[Contact] [Resume] [Research]
CONTACT
Mailing address:
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA
My office is Room 329 in
Arthur Andersen Hall
Telephone: 847-491-8482
Facsimile: 847-491-7001
e-mail: wo@northwestern.edu
RESUME
RESEARCH
Completed Working Papers:
“Contests with a Continuum of Agents”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, February 2013.
“A More General Pandora Rule”, Northwestern University, January 2103.
“Team selection problem”, with Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University, January 2013.
“Simultaneous Selection”, with Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University, May 2012.
“Chip Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information”, with Mikhail Safronov, Northwestern University, June 2012.
“Calibration and Expert Testing, a chapter for Handbook of Game Theorey, Volume IV”, Northwestern University, December 2011.
“Search with Partially Informed Stopping Decisions”, with Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University, January 2013.
“Attributes”, with Diego Klabljan and Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University, November 2012.
“Effective Persuasion”, with Ying Chen, Arizona State University and Northwestern University, December 2012.
“The Market for Narcotics. Is there a Case for Regulatory Policy?”, Princeton University, September 1998.
Published (or Forthcoming) Papers:
[23] “Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall and (Almost) Perfect Monitoring”, with George Mailath, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 71, 174-192.
An unpublished addendum can be found here
“Addendum”
[22] “The principal-agent approach to testing experts”, with Marcin Peski, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3, 89-113.
[21] “A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 174-213.
[20] “Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal”, with Drew Fudenberg, Games and Economic Behavior, 72, 86-99.
[19] “Falsifiability”, with Alvaro Sandroni, American Economic Review, 101, 788-818.
[18] “A Model of Consumption-Dependent Temptation”, Theory and Decisions, (2011), 70, 83-93.
[17] “Manipulability of Comparative Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, (2009), 106, 5029-5034.
[16] “How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring?”, with Johannes Hörner, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2009), 124, 1773-1814.
[15] “Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Mathematics of Operations Research, (2009), 34, 57-70.
[14] “Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Econometrica, (2008), 76, 1437-1466.
[13] “A NonManipulable Test”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Annals of Statistics, (2009), 37, 1013-1039.
[12] “A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games”, Economics Bulletin, (2007), 58 (3), 1-16.
[11] “A Non-Differentiable Approach to Revenue Equivalence”, with Kim-Sau Chung, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 469-487.
[10] “Contracts and Uncertainty”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 1-13.
[9] “Preferences over Sets of Lotteries”, Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007), 567-595.
[8] “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring”, with Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 74 (2006), 1499-1544.
[7] “Rich Language and Refinements of Cheap-Talk Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006), 164-186.
[6] “Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games” with Jeff Ely and Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 73 (2005), 377-415.
An unpublished appendix can be found here
“Dispensibility of Public Randomization Device”
[5] “Informal Communication”, Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 180-200.
[4] “Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods” with Howard Rosenthal, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6 (2004), 707-735.
[3] “Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Provision of Excludable Public Goods”, Games Econonic Behavior 46 (2004), 88-114.
[2] “A Simple and General Solution to King Solomon’s Problem”, Games Econonic Behavior 42 (2003), 315-318.
[1] “Perfect Folk Theorems. Does Public Randomization Matter?” International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 147-156.
The list of my mathematical publications can be found at
http://www.ams.org/mathscinet/basicsearch
[Select field author and search for olszewski, wojciech]
My review of the book "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships" by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson published in Games and Economic Behavior.
TEACHING
The course material for Econ 310-2, 361, 401, 412 is available via the Northwestern Course Management System (Blackboard)
