see Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017; Proposition 1-i)).

**Remark 2:** For any market share function, $s: \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}^+$, satisfying the above conditions,

i) a class of the market share functions, $s_\lambda(z) \equiv s(\lambda z)$ for $\lambda > 0$, generate the same demand system, with $A_\lambda(p_t) = \lambda A(p_t)$, because $s_\lambda \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right) = s \left( \frac{\lambda p_t(\omega)}{A_\lambda(p_t)} \right) = s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right)$. In this sense, $s_\lambda(z) \equiv s(\lambda z)$ for $\lambda > 0$ are all equivalent. This equivalence gives us freedom to select $\lambda$ to simplify the notation when discussing parametric examples.

ii) a class of the market share functions, $s_\gamma(z) \equiv \gamma s(z)$ for $\gamma > 0$, generate the same demand system with the same common price aggregator. We just need to renormalize the indices of varieties, as $\int_{\Omega_t} s_\gamma \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right) d\omega = \int_{\Omega_t} \gamma s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right) d\omega = \int_{\Omega_t} s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right) d\gamma \omega = \int_{\Omega_t} s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega')}{A(p_t)} \right) d\omega' = 1$, with $\omega' = \gamma \omega$. This equivalence gives us freedom to select $\gamma$ to simplify the notation when discussing parametric examples.

**Remark 3:** Symmetric CES with gross substitutes is a special case, which can be generated by $s(z) = z^{1-\sigma}$ ($\sigma > 1$) or its equivalence. Symmetric translog is another special case, which can be generated by $s(z) = \max\{-\log(z), 0\}$ or its equivalence.
Remark 4: By integrating eq.(15), one can show that the common price aggregator, $A(p)$, is related to the unit cost function, $P(p)$, as:

$$\ln \left( \frac{P(p)}{A(p)} \right) = \text{const.} - \int_{\Omega} \int \frac{s(\xi)}{\xi} d\xi d\omega.$$ 

In the case of CES, it is easy to verify that the RHS is independent of $p$, hence $P(p) = cA(p)$, where $c$ is a constant. However, with the sole exception of CES, the RHS depends on $p$, and hence $P(p) \neq cA(p)$ for any constant $c > 0$, as shown in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2020; Corollary 2 of Lemma 2)\(^\text{16}\). This should not come as a total surprise. After all, $A(p)$ captures the cross-price effects in the demand system, while $P(p)$ captures the productivity (or welfare) effects of price changes; there is no reason to think that they should move together.

We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the Judd model under H.S.A.

3.2. Pricing of Differentiated Varieties: All competitive varieties are priced at the marginal cost, $p_t(\omega) = \psi = p^c$ and hence their relative prices are $z_t^c \equiv \psi / A(p_t)$ for $\omega \in \Omega_t^c$. For monopolistic varieties, $\omega \in \Omega_t^m$, from eq.(15), each monopolist/innovator faces the demand curve,

$$x_t(\omega) = \frac{p_t Y_t}{p_t(\omega)} s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right) = \frac{L}{p_t(\omega)} s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right).$$

Hence it sets the price $p_t(\omega)$ to maximize the profit,

$$(p_t(\omega) - \psi)x_t(\omega) = \left( 1 - \frac{\psi}{p_t(\omega)} \right) s \left( \frac{p_t(\omega)}{A(p_t)} \right) L,$$

holding $A(p_t)$ as given. Or equivalently, it sets its relative price $z_t(\omega) \equiv p_t(\omega) / A(p_t)$ to solve:

$$\max_{z_t(\omega)} \left( 1 - \frac{z_t^c}{z_t(\omega)} \right) s(z_t(\omega)) L \equiv \max_{z_t(\omega)} \pi(z_t(\omega); z_t^c) L \equiv \hat{\pi}(z_t^c) L$$

holding $z_t^c \equiv \psi / A(p_t)$ as given. Here, $\pi(z_t(\omega); z_t^c)$ is the profit per unit of the aggregate expenditure, $L$, as a function of its relative price, and $\hat{\pi}(z_t^c) \equiv \max_{z_t(\omega)} \pi(z_t(\omega); z_t^c)$ is the maximized profit per unit of the aggregate expenditure. Thus, the monopoly price needs to satisfy both the following first-order condition (FOC) and second-order condition (SOC):

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\(^\text{16}\)This holds also for asymmetric H.S.A., as well as H.S.A. with gross complements. See Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017; Proposition 1-iii).
FOC: \[ z_t(\omega) \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_t(\omega))} \right] = z^c_t \]

SOC: \[ \frac{z_t(\omega) \zeta'(z_t(\omega))}{\zeta(z_t(\omega))} > 1 - \zeta(z_t(\omega)) \]

where

\[ \zeta(z) \equiv 1 - \frac{zs'(z)}{s(z)} > 1 \quad (17) \]

is the price elasticity of the demand curve for a particular variety, which is a function of its relative price.\(^{17}\) It is inversely related to the markup rate, \( M(z) \equiv \frac{\zeta(z)}{(\zeta(z) - 1)} \). FOC and SOC are sufficient for a local optimum, but generally not for the global optimum. In what follows, we avoid the need to deal with local but not global optima by assuming:\(^{18}\)

\[(A1) \quad \zeta(z) - 1 + \frac{z\zeta'(z)}{\zeta(z)} > 0 \text{ for } z \in (0, \bar{z}). \]

**Lemma:** (A1) is equivalent to each of the following three statements:

i) \( z \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \right) \) is strictly increasing in \( z \in (0, \bar{z}) \).

ii) For any \( z^c \in (0, \bar{z}) \), \( \pi(z; z^c) \equiv \left( 1 - \frac{z^c}{z} \right) s(z) \) has a single peak at \( z^m \in (z^c, \bar{z}) \), given by \( z^m \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right) \equiv z^c \).

iii) \( \frac{s(z)}{\zeta(z)} \) is strictly decreasing in \( z \in (0, \bar{z}) \).

**Proof:** The equivalence of (A1) and i) follows from

\[ \frac{d \left( z \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \right) \right)}{dz} = \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \left[ \zeta(z) - 1 + \frac{z\zeta'(z)}{\zeta(z)} \right]. \]

The equivalence of i) and ii) follows from

\[ \frac{d}{dz} \pi(z; z^c) = \frac{s(z)\zeta(z)}{z^2} \left[ z^c - z \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \right) \right]. \]

Finally, the equivalence of (A1) and iii) follows from

\[ \frac{d \left( \log \frac{s(z)}{\zeta(z)} \right)}{d \log z} = \frac{zs'(z)}{s(z)} - \frac{z\zeta'(z)}{\zeta(z)} = 1 - \zeta(z) - \frac{z\zeta'(z)}{\zeta(z)}. \] ■

\(^{17}\)\( \zeta(z) > 1 \) is well-defined and continuously differentiable for \( z \in (0, \bar{z}) \). Conversely, any continuously differentiable \( \zeta: (0, \bar{z}) \to (1, \infty) \), satisfying \( \lim_{z \to \bar{z}} \zeta(z) = \infty \) if \( \bar{z} < \infty \), can be used as a primitive of symmetric H.S.A. production functions with gross substitutes, with \( s(z) = \exp \left[ \int_0^z \frac{1 - \zeta(t)}{t} dt \right], z \in (0, \bar{z}) \), where \( c \in (0, \bar{z}) \) is a constant.

\(^{18}\)This is mostly for the expositional simplicity. Even if (A1) is violated, much of the analysis would go through. However, the derivation would become far more involved. This is because, for a finite (hence, non-generic) set of the parameter values, different monopolistic varieties are sold at different prices and by different amounts for the same profit. As a result, a change in the parameters could cause discrete jumps in endogenous variables in comparative statics. See Appendix C for an example.
Thus, under (A1), ii) in Lemma holds so that all the innovators sets the same price, \( p_t(\omega) = p_t^m \), and hence the same relative price, \( z_t(\omega) = z_t^m \equiv p_t^m / A(p_t) \), given by the FOC,

\[
z_t^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_t^m)} \right] = z_t^c,
\]

which automatically satisfies the SOC. Furthermore, from i) in Lemma, \( z_t^m \) is strictly increasing in \( z_t^c \), and vice versa.

3.3. Introduction of New Varieties (Innovation): From eq.(18), the maximized profit is written as, 

\[
\hat{\pi}(z^c) L \equiv \pi(z^m; z^c) L \equiv \left( 1 - \frac{z^c}{z_t^m} \right) s(z_t^m) L = \frac{s(z_t^m)}{\zeta(z_t^m)} L.
\]

This is because each innovator earns \( s(z_t^m) \) fraction of the aggregate expenditure, \( P_t Y_t = L \), of which \( 1 - 1/\zeta(z_t^m) \) fraction is paid to the production cost, and the remaining fraction, \( 1/\zeta(z_t^m) \), goes to the profit. The free entry (innovation) complementarity slackness condition is thus:

\[
V_t^m \geq 0; \quad F \geq \frac{s(z_t^m)}{\zeta(z_t^m)} L; \quad V_t^m \left[ F - \frac{s(z_t^m)}{\zeta(z_t^m)} L \right] = 0,
\]

which corresponds to eq.(12) under CES. Since \( s(z_t^m) / \zeta(z_t^m) \) is strictly decreasing from iii) in Lemma, with the range equal to \((\infty, 0)\), this condition can be written as:

\[
V_t^m \geq 0; \quad z_t^m \geq \underline{z}; \quad V_t^m [z_t^m - \underline{z}] = 0,
\]

where \( \underline{z} \) is defined by

\[
\frac{s(z)}{\zeta(z)} \frac{L}{F} = 1
\]

and strictly increasing in \( L/F \), from iii) in Lemma. Furthermore, from eq.(18) and i) in Lemma, this also implies

\[
z_t^c = z_t^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_t^m)} \right] \geq z_t^c \equiv \underline{z} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(\underline{z})} \right].
\]

Since the market share of each monopolistic variety is \( s(z_t^m) \) and that of each competitive variety is \( s(z_t^c) \), the adding up constraint, eq. (16), can now be rewritten as:

\[
V_t^m s \left( \frac{p_t^m}{A(p_t)} \right) + V_t^c s \left( \frac{\psi}{A(p_t)} \right) = V_t^m s(z_t^m) + V_t^c s(z_t^c) = 1.
\]

First, consider the case where \( V_t^m > 0 \Rightarrow z_t^m = \underline{z}; \quad z_t^c = \bar{z} \). Then, eq.(21) becomes
\[
V_t^m = \frac{1 - s(z^c)V_t^c}{s(z^m)} = \theta \left(\frac{1}{s(z^c)} - V_t^c\right) > 0
\]

where \(\theta \equiv s(z^c)/s(z^m) > 1\) is the market share of a competitive variety, relative to a monopolistic variety. Next, consider the case where \(V_t^m = 0\). Then, eq.(21) becomes \(V_t^c s(z_t^c) = 1\). Because \(z_t^c \geq z^c\), this implies

\[
V_t^m = 0 \iff V_t^c = \frac{1}{s(z_t^c)} \geq \frac{1}{s(z^c)}.
\]

By putting these two cases together, we have

\[
V_t^m = \max \left\{ \theta \left(\frac{1}{s(z^c)} - V_t^c\right), 0 \right\} = \max \left\{ \frac{L}{\zeta(z^m)F} - \theta V_t^c, 0 \right\},
\]

which corresponds to eq.(13) under CES. Thus, \(1/s(z^c)\) can be viewed as the saturation level of competitive varieties, which kills any incentive to innovate.

### 3.4. Dynamical System:

By following the same step as in the case of CES, from eq.(22), we obtain the law of motion for \(V_t^c\),

\[
V_{t+1}^c = \delta(V_t^c + V_t^m) = \delta \max \left\{ \frac{\theta}{s(z^c)} + (1 - \theta)V_t^c, V_t^c \right\},
\]

where \(\delta \in (0,1)\) is the survival rate of each variety. Now, divide the measure of competitive varieties, \(V_t^c\), by the saturation level, \(1/s(z^c)\), to define the normalized measure, \(n_t \equiv s(z^c)V_t^c\), which is also equal to the market share of all competitive varieties for \(n_t \leq 1\). The above law of motion is then rewritten as the dynamical system in \(n_t\) as follows:

\[
n_{t+1} = f(n_t) \equiv \begin{cases} 
  f_L(n_t) & \text{for } n_t \leq 1 \\
  f_H(n_t) & \text{for } n_t \geq 1
\end{cases}
\]

where we recall \(\theta \equiv s(z^c)/s(z^m) > 1\) is the market share of a competitive variety relative to a monopolistic variety, which measures the delayed impact of innovations and the force of temporal clustering of innovations.

Notice that eq.(14) and eq.(24) are identical, both characterized by the skewed-V map, with the same two parameters, \((\delta, \theta)\). However, there is one crucial difference. Under H.S.A., \(\theta \equiv s(z^c)/s(z^m) > 1\) is a function of \(L/F, \Theta(L/F)\), which can be defined implicitly as:
\[ \theta \left( \frac{L}{F} \right) \equiv \frac{s \left( z^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] \right)}{s(z^m)} > 1; \quad \frac{s(z^m)L}{\zeta(z^m)F} \equiv 1, \quad (25) \]

using eq.(19) and eq.(20). From iii) in Lemma, eq.(18) shows that \( z^m \) is increasing in \( L/F \).

Thus, a larger market size/innovation cost ratio allows the innovators to break even with a higher relative price. Under CES, \( \zeta(z^m) = \sigma \) and \( s(z) = (\lambda z)^{1-\sigma} \), so that \( \theta = (1 - \sigma^{-1})^{1-\sigma} \in (1, e) \), which is independent of \( z^m \). Generally, however, \( L/F \) affects \( \theta \equiv s(z^m)/s(z^m) \equiv \Theta(L/F) > 1 \) through its effect on \( z^m \). And through its effect on \( \theta \equiv \Theta(L/F) > 1 \), \( L/F \) affects the nature of fluctuations. Since a change in \( L/F \) keeps eq.(14) otherwise intact, it suffices to study the property of this function in order to identify the effect of the market size/innovation cost ratio.

4. Procompetitive Effect under H.S.A.

Before proceeding, we introduce another assumption.

(A2) \( \zeta'(z) \geq 0 \) for all \( z \in (0, \bar{z}) \).

That is, as its relative price goes up, the demand curve for each variety may become more price-elastic, but never become less price-elastic. The property is sometimes referred to as Marshall’s second law of demand. Since \( \zeta(z) > 1 \), (A2) implies (A1), and hence each of the three equivalent statements in Lemma. We will primarily focus on the case where (A2) holds, since it helps to rule out \( \zeta'(z) < 0 \), which is empirically less plausible for the following reasons.

First, when innovation is active and hence there are monopolistic varieties, \( V_t^m > 0, z_t^m = z^m \) and hence they are sold at the price given by:

\[ p_t^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] = \psi \iff p_t^m = \frac{\zeta(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \psi = M(z^m)\psi. \]

Since \( z^m \) is a monotone increasing function of \( L/F \), \( \zeta'(z) > 0 \) implies that monopolistic varieties are sold at a lower markup rate, with a higher \( L/F \). Thus, the larger market size has a procompetitive effect. (A2) would help us rule out the opposite case of the larger market size having an anti-competitive effect.

Second, let us temporarily assume that the marginal cost of production depends on varieties, \( \psi(\omega) \), so that FOC of monopoly pricing becomes:

\[ p_t^m(\omega) \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_t(\omega))} \right] = \psi(\omega), \]
where \( z_t(\omega) = p_t(\omega)/A(p_t) \). By totally log-differentiating this expression, we obtain:

\[
d\log p_t^m(\omega) = \frac{1}{1 + \Delta} d\log \psi(\omega) + \frac{\Delta}{1 + \Delta} d\log A(p_t)
\]

where

\[
\Delta \equiv \frac{z_t(\omega)\zeta'(z_t(\omega))}{[\zeta(z_t(\omega)) - 1]\zeta(z_t(\omega))}.
\]

where (A1) implies \( 1 + \Delta > 0 \). This shows how the pricing of a monopolistic variety responds to a change in its own marginal cost, \( \psi(\omega) \), as well as a change in the pricing of competing varieties, \( A(p_t) \). If \( \Delta > 0 \), which is the case when \( \zeta'(z) > 0 \) for all \( z \in (0, \bar{z}) \),

\[
0 < \frac{d\log p_t^m(\omega)}{d\log A(p_t)} = \frac{\Delta}{1 + \Delta} < 1.
\]

Thus, an increase in \( A(p_t) \) leads to an increase in \( p_t^m(\omega) \). In other words, the pricing of monopolistic varieties satisfies strategic complementarity in pricing.\(^{19}\) Each monopolist responds to an increase in the prices of competing inputs by increasing its price. At the same time, holding the pricing of competing inputs, \( A(p_t) \), fixed, \( \Delta > 0 \) implies that \( p_t^m(\omega) \) responds less than proportionately to a change in its marginal cost, \( \psi(\omega) \).

\[
0 < \frac{d\log p_t^m(\omega)}{d\log \psi(\omega)} = \frac{1}{1 + \Delta} < 1,
\]

which implies that, when the marginal cost goes up, the markup rate would have to decline, unless the prices of competing varieties would also go up. This implies (firm-level) incomplete (i.e., less than 100%) pass-through.\(^{20}\) This also means that, in cross-section of firms, more productive firms have higher markup rates. (A2) thus helps us rule out the opposite case of strategic substitutes and more than 100% pass-through at the firm level with less productive firms having higher markup rates.

To sum up, (A2) means departure from CES within H.S.A. only in the direction to allow for the procompetitive effect of the market size, strategic complementarity in pricing, and (firm-level) incomplete pass-through, as well as Marshall’s second law of demand.

\(^{19}\)That is, firms respond to an increase in the prices of competing products by raising their prices/markup rates.

\(^{20}\)That is, in cross-section of firms, marginal costs are negatively correlated with the markup rates. In other words, more productive firms have higher markup rates. Note that this need not imply an incomplete pass-through at the industrial level. If the marginal cost of all firms change equally, \( d\log \psi(\omega) = d\log \psi \), the prices of all varieties respond proportionately to a change in \( \psi \), \( d\log p_t(\omega) = d\log \psi = d\log A(p_t) \), in equilibrium. Thus, a uniform increase in the marginal cost has no effect on \( z_t(\omega) \), hence on the markup rate, implying a complete pass-through.
5. Two Propositions

We now consider two key questions about the implications of extending the Judd model from CES to H.S.A. and offer two propositions to answer them.

The first question asks whether the Judd model of innovation cycles under H.S.A. could exhibit types of dynamic paths, which cannot be generated under CES. This boils down to the question of whether $\theta$ can be greater than $e = 2.718 \ldots$, which is the upper bound of $\theta = (1 - \sigma^{-1})^{1-\sigma}$, under CES. Proposition 1 states that the answer is negative under (A2).

**Proposition 1.** Under (A2), $\theta \in (1, e)$, where $e = 2.718 \ldots$

**Proof:** Consider the following identity:

$$\theta = s(z^c) = \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} = \exp \left[ \int_{z^c}^{z^m} \frac{1 - \zeta(\tau)}{\tau} d\tau \right] = \exp \left[ \int_{z^c}^{z^m} \frac{\zeta(\tau) - 1}{\tau} d\tau \right].$$

Under (A2), $\zeta(\cdot)$ is non-decreasing, and hence:

$$\exp \left[ \int_{z^c}^{z^m} \frac{\zeta(\tau) - 1}{\tau} d\tau \right] \leq \exp \left[ (\zeta(z^m) - 1) \int_{z^c}^{z^m} \frac{d\tau}{\tau} \right] = \exp \left[ (\zeta(z^m) - 1) \log \left( \frac{z^m}{z^c} \right) \right]$$

$$= \exp \left[ \log \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right)^{1-\zeta(z^m)} \right] = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}\right)^{1-\zeta(z^m)}$$

which is strictly increasing in $\zeta(z^m)$, and converges to $e$, as $\zeta(z^m) \to \infty$. □

The intuition behind this result is simple. Under (A2), price elasticities can become only smaller at lower prices. Hence, when a monopolistic variety becomes competitively priced, an increase in the market share caused by a drop in the price could only be smaller compared to the case of CES, not larger. Thus, it has the same upper bound, $\theta < e$.

Without (A2), however, $\theta$ can be arbitrarily large: see Appendix B for an example. Thus, the Judd model under H.S.A. in principle could generate stable cycles of any period, or robust chaotic attractors with any positive number of cyclic intervals.$^{21}$

The second question is when a larger market size/innovation cost ratio, $L/F$, has destabilizing effect on the dynamics of innovation. Since the dynamic behavior becomes more

$^{21}$For example, one could see in Figure 3 the range of $\theta$, which generates a stable cycle of period 3, a robust chaotic attractor with six cyclic intervals, or a robust chaotic attractor of three cyclic intervals.
unstable as \( \theta \) becomes large, this boils down to the question of when \( \Theta(L/F) \) is increasing in \( L/F \).

**Proposition 2:** If \( \zeta(\cdot) - 1 \) is monotone and log-concave over an interval containing \((z^c, z^m)\), \( \Theta(L/F) \) is increasing in \( L/F \). If at least one of the monotonicity and the log-concavity conditions is strict, \( \Theta(L/F) \) is strictly increasing in \( L/F \).

**Proof:** Since \( z^m \) is strictly increasing in \( L/F \), \( \theta \equiv \Theta(L/F) \) is strictly increasing in \( L/F \), if and only if \( \theta \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} = \frac{s(z^m[1 - \zeta(z^m)])}{s(z^m)} \) is strictly increasing in \( z^m \). By log-differentiating \( \theta \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} \) with respect to \( z^m \),

\[
\frac{d \log \theta}{d \log(z^m)} = [1 - \zeta(z^c)] \frac{d \log(z^c)}{d \log(z^m)} - [1 - \zeta(z^m)]
\]

\[
= [1 - \zeta(z^c)] \left( 1 + \frac{d \log \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right]}{d \log(z^m)} \right) - [1 - \zeta(z^m)]
\]

\[
= \zeta(z^m) - \zeta(z^c) - \frac{\zeta(z^c) - 1}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)}.
\]

Since the mean value theorem implies

\[
\zeta(z^m) - \zeta(z^c) = \zeta'(\tilde{z})(z^m - z^c)
\]

for some \( \tilde{z} \in (z^c, z^m) \), and the monotonicity of \( \zeta(\cdot) \) implies

\[
\zeta'(z^m)[\zeta(\tilde{z}) - \zeta(z^c)] \geq 0,
\]

the above expression can be further rewritten as:

\[
\frac{d \log \theta}{d \log(z^m)} = \zeta(z^m) - \zeta(z^c) - \frac{\zeta(z^c) - 1}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)}
\]

\[
= \zeta'(\tilde{z})(z^m - z^c) - \frac{\zeta(z^c) - 1}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)}
\]

\[
= \zeta'(\tilde{z}) \frac{z^m}{\zeta(z^m)} - \frac{\zeta(z^c) - 1}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)}
\]

\[
= \frac{\zeta'(\tilde{z})}{\zeta'(z^m) - \zeta(z^m)} \left[ \frac{\zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] - \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \geq \frac{\zeta'(\tilde{z})}{\zeta'(z^m) - \zeta(z^m)} \left[ \frac{\zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] - \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m) - 1} \frac{z^m \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta'(z^m) - \zeta(z^m)}
\]
\[
\frac{\zeta'(\bar{z}) - \zeta'(z^m)}{\zeta(\bar{z}) - 1} \left( \zeta(z) - 1 \right) \frac{z^m}{\zeta(z^m)} \geq 0,
\]
where the term in the square bracket is non-negative because the log-concavity of \(\zeta(\cdot) - 1\) means that \(\frac{\zeta''(\cdot)}{\zeta(\cdot) - 1}\) is decreasing. This proves \(\frac{d \log \theta}{d \log (z^m)} \geq 0\) and hence \(\Theta'(L/F) \geq 0\).

Furthermore, if at least one of the monotonicity and the log-concavity conditions holds strictly, one of the two inequalities above holds strictly, from which \(\frac{d \log \theta}{d \log (z^m)} > 0\) and \(\Theta'(L/F) > 0\) follows. \(\blacksquare\)

**Corollary:** Under (A2), \(\theta \equiv \Theta(L/F)\) is strictly increasing in \(L/F\), if \(\zeta(\cdot) - 1\) is strictly log-concave.

Note that the log-concavity of \(\zeta(\cdot) - 1\) is weaker than the concavity of \(\zeta(\cdot) - 1\), and hence the concavity of \(\zeta(\cdot)\). For a thrice-continuously differentiable \(s(\cdot)\), and hence twice-continuously differentiable \(\zeta(\cdot)\), \(\zeta(\cdot) - 1\) is strictly log-concave if and only if

\[
\zeta''(\cdot) < \left( \frac{\zeta'(\cdot)}{\zeta(\cdot) - 1} \right)^2
\]

which can be interpreted as \(\zeta(\cdot)\) being “not too convex.”

What is the intuition behind this result? Under (A1), a higher \(L/F\) leads to an increase in both \(z^m\) and \(z^c\). When \(\zeta''(\cdot) > 0\), the procompetitive effect leads to an increase in \(\zeta(z^m)\) as well as an increase in \(\zeta(z)\) over the range, \((z^c, z^m)\). The former implies a lower markup rate, and hence the price drop due to the loss of monopoly is smaller, which contributes to a smaller \(\theta\).

The latter implies the market share responds more to the price drop, which contributes to a larger \(\theta\). As we know from the CES case, if the price elasticity would go up uniformly, the latter quantity effect dominates the former price effect, and \(\theta\) would go up. If \(\zeta(\cdot)\) is not “too convex,” \(\zeta(z^m)\) does not go up too much faster than \(\zeta(z)\) over the range, \((z^c, z^m)\), so that the former price effect does not dominate the latter quantity, and hence, \(\theta\) becomes increasing in \(L/F\).

### 6. Some Parametric Families within H.S.A.

We now turn to some parametric families within H.S.A. demand systems. All of them satisfy (A2) and contain CES as a limit case. Both Examples 1 and 2 satisfy the log-concavity condition in addition to (A2). As such, these two examples demonstrate the power of
Proposition 2. Both Examples 3 and 4 feature the choke-price, and hence violate the log-concavity condition. Hence, we cannot use Proposition 2 to prove that $\theta$ is strictly increasing in $L/F$. Yet, they are tractable enough that $\theta$ can be expressed explicitly and shown to be increasing in $L/F$. These two examples thus demonstrate under (A2), the log-concavity is sufficient, but not necessary for a larger market size/innovation cost ratio to be destabilizing. In addition, the parametric families introduced in these two examples might be of independent interest, because of their tractability. The parametric family introduced in Example 3 contains translog as a special case. The parametric family introduced in Example 4 is characterized by the constant pass-through rate.\footnote{It is also possible to construct a pathological example, where $\theta$ is strictly decreasing in $L/F$, in spite of (A2). Thus, (A2) alone is not sufficient. See Appendix D.}

Example 1: Multiplicatively Perturbed CES with a Linear Elasticity Function

$$s(z) = (z \exp(\varepsilon z))^{1-\sigma} \Rightarrow \zeta(z) = \sigma + (\sigma - 1)\varepsilon z,$$

where $\sigma > 1$ and $\varepsilon > 0$. Since $\zeta(z) - 1 = (\sigma - 1)(1 + \varepsilon z)$ is strictly increasing and strictly log-concave, one could immediately conclude from Proposition 1 that $\theta$ is bounded by $e$, and from the corollary of Proposition 2 that $\theta$ is strictly increasing in $L/F$. More explicitly,

$$\theta = \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} = \left(\frac{z^c}{z^m} \exp(\varepsilon (z^c - z^m))\right)^{1-\sigma} = \left([1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}] \exp\left(-\frac{\varepsilon z^m}{\zeta(z^m)}\right)\right)^{1-\sigma}$$

$$= \left[1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}\right]^{1-\sigma} \exp\left(1 - \frac{\sigma}{\zeta(z^m)}\right),$$

where $z^m$ is given by

$$\frac{L}{F} = \frac{\zeta(z^m)}{s(z^m)} = \left[\sigma + (\sigma - 1)\varepsilon z^m\right] \left(z^m \exp(\varepsilon z^m)\right)^{\sigma-1},$$

and it is strictly increasing in $L/F \in (0, \infty)$, with the range, $z^m \in (0, \infty)$. Therefore, as $z^m \to 0$, $\zeta(z^m) \to \sigma$ and $\theta \to \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma} < e$, and as $z^m \to \infty$, $\zeta(z^m) \to \infty$ and $\theta \to e$.

Recall that the steady state is unstable, when $\delta(\theta - 1) > 1$. For $\sigma \geq 2, \theta > 2$ always holds. Hence, the steady state is unstable for a sufficiently high $\delta$ (i.e., sufficiently close to one). For $\sigma < 2$, there exists a critical value of $L/F$, at which $\theta = 2$. For $L/F$ below this critical value,
\( \theta < 2 \) and hence the steady state is always stable. For \( L/F \) above this critical value, \( \theta > 2 \) and hence the steady state is unstable for a sufficiently high \( \delta \) (i.e., sufficiently close to one).

**Example 2: Multiplicatively Perturbed CES with a Linear Fractional Elasticity Function**

\[
s(z) = z^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{1+z}{2} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \implies \zeta(z) = \sigma + \varepsilon \frac{z}{1+z}.
\]

Again, \( \sigma > 1 \) and \( \varepsilon > 0 \). Since \( \zeta(z) \) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, one could immediately conclude from Proposition 1 that \( \theta \) is bounded by \( e \), and from the corollary of Proposition 2 that \( \theta \) is strictly increasing in \( L/F \). More explicitly,

\[
\theta \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} = \left( \frac{z^c}{z^m} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{1+z^c}{1+z^m} \right)^{-\varepsilon} = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{1+z^m \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right)}{1+z^m} \right)^{-\varepsilon},
\]

where \( z^m \) is given by

\[
\frac{L}{F} = \frac{\zeta(z^m)}{s(z^m)} = z^{m \sigma-1} \left( \frac{1+z^m}{2} \right) \left( \sigma + \varepsilon \frac{z^m}{1+z^m} \right),
\]

and it is strictly increasing in \( L/F \in (0, \infty) \), with the range, \( z^m \in (0, \infty) \). Therefore, as \( z^m \to 0 \), \( \zeta(z^m) \to \sigma \) and \( \theta \to \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{1-\sigma} < \varepsilon \) and, as \( z^m \to \infty \), \( \zeta(z^m) \to \sigma + \varepsilon \) and \( \theta \to \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma+\varepsilon} \right)^{1-\sigma-\varepsilon} < \varepsilon \).

Recall that the steady state is unstable, when \( \delta(\theta-1) > 1 \). For \( \sigma \geq 2, \theta > 2 \) always holds. Hence, the steady state is unstable for a sufficiently high \( \delta \) (i.e., sufficiently close to one). For \( \sigma < 2 < \sigma + \varepsilon \), there exists a critical value of \( L/F \), at which \( \theta = 2 \). For \( L/F \) below this critical value, \( \theta < 2 \) and hence the steady state is always stable. For \( L/F \) above this critical value, \( \theta > 2 \) and hence the steady state is unstable for a sufficiently high \( \delta \) (i.e., sufficiently close to one). For \( \sigma + \varepsilon < 2 \), the steady state is stable.

In the next two examples, \( \theta \) is increasing in \( L/F \), even though the log-concavity condition in Proposition 2 fails. In other words, they demonstrate that, under (A2), the log-
concavity is sufficient, but not necessary for $\theta$ to increase in $L/F$. We call the parametric family discussed in Example 3 “Generalized Translog,” because it contains translog as a special case. We call the parametric family in Example 4, “Constant Pass-Through,” because it implies the elasticity of the monopoly price with respect to the marginal cost, the pass-through is a constant number less than one. These two families feature the choke price, and yet contain CES as a limit case.23

Example 3: Generalized Translog

$$s(z) = \begin{cases} \gamma \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma - 1}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right) \right)^{\eta} = \gamma \left( \frac{1 - \sigma}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{z}{\bar{z}} \right) \right)^{\eta} & \text{for } z < \bar{z} \equiv \beta e^{\frac{\eta}{\sigma - 1}} \\ 0 & \text{for } z \geq \bar{z} \equiv \beta e^{\frac{\eta}{\sigma - 1}} \end{cases}$$

where $\beta > 0, \eta > 0; \sigma > 1$. Then,

$$\zeta(z) = 1 + \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 - \frac{\sigma - 1}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)} = 1 - \frac{\eta}{\log \left( \frac{z}{\bar{z}} \right)} > 1, \text{ for } z < \bar{z} \equiv \beta e^{\frac{\eta}{\sigma - 1}}$$

which is strictly increasing in $z \in (0, \bar{z})$ with the range $(1, \infty)$, and hence satisfying (A2).

Homothetic symmetric translog is a special case of this family, where $\eta = 1$.24 CES is the limit case of this family, as $\eta \to \infty$, while holding $\beta > 0$ and $\sigma > 1$ fixed, with

$$z < \bar{z} \equiv \beta e^{\frac{\eta}{\sigma - 1}} \rightarrow \infty;$$

$$s(z) = \gamma \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma - 1}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{z}{\bar{z}} \right) \right)^{\eta} \rightarrow \gamma \left( \frac{z}{\bar{z}} \right)^{1-\sigma};$$

$$\zeta(z) = 1 + \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 - \frac{\sigma - 1}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)} \rightarrow \sigma.$$
Because \( \log((\zeta(z) - 1) = \log(\eta - \log(\log(\bar{z}/z))) \) is convex for \( z \in (\bar{z}/e, \bar{z}) \), the log-concavity condition in Proposition 2 fails. It is thus necessary to go through a calculation explicitly. From

\[
\frac{L}{F} = \frac{\zeta(z^m)}{s(z^m)} = \frac{(\log(\bar{z}/z^m))^\eta + \eta(\log(\bar{z}/z^m))^{\eta-1}}{\gamma(\sigma - 1)^\eta},
\]

where \( z^m \) is strictly increasing in \( L/F \in (0, \infty) \) with the range \((0, \bar{z})\). Using

\[
z^c = z^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] = \frac{\eta z^m}{\eta + \log(\bar{z}/z^m)},
\]

we obtain

\[
\theta \equiv s(z^c) = \frac{\log(\bar{z}/z^c)}{\log(\bar{z}/z^m)} = \frac{\log(\bar{z}/z^m) + \log\left(1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}\right)}{\log(z^m/\bar{z})}
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{\eta} \log\left(1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}\right)^{1-\zeta(z^m)} \right] ^\eta < \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\eta} \right) < e.
\]

Because \( \theta \) is increasing in \( \zeta(z^m) \), which is increasing in \( z^m \), \( \theta \) is strictly increasing in \( z^m \) and hence strictly increasing in \( L/F \) with the range \( 1 < \theta < (1 + 1/\eta)^\eta \).\(^{25}\) From this, we can conclude that the condition for the stable steady state always holds if \( \delta(\theta - 1) < \delta[(1 + 1/\eta)^\eta - 1] < 1 \). If \( \delta[(1 + 1/\eta)^\eta - 1] > 1 > \delta^2[(1 + 1/\eta)^\eta - 1] \), a stable period-2 cycle merges for a sufficiently high \( L/F \). If \( \delta^2[(1 + 1/\eta)^\eta - 1] > 1 \), an increase in \( L/F \) first leads to the emergence of a stable period-2 cycle, which then becomes unstable, and leads to the emergence of a chaotic attractor. Note that the existence of endogenous fluctuations requires the \( \eta > 1 \). Furthermore, for \( \delta > (e - 1)^{-1} \approx 0.582 \), it is more likely for a large \( L/F \) to generate endogenous fluctuations (even chaotic fluctuations for \( \delta > (e - 1)^{-1/2} \approx 0.763 \)), as \( \eta \) becomes larger, i.e., when it is closer to the limit case of CES within this family.

**Example 4: Constant Pass-Through**

\(^{25}\)Note that, as \( \eta \to \infty \), the upper bound of \( \theta, (1 + 1/\eta)^\eta \), goes to \( e \), not to \( (1 - 1/\sigma)^{1-\sigma} \), despite \( \zeta(z) \to \sigma \) for any \( z \). This is because, for any \( \eta < \infty \), there exists a choke price, \( \bar{z} \equiv \beta e^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} < \infty \), and \( \zeta(z^m) \) has the range \((1, \infty)\).
\[ s(z) = \gamma \left[ \sigma - (\sigma - 1) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta} \right]^{1/\Delta} = \gamma \sigma^{1/\Delta} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta} \right]^{1/\Delta} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \zeta(z) = \frac{1}{1 - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta}} = \frac{1}{1 - \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta}} > 1 \]

over \( z \in (\varepsilon, \bar{z}) \), where

\[ \bar{z} \equiv \beta \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1/\Delta} < \infty \]

with \( \Delta > 0 \) and (possibly arbitrarily) small \( \varepsilon > 0 \) are both constant parameters, while \( s(z) = 0 \) for all \( z \geq \bar{z} \) and \( s(\cdot) \) is extended over \( z \in (0, \varepsilon) \), such that \( s(0) = \infty \) and \( \zeta(z) > 1 \) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable. Note that, for \( z^c, z^m_\varepsilon, z^m \in (\varepsilon \bar{z}, \bar{z}) \),

\[ z^c = z^m_\varepsilon \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m_\varepsilon)} \right] = z^m_\varepsilon \left( \frac{z^m_\varepsilon}{\bar{z}} \right)^{\Delta} \Rightarrow z^m_\varepsilon = (\bar{z})^{1+\Delta}(z^c)^{1+\Delta} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \ln p^m_t = \frac{\Delta}{1 + \Delta} \ln(A\bar{z}) + \frac{1}{1 + \Delta} \ln(\psi) \]

so that this family is characterized by the constant pass-through rate, \( 0 < 1/(1 + \Delta) < 1 \). CES is the limit case of this family as \( \Delta \to 0 \) and \( \varepsilon \to 0 \), while holding \( \beta > 0 \) and \( \sigma > 1 \) fixed, with

\[ \bar{z} \equiv \beta \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1/\Delta} \to \infty; \]

\[ \zeta(z) = \frac{1}{1 - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta}} \to \sigma \]

and, using l’Hospital’s rule:

\[ \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \log s(z) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{\log \left[ \sigma - (\sigma - 1) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta} \right]}{\Delta} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{(1 - \sigma) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta} \log z}{\sigma - (\sigma - 1) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta}} = (1 - \sigma) \log \Delta, \]

and hence

\[ s(z) = \gamma \left[ \sigma - (\sigma - 1) \left( \frac{z}{\beta} \right)^{\Delta} \right]^{1/\Delta} \to \gamma z^{1-\sigma}. \]

This family satisfies (A2), but \( \zeta(z) - 1 \) is not log-concave, so we cannot use Proposition 2 to show that \( \theta \) is increasing in \( L/F \). To calculate \( \theta \) explicitly,

\[ z^c = z^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] = z^m \left( \frac{z^m}{\bar{z}} \right)^{\Delta} \Rightarrow \frac{z^c}{\bar{z}} = \left( \frac{z^m}{\bar{z}} \right)^{1+\Delta} \]
\[
\frac{s(z^m) L}{\zeta(z^m) F} \equiv 1 \Rightarrow \gamma \sigma^\Delta \frac{1}{F} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z^m}{z} \right)^\Delta \right]^{1+1/\Delta} = 1 \Rightarrow \left( \frac{z^c}{z} \right)^\Delta \left( \frac{z^m}{z} \right)^\Delta = 1 - \left( \frac{F}{\gamma \sigma^\Delta L} \right)^{\Delta/(1+\Delta)}
\]

for \( F/L < \gamma \sigma^\Delta \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{e^\Delta}{\Delta}\right) \right]. \) In this range, \( z^c \) and \( z^m \) are both strictly increasing in \( L/F \) and

\[
\theta \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} = \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z^c}{z} \right)^\Delta \right]^{1/\Delta} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z^m}{z} \right)^\Delta \right] = \left[ \frac{1 - \left( \frac{z^m}{z} \right)^{\Delta(1+\Delta)}}{1 - \left( \frac{z^m}{z} \right)^\Delta} \right]^{1/\Delta}
\]

is also strictly increasing in \( z^m, \)\(^{26}\) and hence it is strictly increasing in \( L/F \) with the range, \( 1 < \theta < (1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta}. \)\(^{27}\) The upper bound of \( \theta, (1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta}, \) is decreasing in \( \Delta \) and \( (1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta} \leq 2 \) for \( \Delta \geq 1 \) and \( (1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta} \to e, \) as \( \Delta \to 0. \) From this, we can conclude that the steady state is always stable if \( \delta(\theta - 1) < \delta[(1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta} - 1] < 1. \) If \( \delta[(1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta} - 1] > 1 \)

\[
\delta^2[(1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta} - 1],
\]

which requires \( \Delta < 1, \) a stable period-2 cycle emerges for a sufficiently high \( L/F. \) If \( \delta^2[(1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta} - 1] > 1, \) an increase in \( L/F \) first causes the loss of the stability of the steady state, which leads to the emergence of a stable period-2 cycle. A further increase in \( L/F \) then causes the loss of the stability of the period-2 cycle, which leads to the emergence of a chaotic attractor. Note that the existence of endogenous fluctuations requires the (constant) pass-through rate, \( 1/(1 + \Delta), \) to be greater than one half. Furthermore, for \( \delta > (e - 1)^{-1} \approx 0.582, \) it is more likely for a large \( L/F \) to generate endogenous fluctuations (even chaotic fluctuations for \( \delta > (e - 1)^{-1/2} \approx 0.763), \) as \( \Delta \) becomes smaller and hence the pass-through rate, \( 1/(1 + \Delta), \) becomes closer to one, i.e., when it is closer to the limit case of CES within this family.

7. **Concluding Remarks**

In this paper, we have investigated how market size affects the patterns of fluctuations in the dynamics of innovation. Previous models of endogenous innovation cycles were silent on

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\(^{26}\)To see this, let \( \xi \equiv (z^m/z)^\Delta, \) then \( \theta \equiv \theta(\xi) = (1 - \xi^*(1+\Delta))^{1/\Delta}. \) Then, \( \frac{d}{d\xi}(1 - \xi^*(1+\Delta)) \equiv \frac{\Delta(1+\Delta)}{(1-\xi^*2) \equiv N(\xi) \equiv \frac{N(\xi)}{1-\xi} > 0 \) for \( 0 < \xi < 1, \) because \( N(1) = 0 \) and \( N'(\xi) = (1 + \Delta)[\xi - 1]^{\Delta-1} < 0 \) for \( 0 < \xi < 1. \)

\(^{27}\)Note that, as \( \Delta \to 0, \) the upper bound of \( \theta, (1 + \Delta)^{1/\Delta}, \) goes to \( e, \) not to \( (1 - 1/\sigma)^{1-\sigma}, \) despite \( \zeta(z) \to \sigma \) for any \( z. \) This is because, for any \( \Delta > 0, \) there exists a choke price, \( \bar{z} \equiv \beta \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1/\Delta} < \infty, \) and \( \zeta(z^m) \) has the range \((1, \infty). \)
this issue, because a change in market size alters the amplitude of fluctuations but not the nature of fluctuations. This is due to the ubiquitous assumption of CES homothetic demand system, under which monopolistically competitive firms sell their products at an exogenous markup rate. This feature stands at odds with ample empirical evidence for the procompetitive effect of entry and market size. In the presence of such procompetitive effect, a larger market invites more firms to enter. As a result, firms face more elastic demand, which forces them to set their prices at lower markup rates. This competitive pressure makes innovators more sensitive to changing market environments, thereby causing instability in the dynamics of innovation. To capture this mechanism, we extended the Judd model of endogenous innovation cycles. We allowed for the procompetitive effect by replacing the assumption of CES demand system with a more general homothetic demand system, H.S.A., which contains both CES and homothetic translog as special cases. We show that a larger market size/innovation cost ratio has destabilizing effects in the dynamics of innovation through the procompetitive effect under two complementarity sets of sufficient conditions; i) when the price elasticity function is log-concave; and ii) when the demand systems belong to parametric families of “generalized translog” or “constant pass-through.”

Beyond this application, H.S.A. demand systems should provide a useful alternative for the ubiquitous CES demand systems in monopolistic competition models. Being tractable and yet capable of accommodating the procompetitive effect, they can capture mechanisms that cannot be captured by the CES assumption. Four parametric families within H.S.A. introduced in Section 6, particularly “generalized translog” and “constant pass-through,” should find many applications.
References:

Appendix A: Kinked Demand System: An Example

Consider the case where \( s(\cdot) \) has a kink, so that it is only piecewise continuously differentiable. In this case, \( \zeta(z) \) is discontinuous at the kink. Furthermore, the profit maximizing value of \( z^*_m \) may occur at a discontinuity point of \( \zeta(z) \), where \( \zeta(\cdot) \) jumps up, i.e., \( s'(\cdot) \) jumps down or equivalently, \( |s'(\cdot)| \) jumps up. If so, it is characterized by:

\[
\lim_{z \uparrow z^*_d} z \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \right] < z^*_c < \lim_{z \downarrow z^*_d} z \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \right] < z^*_m = z^d; \lim_{z \uparrow z^*_d} \zeta(z) < \frac{L}{F} < \lim_{z \downarrow z^*_d} \zeta(z)
\]

by denoting the discontinuity point by \( z^*_d \).

The following example illustrates such a case.

Example A: kinked CES: For \( 0 < \varepsilon < \sigma - 1 \),

\[
s(z) = \begin{cases} 
z^{1-(\sigma-\varepsilon)} & \text{if } z \leq 1 \\
z^{1-\sigma} & \text{if } z \geq 1
\end{cases} \quad \Rightarrow \zeta(z) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma - \varepsilon & \text{if } z < 1 \\
[\sigma - \varepsilon, \sigma] & \text{if } z = 1 \\
\sigma & \text{if } z > 1
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \frac{\zeta(z)}{s(z)} = \begin{cases} 
(\sigma - \varepsilon)z^{\sigma-\varepsilon-1} & \text{if } z < 1 \\
[\sigma - \varepsilon, \sigma] & \text{if } z = 1 \\
\sigma z^{\sigma-1} & \text{if } z > 1
\end{cases}
\]

For \( L/F < \sigma - \varepsilon \), we have \( z^c < z^*_m < z^d = 1 \) with

\[
z^c = \left( \frac{L/F}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-\varepsilon)-1}} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \right] < z^*_m = \left( \frac{L/F}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-\varepsilon)-1}} < 1
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \theta = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \right)^{1-(\sigma-\varepsilon)}
\]

For \( \sigma - \varepsilon < L/F < \sigma \), we have \( z^c < z^*_m = z^d = 1 \) with,

\[
z^c = 1 - \frac{F}{L} < z^*_m = 1 \Rightarrow \theta = \left( 1 - \frac{F}{L} \right)^{1-(\sigma-\varepsilon)}
\]

For \( \sigma < L/F < \sigma \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{1-\sigma} \), we have \( z^c < z^d = 1 < z^*_m \) with,

\[
z^c = \left( \frac{L}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right] = z^*_m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right] < 1 < z^*_m = \left( \frac{L}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \Rightarrow \theta = \left( \frac{L}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\sigma-1}} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right]^{1-\sigma+\varepsilon}
\]

For \( L/F > \sigma \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{1-\sigma} \) we have \( z^d = 1 < z^c < z^*_m \) with,
1 < \frac{z^c}{\sigma F} = \left( \frac{L}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right] = \frac{z^m}{\sigma} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right] < \frac{z^m}{\sigma} = \left( \frac{L}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \Rightarrow \theta = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{1-\sigma}.

Hence, \( \theta \) is strictly increasing in \( L/F \) for \( \sigma - \varepsilon < L/F < \sigma \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{1-\sigma} \) and constant otherwise.

Appendix B: An example, showing that \( \theta \) can be arbitrarily large without (A2).

Example B:

\[
s(z) = \exp \left[ \int_1^z \frac{1 - \zeta(\tau)}{\tau} \, d\tau \right],
\]

where \( \zeta(z) \) is given by

\[
1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} = \begin{cases} 
1 - A^{-\beta}(1 - A^{1-\alpha})z^\beta & \text{if } z \leq A \\
A z^{-\alpha} & \text{if } z > A
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \alpha \in (0,1) \) and \( A \in (0,1) \) and \( \beta \equiv \frac{\alpha A^{1-\alpha}}{1 - A^{1-\alpha}} > 0 \).

By construction, \( \zeta(z) > 1 \), and continuously differentiable. Hence \( s(z) \) is twice-continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing with \( \lim_{z \to 0} s(z) = \infty \), \( \lim_{z \to \infty} s(z) = 0 \), and \( s(1) = 1 \).

Furthermore,

\[
z \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z)} \right] = \begin{cases} 
z - A^{-\beta}(1 - A^{1-\alpha})z^{1+\beta} & \text{if } z \leq A \\
A z^{1-\alpha} & \text{if } z > A
\end{cases}
\]

is strictly increasing. Hence, (A1) holds, even though \( \zeta(z) \) is strictly decreasing, and hence (A2) is violated. From iii) in Lemma, \( s(z)/\zeta(z) \) is strictly decreasing, from \( \infty \) to 0. For \( F/L = 1 - A \), the unique solution of

\[
\frac{s(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)} = 1
\]

is given by \( z^m = 1 \), from which

\[
z^m = 1 > z^c = z^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} \right] = A,
\]

from which
1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)} = A; 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^c)} = A^{1-\alpha}

Because s(z)/\zeta(z) is strictly decreasing, this implies

\theta \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z^m)} > \frac{\zeta(z^c)}{\zeta(z^m)} = \frac{1 - A}{1 - A^{1-\alpha}}

where the RHS becomes arbitrarily large as \alpha \to 1.

Thus, without (A2), the unique attractor of dynamical system eq.(24) could be a stable cycle of any positive number of periods or a chaotic attractor with any positive number of cyclic intervals, depending on \theta and \delta.

**Appendix C: What might happen when (A1) is violated**

Now, let us consider what might happen when (A1) is violated so that

1 - \zeta(z) > \frac{z\zeta'(z)}{\zeta(z)}

for some \(z \in (0, \bar{z})\). Then, from Lemma,

i) \(z(1 - 1/\zeta(z))\) is strictly decreasing at such \(z \in (0, \bar{z})\).

ii) For some \(z^c \in (0, \bar{z})\), \(\pi(z) \equiv (1 - z^c/z)s(z)\) has multiple peaks in \(z \in (z^c, \bar{z})\).

iii) \(s(z)/\zeta(z)\) is strictly increasing at such \(z \in (0, \bar{z})\).

In this case, we need to worry about the possibility that there may be more than one relative price, \(z^m_t\), that maximizes the profit of monopolists in equilibrium. If two such relative prices, \(z^m_{1t}\) and \(z^m_{2t} > z^m_{1t}\), exist, they must satisfy the following conditions:

\[ z^m_{1t} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^1_{1t})} \right] = z^m_{2t} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^1_{2t})} \right] = z^c, \]

\[ \frac{s(z^1_{1t})}{\zeta(z^1_{1t})} = \frac{s(z^1_{2t})}{\zeta(z^1_{2t})} = \frac{F}{L} \]

where both \(z^m_{1t}\) and \(z^m_{2t} > z^m_{1t}\) must satisfy the SOC, which means that they are at an increasing segment of \(z(1 - 1/\zeta(z))\) and at a decreasing segment of \(s(z)/\zeta(z)\). Furthermore, the budget constraint implies

\[ V^m_{1t}s(z^m_{1t}) + V^m_{2t}s(z^m_{2t}) + V^c ts(z^c) = 1, \]

where \(V^m_{1t} > 0\) innovators/monopolists select \(z^m_{1t}\) and \(V^m_{2t} > 0\) innovators/monopolists select \(z^m_{2t}\).

For this to happen,
First, there must exist \( z_1^m \) and \( z_2^m > z_1^m \) that solve the following two equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
z_1^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_1^m)} \right] &= z_2^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_2^m)} \right] \\
\frac{s(z_1^m)}{\zeta(z_1^m)} &= \frac{s(z_2^m)}{\zeta(z_2^m)}
\end{align*}
\]

Second, the value of \( F/L \) must coincide with the common value of \( s(z)/\zeta(z) \) at \( z_1^m \) and \( z_2^m \):

\[
\frac{s(z_1^m)}{\zeta(z_1^m)} = \frac{s(z_2^m)}{\zeta(z_2^m)} = \frac{F}{L}
\]

Third, the value of \( V_t^c \) must satisfy

\[
V_t^c s(z^c) < 1,
\]

where \( z^c \) is given by the common value of \( z(1 - 1/\zeta(z)) \) at \( z_1^m \) and \( z_2^m \):

\[
z^c = z_1^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_1^m)} \right] = z_2^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_2^m)} \right]
\]

Then, any combination of \( V_{1t}^m > 0 \) and \( V_{2t}^m > 0 \) satisfying

\[
V_{1t}^m s(z_1^m) + V_{2t}^m s(z_2^m) = 1 - V_t^c s(z^c) > 0.
\]

can be an equilibrium. This means that the total innovation, \( V_t^m = V_{1t}^m + V_{2t}^m \) can be any value in

\[
\frac{1}{s(z_1^m)} - \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z_1^m)} V_t^c \leq V_t^m \leq \frac{1}{s(z_2^m)} - \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z_2^m)} V_t^c
\]

Or

\[
\frac{1}{s(z_1^m)} + (1 - \theta_1) V_t^c \leq V_t^c + V_t^m \leq \frac{1}{s(z_1^m)} + (1 - \theta_2) V_t^c
\]

where

\[
\theta_1 \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z_1^m)} < \theta_2 \equiv \frac{s(z^c)}{s(z_2^m)}
\]

From this, the dynamical system of \( n_t = s(z^c) V_t^c \) becomes:

\[
\delta \max\{\theta_1 + (1 - \theta_1) n_t, n_t\} \leq n_{t+1} \leq \delta \max\{\theta_2 + (1 - \theta_2) n_t, n_t\}
\]

Hence, the dynamical system becomes ill-defined (or allow for a continuum of paths).

However, this can occur only if the value of \( F/L \) happens to be equal to:

\[
\frac{s(z_1^m)}{\zeta(z_1^m)} = \frac{s(z_2^m)}{\zeta(z_2^m)} = \frac{F}{L}
\]

where \( z_1^m \) and \( z_2^m > z_1^m \) solve the following two equations:
\[ z_1^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_1^m)} \right] = z_2^m \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z_2^m)} \right] \]

\[ \frac{s(z_1^m)}{\zeta(z_1^m)} = \frac{s(z_2^m)}{\zeta(z_2^m)} \]

Hence, generically, this can occur only for a finite number of particular values of \( F/L \). And when a change in \( F/L \) crosses such a particular value from below, \( z^m \) jumps from \( z_1^m \) to \( z_2^m \) and \( \theta \) jumps from \( \theta_1 \equiv s(z^c)/s(z_1^m) \) to \( \theta_2 \equiv s(z^c)/s(z_2^m) \).

To illustrate this, consider the following example (although this example implies that \( \zeta(z) \) is discontinuous)

**Example C: kinked CES**: For \( 0 < \varepsilon < \sigma - 1 \), define the market share function as follows:

\[ s(z) = \max\{z^{1-\sigma}, z^{1-(\sigma-\varepsilon)}\} \]

The corresponding zeta-function is well defined for all \( z \neq 1 \), and is given by:

\[ \zeta(z) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma, & z < 1, \\
\sigma - \varepsilon, & z > 1. 
\end{cases} \]

In what follows, \( \pi(z) \) will denote the profit function, while \( \pi^*(z^c) \) will denote the maximum value of \( \pi(z) \) as a function of \( z^c \).

**Lemma A1.**

i) If \( z^c \leq 1 - 1/(\sigma - \varepsilon) \), then \( \pi(z) \) is single peaked, and its maximizer is smaller than 1.

ii) If \( 1 - 1/(\sigma - \varepsilon) < z^c < 1 - 1/\sigma \), then \( \pi(z) \) has two local maximizers, one smaller than 1 and the other greater than 1;

iii) If \( z^c \geq 1 - 1/\sigma \), then \( \pi(z) \) is single peaked, and its maximizer is greater than 1.

**Proof:** It is readily verified that \( \pi(z) \) can be represented as follows;

\[ \pi(z) = \max\{\pi_1(z), \pi_2(z)\}, \]

where

\[ \pi_1(z) \equiv \left(1 - \frac{z^c z}{z} \right) z^{1-\sigma}, \quad \pi_2(z) \equiv \left(1 - \frac{z^c z}{z} \right) z^{1-(\sigma-\varepsilon)}. \]

Both \( \pi_1(z) \) and \( \pi_2(z) \) are single-peaked. Furthermore, evaluating the derivatives of \( \pi_1(z) \) and \( \pi_2(z) \) at \( z = 1 \) yields:

\[ \pi_1'(1) = z^c + (1 - z^c)(1 - \sigma), \quad \pi_2'(1) = z^c + (1 - z^c)[1 - (\sigma - \varepsilon)], \]
which yields:

\[ z^c \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \iff \pi_1'(1) < 0 \text{ and } \pi_2'(1) \leq 0 \Rightarrow i \]

\[ 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} < z^c < 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \iff \pi_1'(1) < 0 < \pi_2'(1) \Rightarrow ii \]

\[ z^c \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \iff \pi_1'(1) \geq 0 \text{ and } \pi_2'(1) > 0 \Rightarrow iii \]

This completes the proof.

**Lemma A2.** There exists a unique value \( \tilde{z} \in \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon}, 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) \), such that:

i) If \( z^c < \tilde{z} \), then \( z_1^m \equiv \frac{z^c}{1 - 1/\alpha} < 1 \) is the unique global profit maximizer;

ii) If \( z^c > \tilde{z} \), then \( z_2^m \equiv \frac{z^c}{1 - 1/(\sigma - \varepsilon)} > 1 \) is the unique global profit maximizer;

iii) If \( z^c = \tilde{z} \), then both \( z_1^m < 1 \) and \( z_2^m > 1 \) are global profit maximizers.

**Proof.** We start with proving part iii). It is readily verified that

\[ \pi^*(z^c) = \max\{\pi_1^*(z^c), \pi_2^*(z^c)\}, \]

where

\[ \pi_1^*(z^c) \equiv \max_{z \geq 0} \pi_1(z) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma - 1} (z^c)^{1 - \sigma}, \]

\[ \pi_2^*(z^c) \equiv \max_{z \geq 0} \pi_2(z) = \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \right)^{\sigma - \varepsilon - 1} (z^c)^{1 - (\sigma - \varepsilon)}. \]

Thus, \( z^c = \tilde{z} \) must be a solution to the following equation:

\[ \pi_1^*(z^c) = \pi_2^*(z^c). \]

Because \( \pi_1^*(z^c) \) and \( \pi_2^*(z^c) \) are power functions with different exponents, this equation has a unique positive solution \( z^c = \tilde{z} \), where \( \tilde{z} \) is given by:

\[ \tilde{z} \equiv \left[ \frac{(\sigma - \varepsilon) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \varepsilon} \right)^{1 - (\sigma - \varepsilon)} \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}{\sigma \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{1 - \sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}. \]

In this case, \( \pi(z) \) has two global maximizers given by:

\[ z_1^m \equiv \frac{\tilde{z}}{1 - 1/\alpha}, \quad z_2^m \equiv \frac{\tilde{z}}{1 - 1/(\sigma - \varepsilon)}. \]

This proves part iii).
When \( z^c < \bar{z} \), we have \( \pi_1^*(z^c) > \pi_2^*(z^c) \Rightarrow \pi_1^*(z^c) = \pi^*(z^c) \), hence \( z_1^m < 1 \) is a unique global maximizer of \( \pi(z) \), which proves part i). Likewise, if \( z^c > \bar{z} \), we have \( \pi_2^*(z^c) > \pi_1^*(z^c) \Rightarrow \pi_2^*(z^c) = \pi^*(z^c) \), hence \( z_2^m > 1 \) is a unique global maximizer of \( \pi(z) \). This proves part ii), which completes the proof.

\[ \boxdot \]

**Proposition A.**

i) If \( L/F < 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \), then in equilibrium all monopolists set the price \( p_1^m = \psi/(1 - 1/\sigma) \).

ii) If \( L/F = 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \), then there is a continuum of equilibria;

iii) If \( L/F > 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \), then in equilibrium all monopolists set the price \( p_2^m = \psi/[1 - 1/(\sigma - \epsilon)] \).

**Proof.** The zero-profit condition can be stated as follows:

\[ \pi^*(z^c) = \frac{F}{L} \]

Because \( \pi^*(z^c) = \max\{\pi_1^*(z^c), \pi_2^*(z^c)\} \), \( \pi^*(z^c) \) is a decreasing function, because it is an upper envelope of two decreasing functions. Combining this with Lemma 2A, we have:

\[
L/F < 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \iff z^c < \bar{z} \iff z_1^m < 1 \text{ is the unique global profit maximizer;}
\]

\[
L/F = 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \iff z^c = \bar{z} \iff z_1^m < 1 \text{ and } z_2^m > 1 \text{ are global profit maximizers;}
\]

\[
L/F > 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \iff z^c > \bar{z} \iff z_2^m > 1 \text{ is the unique global profit maximizer.}
\]

Observing that \( p^m = \psi z^m/z^c \) completes the proof. \( \boxdot \)

We now come to studying the behaviour of \( \theta \). When \( L/F < 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \), we have:

\[
\theta = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma}.
\]

However, as \( L/F \) reaches the level of \( 1/\pi^*(\bar{z}) \), \( \theta \) jumps upwards and becomes:

\[
\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - \epsilon} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma}.
\]

Observe that this value is not bounded from above by \( e \), and can be made arbitrarily large.

When \( L/F \in (1/\pi^*(\bar{z}), 1/\pi^*(1)) \), we have:

\[
\theta = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \epsilon}\right)^{1-(\sigma-\epsilon)} (z^c)^{-\epsilon}.
\]
Because \( z^c = (\pi^*)^{-1}(F/L) \) increases with \( L/F \), while \( \theta \) decreases with \( z^c \), we conclude that \( \theta \) decreases with \( L/F \) over \((1/\pi^*(\tilde{z}), 1/\pi^*(1))\). Finally, when \( L/F \geq 1/\pi^*(1) \), \( \theta \) is again constant and is given by:

\[
\theta = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma - \epsilon}\right)^{1-(\sigma-\epsilon)}.
\]

To sum up, the impact of a growing \( L/F \) is, first, destabilizing, and then stabilizing.

**Appendix D: (A2) alone does not ensure that \( \theta \) is increasing in \( L/F \).**

The next example satisfies (A2), but not the log-concavity condition. And \( \theta \) can be decreasing in \( L/F \). Thus, (A2) alone is not sufficient for \( \theta \) to be increasing in \( L/F \).

**Example D: Additively Perturbed CES**

\[
s(z) = \max\{z^{1-\sigma} - \epsilon^{\sigma-1}, 0\}, (\sigma > 1; \epsilon > 0) \Rightarrow 
\]

\[
\zeta(z) = \frac{\sigma z^{1-\sigma} - \epsilon^{\sigma-1}}{z^{1-\sigma} - \epsilon^{\sigma-1}} = \sigma - \frac{(\epsilon z)^{\sigma-1}}{1 - (\epsilon z)^{\sigma-1}} = \sigma - \frac{\sigma - 1}{(\epsilon z)^{1-\sigma} - 1},
\]

with \( \sigma > 1 \) and \( \epsilon > 0 \). \( \zeta(z) \) is strictly increasing in \( z \in (0,1/\epsilon) \) with the range from \( \sigma \) to \( \infty \). It thus satisfies (A2), but not the log-concavity. Hence, it is necessary to go through calculation explicitly as follows:

\[
\theta = \frac{s\left(z^m \left[1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}\right]\right)}{s(z^m)} = \frac{\left(z^m \left[1 - \frac{1}{\zeta(z^m)}\right]\right)^{1-\sigma} - \epsilon^{\sigma-1}}{(z^m)^{1-\sigma} - \epsilon^{\sigma-1}} = \frac{\left[\frac{\sigma - (\epsilon z^m)^{\sigma-1}}{1 - (\epsilon z^m)^{\sigma-1}}\right]^{\sigma-1} - (\epsilon z^m)^{\sigma-1}}{1 - (\epsilon z^m)^{\sigma-1}},
\]

where \( z^m \) is given by

\[
\frac{L}{F} = \frac{s(z^m)}{\zeta(z^m)} = \frac{(z^m)^{\sigma-1} - (\epsilon z^m)^{\sigma-1}}{1 - (\epsilon z^m)^{\sigma-1}}
\]

and it is strictly increasing in \( L/F \in (0, \infty) \) with the range, \((0, 1/\epsilon)\). Therefore, as \( z^m \to 0, \zeta(z^m) \to \sigma \) and \( \theta \to \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma} \) and, as \( z^m \to 1/\epsilon, \zeta(z^m) \to \infty \) and \( \theta \to 2 \). This means that, for \( \sigma < 2 \), \( \theta \) is strictly increasing in \( z^m \in (0,1/\epsilon) \), hence strictly increasing in \( L/F \in (0, \infty) \); for \( \sigma = 2 \), \( \theta = 2 \); and for \( \sigma > 2 \), \( \theta \) is strictly decreasing in \( z^m \in (0,1/\epsilon) \), hence strictly decreasing in \( L/F \in (0, \infty) \).

This example thus shows that, in spite of (A2), \( \theta \) can be strictly decreasing in \( L/F \).