Alessandro Pavan

Contact:

Department of Economics 

 Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Arthur Andersen Hall 329
 Evanston, Illinois 60208-2600
 Tel. (847) 491-8266
 Fax. (847) 491-7001
 alepavan@northwestern.edu

Curriculum Vitae:

• Resume 

Research Interests:

• Economic Theory, Mechanism Design, Information Economics, Global Games, Social Value of Information and Coordination 

• Research Summary 

Work in Progress:

The work indicated by _*_ has been supported by the National Science Foundation under the grants SES-0518810 and SES-0721048. The work indicated by _**_ under the grant SES-60031281

•   Platform Competition under Dispersed Information (**) 

           (With Bruno Jullien) -- FIRST VERSION

• Optimal Taxation and Occupational Choice: The Redistributive Role of Production Inefficiencies -- in preparation

  (With Renato Gomes and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur)

•   (In)attention and Bounded Recall -- in preparation

Submitted Papers:

•  Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design (**)

          (With Renato Gomes) -- NEW VERSION with both vertical and horizontal differentiation in preferences and attractiveness 

•   Dynamic Mechanism Design ---- Supplementary Material 

           (With Ilya Segal and Juuso Toikka) -- UNDER REVISION. It supersedes the old (finite-horizon) version circulated under the same title as well as the notes on

"Infinite Horizon Mechanism Design" and my solo paper Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World

•   Information Acquisition and Welfare 

           (With Luca Colombo and Gianluca Femminis) -- UNDER REVISION

•   Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes           

          (With Daniel Garrett) -- UNDER REVISION

•   Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction (**)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos and Guido Lorenzoni) -- UNDER REVISION -- Previous version circulated under title "Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach"

Publications:

•   Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria  (*)

         (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, forthcoming -- supersedes the paper "Preempting Speculative Attacks: Robust Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria"

• Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 

           (With Daniel Garrett) -- JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 120(5), October 2012, 879-925 --  Supplementary Material 

•   Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games  

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS, 2(2), May 2010, 132-190

• Policy with Dispersed Information (*)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 7(1), March 2009, 11-60.

•  Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 144(2), February 2009, 503-531.

• On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Vol. 64(1), September 2008, 329-334

• Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information (*)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 75(4), July 2007, 1103-1142.  Supplementary Material 

• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks 

           (With George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) -- ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 75(3), May 2007, 711-756.  Supplementary Material 

• Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications (*)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, Vol. 5(3), May 2007, 585-593 -- NBER version with mathematical appendix 

•  On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 130(1), September 2006, 168-204 -- This work builds on a previous paper "Optimal Design of Privacy Policies."

•  Monopoly with Resale 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 37(2), Summer 2006, 362-375 --  Supplementary Material 

•  Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 

           (With George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) -- JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 114(3), June 2006, 452-485.  Supplementary Material 

•  Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions 

           (With Marco LiCalzi) -- EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 49, January 2005, 227-250 -- Accepted when EER was JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

• Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 94(1), May 2004, 91-98 (Papers and Proceedings)

Teaching:

• Graduate:  Information Economics (414-3)

          For course information refer to My Blackboard 414-3 webpage. 

• Third Year Econ PhD Seminar (501)
• Undergraduate: Intermediate Microeconomics 

For course information refer to My Blackboard 310-1 webpage. 

Links:

·  Northwestern Library

·  On-Line Economic Journals: IDEAL Library

·  On-Line Economic Journals: SPRINGER Library

·  On-Line Economic Journals: JSTOR Library

·  On-Line Economic Journals: ELSEVIER Library

·  EconLit

·  Dictionary

 

Last update: February 2013