Department of Economics

Home   >  People   >   Faculty   >   Olszewski



spaceGraduate Students

spacePh.D. Job Candidates


Wojciech Olszewski

[Contact] [Resume] [Research]


Mailing address:
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA

My office is Room 3230 in Arthur Andersen Hall

Telephone: 847-491-8482
Facsimile: 847-491-7001



Completed Working Papers:

“Self-esteem preferences and imaginary effects in information processing”, Northwestern University, Mimeo (preliminary and incomplete), May 2016.

“Pareto-Improving Measures in Contest Design: An Application to Competition for College Admissions”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, in preparation (will be posted soon).

“Effort-Maximizing Contests”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, Mimeo, revised in March 2016.

“Bid Caps in All-Pay Auctions and Other Contests”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, Mimeo, March 2016.

“Large Contests without Single-Crossing”, with Ron Siegel, Northwestern University, Mimeo, August 2015.

“Efficient Cooperation in Simple Strategies”, with Mikhail Safronov, Northwestern University, Mimeo, March 2016.

"Penalty-card strategies in repeated games", with Mikhail Safronov, Northwestern University, Mimeo, revised in December 2015.

"The Market for Narcotics. Is there a Case for Regulatory Policy?," Princeton University, September 1998.

Published (or Forthcoming) Papers:

[31] "A More General Pandora Rule?" with Richard Weber, Journal of Economic Theory, (2015), 160, 429-437.

An originally submitted version of the paper, which contains additional material can be found in arXiv.

[30] "Search for an object with two attributes," with Asher Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory, (2016), 161, 145-160.

[29] "Large Contests," with Ron Siegel, Econometrica, (2016), 86, 835-854.

An online appendix "Appendix"

[28] "Simultaneous Selection", with Rakesh Vohra, Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2016), 200, 161-169.

[27] "Selecting a discrete portfolio", with Rakesh Vohra, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014), 55, 69-73.

[26] "Attributes", with Diego Klabljan and Asher Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, (2014), 88, 190-206.

[25] "Calibration and Expert Testing, a chapter for Handbook of Game Theorey, Volume IV".

[24] "Effective Persuasion", with Ying Chen, International Economic Review, (2014), 319-347.

[23] "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall and (Almost) Perfect Monitoring", with George Mailath, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 71, 174-192.

An unpublished addendum "Addendum"

[22] "The principal-agent approach to testing experts", with Marcin Peski, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 89-113.

[21] "A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 174-213.

[20] "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal", with Drew Fudenberg, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 72, 86-99.

[19] "Falsifiability", with Alvaro Sandroni, American Economic Review, (2011), 101, 788-818.

[18] "A Model of Consumption-Dependent Temptation", Theory and Decisions, (2011), 70, 83-93.

[17] "Manipulability of Comparative Tests", with Alvaro Sandroni, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, (2009), 106, 5029-5034.

[16] "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring?", with Johannes Hörner, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2009), 124, 1773-1814.

[15] "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests", with Alvaro Sandroni, Mathematics of Operations Research, (2009), 34, 57-70.

[14] "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests", with Alvaro Sandroni, Econometrica, (2008), 76, 1437-1466.

[13] "A NonManipulable Test", with Alvaro Sandroni, Annals of Statistics, (2009), 37, 1013-1039.

[12] "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games", Economics Bulletin, (2007), 58 (3), 1-16.

[11] "A Non-Differentiable Approach to Revenue Equivalence", with Kim-Sau Chung, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 469-487.

[10] "Contracts and Uncertainty", with Alvaro Sandroni, Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 1-13.

[9] "Preferences over Sets of Lotteries", Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007), 567-595.

[8] "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring", with Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 74 (2006), 1499-1544.

[7] "Rich Language and Refinements of Cheap-Talk Equilibria", Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006), 164-186.

[6] "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games" with Jeff Ely and Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 73 (2005), 377-415.

An unpublished appendix can be found here "Dispensibility of Public Randomization Device"

[5] "Informal Communication", Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 180-200.

[4] "Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods" with Howard Rosenthal, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6 (2004), 707-735.

[3] "Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Provision of Excludable Public Goods", Games Econonic Behavior 46 (2004), 88-114.

[2] "A Simple and General Solution to King Solomon’s Problem", Games Econonic Behavior 42 (2003), 315-318.

[1] "Perfect Folk Theorems. Does Public Randomization Matter?" International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 147-156.

The list of my mathematical publications can be found at
[Select field author and search for olszewski, wojciech]

My review of the book "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships" by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson published in Games and Economic Behavior.


The course material for Econ 310-2, 361, 401, 412 is available via the Northwestern Course Management System (Blackboard)

Northwestern logo WCAS logo