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ResearchBooksRejecting Compromise: Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters(with Sarah E. Anderson and Daniel M. Butler, Forthcoming from Cambridge University Press)
Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change and poverty usually require compromise, but we show that many legislators at different levels of government reject compromise proposals that move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such compromise offers? We find that legislators exacerbate gridlock by rejecting compromise proposals because they fear being punished in primary elections. In this way, legislators’ electoral interests can cause them to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and may lead to representation of the uncompromising positions held by a subset of their voters at the expense of the broader electorates’ preferences. While this rejection of compromise due to fear of primary voter punishment is likely exacerbating gridlock, we show that negotiating outside of the public spotlight may improve the likelihood of achieving compromise.
Is Bipartisanship Dead? Policy Agreement and Agenda-Setting in the House of Representatives2015 from Cambridge University Press. (Book information on publisher's website here) (Blog post based on the book for The Washington Post Monkey Cage available here) Is Bipartisanship Dead? looks beyond (and considers the time before) roll call voting to examine the extent to which bipartisan agreement in the House of Representatives has declined since the 1970s. The coalitions that members build around policies early in the legislative process point to a surprising persistence of bipartisan agreement between 1973 and 2004. The declining bipartisanship over time in roll call voting reflects a shift in how party leaders structure the floor and roll call agendas. Party leaders in the House changed from prioritizing legislation with bipartisan agreement in the 1970s to prioritizing legislation with partisan disagreement by the 1990s. Laurel Harbridge argues that this shift reflects a changing political environment and an effort by leaders to balance members’ electoral interests, governance goals, and partisan differentiation. The findings speak to questions of representation and governance. They also shed light on whether partisan conflict is insurmountable, and, ultimately, whether bipartisanship in congressional politics is dead. Peer-Reviewed Articles and Book ChaptersCongressional Capacity and Bipartisanship in CongressForthcoming. Congressional Capacity, Eds. Lee Drutman, Kevin Kosar, and Timothy LaPira. Chicago: University of Chicago Press The Effects of Blaming Others for Legislative Inaction on Individual and Collective Evaluations(with David Doherty) Forthcoming. Legislative Studies Quarterly Formerly IPR Working Paper IPR-WP-17-14 Who is Punished? Conditions Affecting Voter Evaluations of Legislators who Do Not Compromise(with Nichole M. Bauer and Yanna Krupnikov) 2017. Political Behavior 39(2):279-300. Formerly IPR Working Paper IPR-WP-14-27 (Blog post based on this article available here)
How Partisan Conflict in Congress Affects Public Opinion: Strategies, Outcomes, and Issue Differences(with D.J. Flynn) 2016. American Politics Research 44(5): 845-902. (Blog post based on this article available here) (Online appendix available here)
Legislative Institutions as a Source of Party Leaders' Influence(with Sarah E. Anderson and Daniel M. Butler) 2016. Legislative Studies Quarterly 41(3): 605-631. DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12124 Formerly IPR Working Paper IPR-WP-14-24. (Online First version available here.) (Online appendix available here.) Public Preferences for Bipartisanship in the Policymaking Process(with Neil Malhotra and Brian F. Harrison) 2014. Legislative Studies Quarterly 39(3): 327-355. Formerly IPR working paper (WP-13-01). The Policy Consequences of Motivated Information Processing Among the Partisan Elite(with Sarah Anderson) 2014. American Politics Research 42(4): 700-728. Formerly IPR working paper (WP-13-02) (Online First version available here) (Online appendix available here) (Blog post based on this paper for the LSE American Politics and Policy website available here) (Research News on this paper by the Institute for Policy Research available here) Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments(with Neil Malhotra) 2011. American Journal of Political Science 55(3): 494-510. (Online appendix available here) (Blog post based on this paper in the Monkey Cage available here) Incrementalism in Appropriations: Small Aggregation, Big Changes(with Sarah Anderson) 2010. Public Administration Review 70(3): 464-474. Book Chapters and Other PublicationsThe Challenges of Partisan Conflict for Lawmaking in Congress(Forthcoming. New Directions in Congressional Politics, 2nd Edition. Ed. Carson, Jamie and Michael Lynch. New York: Taylor & Francis/Routledge).
Presidential Approval and Gas Prices: Sociotropic or Pocketbook Influence?(with Jon Krosnick and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 2016. New Explorations in Political Psychology. Ed. Krosnick, Jon. New York: Psychology Press (Taylor and Francis Group)). The 2008 Democratic Shift(with David Brady and Douglas Rivers. 2008. Policy Review. Hoover Institution, No. 152) Polarization and Public Policy: A General Assessment(with David Brady and John Ferejohn. 2008. In Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics, Vol II. Ed. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press)
Working PapersYou Can't Always Get What You Want: How Majority-Party Agenda-Setting and Ignored Alternatives Shape Public Attitudes(with Celia Paris)
How do partisans navigate elite intra-group conflict? Party leader deviance and elite dissent as viewed from the perspective of the partisan public(with Alexandra Filindra)
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