[Contact] [News] [Resume] [Research] [Teaching]
CONTACT
Mailing address:
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA
My office is Room 329 in
Arthur Andersen Hall
Telephone: 847-491-8482
Facsimile: 847-491-7001
e-mail: wo@northwestern.edu
RESUME
RESEARCH
Completed Working Papers:
“Manipulability of Comparative Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, June 2008.
“Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall and (Almost) Perfect Monitoring”, with George Mailath, May 2008.
“How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect
Public Monitoring?”, with Johannes Horner, April 2008.
“Falsifiability”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Mimeo, Northwestern University, March 2008.
“A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration”, Mimeo, Northwestern University , May 2008.
Figures can be found here
“Figures”
“A Model of Temptation”, Mimeo, Northwestern University , Mimeo, Northwestern University, March 2008.
“The Market for Narcotics. Is there a Case for Regulatory Policy?”, Mimeo, Princeton University, September 1998.
(not intended to be published)
Published (or Forthcoming) Papers:
[15] “Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Mathematics of Operations Research, forthcoming.
[14] “Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Econometrica, forthcoming.
[13] “A NonManipulable Test”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Annals of Statistics, forthcoming.
[12] “A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games”, Economics Bulletin, (2007), 58 (3), 1-16.
[11] “A Non-Differentiable Approach to Revenue Equivalence”, with Kim-Sau Chung, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 469-487.
[10] “Contracts and Uncertainty”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 1-13.
[9] “Preferences over Sets of Lotteries”, Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007), 567-595.
[8] “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring”, with Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 74 (2006), 1499-1544.
[7] “Rich Language and Refinements of Cheap-Talk Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006), 164-186.
[6] “Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games” with Jeff Ely and Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 73 (2005), 377-415.
An unpublished appendix can be found here
“Dispensibility of Public Randomization Device”
[5] “Informal Communication”, Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 180-200.
[4] “Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods” with Howard Rosenthal, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6 (2004), 707-735.
[3] “Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Provision of Excludable Public Goods”, Games Econonic Behavior 46 (2004), 88-114.
[2] “A Simple and General Solution to King Solomon’s Problem”, Games Econonic Behavior 42 (2003), 315-318.
[1] “Perfect Folk Theorems. Does Public Randomization Matter?” International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 147-156.
The list of my mathematical publications can be found at
http://www.ams.org/mathscinet/basicsearch
[Select field author and search for olszewski, wojciech]
My review of the book "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships" by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson published in Games and Economic Behavior.
TEACHING
The course material for Econ 310-2, 361, 401, 412-2 is available via the Northwestern Course Management System (Blackboard)
